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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
This report concludes the analysis of the Skylab Attitude
and Pointing Control System in-orblt performance. The results
are presented in discipline language and are intended for discipline
use. Conclusions and recoaraendations are presented which could be
useful during the establishment of design concepts, requirements and
constraints for future spacecraft.
I B. Scope
The APCS is c_nsidered as an integral system composed of a
number of subsystems. In the interest of emphasizing specific
performance characteristics, system performance is discussed at
the system, subsystem, hardware, and software levels.
Significant concept and requirement evolution, testing,
and modifications resulting from tests are briefly summarized to
aid in understmtding the in-orbit configuration description pro-
cedures, and perfor_nce.
Only in-orbit hardware, operational interfaces, repairs,
work arounds, unscheduled and scheduled activities are included
under mission performance. Anomalous performance is treated
separately for emphasis and visibility.
Manned operations covered 174 of the total 272 mission day_
which began May 14, 1973 and ended on February 8, 1974. The three
3-man missions were for 29, 60 and 85 days respectively. The pri-
mary time references used throughout this report are DAY and Green-
wich Mean Time (GMT).
Table 1 contains a llst of DAYs, Dates and Mission Day_.
This report uses DAY i through DAY 272 to designate dates.
Detailed event times may be found in the Skylab Mission
Events List, 25M00700, availabl_ in the MSFC Documentation
Repository. Additional Skylab systems evaluation details may be
found in the following NASA Technical Memoranda.
TMX-64808 MSFC $kylab Flnal Program Report
_X-64809 MSFC Skylab Corollary Experiments Final
Technical Report
k
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TMX-64810 MSFC Skylab Airlock Module Final Technical
Report
TMX-64811 MSFC Skylab Apollo Tele_cope McunC Final
Technical Report
TMX-64812 MSFC Skylab Multiple Dockin_ Adapter F_nal
Technical Report
TMX-64813 MSFC Skylab Orbital Workshop Final Techni=al
Report
TMX-64814 MSFC Skylab Mission Report-Saturn Workshop
TMX-64815 MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount Summary
Mission Report
TMX-64818 MSFC Skylab Electrical Power System Mission
Evaluat ion Report
TMX-64819 MSFC Skylab Instrumentation and Communication
System Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64820 MSFC Skylab Corollary Experiments Systems
Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64821 MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount Experiment
Systems Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64822 MSFC Skylab Thermal & Environmental Control
System Misslon Evaluation Report
TMX-64823 MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount Thermal
Control System Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-6482_ MSFC Skylab Structures and Mechanical Systems
Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64825 MSFC Skylab Crew Systems Mission Evaluation
Report
TMX-64826 MSFC Skylab Coutamination Control SystmM
Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64852 Skylab Thruster Attitude Control System
2
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SECTION II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary
The Skylab Attitude and Pointing Control System (APCS)
provided three axis attitude stabilization and maneuvering capability
for the Orbital Assembly (OA) and provided pointing control of the
Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) experiment canister for observing tar-
gets of opportunity on the sun. A number of new concepts evolved
into the design of the Skylab APCS. Skylab was thz first manned
spacecraft to utilize large Control Moment Gyros (CMG) for momentum
storage and attitude control, the first to utilize vehicle maneuvers
for CMG momentum desaturatlon, the first to utilize _ fully digital
control system with in-orbit reprogramming capability and extensive
automatic redundancy management, and the first to utilize an atti-
tude reference system based on a four parameter strapdown computation.
The APCS was the culmination of a prolonged evolutionary
process. This evolution was prompted by major changes in mission
objectives, design requirements, state-of-the-art advances, test
results and crew requirements.
Pre-mlssion desist verification was conducted at the com*
ponent, black box, software subsystem and system level. On the
system level, extensive computer simulation and software verifica-
tion was performed. Unexpected anomalies during the mission re-
quired additional ground testing and simulation studies to verify
analytical conclusions and new hardware developed for crew installa-
tion.
During the mission, two of nine APCS Rate Gyro Processors,
the Star Tracker, one Control Moment Gyro, and one EPCS Rate Gyro
Processor failed. Three additional APCS Rate Gyros were serlously
degraded. However, sufficient built-in redundancy was available
to accomodate all these failures, and pointing and maneuver require-
ments were satisfied. Si× additional Rate Gyros were taken into
orbit and installed in the system by the SL-3 crew. Xhls was done
to provide additional capability in the event of more Rate Gyro
failures.
The APCS performed a central role in the survival of Skylab
after loss of the Meteoroid Shield and one Orbital Workshop (OWS)
Solar Array Wing during launch. The built-in flexlbility allowed
off-nominal vehicle attitude maneuvers to be performed for vehicle
pRI_CEDIM6PAGEBLANKNOT
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thermal control until a sunshade could be deployed by the $L-2
crew. Although thesemaneuvers consumed considerable Thruster
Attitude Control System (TACS) gas, it was possible to complete
the expanded 272 day mission, and a!so meet the additional maneuver
requirements imposed by experiments to study the Comet Kohoutek
and perform Stellar X-Ray photography during the SL-4 mission.
The simulations developed during destgn verif_cation proved
to be invaluable for evaluating and optimizing the mission flight
plans and contributed directly to the success of the mission. The
integrity of the simulation techniques was verified by extensive
mission and post-mission comparisons of flight and predicted per-
formance.
Analysis of the data retrieved from the missic,n resulted in
valuable APCS engineering knowledge, useable for establishing
effective design concepts and requirements for future spacecraft.
B. Conclusions
I. General. Based on analysis of fllght data, it can be
concluded that the Skylab Attitude and Pointing Control System
successfully performed within design specification and met or ex-
ceeded all imposed requirements. Problems and hardware failures
were dealt with primarily by means of built-ln system flexlbillty
and hardware redundancy. Some problems were resolved through crew
part£clpatlon in unusual contingency procedures, such as Installatlon
of the Rate Gyro Six-Pack.
As the first mission of its kind, Skylab provided experience
with long term operation of manned spacecraft control system con-
cepts and hardware, many of which had never been flown before.
This experience provided a valuable base for the design and plan-
ning of future long duration missions.
2. Speclflc ' Concluslons. Concluslons for partlcular APCS
subsystems and hardware components are presented in their respective
section. However, to provide an overview, this summary is presented.
a. Test and Verification Program. The Skylab APCS was
composed of components and subsystems of which most had not been
qualified for orbital space fllght. A thorough hardware, software
and systmw test program was developed to verlfy proper desisn and
operation of the APCS. Many signigicant problems were found and
corrected as a result of the test program. In addition, the ex-
perience gained in the program aided immeasurably in the operation
i of Skylab.
6
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b. Telemetry Instrumentation. Additional or expanded
telemetry instrumentation would have been highly desirable for
AFC$ analysis and evaluation. This became evident as a result of
the APCS problems and anomalies encountered during the mission.
In particular, additlonal measurements of system parameters and
command functions, greater resolution of sensor outputs and in-
creased data recording capability would have been useful.
c. Attitude Control Systems.
(1) Navigation and Attitude Reference. The dlgital-
ly implemented, four parameter strapdown calculation, used to main-
tain vehicle attitude reference for attitude control and maneuvering,
worked as designed and demonstrated the value of a strapdown system
for long term orbltal operations. Use of an onboard navigation and
timing scheme utilizing a closed form solution for a clrcular or-
bit proved to be satisfactory for all system requirements when
coupled with the capability for periodic updates to navigation
parameters by ground support.
Degraded knowledge of vehicle roll reference re-
sulted from the problems and ultimate failure of the Star Tracker.
In view of the importance of accurate roll reference information
for momentum management and ATM experiments, a redundant system
for obtaining roll attitude updates would have been very useful.
(2) Attitude Control. Based on analysis of the
fllght data and in-orblt tests, the compensation filters performed
as predicted and the pointing accuracy requirements were met. The
CMG and TACS Control Law, under both two and three CMGcontrol,
performed as predicted. Expanded ATMDCmemory allotment would
have allowed expansion of the Flight Program for improved control
of the momentum states. Consideration should be given to removing
the CMGglmbal stops from future CMGs. This would greatly simplify
the CMGControl Law and ellmlnate Gimbal Stop encounters.
The designed flexibillty of the maneuver scheme
contributed to the survival of the Skylab after loss of the
Meteoroid Shield and OWS Solar Array Wing and allowed the off-
nominal vehicle attitude maneuvers imposed for thermal control.
(3) MomantumManagement. The success in bounding
the CN6 momentum by the momentum management scheme verified the
desirability of using a momentum exchange system as the primary
attitude control system for long term earth orbiting space flight.
(4) ATI4DCSoftware Program. The flexibillty of a
digitally /_plemented APCS was verified by Skylab. The ability
7
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to modify or patch the existing Flight Program proved to be highly
advantageous. This capability enhanced survival of the Skylab and
made it possible to support the new program objectives related to
Kohoutek. Many of the routines were imperative for a successful
mission.
(5) Redundancy Management. Automatic Redundancy
Management was instrumental in the rapid identification of the Rate
Gyro problems and provided the essential short response time required
to recognize and correct any failure in mission critical components
• which could have jeopardized the mission or endangered the crews.
Manual Redundancy Management performed as designed, but an added
capability to select the back-up 800 Hz power source and/or EPC
Roll resolver would have been desirable.
d. APCS Hardware.
(I) Rate Gyro Processors. The Rate Gyro Processors
(RGP) experienced serious problems and failures as a consequence
of two design deficiencies. The RGP anomalies and failures together
with the installation of the Rate Gyro Six-Pack demonstrated that in
future long-duratlon manned missions, consideration should be given
to replacement or maintenance of mission-critical components, such
as the Rate Gyro Processors, during the mission.
(2) Star Tracker. It should be recognized in the
future that a Star Tracker flown on any manned space station similar
to Skylab will most l_kely be exposed to frequent drifting bright
contaminant particles. This appears to be unavoidable in the vicinity
of such a station due to life system vents, large area paint surface
deterioration, etc. Thus every attempt should be made to design a
Star Tracker, or other roll attitude reference system, to recognize
and avoid tracking such particles.
(3) Control Moment Gyros. The CMGs demonstrated the
desirability and effectiveness of a momentum exchange system for
attitude control. The failure of CMC No. 1 and the threatened fail-
ure of CMG No. 2 demonstrated the need for cunttnued analysis on
wheel bearing design in a zero gravity environment. In addition,
it would be advantageous to eliminate gimbal stops and provide in-
creased momentum storage capability.
(4) TACS Hardware. The TACS hardware performed as
des igned.
(5) AT_tl)C/WCIU and _U. The ATM Digital Computer,
Workshop Computer Interface Unit and Memory Load Unit successfully
performed their designed functions. The capability to completely
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load a computer memory by means of RF uplink was demonstrated for
the first time on Skylab.
(6) Acquisition Sun Sensor. The Acquisition Sun
Sensor (Acq. SS) performed as designed throughout the mission. Due
to potentisl problems with detector deterioration or contamination,
fltture lon8 duration missions should inclode a sun sensor dear8 n
which would be insensitive to solar intensity.
e. Experiment Pointing Control System.
(I) Subsystems. The Exper£ment Pointing Control (EPC)
subsystems exceed all imposed design requirements. Indications from
the crews and the Experiment Principal Investigators indicate that
the stability and pointing accuracy were excellent and well within
specifications.
The concept of a separate, gimbaled Experiment Point-
Ing and Control System to isolate transient disturbances and provide
greater pointing accuracy and stability was proven.
(2) Hardware. Perfornmnce of the EPC was as designed.
On two occasions the UP/DN orbital locks did not uncagf_ on command
but they later recovered.
Although the Fine Sun Sensor (FSS) performed as de-
signed, the crew had difficulty in zeroing the wedge counters and
the wedge incrementing problem demonstrated the need for considera-
tion of =lternatlve designs which would ellminate those problems.
9
j
1974021165-024
SECTIO_ III. GENERAL
This section includes s description of the Attitude and Pointing
Control System (APCS), a History of APCS development ar, d the APCS
Test Prosrsm.
A. System Description
I. Introduction. The Skyleb Orbital Assembly (Ok) and its
aasoclsted control axes are shown in fIsure I. The APCS vrovlded
three-axls attitude stabilisation end maneuvering capability for the
vehicle throughout the mission and pointing control of the Skyleb
experiment peckese durins experimentation periods.
I
The APCS wals comprised of two separate control 8ystmms. The Attitude
Control .rysCem (ACS) provided the attitude stabilisation and maneuvering
capability for the vehicle. The Experiment Pointing end Control System
(EPCS) provided pointing control of the ATN Experiment Canister and
allowed offset pointing to targets o£ opportunity on or near the solar
disk.
The major sections of the APCS, shown in flgure 2, are:
ATH Rate Gyro Processors (RGP)
ATH Acqulsltton Sun Sensor (Acq. SS)
Star Tracker (ST)
ATH Digltal Computer (ATI4DC)
Workshop Computer Interface Unit (_'_,IU)
ControA Humane Gyros (CHG)
Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS)
Experiment Polntlng Control System (EPCS)
Control and Display (C & D) Panel.
Six control modes _mre eddresaable by C',..Console _itches and
Digital Address System/Digital Command System (DAS/I)CS_ for APCS
operation. These are briefly described ee follows:
a. Standby. This mode vas used vhen no attitude
control yes required of the APCS. While in the standby mode, the
11
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SCMG gtmbal rate con.hands for attitude control were zeroed and no |
firing commands were issued to the TACS. !
b. Solar Inertial (el _ This mode was used during periods Ii
of solar experiment operation and _or momentum dumping. The vehicle
attitude during orbital day wis the OA + Z-axis pointing toward the |
sun and the X-axis close to the orbltal plane. Vehlcle control was
maintained through the CMG/TACS control systems. The EPCS was not ]
active in this mode.
c. Experiment Pointing. This mode was ideutlcal to the
day portion of the SI mode with respect to vehicle control. In this
mode, however, the EPCS was activated.
d. Attitude Hold (CMG). This mode required that the vehlc:
be held inertially fixed and/or maneuvered to any desired attitude,
with control torques furnished by the CI,_G/TACS syst_.
e. Attitude Hold (TACS). This mode required that the
vehicle be held inertially fixed and/or maneuvered to any desired
attitude with control torques furnished by the TACS.
f. Local Vertical (Z-LV). This mode was entered during
the rendezvous phases of the mission or when Earth Pointing was
required for experimentation periods. The Z-LV (Rendezvous) attitude
was _efined as the -Z-axis pointing toward the earth along the local
vertical (nadir), with the +X-axis in the orbital plane and opposite
the velocity vector. The Z-I_ (Earth Resources) attitude was defi_ed
as the -Z control axis pointing toward the earth along the local
vertical (nadir), with the +X control axis in the orbital plane end
pointing in the direction of the velocity vector.
System redundancy was provided to ensure crew safety and
preclude degradation of system performance.
2. Attitude Control System (ACS). The ACS was • d!gi_ally
implemented combination CI4G momentum exchange and reaction jet control
system. The system was designed to operate in unison with the TACS _.
providing assistance if the CNGs were unable to control the vehicle.
The TACS could also operate as the primary control system. Attitud_
error and rate sensing was provided by two Acquisi=ion Sun Sensors
nine Rate Gyros (three per axis), and a Star Tracker (ST).
a. Thruster Attitude Control Syst_. _ne TAtS was com-
posed of six cold gas thrusters and the necessary logic to select and
fire the proper thruster. The ATMDCuse_ the TACS Contxot Law to
provide thruster firing commends to null out attitude and rate errors
when control deadbands were exceeded, and to assist the CMGs when
systma_emntum approached saturation. The thrusters were mounted on _=
the OWS _s shown in figure 3. Two thrusters provided uncoupled Y-axis t14
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control and four thrusters provided coupled X and Z-axis control. Two
types of tbJ_ustpr firings were commanded, Full-On and Minimum Impulse
Bit (MIB) firing ti_e. For Full-On firings the selected thruster was o
fired continuously for one second. The MIB firing time was selectable
from 40 to 400 milliseccnds to compensate for pre,_sure decrease in the
TACS cold gas supply tanks. At the beginning of the mission a thruster
produced 463 Newtons of thrust. This decreased to approximately 82
Newtons at the end of the mission, as the TACS gas was depleted.
b. CMC Control System. The CMGSystem was composed of
three orthogonally mounted, double-glmbaled CMGs with a stored momentum
capability of approximately 3000 N.m.s. per CMO. When all gimbals were
at their zero position the spin axes ware parallel to the vehicle
coordinates. Fhis configuration is shown in figure 4.
The CMG Control Law in the ATMDCutilized three normalized __
torque commands and the CMC.momentum status to generate proper CMG :
glmbal rate commands. The Control Law consisted of three parts : the
Steering Law, the l_otation Law and a Gimbal Stop Avoidance Law.
Additional routines were included for specialized situations.
The Steering Law pro,¢ided torques on the vehicle either for
attitude maneuvers or to oppose torques from gravity gradient, vehicle !
vents, or crew disturbances. GimLal rate c_,mands were generated in -'
such a way that the torques resulting on the vehicle were identical to
the desired torques in direction and magnitude.
The Rotation Law attempted to minimize the probability of
contact with the gimbal stops by reducing the largest gimbal angles.
This was accomplished by rotation ahout the ve=tor sums only. The
total angular momentum was unaffected and no torque was exerted on
the vehicle.
The last portion of the CMG Control Law utilized a mathemat-
ically defined pseudo gimbal boundary to prevent driving the CMG gimbals !
into the gimbal stops (shown in f_gure 5).
A reset routine was incorporated into the CHG Control Law
to allow the CMG system to recover from undesix'ab!e glmbal angle posi-
tlons and/or momentum configuration.
Outer glmbal drive logic was provided during maneuvers in
order to force a deslrable gimbal angle position. If it was sensed that
a gimbal was moving in a direction which would bring it in contact with
a stop, a momentary attitude po_ _urbation was allowed and an open loop '_
drive was executed to force the glmbal to the proper side of the stop.
16
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ZFigure 4. CMG Mounting Configuration
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c. Attitude Control System Operation° When the TACS and
CMG systems were operated in the augmented configuration, all control
was delegated to the CHG system as long as it was capable of maintain-
£ng the attitude error within 20 degrees. If CMG momentum approached
saturation, TAGS would fire to assist the CHGs. The system would
switch to Auto TACS Only control, with deadbands of (3°, 2°, 2°) in
X, Y, and Z, respectively, whenever the attitude error exceeded 20
degrees on any axis.
The Skylab used a 4-parameter strapdown attitude reference
system consisting of Rate Gyros as inertial sensors and the ATHDC to
calculate the strapdown algorithm. A two-axis Sun Sensor, a Star
Tracker and onboard analysis of the Attitude Control System response
provided information to update the strapdown system. When an attitude
error occurred, the CHG control Law and/or the TAGS Control Law deter-
mined the proper CHG gimbal rate commmnds and/or thruster firing commands.
The CMCmomentum status was monitored by the Flight Program through the
CHG direction cosine resolvers.
A filter was incorporated in the CNG Control Law for each
control axis. The purpose of filters was to remove undesirable flexible
body effects, disturbances and provide adequate stabilization and point-
ins of the flexible vehlcle. The control loop gains and filter co-
efficients were different for each axis.
There were two classes of vehlclemaneuvers: Solar Inertial
offset pointing and general purpose. Solar Inertial offset pointing
was l_nlted to ema11 angles (_ 4 degrees) about the X and Y-vehicle
axes and was accompllshed by biasing the attitude error signal with
the desired offset angle. The general purpose maneuvers required man-
euvering the vehicle to arbitrary time variant or inertial attitudes and
was accumpllshed via strapdown commands. Large momentum changes in the
CHC system were generally required to provide the desired maneuver rates.
d. Digital Implementation. Digital implementation was
accomplished using an ATMDCand WCIU. The Flight Program was responsible
for:
Operating modes
Skylab attitude reference
Navigation and timing
CHC Control Law
19
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TAtS Control Law
Maneuver Ins
Automatic Redundancy 14anagement
Function co_and, data display, telemetry,
and experiment support.
The ATMDCFlight Program was m_dular in design, and con-
slsted of two basic software subsystems: the Executive or Control :
Progrean and the Appllcatlon Subsystem. The Control Prosrmn controlle /
the sequence of the prosr_un execution and provided a software priority
on executable functions in order to achieve a multl-task keyIng capa-
billty. The, application subsystem consisted of all the appllcatlon
program modules which when executed by the control subsystem performed
all required Flight Progrmn functions. From a tIning standpoint the
7
Flight Prosrmn consisted of two loops. A slow loop completed approxl-
mately once per second and an intermediate loop completed f_ve times
per second. The attitude control functions were performed at the rate
of five times per second. Following the execution of the slow loop
the AI_4I)C entered a wait state.
e. CHCMomentum Management. Any noncycllc disturbance-
torque actlns on the vehicle would result in a net CMGmomentum buildup.
Because of finite storage capacity of the CMC cluster this momentum
accumulation w_Juld eventually cause CMGsaturation. After complete
saturation the CHC cluster could not compensate for disturbance torques
about the axis of saturation.
T_ _reclude CNC saturation and minimize the effects of non-
cyclic gravity gradient torques, the vehicle X-principal axis was main- _
tained close Co the orbital plane and CI4Gmomentum desaturation maneuvers
_ere perfomed periodically during the night portion of the orbit.
The maEnituh_ of the desaturation maneuvers was based on factors ob-
tained by sampling normalized components of the total momentum four
times during the day portion of the orbit.
3. Experiment Pointing Control System. The Experiment Point-
tn_ Control (EPC) Subsystem was used for pointing control of the ATM
experiment package. The experiment package (canister) was mounted
within a three-desree-of-freadom simbal mechanism. O_m loop position-
! ing was provided for the roll Z-ax£s and the EPCS provided automatic
i stab£1isation of the canister about the X and Y=axes. This allowed theEPC$ to isolate tha canister from most perturbations due to vehicle
and crew motion disturbance torques.
_ The F_ne Sun Sensor (FSS) and Rate Gyro (RG) sensors mounted
on the canistez supplied position and rate feedback to the Experiment
I!
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Pointing Electronics Assembly (EPEA). The EPRA contained the electronic
functions to command the glmbal actuators, closing the control loop. The
Z-axls stabillzatlon was provided by the ACS.
Manual positioning about all three axes was provided for offset/
roll pointing of the experiment canister. X and Y-axis offset pointing
were achieved by means of r_tating optical wedge mechanisms within the
FSS. Offset commands could be issued from the Manual Polntins Controller
04PC) or from the ATNDC. The Roll Position Mechanism (RPH) was acti-
vated by contend switches located on the Control and Display Panel and
on the ATH EVA Rotation Control Panel. All offset/roll comnands were
processed by the EPEA. A line-of-sight pointing capability during roll
operations was provided by the ATNDC, utilizing the ATNDC wedge drive
capability.
The EPFA also provided an interface between the Star Tracker
and the }/PC for manual positioning of the Star Tracker gimbals.
Other EPCS related functions were canister caging control,
experiment ali&_ment calibration, and experiment and FSS door control.
Figure 6 is a block diagram of the EPCS, showing interfaces with
the APTS. The gimbal and roll mechanise are shown in figure 7.
Descriptions of the EPCS and hardware components are presented in
Section VIII and IX.
4. Redundancy Na.nagement. Reliability considerations fo_"
long missions required component redundancy. All zatssion-critical
single point failures were made redundant by switchover capability
and redundart components. System redundancy was provided to the
point that any component failure that could cause the mission to be
aborted or preciudc mission objectives was provided with a backup
unit or with an alternate subsystem configuration that could be
selected with minimum performance desradation.
Hardware redundancy included the following items:
Nine Rack Rate Gyro Processors (3 per axis)
Two Acquisition Sun Sensors (2 channels per axis)
Three CNGs (two required for control)
Two ATMDC/WCIU Units
Two TAtS Power Control Switching Assemblies (PCSAs)
and quad-redundant solenoid valves for each thruster
TWo Fine Sun Sensors (two channels per axis)
21
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Two Control Moment Gyro Inverter Assemblies
Four EPCS Rate tyro Processors (2 per axis)
EPEA wlth five redundant channels individually
selected.
Four canister torque motors (2 per axis)
Redundant power sources, i_
The Redundancy Management philosophy was that primary APCS
mission crleical systems, those related to system performance or crew
safety, would be monitored and managed automatlcally, utilizing the
Flight Program and backed by a manual switching capability. Capability
existed to Inhlbie all or portions of the automatic redundancy program.
The less critical systems ware monitored manually by the astronauts
using the C&D Panel and by ground support using the telemetry llnk.
Manual Redundancy Management switching capability existed via a switch
selector and were co_anded using the DAS/DCS, or by C&D Panel switches.
To ensure the integrity of the Fllght Program, an ATMDC self-
check capability was included. To increase the reliability of the
computer system, capability was included co reload the ATMDC from a
Memory Load U_it wxth onboard magnetic tape or by RF uplink via the
mS/DCS.
A skeleton program capable of fitting cn 8K Memory was pro-
vided Co maintain limited use of the ATMDC during flight should a
memory failure occur which precluded the use of the 16K Program.
B. System History
The APCS described previously was the final result of many
changes in design that reflected the evolution of Skylab configuration
as the mission developed. This section presents a brief outline of
those design changes and some of the ,easons for them.
The development of the Skylab Attitude and Pointing Cont_'ol
System (APCS) was based on evolving ground rules and directives for the
&polio Telescope Mount (ATM) Pointing Control System (I_$) dating
from June 1966. Prior to that time, various concepts, proposals and
control moment i_vro systems ware studied. The design ground rules ware
established in response to directives from the Of(ice of Kenned Space
Flight (OMSF) and ware included in the July 1966 Preliminary Design
Review.
i 24 .
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I. Free Flylng ATe. The PCS ground rules provided for a design
using the Langley CMG, LM/Rack in free fllght, a 28-day maximum llfe,
no redundancy and a 1968 launch.
The extended ATe4 orbital mission required that the ATI4 vehicle
roll axis be colinear with the solar vector. The requirement for ex-
tremely precise attitude control during long duration missions elimi-
nated consideration of conventional reaction Jet control systems for
attitude control. The practical limitation on mininam impulse vehicle
control obtainable with reaction Jet control systems was inconsistent
with pre_.ision control in the arc-sec range. Also, fuel consumption
with the associated weight penalty precluded the use of reaction Jet
control systems for long-ter_ missions. The Control }4oment _ro (Ct4C_),
which Is a momentum exchange device, was therefore chosen as the con +
trolling device for the ATM vehicle, since it offered the advantages
of prectslon attitude control, extended mission capability, avoided
optics contLulnation, and provided a welght savlnp over a reaction
control system since no fuel would be required in normal operation.
Based on these ground rules, design of a PCS was begun and pro-
curement action for long lead time components was initiated. The PCS
desisn (1966) consisted of fine and coarse sun sensors, a single analog
control computer with switching and logic, three C}4Cs, C}4C electronics
and lnverters, three rate gyros, a hand controller and analog meters.
This system depended on a Reaction Control System (RCS) for manual
dumping of C}4C bias momentum and visual pointing of the experiments.
All telemetry was conditioned external to the PCS. Cround co_mnds
were decoded in the control computer.
2. Workshop Attitude Control System _ACS) Development. The
first major design change occurred when the primary ATH vehicle was
clustered. This assembly was referred to as the cluster configuration.
The necessity for a major new operational capability, unmanned
rendezvous and docking e.nd provision for attitude stabilization during
the manned and storage periods prior to the ATH docking required the
development of the Workshop Attitude Control ¢ystem _KCS).
The WACS was a hot gas reaction control system uslnl nitrogen _
tetroxlde (N204) as the oxidizer and monomethyl-hydrazine OMH) (pres-
surized by nitrogen) as the fuel.
The WACSwas to be activated following S-IVB stage passivation
and commnded to a_sume control of the cluster cnnfi&_ration. Astro-
naut comnands or 8round comands selected the _KCS control modes and
the necessary control phases. After PCS activation the _KCS would be
placed in a minimum power consumption condition and could be re-
energised as required. The CSN RCS would be turned on to maneuver the
cluster conf_uration to the ATJ4 acquisition attitude. Control would
then be assumed by the PCS.
2s
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I3. Wet Workshop. By June 1969, the NACS had evolved to the
system shorn in fisures 8 and 9 and consisted of the follovtns basic
hardvare:
_ate Gyros
Discrete Horizon Sensors, Conical Scan Horizon
Sensors and Processing Electronics
Sun Sensors
Control Computer
Control S_rltchlns Assemblies
WACS Propulsion Nodule
Control and Display (C&D) Panel.
Redundant colponents and c._.rcuttry vere provided to meet crew
safety and _tssion success criteria. With the aforementioned equipment,
the WACS provided the follovin 8 operational nodes vhtch would aaintain
the reference attitudes in addition to saneuvertns through the transi-
tional phases:
Gravity Gradient
Storaae
X-POP (Perpendicular to Orbital Plane) Acquisition
X-POP
X-POP/Z-LV
Inertial Hold and Noneuver
Standby.
Durtns the manned missions the Orbital Assembly (OA), originally
the cluster confiauratton, wou!d have most often been maintained In the
X-POP reference attitude.
The t/ACS used rate sensors in its inertial reference systems.
To cou_mute for 8yro and intearator drifts and orbital resreealon
effects, the X-POP attitude w88 to be updated reaularl,v. Updsten
vere determined uatn8 the Horizon Sensor System and th,_ Sun Sensor.
Durtn8 the storsae node the OA would be placed in the Gravity Gradient
Attitude and all WACS components _uld be turned off except the
26
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Discrete Horizon Sensors and the thermal control system for the elec-
tronics. With no active control, OA oscillations due to aerodynamic
and gravity gradient torques would build up attitude errors. When
a 20 degree attitude error was reached, the Discrete Hozizon Sensors
would issue a telemetry signal and a power-up command. At power-up a
CG orientation was commanded and then the system reverted to a power-
down state.
The Control and Display Panel provided onboard monitoring and
manual control capability. Rate and attitude biases, mode commands,
and computer channel selection were available to the astronaut.
4. Pointing Control System. The primary configuration for the
ATM became the cluster confi_Iration, with a free flying and tethered
concept being considered as backup configuration. Clustering the ATM
imposed additional requirements on the PCS. Increased CMGmomentum was
required due to increased vehicle moments-of-inertla. To signiflcantly
reduce constant gravity gradient bias torques the vehicle's principal
axis of minimum moment-of-inertia had to be constrained to lie as
closely as possible to the orbital plane while the ATMexperiment
canister was pointed toward the sun. Since this constrained the vehicle
attitude about the solar line-of-sight, a roll positioning capability
was added to the experiment canister. To preclude CMG saturation, the
Lunar Module (LM) and Command Service Module (CSM) reaction control
systems would be used to dump excess momentum. About the same time,
experiment demands and crew motion combined to require a decoupled ex-
periment canister mounting with separate controls. It was realized
that man-motlon disturbances would tax the capability of the CMG sub-
system to maintain the experiment pointing stability requirements.
These impacts along with increased readout needs and the addition of a
Star Tracker reference, added to the complexity of the analog control
c_aputer such that a separate electronics box, called the Information
Correlator Assembly (ICA), was proposed.
By August 1967, the PCS had evolved to the system shown in figure
10. During the daylight portion of the orbit the cluster X and Y-
attitude errors were sensed by the A_quisitlon Sun Sensor (Acq. SS).
Differentiating the Acq. SS outputs provided the necessary rate damping.
During the night when the experiment pointing canister was caged, the
integrated EPC Rate Gyro outputs were used to obtain attitude error
information. Due to + 95 degree EPC roll capability, resolvers were
provided to transform the gyro rates to the CMG control system coordinate
system. Roll attitude errors for the cluster were obtained by integrat-
ing the Rack-mounted Roll Rate Gyro output.
Attitude error signals for the EPCS were derived from the Fine
Sun Sensors (FSS) and rate damping was provided by the Canlster-mounted
Rate Gyros. The experiment canister offset capability for each axis
was developed by controlling the FSS optical wedges.
Isolation between the rack and canister was provided by a
three degree-of-freedom glmbal system using frlctionless compensated
29
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flexpivots. The canister attitude was controlled by two redundant
torque motors per axis. A _+95 degree roll position mechaI1ism provided
roll attitude positioning of the experiment canister. A Star Tracker
was used to provide an attitude reference. An analog computer was :
used to implement the CMG H-vector Control Law, _he CMG Steeriv_ Law
and the EPC and CHG error processing. The device is not specifically
labeled in figure 10 but was an integral part of the _G, EPCS and
RPM systems.
Reliability considerations for long-range mission times f_=ced
a new look at redundancy. All mission-critical single-point failures
weremade redundant _y introducing switchover capability to added duplex
components. To accomplish this, additional Rate G>ros wet _ added to
the ATM rack.This eliminated the need for the coordinate transformation
resolver. Sensor averaging was implemented later. The fle-_-pivots were
designed to allow + 2 degrees of rotation about t_,_. EPC Y and Y-ax_s.
Rotation about the Z-axis was extended first to +95, -120 degrees, then
to + 120 degrees by moving the roll ring gear stops. A study of the
ICA design revealed that the minimum complexity was close to that of a
small digital computer. After extensive investigation a digital, com-
puter (ATMDC) and an input/output assembly were added to interface
with the PCS. By August 1969, the PCS had evolved to the system shc ,n
in figure ii. To minimize the CSM and TACS fuel requirements, a CMG _
momentum desaturation scheme utilizing vehicle maneuvurs during night _
portion of the orbit was instituted.
5. Wet-to-Dry Workshop Transition. It was recognized that if
the launch stack could acco_nodate the ATM, it would greatly simplify
the program by eliminating extensive program and technical require °
ments. The capability to reduce program cost and complexity i>y e',_mi-
natlng ATM as a free-flylng module, the ability to rapidly actlvate
the Workshop by pre-installatlon and checkout prior to launch and the
capabillty to significantly expand the mission potential with the
weight margins offered by a Saturn V launch vehicle supplicd the
rationale for conversion from a Wet-to-Dry Workshop.
The PCS and WACS were designed to operate individually during
separate mission phases; however, the Wet-to-Dry conversion made a _
marriage of the two systems desirable. This new system w_,_ renamed
and called the Attitude and Pointing Control System (APCS). Due to
more ample weight margins and lower impulse requirements the wACS w_s
replaced by a blowdown cold-gas (nitrogen) Thruster Att_ade Control
System (TACS). TACS was a simpler and more reliable system than Wf._.
The _,seof nitrogen gas eliminated the risk of experlm_t ccnta_.Inatlon
by control system exhaust gasse8 that existed with WACS. _
The role of the digital computer was incrpas_d and Lhe A'IM con-
trol computer was eliminated. The CMC Control Law, error pr¢_._s_in&, "
and the banding mode filtering was performed in a digJt_il £ashion.
The EPC analog portion of the control computer was retained and |
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assembled in a new unit called the Experiment Pointing Electronic
Assembly (EPEA). The new mission requirements eliminated the need
for a Lunar Module.
The concept of automatic redundancy management was developed
for the ACS. This was accomplished by the ATMIE Flight Program which
monitored behavior of the various redundant components, and switched
to different combinations as required to ensure proper system operation.
The requirement for long-term operation of the ATMDC without
failure forced a change in concept from a single ATMDC to two ATMIEs
and a redundant NCIU operating in a i + 1 configuration. In this
configxtratlon one ATMDC was on, one ATMDC was off, the NCIU common
section and one-half of the Input/output section were on, the other
half of the WCIU input/output section was off. The ATMDC program per-
formed selfchecks and maintained the capability to switch to the re-
dundant ATMDC/I_CIU if a failure was detected.
An expansion in the experiment program imposed a major new
operational capability on the APCS. The experiment program was refined
and required an ear*.n pointing capability w_th negative Z-vehlcle axis
collnear with L;,_local vertical and +X-princlpal axis in the orbital l
plane. Initially, all these attitude maneuvers were to be handled ex-
clusively by the TACS and the remainder of the mission was to be con-
trolled by the CHGs.
As impacts of the new Skylab mission were determined, the
inadequacies of both the TACS and the CHGs became apparent. The TACS
did not have sufficient propellant to perform the total number of
maneuvers being planned. Also, the longer mission time, increased
vehicle inertias, and a more thorough accounting of external dlstu_bances
made the design of the CHG system marglnal. A solution to this problem
was sought by combining the operation of the two systems. Thus, the
CHGs would provide assistance in making maneuvers and the TACS would
be available if the CHGs were unable to control the Skylab. From this
the 'bested" attitude control concept was derived. As studies pro-
greased on the "nested" system, several problem areas arose which
necessitated changes in bo_h the CHG and the TACS Control Laws.
Vehicle inertia increased to the point where performance in the
two CHG case became marginal. The CHG wheel speed was increased
approximately fourteen percent to increase performance and momentum
storage capabillty. This required changes in the CHG Inverters, and the St_r
Tracker and Fine Sun Sensor which obtained power from the inverters.
The ability to offset command the EPC system via the ATHDC was
added. Aut_-_atic control of the Star Tracker with thc AIIqDC was
considered, but this redesign was not made because of the magnitude
of changes to the ST mode logic electronics. :
To increase the probability of the ATHDC successfully com-
pleting the Skylab mission the Memory Load Unit (MLU) was developed
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to provide inflight computer reloading. A skeleton program capable of
filllng one of the two 8K ATHDCMemory Modules was provided to maintain
llmlted use of the ATHDC during flight should a failure occur in one
of the memory moduleb.
When the EPC was in the offset position and a roll comuand was
initiated, the solar image, as viewed from the crew's dlsplay screen,
underwent an apparent roll about the sun center. For some experiments
this would have required a reposltlon of the llne-of-slght after roll
adjustments. To correct this procedural inconvenience and decrease
the response time for experiment set-up, a roll about line-of-slght
capability was added to the ATNDC Flight Program.
C. Test Program
The Skylab APCS was composed of components and subsystems most
of which had not been previously qualified for orbital flight. Ther&fore
each component and subsystem required extensive testing and qualification.
The integrated APCS, including software, also required extensive simulation
and verification. Figure 12 shows the overall APCS test program and the
relationships between the hardware, software and systems tests.
1. Hardware Component Design Verification Testing. The APCS
hardware design verification test program consisted of _evelopmental
tests and qualification tests.
Developmental tests were performed to select parts and components,
investigate the adequacy and optimization of the preliminary design,
determine significant failure modes and effects, evaluate effects of
varied stress levels, and select materials or determin_ compatibility.
Qualification tests were conducted as formal d_nonstrations of
the design and performance adequacy of the production flight hardware.
Development test hardware was representative of the flight hard-
ware insofar as possible. Qualification test hardware was flight-type,
and was identical in performance, configuration, and fabrication to the
flight hardware.
2. FllBht Hardware Verification. Flight APCS verification
testing was performed at the module level on the prototype and flight
ATHs. Testing included in-process tests (performed during final assembly
of the ATM), post-manufacturing checkout (performed to verify that the
overall system functioned per design), vibration tests (performed to
verify the effects of the launch vibration environment on the system),
and thermal-vacuum tests (performed to verify proper APCS operation In
the space environment). These tests were all performed using a special
pre-flight ATHDC test program.
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TAC5 subsystem level testing was performed during similar module
level testing of the 0WS. This testing was performed using simulated
ATI4DC thruster firing commnds.
Additional test_ were performed at the multl-module and cluster
levels at Kennedy Space Center. Multl-module level testing valldated
the interface between the ATN and the Airlock Module (AN) (prlmarily
the C&D Panel). The cluster level systems test verified overall opera-
tion of the AFCS including TACS, and was the only flight APCS test
performed before launch using the fllght ATHI)C program.
3. Software Development and Verification Tests. The followlng
paragraphs describe the slmulatlons that were used in the design and
analysis of the ATMDC software. These are listed in Table 2.
The System/360-75 AS-If Simulator evolved from a general purpose
system analysis simulator of an orbiting vehlcle in the Wet Workshop
era. This exceptlonally fast simulator was used for many of the initial
studies of control law selection and maneuver concept design.
The Skylab Workshop Simulator was built because of the necessity
for a high fidelity simulator to evaluate the APCS pointing requirements
using fixed point implementation of crltlcal Flight Program modules,
such as CHG control and strapdown reference.
The IBM 1800 Skylab Hybrid Simulator was developed to valldate
the redundancy management system under perturbations in a full fixed-
point environment.
The Norkshop Interpretive ATHDC Simulator provided unique
facilltles for debugging and assuring proper Fllght Program operatlon.
The simulator was designed to give repeatable results for runs with
identical setups or _rlth changes which did not alter timing.
The System/360 Hodel 75 was an all-software simulation which
modeled both the vehicle and the ATHDC. It provided capability for
faster than real-tlme operation with the Fllght Program.
The System/360 Model 44 Simulator incorporated a flight-type
ATNDC with software models of the NCIU and the vehicle. It provided
a tool for real-time operation to permit a realistic run ratio_ as
well as for real-time follow-up on suspected program problems.
The Skylab ATNDC Mission Support Simulator was built to provide
additional capability to verify long term performance of the final
Plight Program utilizing two Flight-type AT_)Cs in a computer switch-
over test environment and a WCIU operating in real-time.
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lTable 2. APCS Simulators and Location
i l l i i ii i
Astrlonlcs Hardware, $1mulatlon Laboratory (HSL)/MSFC-ASTR
Astrlonics Simulatlon Laboratory (Non-Linear ¢MG Model
Simulation)/MSFC-ASTR
Astrlonics Simulation Laboratory (Skylab Slmulatlon)/MSFC-ASTR
Astrionics Simulatlon Laboratory (ATM/EPC$ Analog
Simulatlon)/MSFC-ASTR
Control System Design SImulat_on/HSFC-COHP/ASTR
TACS System and Venting SImulatlon/MSFC-COHP/AERO
System/360-75 Fortran Flight Program Simulator/IBM-Huntsville
System/360-75 AS-If 51mulator/IBM-Huntsville
Skylab Hybrid Simulatlon/l_{C-D
QD212, Digltal Simulation Model for Skylab Control
and Homentum Hanagemellt/_4C-D
Skylab APCS Verification and Evaluatlon Model/MMC-D
Skylab Simpllfied APCS Verification and Evaluation Nodel/_C-D
Skylab Rendezvous and Docking Analysis Simulator/MDAC-4_
Skylab Attitude Control System Simulator/MDAC-N
CMG/TACS Control System Model/BRI,
CHG Control Subsystem Nodel/BRL
CMG/EPC Control System lqodel/ERL
i iii , i i i • i i
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The Hardware Simulation Laboratory (HSL) was an a11-f1Ight hard-
ware (ATHDC/h_IU, CHCs, RGPs, Acq. SS, and ST) simulation located at
Marshall Space Flight Center. Software equations wcre used to simulate
vehicle dynamics, and the APCS environment. Thls slmulatlon permitted
long-term evaluation of the Flight Program and Its interfaces wlth the
flight hardware.
A formal verification program was performed for each develop-
ment phase of the 16K and 8K Fllght Programs. This verification effort
was directed toward verifying tile accuracy and adequacy of the Flight
Program to guarantee that It met mlsblon requirements and conformed to
program specification. Both loglc tests and performance tests were
made to accomplish that goal. Each program for each phase, was sub-
Jected to a rigorous set of loglc cases to check every Ioglc path
through the program, every data constant specified, and the accuracy
of each calculatlon. The System,/360-75 Simulator was utillzed extenslvely
for this effort, _vlth a more limited use of the System/360-44 Slmulator
and the HSL.
The performance testlngwas aecompllshed pr_arily on the final
program wlth subsets run on earlier programs. The performance tests
were divided into two categories, general performance and mission re-
quirez_.nts. The RSL and, to a lesser extent, the System/360-44
Simulator were used for these tests. The general performance cases
were used to demonstrate that the Flight Program was capable of proper
functioning in the envlrorment It would experience during the actual
Skylab mlsslon. The phllosophy used in the design of this verification
was to simulate as many variations of program input perturbations and
off nomlnal situations as could be conceived and classtfled as reallstlc
possibilities. The ultimate purpose of this effort was to simulate,
detect, and isolate at system level (all functions in operation) the
following types of problem areas:
Unusual program execution sequences.
Function interference due to unexpected timing situations.
Parameter scaling overflows associated with equation
input extremes.
The mission requirements performance cases were used to delon-
strate that the AT_C Flight Programmes capable of mseting all of its
function requirements with respect to the planned overall mission ob-
Jectives and activities for the entire uission duration.
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4. APCS Simulatlons. A llst of slnulatlons used in APCS develop-
m_-nt is given in Table 2. Due to the length of the planned mlsslo_,
It was not feaslbte to simulate the entire mission. Therefore, the
various s£mulator_ verified concepts and software at the normal and ex-
trecne limits. In addition, continKencles such as 2-CMG operation were
studied exte'_sively. The speed range of these simulators varied f_._u
real-tlme to 100 times real-time de._endlng ou the speed of the compute._
and the complexity of the _od#.is. In general, those simulations con-
centratins on dynamic response utilized greater hardware detail models
and operat_ more s_ovly but did not require as long an examination
period. The most complex and demanding areas simulated were of TACS
bud£etinS, momentum management and mansuvering. The type of parameters .
that were varied included solar elevation, CMGconfiguration and .
maneuver profiles. These studies had to b_ repeated many times in the
development history as simulations were updated to reflect changes in
control concepts. After the Nomentun Nanagelent Laws had been finalized,
computer outputs shoving expected maneuver profiles were generated.
_n_ile those curves were not explicitly utilized durlns the sission, the
experience gained in g_nerating those curves was very useful durlns the
m£sslon. The same techniques of examinim[; maneuver profiles, CNGshsbal
angles and TACS usage that were utilized by the various simulations
durlns system verification proved Invaluable in evaluating and optimizing
the dally fllsht plan during the ulsslon.
5. APC$ Verificatlon. In addltlon to the simulations using
representative versions of the Flight Progrma, the actual &TMDCwas
used for systom verlflcatlon. The various phases of the Flight Program
_are used either with hardware, such as Rate Gyros and CMGsor with
their math model equlvalents.
Due to the physical size of the SkyLab, no complete dynmllc
slmulstlon using actual Inertims was feaslble. TnLread the APCS
components whose orientation was important, such as Acquisltlon Sun
Sensor, were mounted on a three axls dynm_tc platform vhlch was slewed
to a support computer so that the position of the inner platforu followed
that of an Ideal vehicle. Due to the much maller inertia of the experl-
mant canister, a spar, which was a physical representation of experiment
canister inertias and was suspended by mercury bearings, was developed.
kll experiment csnlster components were uounted on this spar which tracked
a simulated sun and was perturbed by external torquing devices. This
slmulstlon was knob_ as the Ksrdvare Simulation Laboratory (HSL), located
_n the Astrionlcs Laboratory at MSrC. The HSL simulations were used to
verify proper system operation using fllght-type hardware and scfCtmre.
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SECTION IV. MISSION OPEP_TIONS
This section provides a statuary of the significant APCS mission
events, a detailed summary of the anomalies and discrepancies that
occurred during the mission and i description of the mission support
team and Its activities during the mission.
A. Mission Description
Followin_ is a brief description of the Skylab mission from
SL-I flit-off through post SL-4. Table 3 identifies the significant
APCS related mission events and gives the sequence Ir which they
occurred.
I. Skylab I. The Saturn Workshop (SWS) was launched, unmanned,
at 17:30 GMT on May 14, 1973 (_¥ 1), from Launch Complex 39A at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The SWS launch vehicle was the
_trst two stages of the Saturn V launch vehlcle. At approxhutely 63
seconds following the SWS launch, the Orbital Workshop (OWS) meteoroid
shlalo 2as severed from the SWS. This event also damaged the OJ$
Solar Az_._y Wing 2 fairing tledown which allowed the assembly to deploy
prwaturely. At apvroxlmately 590 seconds from the SWS launch, the
ignition of the second stage retrorockets was accomplished from the
SWS vehicle. At this time the Solar Array Wlng 2 was lost. The SWS
was then separated from the Saturn V second stage, and the Skylab
Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS) was activated across the
separation interface vla wire disconnects. The TACS thrusters, in
conjunction wlth the Launch Vehicle Digital Computer (LVDC), provided
the SWS attitude contro_ required from S-II separation untll transfer
ot control to the ._kylab APCS.
Approximately eight seconds following S-I; separation, the ,TJS
was inserted in a near-circular orbit of 434 kilometers above the
earth's surface wlth an orbital inclination of 49.84 degrees and
orblcal period of near 93 minutes. Vehlcle rates shortly after S-II
engine cutoff and before orbltal insertion were X = -0.8 deg/sec.
Shortly after achieving orbit, the SWS was maneuvered into a
gravlty-gradlent at'tltude wlth the forward end pointed toward the
center of the earth, and payload shroud was Jettisoned in four sections.
Following the payload shroud Jettison, deployment of the ATt4, the ATM
_olsr Arrays, the remalnlng OWS Solar Array Wins, and release of the
ATM Canister launch locks, vas Initiated. A slJ_.al indicating release
of Wing I was received, but there was no indication that the wing
reached the fully deployed position.
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During this sequence the Instrument Unit (IU), using the TACS
thrusters, maneuvered the SWS into a Solar Inertial attitude, with its
longitudinal axis in the orbital plane and the solar arrays perpendicular
to the incide_t sunlight.
On DAY i, 19:07:00, the ATM portion of APCS was activated.
The CMG wheels were spun up and the ATMDC entered a standby mode until
control could be switched from the IU. Telemetry data on Rate Gyro
Z-I temperature indicated that the temperature was increasing and on
DAY i, 20:34:00, the temperature went off-scale high. At Acquisition
of Signal (AOS) on DAY I, 20:12:00, Y and Z-axes Rate Gyro integral
test discompares occurred. These Gyros remained in isolation for
approximately I-1/2 hours before r configuration. Occurrence of these
test discompares was to continue until the Rate Gyro Six-Pack was in-
stalled. The SWS Attitude Control was transferred from the Instrument
Unit (IU) to the APCS on DAY I, at approximately 22:20:00. At this same
time the CHG/TACS control was enabled. Three minutes later the Z-2
Rate Gyro temperature went off-scale high. Excessive RG drift rates
soon became evident. Drift rates as high as 18 degrees/hour were noted.
The Spec Values were two orders of magnitude less.
On DAY i, at approximately 22:23 the EPFA was powered-up to
activate the spar cagiag logic and engage the orbital locks.
On DAY 2, at 05:17 the third Rate Cyro Processor (RGP) (Y2)
temperature went off-scale high. Eventually, three mor_ RGPs, making
a total of six, were to experience similar temp..reture problems.
Normally, the SWS would have remained in Solar Inertial attitude,
however, the OWS temperatures began to increase due to the loss of the
meteoroid shield.
A procedure was developed to maintain the internal tempera-
tures of the SWS within crltlcal limits. This was accomplished by man-
euvering the SWS so the sunshine was not perpendicular to the longltu-
dinal axis of the SWS for long periods of time. This solution of simply
maneuvering away from the sun was compounded by the loss of the SWS Solar
Panels which restricted the time and distance the SWS could be maneuvered
from the sun, the occurrence of RGP anomalies which caused inaccuracies
in maneuvering, and CMG momentum management while in a non-Solar Inertial
attitude.
After experimenting with a few maneuver attitudes and sequences
such as alternating orbits of Solar Inertial and Z-LV attitudes during
orbital daylight, a tEermally stable attitude which satisfied power
requirements and reduced the complications caused by the RGP anomalies
and CHG momentum management considerations was decide_ upou. The chosen
thermal attitude was such that the sun-line was at an incident angle of
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45 deg (+I0) with the SWS 1ongltudlnal axis (X-axls) and the vehicle
X-prlnclpal (Xp) axis of inertia in the orbital plane. The 45 degree
solar incident angle satisfied the thermal and power constraints, re-
duced the effects of the Rate @yro anomalies, and the X-axis constraint
helped simplify the CM6 momentum management problems. Near the end of
the tnltlal 10 days when the Suit Umbillcal System (SUS) began to
freeze, a third constraint on attitude was imposed. This required
maneuvers to a bias attitude of at least 50 degrees to allow sunllght
to enter the region of the SUS and warm It.
The high RG drift rates were compensated for by changes in the
ATHDC software. The frequent and sudden changes in the drift rates
were a nuisance because of the time and effort required to measure and
recompeneate the new drift rates.
Within the first 24 hours after APCS power on, eight rate gyro
integral test discompares had been detected: two in the X-axis, five
in the Y-axis, and one in the Z-axis. All Rate Gyros except Z3 had
been placed in vehicle control during chat 24-hour period. More fail-
ures would have been logged except that redundancy management was in-
hibited for extended periods of time, and Gyros were allowed to reuwain
in redundancy management isolation routines for hours. The first _-axis
f_'ilure occurred approximately one hour after" APCS power on. The
second discompare occurred one hour later and remained in isolation one
hour. Ten minutes elapsed before a third discompare occurred, which
remained in isclaeton 1-1/2 hours. The fourth discompare occurred 15
minutes later. Thus, in a period of slightly more than six hours, four
Y-axls dlscompares occurred. During approxlnmtely four of these six
hours, the Y-axls failure isolation loglc was being executed. The
rate Integral test is not performed on an axis in failure Isolation.
Following the fourth Y-axls dlscompare, approximately four hours
elapsed before a reconflguratlon was ccmsnanded. With that recon-
figuration, redundancy management was inhibited for nearly 10 hours.
Les_ than 30 minutes after re-e_b!Ing redundancy management, the
fifth Y-axls discompare was detected. Only the extended periods of
failure isolation and the lcng period of inhibited redur, dancy manage-
ment held the total number of dlscompares detected to a relatlvely
low level.
The launch of the first crew was delayed from a plan_ed C_Y 2
l&unch to twelve days following the Skylab 1 launch. This delay was for
the purpose of assessing the situation that existed in the SW$ and to
make the necessary plans to alleviate the problem and to accomplish an
overall successful Skylab mission. During this period, studies and
tests on the _round resulted in three devices for shielding the Work-
shop from the sun; a parasol, to be deployed through the Solar Scientific
Atrlock; a sail, to be deployed from a Command Nodule; and a twin-boom
sunshade, to be deployed from the workstation on the telescope mount.
Each of these was built and delivered in time for the launch of the
first crew. At the same time, the crew was being trained in procedures
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for installing the sunshades and releasing the remaining solar wing.
Besides the sunshades, replacements for a number of items which might
have been damaged by high temperatures in the Workshop were delivered
and stowed in the Command Module.
Throughout this period, a program of careful management of
attitude had been instituted to keep temperatures within the Workshop
as low as possible while providing enough power to keep the SWS opera-
tional. Available power was strictly allocated, and as far as possible,
systems using power were turned off or operated intermittently. Other
effects required consideration. Reducing the heating rates in the
Workshop caused some other parts of the Workshop to become too cold,
but electric heaters could not be used because of the power shortage.
The maneuvers themselves introduced another problem: excessive use of
TAtS propellant. _achmaneuver had to be planned carefully to minimize
use of the t_rusters.
Since the momentum management scheme was designed to operate
only in Solar Inertial attitude, it could not be used. On one occasion
during a temporary return to the Solar Inertial attitude, the momentum
dump scheme was used and worked nominally. '[_ts occurred on DAY 2,
20:22:00.
The large Rate Gyro drift present in the Rack Rate Gyros pre-
sented serious difficulties in maintaining attitude and attitude refer-
ence. By causing movement of the X-principal axis _ut of the orbital
plane, the Rate Gyro drift caused frequent CHG momentum saturations
and subsequent resets.
In an attempt to utilize the dump scheme in non-Solar Inertial
attitudes, consideration was given to implementation of an ATMDC patch.
The patch, however, could not be developed in the time available.
The means used to desaturate the CMGs was the reset routine.
As the reset routine caged momentum to the nominal value for Solar
Inertial attitude, effective resets could only De commanded at orbital
points where the Solar Inertial and thermal attitude nominal momentum
curves intersected. In addition, adequate station coverage was re-
quired for these points. The large and changing Rate Gyro drift pre-
sent in the original Rack Rete Gyros presented serious difficulties in
maintaining attitude and attitude reference. Due to the length of
time in maintaining the thermal attitude without a position update the
strapdown reference became greatly degraded. The strapdownwas occasional-
ly reinitialized to the present attitude so that in the event of a computer
switchover the Flight Program reinitializationwould have automatically
commanded the vehicle to an erroneous Solar Inertial attitude. Since
the ATMDChad no information on vehicle attitude, it was necessary to
maintain attitude reference on the ground.
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Approximately one hour prior to the launch of the first crew on
DAY 12, 09:56:00, the CMGNo. 3 wheel speed transducer failed.
2. Skylab 2. The CSM carrying the first crew was launched at
13:00 GMT on DAY 12 from Launch Complex 39B at Kennedy Space Center,
Florlda. This crew consisted of Captain Charles Conrad, Jr., C_nder;
Com_nder Joseph P. Kerwin, Science Pilot; and Commander Paul J. Weitz,
Pilot.
After the Skylab 2 CSM reached orbit it was maneuvered durln8
the followlng six hour period to achieve an orbit which coincided with
the orbiting Worksho,.
The crew made a flyaround inspection of the SWS, while main-
taining co_sunicatlon _rith the ground. During this inspection the crew
described the condition of the SWS, photographed it, and transmitted llve
televlslon views of its exterior. The crew confirmed that the meteoroid
shield was mission, that Workshop Solar Array Wing 2 was missing, and
that Solar Array Wing 1 was partlally deployed and restrained by a
piece of the meteoroid shleld. After the flyaroun_ inspection, the
CSM was soft-docked.
After a rest period the crew undocked and performed a stand-
up EVA to free the partlally deployed Solar Array Wing. This attempt
at freeing the Solar Array Wing was unsuccessful and resulted in con-
slderable TACS usage. TACS usage was due to CSM RCS I,_Ingement on
the vehlcle and the reaction to the crew, an pulllng on the Solar Array
Wing.
_he stand-up EVA and the subsequent docking attempts were per-
formed with the APCS in Lhe Attltude Hold TACS mode.
Followlng several CSN docking attempts a hard dock was attained
on DAY 13, 03:53:00. The activities of the Skylab 2 crew were many,
Includlng the deployment of the parasol. Followlng this deployment
the Work3hop temperature began to decrease and by DAY 21 had stabillzed
to an acceptable level where activation of the Workshop continued and
the Workshop was habitable.
The Skylab 2 operations were initially limited by availability
of power, but this restriction was removed when Solar Array Wing 1 was
d_ployed during estravehicular activity on DAY 25. When the Solar
Array was initially freed it did not deploy because of frozen dampers.
The SWS was maneuvered using the attitude hold CNCmode and a thermal
soak was performed on the damp_r_ to free them.
On DAY 16 the crew experienced con_tderabl_ difficulty with
EPC offset polntir_. The FS$ wedge counter did not track the wedges
53
1974021165-066
over the entire range and meaningless readouts were encountered.
After consultation with ground support, the situation was corrected
by re-zonlng of the wedges.
On DAY 16, 17:56:00, the first FSS count increment was noted.
The wedge reading changed by one count even though there was no actual
change in wedge displacement. _his phenomenon was to recur through
the mission prbnarily at sunrise. On DAY 17, 20:21:00 _he first EREP
was performed and it worked nominally.
Following the Solar Array Wing 1 deployment, the Skylab 2 acti-
vities were placed on a n_ar-nominal type mission plan. As a result
of the early mission problems and the thermal extremes experienced by
the vehicle, it was decided to perform a manual switchover to the sec-
ondary computer system on DAY 27. This was a test to verify that the
redundant capability of the computer subsystem was functional. At
16:38:00 on DAY 27, the crew selected the secondary computer and enabled
auto switchover using the C&D panel computer select switch. The sec-
ondary computer system powered on, initialized, and began operating
properly. During the next two days, the program was updated to the
FF70 level (same as the primary) by uplinking three program patches
necessary to compensate for the continuing _te Gyro anomalies and
vehicle inertia changes due to loss of SAS Wing 2 and meteoroid shield.
On several occasions during SL-2 the Star Tracker erroneously
locked on to objects other than the required star. As a contamination
particle with reflected light brighter than the star being tracked
came into the Star Tracker field-of-vlew the Star Tracker would track
the particle. In order to avoid these situations a procedure was
formulated. Effective utilizatlon of this procedure alleviated the
problem. On DAY 37, the SL-2 crew performed their second EVA primarily
for the purpose of film retrieval. On DAY 40 the SL-2 undocked for
their return to earth. This represented at that time, M_n's longest
space tiight.
During the unmanned period problems with an experiment door led
to a desire to avoid desatuzation maneuvers continuing into the day-
light portion of the orbit. The half-angle of the dump maneuver was
decreased from 63 degrees to 51 degrees. Prior to SL-3 the dump half-
angle was changed back to 63 degrees and was retained at that value [or
the remainder of the mission.
On DAY 59 the Zl Rate Gyro began to oscillate full scale and
was declared failed.
The Rate Gyros continued to exhibit high drift rates. The
ivlclally observed drifts were successfully compensated via biases
upltnked to the ATld Digital Computer. As time passed in the mission,
Lht magnitudes of required bias corrections decreased.
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Efforts were undertaken to determir, e the cause. Areas of in-
vestigation focused on component failures, Electromagnetic Inter£erence
(_II) and design deficiencies. During this period a crash program was
initiated _.o prepare a package of ATM Rate Gyro Processors that could
be interfaced into the APCS system should addiclonal Rack Rate Gyro
failures threaten mission termination.
On DAy 64 the prL_ary UP/DYI EPC Rate Gyro became very noisy
and ultln_Itely failed. Loss of rate damping in the EPC loop resulted
in canister oscillations which caused eventual overheating of the
canls_.er actuators. T_e overheating caused the actuator rotor and
s_ator to eventually bind.
It was belleved that a significant posslbility existed that
the secondary UP/DN Gyro could fail. The EPCS was equipped wlth .'wo
gyzos per axis, so a second UP/DN Gyro failure would have terminated
usa of ':_le F.PCS. Replacement or .qupple_entlng of the EPC Gyro system,
such as had been done in the CMG/TACS system, was not considered
feasible. Subsequentially, a device, the EPC Derived Rate Control
Assembly, was designed to be inserted in series with the FSS output
for the purpose of producing a pseudo rate signal Co stabi?':e ths EPC
systelm in lieu of Spar Rate Gyros. This device was to be carried into
orbit by the SL-3 crew. To preclude irreversible damage to ' }? EPCS
actuators, t._ a similar failure occurred, a constraint was a.ded that
continuous active and unattended EI_S operation should not exeed fifty
minutes without station coverage.
3. Skylab 3. Skylab 3 was launched at II'I0:50 GMT on DAY 76
from Kennedy Space Center. Florida. The Skylab 3 crew consisted of
Captain AUen L. Bean, Coanander; Dr. Ow_n R. G_rrlott, Science Pilot and
Major Jack R. Lousn_s, Pilot.
After Skylab 3 attained a nominal orbit and ren_:-voused with
the SWS a flyaround was performed co inspect the pal asol installed by
the Skylab 2 crew. The flyaround was ter_nlnated earlier than planned
due to RCS Inplngen_nt on the parasol. The impingement forces resulted
in increased TACS usage. With the APCS in the attitude hold TACS mode
hard dock was completed on DAY 76, 19:39:O0.
On DAY 79 the Star Tracker shutter failed to close st momentum
dump comaenre when conDanded by the ATHIX:. Attempts by the crew ;o
close the shutter manually using the C&D Panel were also unsuccessful.
On later occasions the ,ame shutter probl_ was to occur. In all cases
the failure would recover after several hours. A protective procedure
was developed to prevent pern_anent damage to the Star Tracker photo
multlpller by exposure to the earth'e albedo or the su,l while the
shutter was open. This procedure Inc'uded positioning the ._tar Tracker so
that it looked at the dark surface in the back of the ATM Solar Arrays.
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On DAY 86 single Rate Gyro control was selected in the Y-axis
because of the numerous redundancy management integral test discompares.
On DAY 91 during a nominal GC dump maneuver certain events
occurred that resulted in loss of attitude control. Following a Z-axis
redundancy management discompare an add'tional 0.3H of momenttma was
required to bring the controlling gyro ,ate to the gyro rate to the
required rate. The additional momentum requirement forced tile CMG
into saturation and siphoned momentum from the X-axis at the same
tLme. The X-axis momentum change prodtced an uncontrolled rate and
res.ilted in a 20 degree attitude build-up £i, the X-axis requiring an
auto._atic switch to TACS only rontrol. In the process of stabilizing
the system the crew observed that the C6D Panel analog meters were
incorrectly indicating that CMG No. 1 and CMG No. 3 were on -_ stop.
The gimbals were actually caged This malfunction resulted in an
incorrect assessment of the CMG status, leading to excessive TACS usage.
I)urlng a later test the problem was observ,_.d only on the CMG No. 1
measurement.
On DAY 99 at 12:13"00 the l.:_:Sdrove off ti_ sun iuring a llne-
of-sight roll. The EPCS worced nominally after the occv_'rence.
Because of the continuing Rate Gyro problems one of the fore-
most concerns of the crew was the installation of the Six-Pack. The
Six-Pack was mounted in the Multiple DockLng Adapter (MDA) and powered
from an existing uti]fty outlet of AM Bus No. 2. A new unit, Rate Gyro
Control and Distributor was installed in the MDA; its function was to
provide overcurrent protection in the _nput power lines and to _erve as
a Junction box for input power, gyro outputs, and RGP c.oarse/fine gain
coe_mands. An existing ceble was disconnected from the C&D Panel and
a new T cable installed to permit routing of RC' .,utputs and gain com-
nLands through existing spare wires to the ATM.
The Six-Pack RGPs weru then briefly powered up, polarities and
temperatures verified and then powered down. Six-Pack £nstallation was
then completed by an EVA perfor_.d on DAY 103. Extensive wiring chan_;es
were _equired. The existing cable which routed the Rack Rate Gyro out-
put_ to the WCIU was disconnected at the _/CI_. The ATH end of the cable
used for routing Six-Pack functions was disconnected at the AI_4 Trunion
Plate. Tv_ T cables which were an integr_l part of the kate Gyro Select
_ox were connected to the WC[U, ATM Trunlon Plate, and the two dis-
connected cables. Through these cables and the Rate Gyro Select Box.
Six-Pack outputs were connected to pins on tl_e WCLU _d_ure Kack P_Lte
Gyros No. I and No. 2 had previously been connected. Rack Rate (:yro
outputs were routed to the Rate Cyro Select Box where one of the three
outputs in each axis could be selected as Gyro No. _ for redundancy
_nagement purposes in the ATMDC. Plan_ "Nets to _ae the two S_x-Pack
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Rate Gyros in each axis for control with the selected Rack Rate Gyro
a_ a spare, but due to a single failure point which existed in the
Six-Pack Power source, the remainder of the mission was flown with
one six-Pack RGP and the selected Rack RGP for each axis in control.
As Rate Gyros are essential to APC; control, both with TACS and
CMGs, no control of the OWS with APCS was possible during the period
of Six-Pack Installation. Since the CSM for SL-3 had thruster problems,
it was decided not to utilize CSM control. Instead a procedure was
developed to allow tLe vehicle to drift. The procedure was:
Go to TACS only, Nominal Momentum Cage (Allo_ed
vehicle momentum and nominal momentum to be as
close as possible prior to Standby period of control).
Go to CMG Control. This allowed Attitude Errors in
the TACS Deadband (3 degrees, 2 degrees, 2 degrees)
to be brought to zero prior to going to Standby.
Go to Standby, Nominal Momentum Cage. The vehicle /
was now in free drift with oper loop compensation •
for gravity gradient torques.
Performed Six-Pack Wiring change.
Enabled CMG control and reacquired Solar Ynertial.
After the installation of the Six-Pack, calibration maneuvers were
performed on DAY 106, 15:20:00 to establish the alignment. The maneuvers
were performed in the attitude hold mode using CMG control. A three-
minute settling time was allowed for each maneuver and a two-minute
se tling time was allowed for each maneuver requiring a total of 5 minutes i
per maneuver. The maneuver sequence consisting of 8 maneuvers initiated
shortly after orbital sunrise.
After analysis of the data by the mission support team the mis-
alignment of the Six-Pack was determined to be small and no compensation
ir the Flight Program was required.
On DAY 119, a test waE performed to verify vehicle stability in
the Attitude Hold mode. fhe purpose was to plan SL-4 Kohoutek Maneuvers.
S052 solar data was utilized for this purpose. The results of this test
indicated that stability was within acceptable bounds for future viewing
of Kohoutek.
On DAY 1_ the first JOP-13 maneuve', pointing ATM at a star for
X-ray photogr_ ,, was performed. This maneuver was successfully com-
pleted using 47 MIBs. The technique of maneuvering the workshop to
point the ATM at a non-solar target was later extensively used in the
Kohoutek studies.
l
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On DAY 132, the SL-3 crew performed an EVA for the purpose of
film retrieval u_ing a total of 1470 n.s. of TAGS propellent.
During the unmanned phase on DAY 177, 03:19:00, a 500 ampere
short developed on Television Bus 2 for 3 seconds. This had a minor
impact on the APCS; the power transient caused the FSS wedge counter
to be zeroed. Driving the FSS wedges through zero was required to
correct the problem.
The SL-3 manned period ended with the CSM undocking on DAY
135, 19:53:00.
The UP/DN Orbital Lock failed to uncage on DAY 185 at 17:48:00
GMT. A temperature rise of 3.7 degrees C was observed on the lock
housing. Tests run on the motor in thermal vacuum at stall currents
produced a temperature rise similar to that seen during the anomaly.
The EPEA was switched to secondary for the purpose of using the sec-
ondary caging loop. On DAY 195 the UP/DN lock again failed to uncage
while usinB the secondary cagi1_g loop. Without any configuration
changes_ the lock successfully uncaged when tested about an hour af-
ter the second anomaly.
4. Skylab 4. Tilethird three man crew was launched from
Kennedy Space Center on DAY 187 at 14:03 GMT. The crew consisted of
Lt. Col. Gerald P. Carr, Commander; Dr. Edward G. Gibson, Science
Pilot; and Lt. Col. William R. Pogue, Pilot. Docking of the Command
Service Module to the Skylab cluster occurred on DAY 187, 21:41:00.
On DAY 190 the crew modified the M092 vent so it vented into
the OWS waste tank instead of directly overboard. This was done to
eliminate the disturbance torques which the vent caused.
Failure of CMG No. i occurred between tracking stations on
DAY 194 at approximately 08:15. At the preceding tracking station
Honeysuckle, CMG No. I phase A current increased 65 ma, bearing No. I
temperature increased 5 degrees C, and wheel speed decreased 120 RP_.
At AOS Bermuda ,o8:42 GMT) the phase A current was 2.06 amps, bearing
No. i temperature w_u 82 degrees C, and wheel speed was indicating
zero RPM. A speed of approximately 4000 RPM was inferred from the
wheel currents. Beginning at 08:50:00 the CMG No. i brake was applied
for seven minutes and control was switched to the two CMG mode.
The Comet Kohoutek was studied extensively duriLL_ _Kylab. In
order to verify instrument capability and maneuver accuracy a maneuve,
to point the ATM at Mercury was performed. The APCS supported Kohoutek
observations by performing three types of maneuvers, One was a roll
maneuver about the X-princlpal axis for the purpose of viewing }'rboutek
with an articulated mirror system. The second type maneuver involved
pointing the ATM experiment at Kohoutek. The third type maneuver was
one which would shade the astronaut held _201 camera and was performed i
i
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in conjunction with an EVA. Two EVAs were performed for S201 photo-
graphy of Kohoutek.
On DAY 228 at 14:13:00 the Star Tracker failed. Analysis of
telemetry data was made and laboratory tests were performed to sim-
ulate the failure mode. The failure was duplicated by interrupting
the outer gimbal encoder output. Operation of the Star Tracker was
terminated and backup techniques were implemented to calculate the
vehicle roll referen:e on the ground.
Skylab 4 undocking occurred at DAY 271 at 10:34:00. After
crew departure, several engineering tests were performed in the APCS
area. These tests consisted of:
CMG No. I spznup - Power was applied to the wheel for
8.5 hours without response
RG power up - All RGs were powered up and those
which had exhibited erratic outputs on off-scale
temperature indications were observed. Operation
was not significantly different than had been
previously observed.
ATMDC reprogram - The ATMDC was successfully re-
programmed via RF uplink and via the MLU.
On DAY 271, 12:09:00, a maneuver was performed to place the
Skylab cluster in the Gravity Gradient Attitude such that the +X-axis
was pointed away from the earth. The APCS was powered down on DAY
271, 20:00:00.
B. Mission Anomalies and Discrepancies
I. Anomalies.
a. Rate Gyro Failures
(I) Rate Gyro Drift Anomaly.
(a) Description. The Rack Rate Gyro Processors
(RGPs) were powered up on DAY i, 19:07.00. At 20:12:0_ a RGP redun-
dancy management discompare in the Y-axis was noted. Additional fail-
ures were noted over the next several hours. Eventually it was deter-
mined that five Rack RGPs (XI, X2, X3, YI, and Y_,) had out-o£-spec_fi-
cation drift rates. These drift rates were sometimes quite high ana
changed suddenly in random fashion. The drift rateq of the RGPs
gradually decreased as the mission progressed. By DAY 78, all except
X3 had stabilized at low rates.
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Extensive analysis was p_rformed to determine the
cause of the Rate Gyro drift anomalies. The high drift rates were
attributed to gas bubbles in the Gyro flotation fluid which formed
when the float chamber bellows was exposed to the hard vacuum of
space. This problem had been seen during ATMThermal-Vacuum Testing
and was judged an acceptable risk because the high drift rates could
be compensated in the ATMDC software.
(b) Impact. The large erratic drifts present in
the Rack Rate Gyros caused serious difficulty in maintaining attitude
and attitude reference. The drift changes caused movement of the
X-principal axis of the vehicle out of the orbital plane, which
caused CMG momentu= saturation and frequent resets. During the time
when it was necessary to maintain thermal attitude, the strapdown
attitude reference became greatly degraded due to erratic RGP dirft.
(c) Corrective Action. The large RGP drifts
noted during the SL-I/SL-2 mission were compmnsated in the
ATMDC software by couuuands uplinked to the AT_C. The capability to
compLnsate for RGP drift was designed into the ATMIX3 software.
During the SL-2 mission, a crash program was
begun to prepare a package of the six RGPs (2 per axis) that could
be installed in the _[DAand interfaced into the APCS, if necessary.
The RG Six-Pack was carried to the SWS by the SL-3 crew. On DAY 103
the Six-Pack was installed in the system. Three Six-Pack RGPs were
paired with the ren_aining Rack RGPs (XI, YI,Z3). No further RGP
problems were encountered. The Six-Pack Rate Gyros were modified
to protect the float chamber bellows from the vacuum of space. This
modification was also incorporated on the backup ATM RGPs.
(2) Rate Gyro Overheating Anomaly.
(a) Description. The APCS Rate Gyro Processors
(RGPs) were powered up on DAY i, 19:07:00. At 20:34:00 the ZI RGP
temperature went off-scale high. At _2"23:00 the Z2 RGP temperature
went off-scale high. Eventually, a to! of six RGPs showed off-scale
high temperatures. These were X2, Y2' , ZI, Z2 and Primary UP/DN.
Eventually, the Primary UP/DN R(;P faileduvmpletely with zero output.
The RGP overheat problem was traced to a fiber
washer used in mounting the RGP heater power switching transistor on
its heat sink. The washer shrank in the space environment, which
allowed the transistor mounting to loosen. This caused the translstor
to thermally saturate and leak excessive current to the RGP heating
blanke=_ which caused the RGP to overheat. This problem had not
been seen during ground testing.
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J! (b) Impact. There was concern that as the RGPs
grew hotter and the float fluid viscosity decreased, they would be-
come unstable. This apparently occurred with the ZI and Y3 RGPs.
In addition, the hot Rate Gyros showed a change in scale factor,
which caused redundancy management discompares during maneuvers.
The primary concern was, however, that if three
RGPs failed in any one vehicle axis, it would be impossible to con-
tinue the mission. Also, if two RGPs failed in either EPC axis it
would be impossible toperform ATM experiments.
(c) Corrective Action. The scale factor errors
noted in the Y-axe3 RGPs were compensated in the ATMDC software.
The scale factor errors in the X and Z-axis RGPs could not be com-
pensated because of software limitations.
The RGP Six-Pack successfully eliminated the
possibility of terminating the mission due to failure of all three
RGPs in any one axis. At the time of SL-3 launch, the cause of the
RGP overheat problem had not been determined. When the cause of the
failure was determined, a quick fix for use by the crew was devised
which would have allowed the crew to repair overheating Six-Pack
RGPs. Overheating did not occur and the fix was not used.
A Derived Rate Conditioner Assembly (DRC) was
developed te provide rate inputs to the EPC system if the secondary
EPC UP/DN RGP failed. This device conditioned the FSS output to
provide EPC rate information. The DRC was carried into orbit with
the SL-3 crew. The secondary EPC UP/DN RGP performed satlsfactori%y
through the rest of the mission and the DRC was not used.
b. CMG No. i Failure.
(I) Description. The CMGs performed nominally during
the Skylab mission until DAY 194, 08:03:00, when CMG No. i failed.
The failure was characterized by a rise in the No. i wheel spin
bearing temperature from a normal 21 degrees C to a point Just under
the auto shutdown temperature of 90 degrees C, a gradual decrease
in wheel speed accompanied by an increase in wheel spin motor current,
and failure of the wheel speed pickoff. The failure occurred between
tracking stations and was first observed by the Bermuda tracking
station forty-sever minutes later. The No. i wheel spin bearing
temperature at that time was 83.2 _-grees C and decreasing. The
wheel speed was estimated from spin motor current to be about 3800
rpm, down from 9060 rpm before the failure. The failure was not
detected by the Redundancy Management Scheme, since the bearing
temperature did not exceed the auto-shutdown temperature of 90 de-
grees C. The spin bearing temperature did exceed the caution level
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of 74 degrees C and the caution was set. The caution indication was
not seen by the crew, who were asleep. Shortly after detecting the
failure over Bermuda, the Flight Director directed that power be
removed from the wheel spin motor and applied the brake for s_,en
minutes. This probably did not slow the wheel appreciably. At
that time, the ATM/)C switched to 2-CMG control, and the mission con-
tinued normally.
Considerable analysis was performed to determin_
the mode of failure of CMG No. i. Preliminary analyses indicate
the failure mode was failure of the No. i wheel spin bearing due to
insufficient lubrication. The failure appeared co be progressive,
with indications of bearing distress as early as DAY 174. At the
time, these indications were not considered to be significant.
Unfortunately, the telemetered data were not sufficient to show all
symptoms ¢f bearing distress.
(2) System Impact. The APCS was programmed to pro-
vide normal control of the SWS with two CMGs operating. The system
performed satisfactorily after the CMG No. I failure. However, fail-
ure of CMG No. i reduced the total CMG momentum transfer capability
from approximately 9000 N.m.s. to approximately 6000 N.m.s. TACS
usage increased accordingly. CMG gimbal scop encounters became
more frequent.
(3) Corrective Action. The mission continued in
2-CMG operation. Ground support simulations were used to optimize
vehicle control for EREP passes and JOP experiment passes to reduce
TACS usage. CMG momentum biases were used to minimize the CMG
glmbal stop encounters. These measures enabled completion of the
SL-4 mission essentially as planned.
c. Star Tracker Anomalies.
(i) Description. Four major probler_ were encountered
with the Star Tracker (ST): tracking contaminants, shutter sticking,
photomultiplier tube degradation and outer gimbal encoder failure.
Work-arounds were developed for the first three problems, but the
encoder failure terminated use of the ST.
(a) Contaminant Particle Problem. The ST was
activated at the beginning of SL-2 and operated satisfactorily ex-
cept for frequent disturbances when star acquisition was lost due
to dontaminants entering the field of view. If a particle reflects
light of intensity above the photomultipller tube threshold and
enters the field-of-vlew, the particle wlll be tracked as a target
star. This type of disturbance was noted thirty-five times durlng
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SL-2 and 4 times during SL-3. Typical particles were generated by
dust, outgassing, sloughing of paint, and venting from the vehicle.
(b) Shutter Anomaly. Five times during SL-2
the ST shutter stuck in the open position. On the first occasion,
on DAY 79 at 00:31:00 just prior to the momentum dump, the ATMDC
issued a ST Hold discrete. The ST exited Auto Mode, but ST Hold
and Shutter Close discretes were not issued by the ST, and the Star
Presence discrete stayed on until the vehicle maneuvered away from
the star. The crew tried to close the shutter by a C&D Panel command,
but without response. The ST was then manually positioned to point
at the backside of a Solar Array, to prevent damage to the photo-
multiplier tube. About 1.5 hours later, the shutter was observed
to be closed when telemetry was acquired at a ground station. The
ST was powered down. On DAY 79, 02:26:00, the shutter operated
normally. Similar events were noted on the other occasions.
Possible explanations were examined, and inter-
mittent binding at some point in the shutter mechanism was found
to be the most likely problem. All the events and symptoms can be
explained if it is assumed the Star Tracker Shutter hung up due to
binding in a position where it was not fully open or closed but it
was still possible to obtain a star presence.
(c) Photomultipller Tube Degradation. On DAY
I01, the ST failed to acquire the target star, Alpha Crux. It was
believed that bright light, presumably from the earth's albedo, im-
pinged on the photomultiplier tube during a shutter anomaly. Light
as bright as the earth's albedo would permanently degrade the ST
sensitivity by 50% if exposed for twenty minutes.
In order to determine if photomultiplier tube
degradation had occurrea, and to determine the level of any de-
gradation, a number of stars of different magnitude were selected
and attempts to acquire each were made. It was found that the stars
of magnitude 0.56 and brighter could be acquired and tracked. Stars
of magnitude 0.66 and belc_ could not be acquired. Comparison with
ground test results indicate a sensitivity degradation of 30 - 5_.
(d) ST Encoder Failure. On DAY 228, a failure
was noted when the outer glmbal position indication went to zero and
the outer gimbal rate signal recorded a constant output. An analysis
of telemetry data was made and laboratory tests were performed to
simulate the failure mode. The failure was exactly duplicated by
interrupting the outer gimbal encoder output or the encoder lamp
excitation. It was therefore concluded that the outer gimbal encoder
had failed and in all probability would not recover. This failure
mode rendered the Star Tracker useless and its operation was terminated
(2) Impact. On several occasions during SL-2, the
Star Tracker erroneously locked on to on)ects other than the requlre_
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star. This caused the outer gimbal angle input to the roll reference
calculations to be inaccurate. On one occasion the erroneous in-
puts were received just prior to calculation of the momentum de-
saturation maneuvers. This resulted in degraded momentum manage-
ment performance and in less than optimum momentum states.
The Star Tracker Shutter anomaly resul:ed in tempo-
rary degradation in roll position information, but since the
shutter problems cleared themselves after a few hours, the data loss
was considered minimal. Work-around procedures required somewhat
long_r operating time by the crew.
The photomultlpller tube degradation resulted in the
loss of all stars of magnitude 0.66 or less as potential target
stars. Alpha Crux was among the stars which could no longer be
acquired. Since there were periods when both A=henar and Canopus,
the prime target stars, were occulted, another _tar of sufficient
magnitude was found (Rigil Kent).
Failure of the ST Outer Gin_al Encoder terminated
use of the unit, and backup roll u_'ate techniques had to be im-
plemented.
(3) Corrective Action. To preclude occurence of
the dump scheme interface problem and minimize tracking of stray
contaminants, use of the ST was restricted. A procedure was de-
veloped where the ST was utilized only during discrete periods.
This procedure impacted the experiments area since the ATMDC pro-
vided roll information based on ST information.
Work-around techniques were developed to deal with
the shutter anomalies and photomultiplier tube problem. If a stuck
shutter condition arose, the ST was imediately powered down, then
powered up during orbital night and repositioned to parking angles
looking at the dark surface of a blocking plate. The unit would
then be powered down again.
There were two reasons for keeping the ST powered
down anytime a shutter anomaly was present. First, the photo-
multiplier tube was not as sensitive to light damage with the
power off. Second, internal logic in the ST maintained power to
the shutter motor if the shutter was not in the required logic
state. This could result in permanent damage to the shutter motor.
As a consequence of photomultip]ier tube degradation,
the star Alpha Crux had to be deleted as a target star. Studies
were made to find suitable substitute stars. Ultimately, the star
Rigil Kent, magnitude +0.06, wan selected.
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Since the ST was a simplex device, failure of the
gimbal encoder terminated use of the Star Tracker. After the fail-
ure, on DAY 228, outer glmbal backups were computed by ground sup-
port personnel using vehicle inertia and solar elevation. This
method was later improved by having the crew periodically measure
star positions with a sextant.
2. Discrevancies.
a. Excitation of ATMSpar Bending Modes.
(I) Description. Dynamic coupling between the
vehicle ACS and the EPC was a major source of transient disturbances
to the ACS. Two predominant bending modes were excited. These
frequencies were approximately 0.81 Hz on the vehicle X and Z-axls
and 1.48 Hz on the Y-axls. Rolling the EPC canister caused X and
Z-axes Rack Rate Gyro oscillations. Peak amplitudes of approxi-
mately 0.02 degrees/second occurred at the start of the roll and
0.09 degrees/second occurred when the roll command terminated.
Caging the canister at sunset also excited the same frequencies.
(2) Impact. The transients associated with the
EPC roll activity caused momentary degradation of spar pointing
stability. There was concern that the structural ringing due te
spar roll might reach sufficient magnitude to cause Rack Rate Gyro
gain changes. The caging transient was not detrimental since
experiment pointing was terminated.
(3) Corrective Action. The crews were requested
not to use the 7 deg/sec roll rate or pulse the spar at the 3.5
deg/sec rate.
b. Sun Presence Timing Errors.
(I) Description. During early SL-2, the ATMDC
Effective Sun Rise (ESR) flag occurred in an irregular manner with
respect to the Acquisition Sun Sensor sun presence discrete. For
the solar elevation at the time, the ESR should have occurred 15.5
seconds after the sun presence discrete. However, ESR was observed
occurring within 2-3 seconds of sun presence, and sometimes came
prior to sun presence. There was s,xue irregularity at sunset, but
the irregularity was not as great as at sunrise. The state vector
indicated that the on board navigator was within 2.5 seconds of
beln8 correct.
(2) Impact. The timing problem had direc£ impact
on the Fine Sun Sensor (FSS), and was a potential problem for Rate
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Gyro RedundancyManagement (RGRM). Because actual sun presence
came somewhat later than planned, the FSS wedges were often released
before the aperture door was fully open. This resulted in an in-
correct change in wedge count (this problem is discussed below).
If RGPJ4was performing a Rate Gyro isolation at an
orbital sunrise and the Acquisition Sun Sensor sun presence dis-
crete came after ESR, RGRMwould have interpreted the disparity
as being the result of drift in the primary strapdo_m calculations,
; and secondary strapdo_would have been selected. _Ithough this
situation did not occur, the Rate Gyro dlfficultles being experienced
at the time made it an important area of concern.
(3) Corrective Action. Several possible causes for
the timlng error was investigated:
Possible error in earth radius to orbltal
radius ratio.
The AIHDC had an II second error in (TGHT),
which was being compensated in navigation
updates.
Possibility that sunllght was being refracted
through the atmosphere differently than antl-
clpated.
Correlation with solar elevatlon angle.
Acquisition Sun Sensor hardware problem.
No specific error source could be found. It was
felt that small errors in navisatlon parameters were having a
detrlmental, cumulative effect on the navl&atlon calculatlons.
By DAY 24, however, the time between sun presence and ESR had,in-
creased to 8-9 seconds. This time was considered adequate to pre-
clude RGPJ4 problems. The rate of navigati_n updates increased after
DAT 27, and the sunrise timing was kept within acceptable bounds.
c. Fine Sun Sensor Wedge Count Error.
(I) Description. Disparities arose between the
actual FSS Wedge position _nd the wed&? position readout as a re-
sult of the wedges being released (enabled) by the ATHDC prior to
the FSS Aperture Door being fully open. Transit of the door shadow
across the encoder detectors produced an output which the FSS Slgnal
Conditioner interpreted as wedge rotation. Th_s disparity could
only be rr_oved by driving the wedges through _he act1_al zero posi-
tion, where _ne encoder zero pulse would res_ t e counter _o zero.
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Allowance for the FSS aperture door opening time
was incorporated in the ATRDC Fllght Program when the experimmt
polntlngmode was automatically entered at sunrise. Navigation
and timing errors at times made these allowances inadequate. In
addition, no provisions werz made in the Fllght Program for the
aperture door opening time when the Experiment Pointing mode was
entered manually during the day period.
(2) Impact. Under most conditions, the error was
not significant. During ATHDC controlled pointing, however, erratic
spar behavior could result as the wedges were driven through zero.
the wedge counter would overflow when the count reached zero, but
the sign bit for the counter was tied to the encoder zero pulse.
In the absence of the zero pulse, the counter would reset to its
maximum value. The ATHDC would interpret this condition as a
large error and issue saturated wedge rate commands, causing un-
usual spar motions.
The effect of the error was partlcularly evident if
the disparity occurred during llne-of-slght (LOS) roll (see Section
VIIl). This problem was the cause of several LOS roll anom_lles.
(3) Corrective Action. A corrective procedure of
rezerolng the wedges at the beginning of orbltal day was establlshed.
d. EPC UP/DN Orbital Lc k Discrepancies.
(1) Description. On DAY 18S, the UP/DN Orbltal
Lock failed to uncage at orbital sunrise. As a result, the lock
motor and UP/DN actuators drew maximum current for qbout eight
minutes. The EPEA was switched to secondary and t,: spar uncaged
successfully when tested a few hours later. Normal ATH experiment
operation was not resumed untll DAY 19t, however. The UP/DN lock
again _dfled to uncage on DAY 201, but operated normally when tested
abouL an hour later.
It was concluded that an intermittent mechanlcal
binding had occurred, posslbly due to contamination from wiring
Insulatlon in the vicinity of the lock.
The uncage failhre was not observed again, and the
secondary orbital lock motor was used for the remainder of the
Skylab mission.
(2) Impact. Primary impact of the lock problem was
the temporary haltlns of Experiment Pointing Mode operations. There
was concern that a hard failure might occur between tracking stations
which would serlously limlt ATM experiment operations.
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(3) CoL,_-rive Action. Studies were made to develop
contingency plans. Following the second lock problem, however, it
was concluded that there was no need to limit or Iz,nibit EPC opera-
tions.
e. TACS Only Control on DAY 91.
(i) Description. On DAY 91, EREP end EREP Calibra-
tion Maneuvers were performed during two consecutive orbits, during
which momentum dumps were inhibited. As a result, the vehicle
entered a single-sample dump maneuver with a total momentum of
2.5 H. This did not leave sufficient momentum to maneuver the
vaktcle in all three axes. Momentum was prorated on each axis
• needing to the control gains, the X-axls galn being about I/6th
ef the Y and Z-axis gains. A rate buildup resulted on the X-axis,
end the X-axls attitude error eventually exceeded 20 degrees.
_/" This caused an automatic switch to TACS Only Control,
The Auto TACS Only Mode terminated the dump maneu-
_er, cased the CHGs to nominal momentum and initiated a return to
Solar Inertial attitude at maximum rate. The crew responded to the
CHG Saturation and Veh_<le Over-Rate Alerts and attempted to deter-
mine the cause of the _lerts and state of the control syJtem.
An involved and unusual sequence of events followed
during which a large amount of TACS fuel was consumed. The fact
that the CNCs were inhibited was not obvious and the situation was
clouded by Rate Gyro integral test failures and the faulty CHG
glmbsl angle readouts (discussed belov). In addition, the vehicle
was outside station coverage at the tbne, so that ground support
was not available.
(2) Impact. During the time that the vehicle was
in TACS Only Control, there was 11,454 N.sec of TACS impulse ex-
pended.
(3) Corrective Action. A soitware patch was studied
vhlch would prevent recurrence of the problem. However, because
the probability of a recurrence of the extreme TACS expenditure was
very sm_ll, the patch was never implemented. It was zeco_nded
that if the X-axis momentum ever exceeded 2000 N.m,s. and the
attitude error exceeded 10 degrees during dump, the maneuver would
be inhibited. This would allow Z-axls attitude to be updaeed. The
momentum cross coupling in X would produce a better mome.ntum state
for the next dump.
f. Faulty C_G Gimbal Angle Readout.
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(1) Description. During the sequence of events on
_Y 91, the crew selected the CMG gimbal _ngles for display on the
C&D Monitor Panel. This was done by se_,ting two rotary switches,
one which determined the measurement and another which determined
tlle hardware source (e.g., CHG No. 1). The selected sigr,_l was
displayed on a meter readout.
In this case, the outer gimbal angles of C}/G No. 1
and CMC No. 3 read off-scale-low. The crew interpreted the readiug
as gimbals on the stops. At the time, the CHGs were actually caged
to nominal momentum, and the two gimbals were not near the stops.
(2) Impact. Since the problem occurred at a _.ime
when the crew was attempting to determine the system status, the
erroneous reading implied that C_ cont:'_l was active when, in
fact, it was inhibited. It thereby materially added to the pro-
blem of restoring the vehicle to C}4C control.
(3) Corrective Action. The crew _as instructed co
move the Rotary Select Switch to the next position and back any
time a reading of -100"/. occurred.
g. CMG No. 3 Wheel Speed Transducer Failure.
(1) Description. On DAY 12, 09:56:00, the CldC
No. 3 wheel speed indication on telemetry went to zero. All other
data from C}/C No. 3 remained nominal, which indicated that the
wheel speed transducer had failed.
(2) Impact. Failure of the CHC No. 3 wheel _peed
transducer on DAY 12 had no impact on the missiou. CF,C motor
currents were an adequate indication of wheel speed.
(3) Corrective Action. None.
C. AI_S Mission Support Teem
I. Purpose. The Mission Support Team for the A._titude and
Pointing Control Syste_ was orsavlzed to provide real time support
for Johnson Space Center (JSC). This support was to provide direc-
tion, answer questions at_d analyze and solve problems that occurred.
The STAC (Support Team fo¢ Attitude Control) would receive problems
or q_estions from the OV (Operations Director) in HOSC (Huntsville
Operations Support Center). The STAC would then obtain answers from
the proper support group or groups, coordinate the an_b_ers and
_urnlsh a reply t,_ _ (Flight Operetions Hanagement Roo_) at JSC
through the OD at ,IOSC. After som_: mission time had passed,
rapport was _stabllshed wLth ASCO (ATI4DC Software Control Officer,
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and GNS (SWS Guidance Navigation and Control Systems Engineer)
Flight Controllers at JSC allowing direct communications with
these personnel.
2. Organi_ation.
a, Personnel. The origi_lal plan was to have two
complete APCS Teams (Red and Blue). Each te_m consisted of a
specialist in his field--such as TACS, Test, Software, Stability,
Simulators and each of _he hardware components--plus add. tioual
personnel to cover other contingencies. Each team was to work or
be on-call for 24 hours allowing the other team time to relax or
perform other tasks.
After the meteoroid shield was torn away, Al_S support
was cha_ed to provide continuous coverage of 24 hours per day.
Hanymem;ers worked seven days per week for three weeks until the
APCS teams were changed. Five teams were then formed so that full-
time covcrage would be available in each of the $PCS disciplines
an_ yet allow some much-needed time off for the mmnb_rs, mhe
HSFC-COHP/AERO and IBM simulator also provided this sane coverage
while the coverage of the other areas varied depending on the sit-
uation. This type support continued until the end of the mission,
although the coverage was somewhat reduced during _he unmanned
portions.
b. Data Source. A prime factor in pro_iding support
for the APCS team was adequate data. The six different data sources
providing data for the support teams were Real Time Console, Data
to Television (E/TV) Formats, Houston D/TV Formats, IBM Data _ou-
version, HOPS _tisslon Operation Planning System) and Data Books.
A description o_ each source follows:
(1) Real Time Console (Attitude Console). 1he
Attitude Console was set up to display the telemetered data re-
ceived from JSC. Any of 265 APCS measurements or events could be
displayed. Heters were used to display items such as CNCwheel
speeds, bearing temperature and TACS pressure. Lights were used
to indicate events or to indicate when a measurement Nay be near-
ing its limits. The console also contained two D/TV motsitors.
The formats were changed at the console by notifying a teletype
operator of the desired change.
Two eight channel recorders were used tc record
items such as global anRles, commands and Pate Cyzo pezfor._ance.
Later in the mission, _nother re_rder was utilized to record the
various CHC parmeters to maintain a close watch on th_ CNG per-
furnace.
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7Prior to launch of SL-2, mission support programs
were developed for use on a Hewlett-Packard desk type programmable
calculator to be located behind the Attitude Console. New programs
were developed during the mission, as the need arose.
(2) D/TV Formats. Data _V formats were displayed on _
monitors. Any of 39 APCS formats could be called up on o _nonitor by
the operator of the Attitude Console. The formats display d the '_f
telemetered data plus some calculated parameters. The formats were ;,
limited to 25 items of data.
(3) Houston D/TV Formats. Houston D/TV formats could
also be viewed on the monitor through special arrangements with 3SC.
These formats contained much more information and were apdated more
often than MSFC formats.
(4) IBM Data Conversion. Originally. the IBM data r_-
duction programs were written to convert only the 131ATMDC parameters.
The program would take as an input a data tape producei by HOSC at !
MSFC avd ._vert it tea Converted Data Tape (CDT). When _he IBM
data r_ _c_iotL roll was increased to include the capability to pro-
cess all PCM data, the programs had to be significantly modified.
his t'_s true of both the real time conversion pr,'_rams as well as
he All Digital Data Tape (ADDT) user tape conversion programs.
Later when the capahil_ty was required to process Engineering Units
Conversion (EUC) tapes, the ADDT user rape conversion programs were
again modified; however, these modifications were minimal.
(5) MOPS. Other data was obtained from the Mission
Operations Planning System (MOPS), which was a JSC system. This sy-
stem was a storage system in which real time or tape dump data cou d
be recalled for periods of up o 48 hours. This allowed data para-
meters to be obtained to analyze p1_blems or various occurrences.
Data could be obtained at the regular sample rate or as in some
cases as much as 12 samples per second.
(6) Data Books. All Digital Data Books were pub-
lished containing specitic APJS parameters. These were issued several
days after data was received and were useful in analyzing major pro-
b_ems.
c Facilities. The APCS Team was assig,_ed a work room in
Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC). This room contained a
d_ta TV, and communication lines consisting of a direct line to JSC
in addition to normal t_,]ephone communications. Several remote sites
h_vtnB various capabilities were also utilized. Thes_ area_ are
listed below:
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XBM Support Room at IBM, Huntsville
RAPS Room (Real Time Astrionics Problem Solving)
HSL (Hardware Simulation Laboratory) in Astrionics
Building
MSFC-COMP/AERO Simulation in Computation Laboratory
TACS Support Room in HOSC
Denver Support Room, Martin Marietta, Denver,
Colorado
Bendix Research Laboratories, Detroit, Michigan
A brief description of each remote site is contained in
the following paragraphs.
(i) IBM Mission Support. The Frimary role of IBM was
to provide support in the areas of ATMDC software and hardware. As
the mission progressed their role was greatly expanded to include
Data Reduction, Problem Tracking and Anomaly Analysis_
The IBM support team was comprised of specialists
in the following areas:
ATMDC Software System Analysis
Flight Programming
Simulation
CMG Control and Momentum Mmnagement
ATMDC/WC[U/MLU Hardware System Engineering
Data Reduction.
The personnel identified in these areas were the
people who played a significant part in the design, development, and
verification of the ATMDC Flight Progrzm. In addition, hardware
adn systems engineers familiar with the flight hardware and system
interfaces in both the hardware and software a:ea were assigned as
team members.
The computers used in the mission support role were
the same as those used in the design, development and verification
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of the ATMDC Flight Program. These computers were utilized as
Skylab simulators, for telemetry data reduction, maintaining ATMOC
memory images, and for development and verification of Flight Pro-
gram patches.
A room at IBM, Huntsville was dedicated to the mission
support activJty and contained communication lines, a D/TV monitor
and a telecopier.
More details concerning IBM participation in the
mission are contained in Reference 12.
(2) RAPS Support. The primary role of the RAPS
support was to provide an area in which the hardware designers
could monitor systems and hardware and provide real-time problem
solving. The personnel manning the room consisted of the hardware
personnel who designed and built the various items of hardware.
They monitored hardware performance daily to determine trends that
might have developed. They also provided information about limits,
proper usage of hardware, analyzed problems and furnished answers to
problems and questions that arose.
The RAPS Room was located in Astrionics Laboratory.
It contained _ V/TVmonitor, a hard copy machine and communication
lines.
(3) Hardware Simulation Laboratory. The primary ob-
jective of the Hardware Simulation Laboratory was to verify the
Fllght Programs. In addition the HSL was called upon to develop
procedures and examine various hardware problems.
Two support teams were established for the HSL.
Each consisted of a RAPS Room Engineer, two systems engineers, a
simulation engineer, a progra_ner and two technicians.
The HSL consisted of a Control Moment Gyro Subsystem
installation, an Experiment Pointing Control Subsystem installati.,n,
a Control and Display Cockpit Unit, the Flight and Support Computers,
and the necessary control and monitoring consoles. The selection
and placement of these test configurations was planned to facilitate
testing the system to simulated orbital conditions within the bounds
of practical methodology.
(4) MSFC-COMP/AERO Simulator. The MSFC-COMP/AERO
simulation was used to optimize the daily flight plan in order to
minimize TACS usage and gimbal stop problems during maneuvers. The
studies became critical after the failure of CMG No. 1 and the re-
sulting switch to 2-CMG control.
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The MSFC-COMP/AERO simulator had several teams consisting of
a systems engineer, a simulator engineer, a computer programmer and
computer technicians. The simulator had been planned to be dedicated
to Skylab only during critical phases. However, the anamolous con-
figuration of the vehicle caused the simulator to be dedicated to
Skylab for the entire mission.
The analog models included rigid and flexible body dynamics,
limited CMG dynamics and TACS. Digital models included CMG control,
momentum management, disturbance torques, maneuvering logic and or-
bital ephemeris.
(5) TA6S Mission Support. The primary roles of the
TACS Mission Support were observation of TACS performance and fuel
usage, monitoring for trends, real-time problem solving, and special
studies.
The TACS Mission Support Room was located in the
main conference room of the HOSC. Additional MDAC personnel were
located at the MDAC-W facility.
(6) Bendix Research Laboratories (BRL). The primary
function of BRL was to provide assistance in solving long range
problems and simulations.
A support group consisting of separate teams of four
analysts, three hybrid programmers, two digital programmers, two
computer technicians and a supervisory engineer was formed at
Bendix Research Laboratories. This group worked together in the
prelaunch period in preparing the four hybrid simulation models of
Skylab Control Systems as well as durll B the course of the mission
to provide technical support.
Four simulation models of Skylab Control Systems were
used for mission technical support. The four model simulated the
CMG Control System but differed in their emphasis on details. The
four models were:
CMG/TACS Control System Model
CMG Control Subsystem Model
CMG/EPC Control System Model
Six-Mass CMG Servo Model.
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(7) MartinMarletta, Denver, Colorado. The primary
function of MartlnMariatta, Denver was to provide a simulations and
assistance in long range solutions of problems. The personnel in-
volved were those who programmed and ran the simulations prior to
the mission.
Several simulators were available for long-range
problem analysis and solving.
One was an all-dlgltal simulation progranuned in
Fortran IV. During a typical Skylab orbit, which included a momen-
tum desaturatlonmaneuver but no TACS firing, the simulation ran
approximately 80 times faster than real time. Two other simulations,
an all digital and a hybrid simulator, were used to obtain attitude
reference calculations, vehicle Control Law calculatlons, and CMG
Control Law calculations.
3. Prevara_ion. Several months were spent in practicing
mission support by the STAC. The first practices were used to
acquaint the team personnel with communications, procedures, refer-
ence documents and the coordination aspecks of problems. Problems
or contingency situations requiring solutions were used in the
final practices. These practices involved the full team including
various simulators to arrive at a solution to the nroblem.
4. _. Following the launch of SL-I, the problems
which occurred slgnifican:ly changed the level of support planned
for the Skylab mission. The thermal problems and maneuvers of the
first 12 days and Rate Gyro scale factor and drift anomalies re-
quired constant monitoring and corrective action. The tempo of the
problems, action items and short response times during this phase
of the mlsslon support effort texed the team close to the limit of
capacity.
A few normal actlvities are listed below:
r
Daily reports
Daily tracking of system and hardware
Maneuver plannlng
Anomaly analysis
Inflight data analysis
Generation of Memory patches
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Provide data to JSC
Provide answers to JSC
Answer all Action Requests (ARs) and Mission Action
Requests (MARs)
Information came from a coordinated effort of all
remote locations. Maneut,er planning heavily involved the MSFC-COMP/
AERO Simulator and IBM. IBM was also directly respovsible for pro-
viding daily status reports, daily Rate Gyro drift plots, Rate Gyro
noise plots, and generating, verifying and delivering memory load
patches. The other support activities were involved in the detailed
analysis and long-range solutions of mission problems.
STAC effectiveness in solving mission problems was
greatly enhanced by the presence of many of the key personnel re-
sponsible for the design, develolxnent, analyses and verification of !_
the AFCS. No group of purely mission support personnel, regradless
of their training, could have provided the depth of system knowledge
required to determine solutlons to the many problems. Had these
design personnel not been dedicated to Skylab during the mission,
an Inevltable dilution of their APCS knowledge would have occurred.
5. Concluslons and Recommendati@_S. The entire operation
performed admirably considering that no one was prepared for con-
tinuous mission support. However, improvements are in order and
should be implemented if MSFC is to undertake any programs similar
to Skylab in .the future.
MSFC should not be dependent on JSC for data flow. MSFC
should have direct access to the tracking network through GSFC.
Furthermore, the backup command center should have been MSFC, not _
GSFC, since the system specialists were at MSFC.
The HOSC Data System was inadequate for the support required.
The following improvements are suggested:
More than 25 parameters per D/TV format.
More capability to dlsplav computer parameters.
Display update rate of once per second.
Real time programming capability on consols and D/TV
Better format call-up capabillty, i.e., eliminate the
teletype and institute a system similar to JSC's.
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Long-term D/TV plot capability. Fifteen minute maximum
is not adequate to detect trends.
Stripchart range should be variable.
Increase system redundancy.
Improvements could be made in the areas of facilities and
covmmunica=ion and should include:
Better display capability to remote support areas.
These areas should have their own display select
capability.
Better communication to remote areas (internal
conference loops).
More full-perlod voice lines between MSFC and JSC,
e.g., one for APCS, one for EPS, etc.
At least one handset at each console.
A call director in each support room. This would
eliminate the need for four phones in each room.
Larger facilities f_r support teams should be pro-
vided to accomodate the large numbers of people re-
quired during emergency operation.
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SECTION V. APCS Interfaces
A. Control and Disvlay Panel
l o Description° The C&D Panel provided crew interface for con-
trolling and monitoring the APCS. APCS related C&D Panel functions were
as follews :
a. Switching.
Redundancy management of the ATMDC, EPEA, SPAR RG,
FSS, ROLL RSLVR, & 800 Hz power
APCS mode selection
ST power, mode, and shutter control
EPC roll enable/Inhlblt, rate, & direction control
FSS door control
MPC enable/inhibit
CMG control
TACS enable/Inhlblt
Momentum dump enable/inhlblt and caging coatrol
Timing selection
i
Rate gyco monitor control
bo Analog Meters. Two meters provided capabillty for crew
monitoring of:
Moment,--
CMG wheel speed, phase currents, bearing tempera-
tures and glmbal angles
Acq, SS angles
TACS pressure
ca Digital counters. The following ATMDCdata could be selected
for display on three C&D Panel counters:
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Vehicle rates
Attitude errors
Caution and warning conditions
Alert conditions
ATMDCstatus words
ATMDC single memory data
Acq. SS angles
Roll reference and roll position
ST glmbal angles
FSS wedge position
i
Navigation parameters
d. Alerts. Five alerts were displayed on the C&D Panel-
C_3 malfunction
CMGhearing uvertemperature
Attitude control system malfunction
Computer reject of DAS/DCS coanand
FSS or experiment door open
e. APCS System Status Flags. Provided the crew with indica-
tions of hardware configurations selected, modes selected, sun and star
presence, momentmn dump status, and TACS firings.
f. Manual Pointing Co_troller. Provided the crew _lth the
capability of ma,mally pointing the ATM Canister and for positioning the
Star Tracker.
8. Digital Address Systei. Provided astronaut command capa-
bility to the ATMDCand to other APCS hardware through a Switch Selector.
2. Mission Operation. Operation of the APCS portion of the C&D
Panel was nominal with one exception. On DAY 217, ATMDCsoftware recog-
nized that the ATMDChad received excessive interrupts at the ATMDC/DAS
interface. This resulted when three or more interrupts were received in
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180 milliseconds or less tnd caused the ATMDC software to lock out the
interrupt. The prob,,_ cause _f "he problem was that cycling of the DA$-
ORBIT _ASE Switch o,_ the C&D _a,,elupset the logic state of the DAS Elec-
tronics. When a cora_and was then keyed in to this undefined state, the
ATMDC enable bit was pulsed severa_ times with no data bits. The problem
was transient and did not cause any ma_v, impact on the mission. The DCS
was used to upllnk a patch which re-enabled the masked interrupt.
3. Conclusions° The C&D Panel layout, control capability, and
parsmeter display was adequate to support crew efforts in APCS trouble-
shooting. No major problems were encountered in activation or deactiva-
tion.
The DAS provided the crew with command capability which would have
been impossible to implement w_,th switches because of space limitations.
Ground command interferred with the use of the DAS at times. Automatic
lockout o_ the DAS or DCS as a command was entered from the other would
have been a desirable design feature. The SL-4 crew reported that the
use of octal for cr_mandlng maneuver angles was awkward since the feed-
back provided was in declm_Is. In addition, they reported the DAS to be
time consuming for making small trial and error cluster maneuvers and would
have preferred to have had a control stick similar to the MI_ for this
purpose.
The alert system functioned as deslgred and contained an adequate
number of parameters to alert the crew of APCS =y_tem anomalies. One
problem wlth the system was that the alert lights occasionally went unno-
ticed for long periods of time. An audible alarm would have been deslrable
in the alert system.
B. Caution and Warning System
1. Description. The Caution and Warning (C&W) System provided
the crew with indications of major problem existence. In the APCS area
there were three types of C&Walerts.
a. Computer C&W. Activated by computer s_rltchover or a com-
puter self-test failure.
b. ACS Malfunctlon C&W. Activated by CMC saturation, switch
to TACS only, or a second Rate Gyro or Acq. SS failure in any axis.
I
c. Cluster Attitud_ C&W. Activated by vehlcle rates greater
then 0,3 des/set or by a stuck thruster which was determined from momen.
tim.
When a Computer or ACS Malfunction C&Woccurred the crew was alerted
by a 1KHz continuous tone. When a cluster attitude C&W occurred, the
cre_ _rs alerted with 1K_z tone frequency modulated a_ 1.4 KHz and a red
master alarm l_,p.
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The C&N condition which existed was stored in the C&N system memory
and the major type condition could be recalled by a switch on the C&N
Panel. In addition, the specific C&W con41tlon could be displayed on the
C_ Panel by keying a code into the DAS. The capability existed for In-
dlvldually inhibiting each C&W condition.
2. lllsslon Operation. Performance of the C&N system was as In-
tended. Crewmen reported that the inhibit switches w_re dlffi:ult to
locate at times (even though the layout co:respondL _ to the dlsplay) and
that checkout procedures were too extensive and not ea_y Co understand.
C. EVA Rotation Control Panel
1. pescrIptlon. When enabled from the C&D Panel, the EVA Rotation
Control Panel gave the crew the capability of rolltr_ the Experiment Can-
ister to the proper position for film removal and installation during an
EVA. Canister rates of 0.35/0.7 and 3.2/7.0 degrees per second could be
commanded from the EVA Panel. Selectlon rate gain (Xl or X2) was deter-
mined by C&D Panel switch status. Controls for opening and closing the
S08_ and S082B doors were also provided on the EVA Panel since these
doors had to be opened for film removal/replacement.
2. Mission Operatlon. No problems were encountered _th the EVA
Panel; it performed as desigred. One APCS system problem resulted from
rolling the canister at hlgl: rates, this being coupling of Canister mo-
tlon into the Rack Rate Gyros. As a result of this, Canister roll rates
were limited to 3.5 deg/sec from both theEVA Panel and the C&D Panel.
D. Electrlcal Power System
I. Description. The Electrical Power System converted solar power
to 28 Vdc electrlcal power. The 28 Vdc power was supplied to the APCS
from redundant, diode isolated buses. The APCS used part of the power
i_ the 28 Vdc form and converted part to different voltases and frequen-
ties. All APCS power was supplled from the ATM power syst._m except for
the TAC$ and the Rate Gyro Six-Pack _hich were powered by the AM pow_:
system.
The C}4GIA used the 28 Vdc power for circuitry within the CMGIA and
also senerated 130 Volt - 455 Hz, 28 Volt - 800 Hz, and I0 Volt - 4.8 Khz,
from the 28 Vdc power for distribution to other hardware. The following
is a description of the uses of the power generated in the CHOIA:
a. _)5 Hz. 130 volt, 455 Hz power was supplied to the CMG
splnmotor, to the FSS and to the ST.
b. 800 Hz. 28 volt, 806 Hz power was supplied to the MPC,
to the Ml_ channel of the EPEA for reference in demodulating the 14PC
signal, to the EPC UP/DN, L/R, and Roll Resolvers, and to the l_!U
for demodulation of the EPC resolvers.
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c. 4.8 KHz. 10 volt_ 4.8 Khz power was supplied to the exci-
tation coils of the linear and desaturation resolvers _n the CMG and to
the WCIU for reference in demodul,_ting the CMG desaturatlon resolver out-
puts. In addition, 4,8 KHz power w-'_ supplied to the CMG Servo Ampli-
fiers.
2. Mission Operation. Due to t:e loss of one OWS Solar Wing
and the failure of th_ second Wing to d_ploy, som_ APCS hardware was ini-
tially powered down tr,conserve power. One Rack Rate Gyro in each azls
was powered down. The Star Tracker_ Spar Rate Gyros, Fine Sun Sensor,
and Experiment Pointing Electronics Assembly were off-loaded when not
required for a maneuver. After the remaining OWF Solar Wing was success-
fully deployed, power off-loading of APC_ hardware wzs not required. The
APCS power off-loadlng did not interfere with the operation of the APCS.
One anomaly occurred in _he Electrical Power System which impacted
the APCS. On DAY 177 a _hort developed on TV Bus 2. This caused a tran-
sient on the APCS power buses which caused _he FSS wedge counter to be
zeroed. There were other occasions when the FSS wedges were zeroed; how-
ever, due to insufficient data the occurrencles could [totbe attributed
to power transients. This had a minor impact on the APCS; driving the
FSS wedges through zero, so that the wedge counter indicated true wedge
position, was required to correct the problem.
3. Conclusions. Other than t_e TV Bus 2 anomaly and Lhe minor
inconvenience, caused by power off-loading, the EPS/APCS interface func-
tioned as intended.
E. Networks
I. Description. Networks provided the relay logic for power co_-
trol, redundancy switching, and contzolling the state of APCS hardware.
In addlt_on, Networks provided be interconnect cabling for routing slg-
rials between various pieces of APCS hard,:are and interfacln8 the AI_S
with other systems. Functions provided by Networks wer_ as follows:
Control and distribution of power to the CMGIA,
ST. Acq. SS, RG, EFEA, FSS, ATMI)C, WCIU, and
._LU
CI_ wheel control
RG wheel control
CY_ desatuzatlon resolver sc_rce and reference
switching ;
800 Hz redundancy switching
t
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FSS _>or control
ATHDC, CMGIA, and CidGbearing heater enable/
inhibit
Interconnectlon between APCS hardware and inter°
facing the APCS vlth other systems
2. Mission O_ratlon. Because of the problems encountered with
the rack RGPs early in the mission, a major design change was implemented
during 5L-3. This involved installation of the six Rate Gyros (Slx-Pack)
and associated cabling and control boxes to replace six cf the Ra_.k Rate
Gyros. The RGP Six-Pack was mounted in the MDA and powered from an exist-
ing utility outlet off AM Bus No. 2. A new unit, Rate Gyro Control aria
Distrlbutor, was Installed in the HDA. The function of the Distributor
was to provide overcurrent prctectlon in the input power llnes _nd to
serve as a junction box for input power, gyro outputs, and gyru coarse/
fine gall; co,hands. An existing cable was disconnected from the C&D
Panel and a new '_" cable installed to permit routing of Gyro outputs and
gain c_ands through existing spare wires to the ATM. An EVA was per-
formed to install another new unit, the Rate Gyro Select Box, and to
attach break-ln cables. The existing cable which routed the Rack _ate
Gyro output i to the WCIU was disconnected at the WCIU and the cable use¢
for routing Six-Pack functions was disconnected at the ATM Tnmlon Plate.
Two '_" cables which were an integral part of the Rate Gyro Select Box
were connected _o the WCIU, ATM Trunlon Plate, and the two disconnected
cables. Through these cable_ and the Rate Gyro Select Box, Six-Pack out-
puts were connected to pins on the WCIU where Rack Rate Gyros No. 1 and
No. 2 had previously been connected. Rack Rate Gyro outputs were r_tted
to the Rate Gyro Select _.ox where one of the three outputs in each axis
could be selected as Gyro No. 3 for redundancy management purposes in the
ATNDC. Plans were to use the two Slx-Pack Rate Gyros in each axis for
control with the selected Rack Rate Gyro as a spare, but due to a single
failure point which existed in the Slx-Pack power source, the remainder
of the mlsslo, was flown with one Six-Pack Rate Gyro and the selected
Rack Rathe Gyro for each axis in control.
After Six-Pack installation, Rate Gyros were no longer a problem
but system analysis did suffer from loss of high speed telemetry (12
ssmples/sec) of the _Ix-Pack outputs although the oatputs were available
o_ AT]4DC telemetry at I ssmple every 2.5 seconds. Also, the Slx-P_ck RG
temperature measurements were not available on telemetry. As a result,
the crew was required to monitor Slx-Pack RG teaperatures periodlcally.
Only one a_omaly occurred in Electrical Networks which was related
to the APCS. On DAY 91, folloelng an EPh:P calibration maneuver, a con-
trol system deviation occurred because of an extremely bad momentum state.
Due to insufficient mcemntum in the X-axis, there was _: buildup of vehicle
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rates and attitude error resulting in a _ _itch to auto TACS only. In the
process of stabillzln8 the system the crew observed that one of the C&D
Panel analog meters was indicating ,_G No. 1 and C_ N_. , outer _Lmbals
were on a stop when actually they were caged. T_Is caused the crew to
coumand a nominal H cage b1_t had no effect on the CMGs since the ClUe
were already caged. In a later test, the problem was obse,_ed only on
the CMP No. I measurement. The cause of the problem was dete_Inlned to be
InCennlttent operation of a relay in the Networks.
Loading of CMGwheel speed and Phase A current telemetry measure-
ments by the C&D Panel analog meter was recognized during eL-4 _s a system
design problem. When the crew selectel one of these measurements o,_ the
C&Dmeter a decrease in the telemetry measurements occurred instanteously.
Since the C&Dmeter and the telemetry measurement were paraUeled in Net-
works _rlthout _ny isolation, current drawn by the meter caused a us1 ._e
drop across a reslstor c_n to both measurements in *he C}4CIA. The
measurermnt shoul_ have been taken off the CMCIA Signal Conditioners
through separate resistors.
3. Conclusions. Except for the relay failure discussed -tn_er
Htssion Operation above, the Electrical Networks/APCS ~_terface func-
tioned as deb:gned. Installation of the Rate Gyr¢ S_x°Pack demon_ _rates
that design changes/hardware replacemen_ can be a._.ompttshed in space
an_ that future spacecraft should be designed with repair/replacement _n
mind.
F. Tl_rmal Control Sys_e_
1. Description. The The_tal Control System (TCS) provided ther-
e81 protection to APCS hardware. Thll was accomplished by passive me-
thods on rack mounted hardware. In addition to passive therm_l contxol,
temperatures of eq_ipumnt mounted within the ATM Experieent 'anlster
were controtled by an active fluid thermal control system. All APCS
hardware was rack-_ounted except for the Spar Rate Gyros and the Fi_,e
Sun Sensor Opto-Hechanical Assembly, Presaplifier Electronics, a_d Con-
trol Electronics.
The Canister active thermal control system, which coul4 supply heat
as well as radia, e heat, maintained the Canister temperature at 10 _ .5°C.
The Canister wall contained cold plates through ,_ich fluid was circulated
to absorb the heat. The heat absorbed was then transported to radiators
where it w_s radiated to space.
Paesivee_ethods used for APCS hardware thcnu_t control _mre _s
follows:
Surface coatings - _hite paint was used on eli
ext_mlly exposed surfaces
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Solar shield - The sun end of the ATM contained a
shield to prevent direct sunli&ht impingement on
rack hardware
Thermel shields - Heat losses of components with
low power density were reduced by using thermal •
shields which were covered with insulation.
Insulation - Mounting panels were covered with
insulation
Thermal isolation - Various components were con-
ductively isolated from the rack structure
Thermostatically controlled heaters were used on some APCS hardware
to supplement the TCS. CMGbearings were maintained within a + 15 to
+ 26°C range by heaters internal to the CMG. Rate Gyros contained heaters
for maintaining their fluid temperature at 67.8 + l°C. The ATMDC, CMGIA
and ST OMAhad heaters for regulating the temperature of the entire units.
2. Mission Operation. Due to the loss of the OWSmeteoroid shield
during Skylab launch, the vehicle was _lown in a thermal attitude (X = O,
Y = -45, Z = 0) for the first 13 days of the mission to regulate O_S tem-
peratures. Ibis created a thermal environment for some APCS hardware
which was different than anticipated. Although APCS hardware tempera-
tures were different than expected while in the thermal attitude, they
were maintained within design limits and there -_as no adverse effect on
the equipment operation. While in the thermal attitude, temperature
measurements on the Solar Arrays and the OWS skin were used to roughly
determine attitude. This was necessary since the sun was out of the Acq.
SS fleld-of-vlew.
There were thermal fluctuations in the APCS hardware which were
caused by changes in solar elevation and maneuvering. Temperatures
changed gradually with solar elevation for all hardware except for the
Acq. SS which had a change of 15°C for each day/night cycle. The effects
of solar elevation are tabulated in Table 4. Increases in solar eleva-
tion increased the cycle time for the CMGbearing heaters and at large
solar elevation the bearings were maintained in the range where heater
turn-on was not required. The only unit which had a large thermal fluc-
tuation due to normal operation was the Roll Actuator. Temperature changes
of 13°C were observed when the Roll Actuator was activated.
3. Conclu.gion s. Thermal control of APCS hardware was satisfactory.
Even during the period that Skylab was in the thermal attitude, tempera- _
tures of APCS hardware were main_ained within design limits.
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G. Instrumentation and Communication
I. Description. IRe Instrumentation and Ca_munication (INC) Sys-
tem provided the ground capability for control and monitoring of the APCS.
This allowed the ground to perform routine monitoring and control which
would have required considerable crew time, provided backup for onboard
controls, and gave ground operation control of the APCS during unmanned
flight, i
The Telemetry System took raw analog data from the APCS and signal
conditioned the data into amplitude limits compatible with the system.
This data was then fed into multiplexers. Other data which was conditioned
within the APCS hardware and APCS digital data were fed directly into mul-
tiplexers. The multiplexed data was then fed to the PCM telemetry system
where it was converted to a 10-bit digital word and formated for real time
transmission to the ground or recording when not over a ground station.
APCS real time data was availsb!e at sample rates of up to 24 ssmples/sec.
While not over a ground station, the Auxiliary Storage and Playback Unit
(ASAP) extracted presclected portions of the data and recorded it for
playback later. This data was available at a rate of one sample per sec-
ond for PCM data and one sample per 15 seconds for ATMDC digital data.
The Digital Command System provided the ground with the same capa-
bility of commanding the APCS that the Digital Address System gave the _
crew. The DCS could address one of four Switch Selectors or the ATMDC
which in turn executed the command.
2. Mission Operation. Performance of the I&C/APCS interface was
as designed. Although noise on APCS measurements met design require-
ments, some measurements, for example the FSS errors, contained noise
which degraded the usefulness of the measurement. Only one APCS measure-
ment was lost during the mission, that being CMG No. 3 wheel speed which
was caused by a transducer failure.
3. Conclusions. ATMDC telemetry and PCM telemetry were difficult
to correlate due to the different cycle times of the two systems. Cycle
times that were a multiple of e_ch other would have aided data analysis.
Some additional measurements, especially on the Star Tracker, would have
been helpful in solving problems. There was some difficulty in deter-
mining what the crew was commanding; a telemetry measurement on each com-
mand function would have been desirable. An increased recording capa-
bility for ASAP data would have been highly desirable.
H. Space Environment
Several Star Tracker problems resulted from the environment in wt_lch
it operated. Contamination produced by the sloughing of paint and du_ _,
outgassing, and venting caused Star Tracker loss of star numerous times.
As a contamination particle with reflected light brighter than the star
being tracked came into the NT field-of-view, the ST would track the par-
ticles. False ST lock-on also occurred, due to reflected light from the
vehicle surfaces. See Section VII.B.
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SECTION VI. ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM
A. Navigation and Attitude Reference
I. Attitude Reference.
a. Description and Design Goals. The SWS attitude
reference was maintained for attitude control and display purposes.
The four-parameter strapdown method, based on Euler's theorem, pro-
vided an SWS attitude reference relative to a desi=ed reference.
Vehicle rates were sensed by triple redundant Rate Gyros. The
I Rate Gyro outputs were sampled by double redundant multiplexed
: Analog-to-Digital (A/D) Converters. The outputs of the A/D Con-
verters were used as the primary input to the strapdown reference
calculations. The dynamic range of the Gyros and the A/D Converters
was extended by operating the Rate Gyros with selectable gains. The
tWO gain ranges were _ 1.0 and _ 0.i degrees per second full scale, i
The scale change was commanded by the digital computer at about 0.09
degrees per second. The ATMDCmade a conversion calculation of the
information received from the A/D Converters. The A/D Converters
operated with I0 bits plus sign. During orbital daylight in the
Solar Inertial attitude, attitude error data from Acquisition Sun
Sensors (Acq. SS) was used to update the strapdown reference in the
X and Y-axes. The Star Tracker, ground updates, and the momentum
management scheme were used to update and stabilize the Z-axls
reference. Figure 13 shows the role of the strapdown in the APCS.
The attitude reference design goals consisted of a com-
putational accuracy requirement and an updating or compensation
capability. The computational accuracy requirement was a portion
of the total Skylab system pointing requirements and the compensation
capability provided the meanb for compensation of system anomalies.
(1) Accuracy. The error sources were categorized
according to the factors on which they were primarily dependent.
These were initialization, tlme-dependent, and maneuver-dependent
errors.
The initialization errors included the accuracy of
the Sun Sensor and its misallgnment, and errors in computing the
location of the orbital plane.
The significant time-dependent errors were caused by
the Rate Gyro drift, drift in the digital computation, and the A/D
Converter scale factor error. The maneuver magnitude-dependent
errors were caused by Rate Gyro scale factor errors, and Rate Gyro
misalignment.
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The attitude reference computatiotLal accuracy re-
quirement was that the eigen-axis rotation represented by the atti-
tude reference quaternion must not drift, due to software imple-
mentation of the attitude reference equations, more than 0.J5 degrees
per hour when operating with fine scale Rate Gyro readings, or 1.5
degrees per hour when operating with coarse scale Rate Gyro readings.
The most stringent requirements occurred when the
system was operating in the Z-LV rotating reference frame. Table
5 gives the accuracy requirements for the APCS operating in Z-LV.
Table 5. Pointing Accuracy Requirements and Budget
Position
Operational Requirement Attitude Structural Navigation and
Attitude and Purpose Navigation Misallgnments Control Error
- I (deg) (deg) (deg) (deg)
I
Z-LV 2.5 Each Axis 1.5 0.5 0.5
Earth Resources
.... i J
In the Solar Inertial and Experiment Pointing modes,
strapdown calculations were performed double-precision. These cal-
culations were performed single-precision while in all other modes.
As an example, the strapdown calculations X-axls jitter was about
0.6 arc minutes using double-precision compared with 1.7 arc minutes
using single-precislon.
(2) Rate Gyro Scale Factor and Drift. Due to the
physical characteristics of the Rate Gyros on the Skylab vehicle,
the ATMDC software was designed and programmed to compensate for
possible errors. These errors were of two distinct types: Rate
Gyro scale factor errors and Rate Gyro drift errors. Scale factor
error is one in whlch the amount of error is directly proportional
to the sensed rate. Drift is a constant error or bias. Software
capability was provided to change the Y-axis Rate Gyro scale factor
compensation. The scale factor compensation had a range from 0.0
to 2.0 and could be entered as an ATMDC memory load via the DAS/DCS.
The Rate Cyro drift compensation could be applied to any Rate Cyro
in any axis and could be entered as an ATKDC memory load. The range
of the drift compensation was approxlmately _ 22.7 degrees per hour.
(3) Attitude Updates. Since the attitude reference
did drift during test and flight, it had to be updated periodically.
The system was designed so that the attitude reference would be
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updated while in the Solar Inertial attitude and allowed to drift
while in other attitudes (Z-LV, etc.). This was acceptable since
no long periods of non-Solar Inertial attitude were planned. The
X and Y-axes attitudes were updated continuously while in the Solar
Inertial orbital daylight. The Z-axis attitude was updated once
per orbit using the Star Tracker data.
b. History, The attitude navigation system for Skylab
uses components originally designed for the earlier Wet Workshop
ATM. A much more demanding mission requirement was imposed in the
Dry Workshop than in the earlier Wet Workshop and yet the hardware
components were basically unchanged. The design of the new system
was constrained to utilize existing hardware if at all possible.
The upgrading of the system, using the same hardware was accomplished
in three ways:
By tightening component specifications where con-
servative design would permit without hardware
impact.
By using onboard compensation for some of the
deterministic errorq.
By selecting the most accurate instruments
to fill critical positions.
c. Design, Test, and Verification. A number of digital
simulations were built to study the effects of sampling noisy Rate
Gyro signals, the roundoff error on the A/D Converter, and the
truncation and roundoff error of the strapdown algorithm. The
fixed-point arithmetic of the ATM Digital Computer and the computa-
tion cycle time were also simulated. Typical maneuver profiles
were chosen to study the combination of these effects. Table 6
lists the results of an error source study.
The computational drift was tested prior to delivery of
the final Flight Program using both the actual Flight Program and
an IBM System/360 Ilight Program Model. Tests were run at high
and low rates during Z-LV and Attitude lloldmaneuvers, and while
maintaining an intertlal attitude. The results showed that the
attitude reference drift was less than 0.15 degrees per hour for
all tests with the majority being less than 0.I degrees per hour.
d. System Performance.
(I) Accuracy. Loss of tile meteoroid shield and re-
sulting thermal and solar power requirements shortly after orbital
insertion required maintenance of an attitude where the Z-axls was
not pointing at the sun. This was accomplished using the Attitude
Hold Mode. The large and changing Rate Gyro drift present in the
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Table 6. Strapdown Inertial Reference Error Sources Study
Error Source Specification Results
.. x y z
Gyro Drift (deg/hr) 0.1 0.06 0.03 0.01
Scale Factor Nonlinearity (percent)
Fine Scale 1.0 0.18 0.14 0.40
Coarse Scale 1.0 0.74 0.42 0.52
Gyro Misalignment (arc min) 30 i0 i0 I0
A/D Converter (percent full scale) 0.i 0.I 0.I 0.i
Computation (deglhr)
Fine Scale NA 0.15 0.15 0.15
Coarse Scale NA 1.0 1.0 1.0
Initialization (deg)
Star Tracker NA 0.1 0.1 0.1
Momentum Management NA 0.I 0.I 3.54
original Rack Rate Gyros presented serious difficulties in maintain-
ing attitude and attitude reference. Due to the length of time in
maintaining the thermal attitude w_thout a position update the strap-
down reference became greatly degraded. The strapdownwas continuous-
ly reinitialized to the present attitude because in the event of a
computer switchover the Flight Program reinitialization would have
automatically commanded the vehicle to an erroneous Solar Inertial
attitude. Since the A_DC had no information on vehlcle attitude,
it was necessary to maintain attitude reference on the ground. It
became apparent that Rate Gyro drift made it impossible to deter-
mine attitude from a reconstruction of the command history. There*
fore, an improved method of attitude determination was required.
Solar panel power was proportional to the cosine of the sun angle
(i.e. between the Z-axis and the sun line) and this data could be
utilized. However the power indication alone left two degrees of
freedom of uncertainty. These were the Z-axis in a cone about the
sun line and the vehicle rotation about the sun line. To resolve
' these additional degrees of freedom, thermal measurements, shadow
patterns and momentum sample data were used. The temperatures of
93
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certain ATM components indicated the angle of the sun line to the
vehicle Y-Z plane, the momentum samples provided the angle of the
vehicle X-principal axis relative to the orbit plane.
Despite inaccuracies, the results were sufficient to
provide inforNatlon on vehicle attitude accurate to a fev degrees.
After installation of the solar umbrella the vehicle
was returned to Solar Inertial attitude. The Gyro drifts were
compensated end strapdown attitude reference was updated usin 8 the
Aoquisleion Sun Sensor and Star Tracker.
After installation of the Six-Pack Gyro P_ckage,
Six-Pack calibration _aneuvers were performed to deterNine the _o
misalignNent. The mlsalignment was determined to be 0.i degree
40.1 degree about the X-axls, -0.24 degrees _ 0.1 degree about the
Y-axis an_ 0.30 degrees _ 0.2 degrees about the Z-axls. The mis-
alignment angles were quoted with tolerances because they were so
small they stretched the accuracy of the alignment determ£natlon
method. A Six-Pack misalignment patch for the Flight Program was
developed but was not loaded because the misalignment was so small
that compensation was not required.
As the mission progressed, the Star Tracker deterlo-
rated. Backup methods of updating the Z-axis attitude reference
were developed. These are discussed in Section VI. A. 3.
(2) Rate Gyro Scale Factor and Drift Compensation.
A ]_nitation on the amount of scale _actor correction and drift
compensation was imposed by the fact that scale switching relays
for the Rate Gyros were activated by the flight soft_aare when the
compensated rate (sensed rate plus any compensation) exceeded a
certain limit (initially 0.095 deg/sec for a switch to coarse scale
and 0.085 deg/sec for a switch to fine scale). In order to main-
tain the integrLty of this program_ no scale factor corrections
smaller then 0.9_ could be entered, and no drift compensation
greater than 0.005 degrees per second could be used. The switching
limit was changed on DAY 39 (from 0.095 to 0.088 and from 0,085
to 0_078) to allow greeter scale factor error compensation and
larger drift compensation values to be used.
The scale factor correction capability was execcised
four times during the Skylab mission end the resulting cor:ections
applied to the Y2 and Y3 Rate Gyros. The Y3 Rate Oyro scale factor
in the prUnary A11_C program was changed from 1.000000 to 0.9942383
on DAY 22, On DAY 28 the sa_e change was implemented in the sec-
ondary ATHDC software. The Y2 Rate Gyro scale factor was changed
from 1.000000 to 0.938967 in the secondary ATHDC softvare on DAY 39.
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After installation of the Six-Pack Rate Cyro package on DAY 103
the scale factors for bo_h Y2 and Y3 were restored to a value of
1.000000 in the secondary ATMDC software. The Rate Gyro drift
compensation capability in the ATMDC Flight Program was exercised
considerably more than the scale factor capability. Between DAY I
and DAY 103 the Rate Gyro drift compensation DCS/DAS command input
was utilized over 280 times to change the drift compensation for
the nine Rate Gyros. After the Six-Pack Rate Gyro package was in-
stalled, only two drift compensation changes were entered.
(3) JOP 13Naueuvers. A procedure was developed
during the mission to utillze the high resolution Solar Inertial
computation accuracy for JOP-13 and JOP-18D (Kohoutek). The
secondary Acquisition Sun Sensor was selected for control and
Acquisition Sun Sensor Redundancy Management was inhibited. The
secondary Acquisition Sun Sensor was then powered down. This in-
sured zero error signal from the Acquisition Sun Sensor to the
strapdown update. After the maneuver to point at the target was
completed in the Attitude Hold Mode, the strapdown calculation was
reinitialized. The Solar Inertial Mode was then selected for the
experLment. After c_mpletion of the experiment, Attitude Hold was
selected and the maneuvers for an approximate return to Solar
Inertial were commanded. After the return maneuver was completed,
the repowering of the Acquisition Sun Sensor and the selection of
Solar Inertial caused the Acquisition Sun Sensor to update the
strapdown in X and Y and converge the vehicle Z-axis to the sun.
The maneuver had put the X-principal axis approximately in the or-
bit plane and the next desaturation maneuver converged the X-prin-
clpal axis into the o=bital plane.
2. Navi&ation and Timing.
a, Description. The ATI_C Flight Program was con-
figured to provide navigation and timing information for the S_.
The navigation scheme was designed to maintain knowledge of SWS
position in orbit relative to orbital midnight. Significant orbital
event times were calculated and, along with SWS position in orbit,
were used to determine day/night phase of orbit and time remaining
in the prevailing orbital phase. This information along with
several Intermediate parameter calculations, were used to support
other functional areas of the program such as maneuvering, momentum
managoment, orbital plane error, roll reference, etc., as well as
for display purposes.
The navigation equations were derived to relate the
orientation of the orbital plane in inertlal space to the equatorial
plane and the orientation of the sun vector relative to the orbltel
plane. In deriving equations for the necessary p_ra_eters, signtfieant
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slmpllfluation was •chleved by ••strains • clrcu1•r orbit. The
• ssumptlon was made that between orblt•l midnights the movement of
the earth about the sun and the rqressLon o5 lonSltude o5 the
orbital ascending node could be Isuored. To f.•cilit•te periodic
coupans•tlon for navls•tlon drift due to these assumptions and
• nticlpated off-nomlnal orbits, sufficient navlsatlou p•rsmoterr
were wad• updat•ble to reiniti•lize the scheme per 8:ound calcu-
lations.
Other navis•tion scheme functional requirements included
maintenance of nLssion t£ae from one of two available tiers and
execution of • partial navigation scheme followin8 8vttchover. The
pa,'ttal scheme was • subset of the primary umvig•tian equations
dosfdnateC to be executed follovinS svitchover until • nav/_atiou
update was issued. The p_rtial scheme was demonstrated as properly
implemented followil_ the switchover on DAY 27.
Eleven navisation parameters were uade updatable via the
I_/DCS comnand system in order to adjust the naviSation scheme
to o£f-noulual orbits. The 11 parameters at•:
Lonsitude ot orbital eacendins node
Period between asceudin8 nodal crossinss
Orbital plane inclination
Ratio of earth to orbital redtus
thanes to previous orbital midnight tie
Orbital r•te
Moan •nouJly o5 earth in solar orbit reforenced
to perihelion
Solar _Ova_iOn Aerie
_ol_aphic lousitude of orbits1 8scendin8 node
Orbital plsne nodal rqressiou rate
Orb£tal atdn/_ht period chauSe
The value of _ch update par_t_r, vith the qmCOlPtton
of Solar |levst£on Ansle, yes valid st the actual time of the updste.
The Solar IDevatLou Ansle was updated to the value for the prevLona
orbital midn_ht.
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One of the most important navigation parameters was the
Solar Elevation Angle, which was defined as the angle that a line
from the center of the earth to the sun makes with the orbital
plane. The Solar Elevation varied between plus and mlnus 73 degrees
and its time history during the mission is shown in figure 14.
b. Developme_i:. Th'. original Wet Workshop navigation
and timing r'..quirementsconsisted of maintalnl_ the orbital plane,
sun and SWS orientations to provide navigation and tlm!m8 infor.-Jation
for the SWS.
The first Dry Workshop program replaced the computatloo,
and dlsplay of earth-referenced latitude and longitude data with
earth-referenced ascending node and time from no&_l crossing
computation and display. This simplified the couq_utat!on and still
provided the necessary crew display data. Later programs had four
major chan_es :
Computed tG_4T from the real time clock as opposed
to the A and B mission timers.
Deleted the testing and automatic selectlon of
the A and B mission timers.
Deleted the backup navigation scheme _Ich
derived its information from the Acq. SS.
A slmplified navigation was still provided
for use following an AT_ owitchover to
maintain a navigation reference until DAS/DCS
updates could be transmitted.
Based the navigation and timing reference on
orbital midnight crossing instead of 8scendina
node cross £n8.
All of these changes w_re primarily for memory sav/J_8
and reduced the complexity of the program withnut sacrificing any
capabilitles.
Asi#e from several navigation date chanps, there were
no other major navigation and timing design changes.
c. Mission Operations. The original Skylab laur'h
achieved a nut-circular orbit with 5n initial aposea of 441 Km and
s pm'.sae of 437 _. During the course of the mission, several trim
burns _mr_ executed to adjust the SkyLsb orbit to provide repeatable
_round tracks for Earth Resources Experiment passes. These trim
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burns combined with normal orbit degradation resulted in the apogee
ranging from 441Km to 456 Km and the perigee ranging from 421 Km
to 437 Km.
The navigation update capability was used extensively
during the course of the mission. During the 271 days of Skylab,
there were 152 navigation updates issued. Six of these occurred
during primary computer operation in the first 26 days of the
missiun and the remaining 146 were issued during secondary compu=er
operation following switchover on DAy 2,. The criteria used for
determining the requirement to update the navigation scheme involved
a comparison of the actual time of orbital midnight to the Flight
Program calculated value was in error by five or more seconds, then
a navigation update would be formulated and uplin|-ed. Navigation
updates were also used to help control naviBation day/nlght conflicts
with sun presence indications from the Acquisition Sun Sensors
(see Section VII.D). Several of the updated parameters involved
angle variables cycled 0 - 360 degrees each earth orbit and as ex-
pected exhibited a cyclic update value history. Others, such as the
time parameters, exhibited non-cyclic update histories.
In summary, all the parameters which were critical to
the integrity of the navigation scheme were updated successfully
in order to adapt the navigation scheme to the changes in orbit as
the SWS orbit degraded between trim burns. This success was in-
dicative of not only sound design and critical parameter designation,
but al_o good performance of the software designed to process updates
to the navigation scheme. I
Mission time for display was maintained from one of two
available mission timers. The redundant mission timers were 29
bit registers that stored time in terms of days, hours, minutes,
and seconds. These timers utilized basic oscillators separate from
those used to provide ATMI)C software timing. Mission time data was
obtained from either Timer A located in the ATMDC or Timer B located
in the WCIU. Either timer could be selected for use via switch
selector command and timer drift could be compensated via a DCS
command to the ATMDC.
During the first 26 days of the Skylab mission, the two
timers were alternately used in an effort to determine which timer
was most stable. The first timer update occurred on DAY ll when !
Timer B was updated by (-ii) seconds. The next update was to Timer
A on DAY 21 and was an amount of (-4) seconds. The last update to
Timer B was on DAY 24 by a delta of (-18) seconds. After the switch-
over to the secondary computer, on DAY 27, Timer A was used for the
remainder of the mission. During this time, Timer A exhibited a
positive drift of approximately 0.3 seconds per day whlch was well
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within the specification tolerance. Following switchover, the
timer was held within an accuracy of 3 seconds requiring an u|date
every ii to 13 days. This resulted in a total of 21 updates to the
secondary computer Timer A.
The navigation scheme interfaced with various program
functional areas including both Rate Gyro and Acquisition Sun
Sensor Redundancy Management. The navigation logic determined
whether the vehicle was in the "day" or "night" portion of the
orbit. This day/night indication affected dual Rate Gyro post
failure detection processing, single Rate Gyro failure detection
processing, and Acquisition Sun Sensor failure detection processing.
These Redundancy Management functions, if required, were performed
if all the following conditions were satisfied.
The APCS was in the Solar Inertial or
Experiment Pointing Mode.
A Solar Inertial Acquisition maneuver was
not in progress.
The SWS was in the "day" portion of the orbit.
The Sun Presence Indicator was set to light.
However, these Redundancy Management functions would
also be executed if only the first three of the four conditions
above were satisfied and the prime strapdown indicated that t_=
SWS was within 3.25 degrees of the Solar Inertial attitude. The
day/night indication was a function of true sun time or effectivL
sun time depending upon whether the sun timing option or the com-
puter timing option, respecti_,ely, was selected. The integrity
of the redundancy management interface required that the Sun
Presence Indicator, which was set in reaction to the status of the
Sun Preset_ce discrete inplzts, must be set to "light" it all poi_s
in the navigation determined "day" portion of the SWS orbit. This
was required because a Rate Gyro failure would be declared if the {
conditions discussed above indicated that a "light" indication was
expected (i.e., navigation indicated "day" portion of orbit), but
the _un Presence Indicator was set to "dark". Also, if this integri-
ty was not preserved, then Acquisition Sun Sensor Redundancy Manage-
merit logic would be executed during a portion of orbit not considered
by the original design, possibly introducing problems.
?
A potential problem existed during the course of the
mission relative to the navigation/sun presence indication inter-
face. The Sun Presence discretes appeared to indicate "light"
approximately 5 seconds after computed true sunrise ._d disappeared
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to indicate "dark" approximately 5 seconds prior to computed true
sunset. This left a 5 second window at sunrise/sunset in which
the vehicle would be in the "day" portion of the orbit with the
sun presence indication set to "dark" if the sun timing option
was selected.
Another program area affected by navigation was program
control of the Fine Sun Sensor (FSS) aperture door OPEN/CLOSE and
wedge }{OLD/RELEASE functions. The FSS aperture door was opened at
sunrise when the Sun Presence discretes were activated. The FSS
wedges were released at the start of the navigation "day" portion
of orbit. Due to the navigation timing situation introduced by
the Sun Presence sensitivity, with computer timing selected, the
FSS wedges were, on some occasions, released approximately 3 - 5
seconds prior to completion of _he aperture door open operation.
Since FSS wedge position readouts were sensitive to changes in
light exposure, the wedge readings sometimes changed by one count
at sunrise even though there was no actual change in displacement.
(See Section VIII. B).
A similar discrepancy involving experiment interface
was attributed to navigation timing properties during periods of
all daylight orbit (absolute value of solar etevation greater than
69.4 degrees) processing. It was possible during periods of an
all daylight orbit that the time remaining in orbital phase cal-
culation might result in a negative value at orbital midnight.
This possibility had been documented prior to the mission in an
ATMDC software program note (PN6-057). When this happened during
the mission, it caused some concern because as a consequence of
t_ne remaining being negative, the navigation logic determined
"night" phase of orbit and disabled the EPEA, closing various
experiment doors. This happened only once during the mission and
was at a time when the experiments were not actzvely being used.
Also, the situation was in effect a nmximum of two slow loops before
the time remaining value corrected itself and the experiment doors
were reopened.
Related also to the navigation Sun Timing/Sun Presence
interactions was the up-linking of a program patch prior to the
planned swltchover on DAY 160. S:_nceSun Timing was automatically
selected by the software following switchover and the Rate Gyros
were behaving so erratically, there was considerable concern about
what might happen following the switchover. This concern resulted
in a Flight Program patch ($3030) to alter the initial value which
the ratio of earth radius to Orbital Radius would have following
the switchover. The ratio was changed so as to effect a true
sunrise value not to precede the Sun Presence indication at sunrise
lOl
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value not to occur subsequent to loss of Sun Presence, thus avoiding
any potential Redundancy Management interface problems.
Since the effective sunrise define a significantly
longer "night" phase of orbit, the computer timing option was not
affected by the Sun Presence indicator sensitivity characteristics
as far as Redundancy Management interface was concerned. Hence,
computer timing was the option selected for the greater part of
the mission. Occasionally, Sun Timing was selected to extend the
viewing time during various experimental observation periods.
This advantage of Sun Timing was due to the fact that the true
sunrise and sunset times define the longer navigation "day" phase
and this is required to activate the Experiment Electro_ics Assembly.
During periods of Sun Timing Operation, the Rate Gyro aad _cquisition
Sun Sensor Redundancy Management performance was monitored very
closely to insure that the potential problems never materialized.
Consequently, the unexpected Sun Presence indication sensitivity
characteristics were never allowed to be a deterrent to performing
any planned experiment activitie_ and at the same time any poten-
tial Redundancy Management interface problems were avoided.
3. Roll Reference.
a. Description. The Star Tracker acquired one of three
reference stars to provide an orbital plane error angle and a solar
reference angle, called the roll reference angle. The primary
reference star, Canopus, and the secondary reference stars, Achenar
and Alpha Crux, were selected on the basis of their magnitudes and
locations.
The orbital plane error angle was defined to be th_
angle between the orbital plane and the X-vehlcle axis about the
vehicle-to-sun line. It was a function of Star Tracker gimbal
angles, relative positions of the earth, sun and reference star,
and orientation and position of the vehicle in its orbit. It
primarily supported momentum maneuvers and maneuvering to Z-Local
Vertical attitudes.
The roll reference angle was defined to be the angle
between the projection of both the solar north and the experiment
pointing systems Y-axls into the plane of the solar disc. It
was a function of Star Tracker inputs, relative positions between
the earth, sun and reference star, and the orientation of the
Canister relative to the experiment pointing system's axes. This
: angle primarily supported experiment film recordings.
b. Development. To support the SWS attitude reference
maintenance, a stellar reference was provided for display, telemetry,
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orbital plane error, and roll reference information. The star
occultation intervals were computed and used to control the Star
Tracker track and search functions. The Star Tracker position
data was used in computing the orbital plane error (vehicle attitude
reference) and roll (EPC) reference information.
Additional requirements after change to the Dry Workshop
a:te listed below:
i
Deletion of an arbitrary star selection capability.
Star Tracker control function ENABLE/INHIBIT
capability.
DAS/DCS Star Tracker outer gimbal backup
capabilLty for use in the event of Star
Tracker failure.
EPC line-of-sight roll capability was added.
The FSS was positioned according to EPC
roll changes to allow EPC roll about the
ATM experiment line-of-sight.
The next levei of changes included:
EPC line-of-sight roll filter was bypassed
for FSS fixed positioned pointing.
HCO door opening delay capability was added.
Protection for erroneous FSS position input
data was provided.
Subsequent changes:
Star Tracker data was compensated for known
Solar Inertial attitude offsets prior to use
in orbital plane error and roll reference
computations.
Protection for erroneous Star Tracker input
data was provided.
An ENABLE/IN_IlBIT Star Tracker data use
capability was provided to prevent erroneous
tracking data from contaminating attitude
reference.
EPEA activation logic was modified to account
for Solar Inertial offset pointitLg.
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An EPC roll change threshold for EPC line-of-sigh= roll
activation was added to prevent erroneous activation.
c. Mission Operations.
(I) General. During the SL-2 mission, the Star
Tracker performed normally at most times. However, on several
occasions, the Star Tracker either acquired contaminant particles
as false stars, or failed to acquire the reference star because
the vehicle was not closely aligned to the vehicle-to-sun line
when acquisition of a star was coummnded by the ATMDC. When these
discrepancies occurred, they were corrected according to procedures
developed at Johnson Space Center. To reacquire a star after the
Star Tracker failed to acquire either because the star was not
in the field-of-view of the Star Tracker or the Tracker locked on
a contaminant was a task that the SL-2 crew characterized as one
of the biggest attitude control problems. A procedure was develop-
ed in the $L-3 manned spacecraft-experiment management criteria
which minimized the impact on the crew timeline, but which could
not prevent the Star Tracker from losing star presence for the
above reasons.
The criteria permitted the Star Tracker to track
a star while the crew was awake. However, it selectively permitted
the ATMDC to correct the orbital plane error angle and roll reference
angle. According to the criteria, in those cases where the Star
Tracker did not acquire a star, the discrepancy was to be corrected
by the crew at t_eir convenience, but within four revolutions. In
those cases where the Star Tracker failed or its data was invalid,
the orbital plane error angle was to be updated when its ATMDC
computed value differed by a specified amount from a JSC computed
value.
The Star Tracker could not be controlled from the
ground during the unmanned phases of the Skylab mission. An
abbreviated criteria was developed to be used during the unmanned
phases of the mission. According to this criteria, the orbital
plane error angle was to be updated when the ATMDC computed value
differed by a specified amount from a JSC computed value, but
subject to restrictions related to TACS firing, vents, ATM data
availability, and momentum buildup.
During SL-3, the performance of the Star Tracker
began to deteriorate. On several occasions, the shutter failed to
respond to ATMDC commands. Investigation indicated an apparent
intermittent problem with the shutter mechanism, its associated
sw£tch, or a circuit relay that commanded the shutter flag. The
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simplex shutter system and minimal telemetry data precluded iso-
lating the failure to a specific relay, logic module, or to the
shutter mechanism.
Procedures for limited utilization of the Star
Tracker were developed and transmitted to the crew. Under these
procedures, whenever the problem occurred, the crew cycled both
the Star Tracker power switch and the shutter switch at the
Control and Display Pallel. When this was unsuccessful, the TracR-
er was placed in a parking position away from light sources. The
Star Tracker was used only at discrete times specified in the
daily flight plan.
Also, during SL-3, Alpha Crux, or a star dimmer than
Alpha Crux could not be successfully tracked because the sensiti-
vity of the star phototrbe degraded faster than was expected.
The ATMDC Flight Program was modified to substitute Rigil Kent
for Alpha Crux as a secondary reference star.
The SL-4 manned spacecraft/experiment management
criteria was developed with emphasis upon minimizing the number
of cycles of the shutter and to preclude the unwanted effects of
the Star Tracker locking on a foreign object. According to the
criteria, the automatic operation of the Star Tracker was re-
placed by positive manual control of the Tracker. On DAY 228 the
Star Tracker failed and its use was discontinued. For more in-
formation see Section VII.B.
The SL-4 manned spacecraft/experiment management
criteria was changed to reflect the loss of the Star Tracker.
According to the criteria, the crew performed sextant sightlngs
using the sextant/scanning telescope in the Command and Serv:.ce
Module. Each sighting was performed to establish a baseline for
the orbital plane error angle. The ground support team, using
DCS commands to the ATMDC would then continue to update the orbital
plane error angle with a computed value until the sextant data
differed from the computed value by a specified amount. When
this occurred, the procedure was repeated using the most recent
sextant measurement.
(2) Impact of Degraded Performance of Star Tracker,
Maneuvering accuracies and experiment data were characterized as
doubtful whenever the Star Tracker failed to provide valid Inp_tts
to the ATMDC.
Errors in the orbital plane error angle led to
automatic resets of the CMGgimbal angles, a procedure which
allowed the CMO system to recover from undesirable momentum con-
figurations. The TACS was fired to assist the CMGs in recovering
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to a desirable momentum state. Under certain conditions, relativel_
large quantities of TACS fuel was expended because erroneous orbital
plane error angles were used by the CMG momentum management system.
Errors in the orbital plane error angle also affected
maneuvers to support selected experiments. For example, a JOP 18D
maneuver on DAY 215 with an orbital plane error of one degree created
an error in the X-vehicle axis equal to 0.37 degrees against a de-
sired total error of less than _ 0.04 degrees for the experiment.
The ATM experiments relied on the Star Tracker for
accurate roll reference information during solar observations.
Losing the Star Tracker did not prevent Solar Pointing activities.
However, it did result in losing an accurate solar north reference.
Experience _ith the results obtained while the Star Tracker was de-
graded has shown that large errors in the ezpcriment roll accumulated
when the vehicle attitude was not frequently updated with Star
Tracker data. This uncertainty in experiment roll caused serious
data evaluation problems for the various ATM principal investigators.
(3) Corrective Actions. As a result of the Star
Tracker problems, STAC developed a means to calculate the orbital
plane error from telemetered data. A program was written for a
programmable calculator to model the equations specified in the
ATHDC Program Definition Document. Data reduced from telemetry
tapes were used as the source for inputs into the program. The
program was verified by using data reduced from DAY 20 real time
telemetry tapes as inputs into the program. Two comparisons were
made between the calculated value and the telemetered value of the
orbital plane error. The maximum difference between the two values
was less than one least significant bit of the telemetered value.
STAC also developed an analysis of the SL-2 and SL-3
dat_ to demonstrate the drift of the telemetered experiment roll
reference angle with respect to its probable true value. First, the
sources which contributed to errors in calculating the value of the
roll reference angle were identified and analyzed. Analysis showed
that the requirements for accuracy of the roll reference angle could
._ be met only during the period w_en the Star Tracker was actively
tracking a star. Second, an algorithm was developed which expressed
the change to the roll reference angle between successive Star Track-
er updates as a function of those sources and time. Third, telemetry
data from the time interval DAY 114 through DAY 125 was reduced.
Two techniques for reconstructing the roll reference angle were used
in conjunction with the telemetered data and were validated for
automated processing of telemetry tapes. Fourth, costs were estimated
for designing computer programs and for processing Skylab mission
telemetry tapes to satisfy the requirement.
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As a result of the analysis to identify sources of
error in the roll reference angle calculations, STAC developed a
modification to the Flight Program that would update both orbital
plane error angle and roll re£erence angle with the effects of or-
bital procession and momentum desaturatlon. This modification In-
creased the crew's capability to point to the same solar positions
on successive orbits.
4. Random Reacquisition.
a. Description. A Random Reacqulsitlon maneuver capa-
bility was provided in the ATMDC software. This capability permitted
reacquisltlon of the sunline by the Acquisition Sun Sensor from any
random vehlcle attitude.
, b. Mission Operations. The Random Reacquisitlon maneuver
was not used during the mission. Acquisition of the sun by Attitude
Hold Manpuver was accomplished from random vehicle attitudes during
SL-I. Thermal and solar panel data were used to find the approximate
vehicle attitude.
c. Concluslons and Recommendations. The random re-
acquisition capability was not needed. This provision is not re-
quired on future long-duratlon spacecraft. Simple sensors located
strageglcally would provide all the needed vehicle attitude Informa-
tion.
B. Attitude Control
After orbital insertion the TACS under Saturn V Instrument
Unit (IU) control maintained attitude control. IU/TACS was used
during the followlng events:
Separation of the S-II stage from the SWS
Maneuver to gravity gradient attitude _or Payload
Shroud jettison
Payload Shroud Jettison
ATM deployment
Maneuver to and hold Solar Inertial attitude prior
to CMG spin-up
ATM and OWS Solar Arra,t deployment
CMG spln-up
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During CMG spln-up, control was switched to the ATY_C and
attitude control and maneuver capability was provided by the ACS
far the duration of the mission.
The ACS operated in two control modes: CMG/TAC$ and TACS
only. Selection of the controlling mode was determlned by the
status of the CMC and TACS ENABLE/I_IBIT swltches, DAS/DCS coumands
and the active APCS functional mode. CMG/TACS was the primary cor trol
mode, in which the CMGs actively controlled the vehicle and TACS
provided assistance only in the event of _IC saturation. Automatlc
selection of TACS only from CIdG/TACS would occur If the attitude
error about any axis exceeded 20 degrees.
i. Control Moment Cyro Control.
a. Description. Three vehicle mounted doubled glmballed
CMGs were used as momentum exchange devices for malntainlng vehicle
attitude. The underlylng principle of momentum exchange is the con-
servatlon of momentum. The total Skylab system n_mentum was made up
of vehicle momentum plus CMC momentum and constrained such that the
change in veh£cle momentum was equal to zero. Any transient change
in vehicle momentum due to external torques (£.e., gravity gradlant
or venting torques) was compensated for by an equal a1,_ opposite
change in CHC momentum.
To compensate for an external torque, a restorlng torque
was generated by the CMG systom. This was accompllshed by rate
commanding a change in direction of the three CMC spin vectors.
The rate commands to the C_ gimbals were computed in the ATMDC as
part of the CMC Control Law.
As long as the Cl_s were capable of malntalnlng the attl-
tu,le error within specific llmtts, all control was delegated to the
CM(: system. If the attituda error exceeded the limits, the CHCs
were caged to • nominal momen;,-n profile and the TACS was placed in
complete control of the vehicle. Norma]ly, while under CMG control
TACS 2ould also assist the CMCs when the system a_mentum approached
saturation. The CMC mo_ntum status was monitored by the fltght
program through the CMG direction cosines resolvers and was utilized
with the vehicle rates to calculate system moewantum. When a vehicle
e_neuver was required the CMC gimbals were rate commanded, changing
the C_ momentum. This caused the vehicle to maneuver in keeping
with the conservation of momentum.
A siapllfled functional dlagrm of the CHC Control Sub-
system is shown in figure 15.
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The attitude errors for the CMC Control Law were derived
from the scrapdown reference. The attitude race errors were deter-
mined from the difference in the actual measured vehicle races and
the coananded races. The error commands for the Control Law ware
obtained by combinlns the acClCude errors and the attitude rate
errors, and modifying them with appropriate gains. The X, Y, and
Z-axis attitude _rrors were magnitude limited. The error commands
ware also limited and scaled Co insure the coamanded torque direc-
tion was melnCained if the maximum C}4C glmbsl rate capabiliCle8 ware
exceeded.
(I) Digital Bending Filters. The bendin$ filters
for the _ vehicle loop were used to damp bending modes that are
inherent in the vehicle and Co provide adequate scabillzaclon and
polnCing. These bending modes, _d_Ich are due co structural flexi-
billCy of the vehlcle, may interact with the vehicle control system
co produce instability. The dominant flexible body modes resulted
from the ATM deplo)_nenc arm mechanization.
The design approach was Co sCabillze all bendlns
by attenuation, but with a sufficient high control gain co meet
pointtn s requirements. The filtering of the flexible body effects
allowed only the rigid motion of the vehicle as in input tnco the
C}tC Control Law. The bending filters ware instrumented in the
A°A_4DCand were composed, for each axis, of three cascaded second
order linear difference equaClon8. The numerical values for the
coefflclencs gain and scal_ factors are given in Reference I.
Different scal_ing coefficients ware used for the CSM docked and
undocked cases.
(2) Pointing Accuracy. While in the Solar Inertial
attitude, the CMC/TACS was required to provide a poincinK accuracy
of + 6 arc-minutes about the X and Y-axis and + 10 arc-minutesm
about the Z-axis. The pointing stability requirements were _+ 9
arc-minutes for 15 minutes of time about the X and Y-axis and 7.5
arc-minutes per 15 minutes of time about the Z-axis.
(3) CHC Control Law. The O4C Control l_w used three
normalized comnands (derived from the strapdotm computation) and
the present orientation of the O4C spin Vectors (from the 8imbal
mounted reaolvors) to _enerate six 81mbel rate comnands. The O4C
Control Law solutions were computed five times per second. The
law Cook advantage of the six desreu of freedom of the Q4G system
Co generate 8tmb81 race coemends that caused unto,:, :ed torques to
be imparted on the vehicle when required. Thus the 811bol cemmands
vere steered in such a way Chat (sesunin8 that the actual $imhal
races are equal to the com_nded 81nhal rates) the torques resulting
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fon the vehicle were identical to the desired torques in dI_rection
and magnitude. Only when the maximum gimbal rate capabillty was
exceeded, would the magnitude of the resulting torque be leas, but
the direction would still be th_ of the conlnand.
The Steering Law drove the spirt vectors to provide
the desired torques in direction and magnitude. The C_Gs partici-
pated in pairs: pair A was composed of CMGs 1 and 2; pair B was
composed of CNGs 2 and 3; and CMCs 3 and 1 formed pair C. Each
CMGwas therefore participating in two pairs, and the resulting
angular veloclty commands were combined. Each vector pair generated
a control torque, and the demand on each pair was scaled according
to the individual torquing capability of each pair, while main-
tainlng the desired total control torque. Each vector pair handled
its share of the command by splitting it into two components: one,
along their sum; and, another, perpendicular to their sum. The
first component was adjusted by a scissoring action of the two CHG
vectors wlth respect to each other; the second component was ad-
Justed by a rotation of the pair as _ ,mat.
The Rotation Law attempted to minimize the prob-
ability of contact with the samba1 stops by reducing the largest
glmbal ankles. This was accomplished by rotations about the vector
sums only, and th,Js the total angular momentum was unaffected, i.e.,
*.here was no torque exerted on the vehicle from the Rotation Law.
The last portion of the CNG Control Laws made use
of an equation that generally described the inner and outer gimbal
boundaries. By proper scaling, a pseudo glmbal boundary could be
math_tically implemented sueD. that the intersection point of the
inner and outer simbal boundaries was rounded. If a spin vector
approzr_hed the pseudo boundary, the law would deflect it away with-
out it ricocheting against g/_bal stops, as it would ware toe law
not s part of the O4G Control Law and the actual hard stops were
impacted.
The gimbal rate coanand_ &enerated by each law were
derived from the angular velocity comua,_ds and adJustmentm were
calculated to drive the outer &arabs1 of each O4G away from its stops
whenever both gimbals for _hat C14Cwere near their slabs1 stops.
^11 of the samba1 rate commands were checked, and if shy com_nd
exceeded cub'rent limits, all of the coam_nds were reduced proportion-
ally to assure that all of the couuands were within the llmtta.
This wam necem_ary to maintain the desired torque direction and
avoid cross-coup! inK. •
If one of the O4Gs failed, the APCS was required
to maintain attitude control using two CMGs. This situation
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modified the Control Law in that the zomentum of each of the re-
islnins Ci4Gs would then operate aboqt some momentum bias value
(as seen in vehlcle axis zomentum profiles), vherlls vlth three
CI4G operation, each CiiG operated without bias. This bias iomentu::
varied wlth; solar elevatlon; _ conflguratlon; proposed minimum
TAtS usage, etc., and was updatable by llq_/l)C5.
A reset routine was incorporated into the Ci4G Control
l_iv to allow the O4G system to recove._ from undeslrabl,: qimbal
angle positions and/or momentum configurations. This routine yes
primarily added to aid a two _ operational situation, though it
yell function with three Oils when the appropriate co_ditlone exlst.
A reset was to be executed if the vehlcle was in either the SI mode
or the EXP F_G mode and one of the following conditions was satis-
fied: requested via a ".I#_S/I)CS coawsand; total attitude error greater
t._In 5.7 degrees with s _ glebe1 on • n_echenical stop.
At the initiation of the reset routine, TACS was
inhibited and the CHG iosld be commanded to the spin up configuratlon,
i.e., inner gimbals at 0 degrees and outer p4_bals at 45 degrees.
At 60 seconds after initiation, the _llGs _._, conmlnded to a nominal
molentum value for the orbital position. At 100 seconds after
initiation, TACS i_iuld be enabled to reduce the attitude rate error
to less then 0.01 degrees per second in the ¥-axls and less than
0.02 degrees per second in the X and -'.-axes, while the CI4Gs _r_
held at the nominal momentum value. At 160 seconds, the CHG/TACS
operating configuratlon yes enabled to reduce any accumulated
attitude error to zero.
The ATHi)C monltc, red the performance of the _ outer
ILeal movements vlth respect t.o the d.-.sired torque vector and the
attitude error and drove the gimbals to more desirable positions
when necessary to complete Si_ ._aneuvers. Thli i_ called the
Outer Gimbal Drive. While the deteils of the logic utilizing the
Outer Gillal Drive _ere complicated, three conditions _uit always be
present. These _ele :
Outer gi_al _Ithin 90 degrees of its stop
Torque co_ilnd driving ginlbel into stop
Be within first or last 60 seconds of a _lineuver
Outer Gilel Drive yes available under a modified set
e_ logic conditions vhile the vehicle _l in Z-LV attitude. See
lleferince l.l., for complete details.
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The rate commands to that CMG were then issued to
drive the CMG to the opposite side of the outer gimbal stop where
it could again generate a useful control torque. During this period
of open loop commands, attitude errors were allowed to build up.
b. Design and Verification History.
(I) Bending Mode Filters. The compensation filters
for the Wet Workshop configuration were designed and implemented
as analog filters. After conversion to the Dry Workshop concept
the filters were implemented digitally in the ATMDC.
The structural dynamic characteristics of the Skylab
vehicle were simulated by a mathematical structural model from
v,hich the flexible body mode, slopes, deflections, and frequencies
were generated. Also included in the model was the weight and mass
distributions for both the SWS with and without the docked CSM. As
the evolution of the Skyiab vehicle changed, so did the structural
dynamics. Each of the configurations and mass distribution changes,
required generating a complete new set of _tructural data and up-
dating the structural model. Because of uncertainties in the
mathematical model and structural testing, tolerances were then
specified for each of the flexible body modes.
The structural dynamic characteristics dictated the
design of the digital compensation filters. The frequency range of
mode3 considered for the design of the digital filters was from
0.188 to 1.6 Hz.
The CMG/TACS control system consisted of both a
rate and altitude feedback loop the sum of which was used as input
into the compensation filters. To insure rigid body stability in
terms of phase and gain margins, a gain had to be determined for each
of the rate and attitude loops. These gains established the rigid
body control system bandwidth. Also included in the control loop
were configuration compensation gains which were required to com-
penaate for the change in the Skylab configurations from docked
to undocked CSM. The change in the co_,pensation gains are approxi-
mately the ratio of the inertia of each axis for the undocked CSM
configuration to that of the docked.
With the control system galns determined and the
structural modes defined, compensation filters were designed. The
design of the filters was such that the rigid body phase and gain
margins and control system frequency were maintained but at the
same time attenuated the dominant flexible body modes. The digital
compens_tlon f11ter design was then verified, using the tolerance
structural data for each configuration with its respective con-
figuration compensation gain. The compensation filter design
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underwent extensive analysis and simulation verification. In the
process of designing the filters, and in conjunction with the
structural data, it was determined that the dominant flexible
body modes for either configuration consisted of an 0.8 Hz for
the X and Z-axes, and a 1.5 Hz for the Y-axis. These frequencies
were to be seen corrupting the AIM Rack Rate Gyro signals during
the entire mission.
The simulation verifications were conducted in the
HSL using both software and/or hardware in the control loops.
(References 2, 3, 4, and 5 are summaries of the desig_ and analysis
verifications). These simulations consisted of system-level verifi-
cation in the area of dynamics and control. Dynamics verification of
the various phases of the Flight Progrem included Nyqulst stability
checks and studying the effects of disturbances and parameter
variations. The purpose of the verification activities was to
verify that the control system would perform satisfactorily with
the flight hardware and models of the flight vehicle. Anomalies
attributable to the Flight Programs, found during the dynamics
verification, were corrected, or program notes were written. The
dynamics verification on the Final Flight Program deemed it flight-
worthy in the area of dynamics and control.
(2) CMG Control Law. The first Control Law under _
investigation converted moment commands to CMG gimbal rate commands.
The law was deficient in that for some regions of CMG gimbal angles,
the primary axes moments were reduced but the cross-coupling moments
were increased significantly. One of these regions was when all
inner gimbals were zero and all outer gimbals are minus 45 degrees.
The Cross-Product Steering Law was an alternate
Control Law. To nullify a disturbance torque, the H-vector of each
CMG was commanded to move into the direction of the disturbance
torque. While both of these laws basically were designed to do
this, the Cross-Product Law included the sine functions of the
inner gimbal angles to reduce the cross-coupling effects. If
used directly to control the CMG cluster, the Steering Law woul_
still fall short of the control goals; an invariant forward gain
with a minimization of cross-coupling torques.
The H-vector Control Law which was developed was a
closed loop controller. This law, when used with the Cross-Product
Steering L_w, provides an almost optimal CMG cluster control law.
The ideal control law implies that the torque obtained from the
CMG cluster must be identical with the commanded torque to the CMG
cluster. The H-vector Control Law scales a vector to be a commanded
torque. This vector is based on vehicle body sensor information and
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thus indicates the direction of the disturbance moment. The
commanded torque vector is then electronically integrated and com-
pared to the angular momentum of the CMG cluster. The error
momentum vector is then nulled by driving the six CMG gimbal
angles with the aid of the Steering Law.
Using the H-vector Control Law and its associated
Cross-Product Steering Law, the CMG gimbal angles required to
produce a given total momentum vector were not uniquely defined.
A highly undesirable momentum distribution could develop where two
of the three individual angular momentum vectors are parallel and ?
the third is antiparallel, or IH. For this antiparallel orienta-
tion, the CMG cluster exhibits zero gain along the axis of colinear-
ity. Thus, even though the CMGs were r_t saturated they would not
be able to compensate for a disturbance along that axis. Studies
were then started on the development of an Isogonal Distribution
and Rotation Law.
It had been shown that for any given total angular
momentum vector, it is desirab_ to place the three individual spin
vectors into an orientation in which each contributes an equal
component along the total vector. This constraint results in
equal angles between the actual vectors and the total, i.e., an
isogon_l distribution. The H-vector Control Law utilized only
three of th= _vailable six degrees of freedom; the isogonal
distribution useo two of the remaining three degrees of freedom.
Rotation of the individual angular momentum vectors about the
total angular momentum used the remaining degree of freedom. This
Rotation Law minimized impact of the CMGs inner gimbal stops. The
Isogonal Distribution and Rotation Law not only eliminated any anti-
parallel condition, but also extended the bandwidth of the direct
gain and reduced the cross-coupling torque.
At the time of the change from the Wet to Dry Work-
shop concept, it was apparent that the avoidance of outer 8imbal
stops and the switch to 2-CMG control in the case of a failure
required too much logic for an analog computer and CMG control
was inserted into the ATMDC.
The original requirements for CMG control defini-
tion for the Dry Workshop ATMDC indicated that the commands to the
CMGs were to come from one of two sources: the first being the
output of a digital filter whose input was composed of a proportional
attitude plus rate feedback parameter (CMG control enabled), the
second being the scaled difference between the CMG momentum state
and a calculated desired momentum state (caged operation). Resard-
less of the command source, control logic was then entered to pre-
vent gimbal rate limit cycling when a saturated momentum state
115 •
1974021165-127
was reached. The function of the CMG Control Law was to take the
torque command vector and produce CMG gimbal rate commands. The
initial form of the Control Law was conceptually broken down into
the following five portions:
Steering Law. Using vector pairing exclusively
(three pairing combinations from the three CMGs),
the Steering Law equations defined the indivi-
dual momentum vector rotational rates that would
produce an exact torque on the vehicle equal to
the commanded torque.
Distribution Law. The Distribution Law attempt-
ed to equally distribute the CMG momentum vectors
along the orbit nominal. The effect was to re-
duce the angular velocity required of the mo-
mentum vectors to meet the needed momentum change.
Rotation Law. The Rotation Law utilized rotations
about CMG pair sums so that the total angular
momentum was not disturbed. The purpose was to
generate the angular rotations such that the
largest gimbal angles are reduced.
CMG Re-distrlbution Maneuver. Used in con-
junction with the Distribution Law, this logic
would force a right or left-handed distribution
depending on which was preferred.
Gimbal Angle Rate Commands and Limiting. This
function provided the transformation of angular
rate vectors into glmbal rate commands and pro-
vided a proportional scale if the capability of
the CMG servo loops was exceeded. In addition,
logic for generating outer gimbal rate commands
for avoiding the position stops, if both inner
and outer were sufficiently close to the stops,
was present.
Subsequently the CMG Control Law was subjected to
extensive analysis. Two points were key to the investigation:
I) requirements were exceeding computer core capacity, and 2)
performance of system with a CMG gimbal on a position stop was
marginal. Therefore, the following changes were made:
Saturation control logic, distribution law
and CMG redistribution maneuver were deleted
as analysis showed small performance gain,
core usage was large.
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New logic was developed for computing gimbal
rate commands when the gimbal was on a stop.
Function of logic was to provide a smooth
transition of gimbal around stop without
significant attitude perturbation.
Upon recognition of the severity of the control
problems that could ensue if gimbal stops were
encountered, the CMG Reset Routine was developed.
TACS definition allowed firing the TACS thrusters
based on vehicle state information and at the
same time firing a thruster based on CMG momen-
tum. Regions of incompatibility between TACS
and CMG control phase planes were identified
and adjustments were made to prohibit the CMG
system from attempting to develop torques in
opposition to those developed by the TACS.
The desire to cut core requirements and lessen the
impact of gimbal stop encounters, was still most important.
Numerous memory saving changes were made which were shown to have
little or no effect on system performance. The Reset Routine was
further refined in order to make it more generally applicable.
However, deficiencies in maneuvering and the TACS desaturatlon
firing scheme instigated major changes. These were:
The CMG/TACS incompatibility logic was removed.
This was possible due to the decision to elimi-
nate having both TACS and CMG control active
at the same time. This eliminated the concept
of nested control and was a key fa=tor in de-
signing a maneuver scheme that made efficient
use of TACS.
The Outer Gimbal Drive Logic (OGDL) for CMG
gimbal angle management during maneu_,ers was
added. With the new CMG/TACS utilization
philosophy and the concept of a closed loop
maneuver scheme (continuous checking of present
position versus desired position), it became
feasible to allow a momentary attitude per-
turbation in order to forca a desirable gimbal
angle position. Therefore, logic was added
that predicted the polarity of outer gimbal
angle required in order to allow the momentum
swing required during maneuvers. If it was
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sensed that the gimbal was moving in a direction
opposite to the desired one, an open loop drive
was executed to force the proper polarity.
The generation of control torque commands dur-
ing maneuvers was made to be a function of
rate error only. This change provided a
significant performance improvement. By utiliz-
ing rate only control, the momentum vector would
always attempt to align along the maneuver
eigen-axis. This resulted in a clear decision
as to where the OGDL should place the outer
gimbal and in addition would result in constant
maneuver rates. Constant maneuver rates were
preferred by the crew.
There were basically no conceptual changes in CMG
control in the final ATMDC Program. The design activity concen-
trated on optimizing the existing system and insuring that all
nominal and reasonable off-nominal conditions could be handled
efficiently. Tbe following changes resulted from the activity
and represented the last major updates to CMG control:
The rate ledges were given dual values. One
set for when GG dump was in progress and the
other for all other times. This was done
in order to lower the rate ledge for nominal
use. Analysis of design verification simu-
lations indicated that if attitude transients
did occur (_uch as the completion of a maneu-
ver) the probability of hitting a stop in
recovery was proportional to the amount of
momentum change that occurred in the CMGs.
Lowering the rate ledges was a technique that
limited the momentum change allowed. Higher
rate ledges were required during GG dump be-
cause of the manner in which the dump maneuver
was executed. As the maneuvers were commanded
as an attitude ramp, a rate ledge lower than
the ramp slope would have interfaced with the
execution of the maneuver. Therefore, the
rate ledges during dump had to be set higher
than the expected worse case rates during
dump maneuvers,
The modifled outer Gimbal Drive Logic was
added. This logic was similar to the pre-
viously mentioned OGDL and was operational
during the Z-LV Mode. This resulted from
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certain 2-CMG rendezvous Z-LV simulations
in which the required two orbits of Z-LV
could not be maintained without gimbal stop
encounters.
The CMG Control Law underwent extensive
analysis and simulation under varied conditions.
The actual ATMDC Flight Program version of the
Control law then was verified, also, under
varied conditions. For a summary of design
analysis and verification, see Reference 2.
e. Mission Operations
(I) Bending Mode Filters. During the mission,
the ACS met the necessary stability and pointing accuracy. Ex-
tensive analyses were carried on to evaluate the system performance.
Using telemetry data, various parameters were analyzed and, where
possible, compared to premission simulation results. Also, certain
mission time periods were run on simulators using actual telemetry
data for initialization. References 6-10 include the results
of the APCS data acquisition and evaluation studies for all
Skylab missions.
The comparisons of flight data with preflight
simulations demonstrated that the performance of the ACS was
reasonably close to expectation. However, there were some
deviations from predicted performance. These deviations re-
sulted primarily from the difference in mass properties due to
the missing solar panel and meteoroid shield, and the anomalous
behavior of the Rate Gyros. The telemetry data exhibited
structural dynamic characteristics somewhat different than
preflight predictions. The premission structural data did not
disclose some flexible body modes which were discovered in the
early flight data analysis. The structural model program was
subsequently reevaluated and modified. Once this was done the
model reproduced the flight modes.
The unexpected bending modes were first observed
on DAY 16 when the SPC spar was rolled at the high (7.5 deg/sec)
rate. Frequencies of 0.8 Hz on the X and Z-axes and 1.5 Hz on
the Y-axls were the dominant modes seen and were associated with
the ATM supporting structure. The Z Rack Rate Gyros saw rates
of about _ 0.i degrees per second dur to the transients. This
caused concern that gyro gain switching might occur as a result
of the SPC roll operations. Subsequently, the crews weL re-
quested not to use the 7.5 degrees per second roll rate. The
I19
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0.8 and 1.5 Hz modes were observed throughout the mission, but at
generally lower levels. EPC roll and spar caging operation were the
primary means of exciting the bending modes. However, on DAY 237,
a combination of roll and MPC operations excited the 0.8 Hz frequency
enough to cause gain switching of the Six-Pack Rate Gyros.
There were other occurrences of unexpected or high
level bending mode excitation. On DAY 19, crew motion (foot race)
around the water tanks set up low frequency (approximately 0.i Hz)
oscillations with peak rates of 0.025 to 0.035 degrees per second
on the X and Y-axes. Z-axls amplitude was about ± 0.012 degrees per
second. Other bending mode frequencies were seen riding on the 0.I
llz oscillation. The low frequency oscillation, which was near the
rigid body natural frequency, allowed large amplitude attitude ex-
cursions.
An oscillation seen only on the Y-axls was observed
several times during the mission. The oscillation was not of
sufficient magnitude to cause any difficulties. Studies indicated
that the frequency of 0.5 Hz, beating with a rigid body oscillation
of about 0.025 Hz, could be set up by ergometer operation, ATM opera-
tlons and momentum dump maneuvers.
On DAYS 201 and 220, "klunk" sounds were heard in the
CSH which seemed to have originated in the vicinity of the ATM and
were transmitted through the structure. Data analysis indicated
that a number of bending modes were set up on on both occasions.
However, the magnitude of _:heRack Rate Gyro responses were much
lower for DAY 201 than DAY 220 and the DAy 220 disturbance was con-
tinuous while three distinct periodic disturbances were seen on
DAY 201. Also, a 5 Hz oscillation seen on DAY 201 was not present
on DAY 220. No causes could be determined.
Throughout these transient disturbances, and in
normal operations, the Bending Mode Filters functioned _s designed,
removing almost all of the flexible body effects from the Rate Gyro
outpups before the CMG gimbal rate coumuands were computed. This
was demonstrated by the absence of oscillations of bending mode
frequencies on the CMG gimbals.
(2) Pointing Accuracy. As a result of the DAY 19 crew
motion around the water lockers, a low frequency oscillation was set
up which allowed attitude excursions in excess of 10 arc-min on
X and Z-axes. The excursions exceeded the X and Z-pointing require-
ments by 4.8 and 0.8 arc-min, respectively. Consequently, the crew
was requested not to use this exercise mode,
,j
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On DAY 194, six days into the SL-4 mission, CMG No. I
was declared failed and turned off. Prom this point the CMG control
subsystem functioned with the two remaining CMGs. An analysis was
performed to compare 2 CMG and 3 CMG control pointing accuracy. The
pointing accuracy was found co be very much the same. The X-axis
rates did appear to be slightly higher in the 2 CMG control case.
A procedure was developed to improve the pointing in
a near-Solar Inertial Attitude by utilizing the Solar Inertial compu-
tation accuracy. T_is is summarized in Section VI._.
As requirements for Kohoutek evolved, special interest
focused on ACS pointing. To determine the pointing accuracy of the
CMG control subsystem a test was performed on DAY 119. The test
was performed by placing S052 experiment near the sun center, with
the canister caged, using a Solar Inertial bias (X = 0, 4 - 0.1 deg,
Z = 0) command. A star was acquired by the Star Tracker and the
attitude hold mode was selected. The pointing accuracy data obtained
from the test during a 25 minute period is summarized in Table 7.
The numbers fall well within the pointing requirements for the CHG
control subsystem.
Table 7. Measured Pointing Accuracy Data
Vehicle Axis Total Excursions Strapdown Drift Worst-Case LimltCycle
X 2.8 arc mln p-p 1.8 arc mln 1.2 arc mln p-p
Y 0.9 arc min p-p 0.5 arc min 0.9 arc mln p-p
Z 1.5 arc mln p-p 0.5 arc mln 1.0 arc mln p-p
(3) CMG Control Law. During the mission the CMG
Steering Law performed as designed including switching to 2-CMG oper-
ation after failure of CMG No. 1. However, the requirements of 2-CMG
operation dictated that momentum bias values were continuously up-
linked to the ATMDC as a function of solar elevation. This prevented
glmbal stop encounters and antiparallel CMGs. Table 8 is a llst of
momentum bias values upllnked for normal 2-CMG control. Some special
biases upllnked for maneuvers are not Included.
The CMG Rotation Law worked as designed. However, a
refinement involving rotation about the total momentum vector in the
3-CMG case, was omitted from the ATMDC in order to save memory. This
rotationwould have helped avoid gimbal stops. In the 2-C_G case,
a gain change in the Rotation Law would also have helped avoid simbal
stops.
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Table 8. CMG Momentum Bias History
DA__Y TIME (H:M:S) BIAS (?o3H)
X Y Z
194 08:56:00 -13 20 0
194 18:19:29 -13 13 0
198 07:36:45 -ii 8 0
201 19:43:06 -II -4 -9
208 04:57:23 -17 0 -7
211 08:41:42 -15 2 -5
213 08:05:00 -13 4 -2
217 08:18:00 -16 4 -2
218 17:06:18 -II 6 0
219 13:15:00 -16 4 -2
220 12:31:23 -20 6 2
220 16:09:33 -16 4 -2
222 09:01:47 -20 6 -6
223 03:36:22 -16 4 -2
224 16:46:40 -20 6 -6
224 21:41:52 -16 4 -2
225 15:48:11 -20 6 -6
225 21:39:11 -15 2 -5
226 20:13:01 0 2 -5
227 00:52:16 -15 2 -5
234 12:32:07 -7 -13 -9
235 Ol :27:13 -11 -4 -9
235 23 :06:06 -14 4 -4
243 00:45:05 -11 11 0
243 09:31:42 -17 7 0
243 18:36:20 -11 11 0
244 10:11:01 -17 7 0
244 17:53:22 -II II 0
245 07:52:22 -17 7 0
246 18:34:45 -11 II 0
250 16:50:37 -17 7 0
250 23:56:14 -11 11 0
251 16:27:28 -11 7 0
251 23:06:29 -11 11 0
252 07:58:48 -17 7 0
253 06:16:00 -11 7 0
256 21:35:46 -11 1 -5
257 04:16:20 -4 -9 3
261 23:56:17 -11 54 4
262 O1:23:46 -19 -4 -9
262 03:00:57 -15 -4 -9
262 04:49:08 -11 -4 -9
i 263 06:37:52 ...... -11 2 -5
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The outer gimbal drive and modified outer gimbal drive
were designed to prevent a CMG from driving into an outer gimbal stop
during inaneuvers. They were primarily utilized in 2-CMG operation
and functioned well. Additional availability of an outer gimbal
drive loglc at the end of maneuver in the presence of large attitude
errors would also have been desirable several times in the mission in
preventing a switch to '_ACS Only" Mode.
The gimbal angle reset routine was developed spe-
ciflcally for the purpose of recovering from CMG gimbal-on-stop
situations and was automatically initiated in the ATMDC Flight
Program when this problem occurred. During the mission, this re-
covery capability was proven workable and essential to the control
of the SNS by the CMG control subsystem. It was automatically
initiated several times during the mission, during both tracking
station acquisition and loss.
In addition to the automatic entry, the reset routine
can be initiated by ground or crew command. This capability led to
an extensive and varied use of the reset routine during the Sky_ab
mission. Below is a description of three additional ways that the
reset routine was used:
Dump CHG momentum while in thermal attitude.
Thermal attitude refers to a variety of inertial
attitudes that were maintained during the first
I0 days of the mission to satisfy thermal and
power requirements. These attitudes prevented
normal gravity gradient desaturation of the _4Gs.
Therefore, the reset routine was used s_-eral
times each mission day to desaturate the CHGs.
Force particular momentum profiles. This use
was necessitated by the CMG No. I failure.
Following the failure of CMGNo. 1, gimbal
stop encounters became more frequent during
experiment maneuvers. It became essential to
eliminate these encounters because entire
experiments and data-taking passes were beln 8
cancelled due to attitude divergence from
gimbal stop encounters. One method used to
minimize these encounters was to force the
momentum on to particular trajectories using
the reset routine. These trajectories had
been shown to be free of 8imbal stop encounters
by simulation.
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Prevent thruster firing during 30P experiment.
During some of the JOP experimants, extremely
fine pointing of the SWS was desired. This
made it mandatory that TAtS desaturation firings
not occur during the data take. To ensure that
no desacuratiou firings would be needed, the
reset routine was employed to initialize the
CMCmomentum Co a desired level at the beginning
of the data take.
The reset routine was also required to use a minimum
amount of TAtS fuel. It was designed to meet this requirement and
the design performed well during the mission. However, the use o£
the reset routirse to cage the CMCs to a nominal momentum had several
minor problems which were:
Hemoz:t savings caused the removal of a more
accura:e momentum profile from the ATMDC
Removal of residual veh._cle races, following
return to CMC control during reset, caused
momentum bias
Removal of attitude error, followin S return to
CMC control durin s reset j could represent a
significant vehicle rotation. The subsequent
transformation of CHC momentum would then
represent a momentum bias.
d. Conclusions
(1) The Bendin 8 Mode Filters operated as designed
throughout the Skylab missions and successfully removed most
flexible body effects from the control loops.
(2) The Skylab ACS m_intained the pointin S accuracy
and stabil-ty requirements, with minor exceptions, for the entire
mission. ,
(3) Skylab proved the feasibility and desirability
of C!4C control. Q4(] control concepts worked as destBned for both
stabilization _nd maneuvering.
(4) The absence of CHC outer $1mbal stops would h_ve
sllntficantly simplified the control software and prevented many
periods of rttltude _xcurslons.
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(5) Greater CIG mon_ntum would have reduced TACS
propellant consumpclon, partlcularly during 2-_ operation.
(6) Inclusions of a more accurate CMGn_mentu:
profile would have improved performance during _ resets.
2. TACS Control
a. Description. The TACS was composed of six cold gas
thrusters and the necessary logic to select and fire the proper
thruster. The TACS Control Law provided thruster firing counands to
null out a'titude and rate errors when control dead-bands ware ex-
ceeded. The thrusters were mounted on the OWS as shown in figure 3.
Two thrusters provided uncoupled Y-axis control and four thrusters
provided X and Z-axis control. Two types of thruster firings were
comwsnded; full-on and minimum impulse bit (MIB). For full-on
firings the selected thruster was fired continuously for one second.
The HIB firin$ time was selectable from 40 to 400 milliseconds to
compensate for pressure decrease in the TArS cold gas supply tanks.
At the beginning of the mission a thruster produced 463 N_ons of
thrust. This decreased to approximately 42 Newtons at the end of
the mission. The value of a NIB stayed approxL_ately constant during
the mission.
A TACS f£rlngwas capable of exciting structural fra-
quencles. To remove the corruptin 8 flexible body effects on the rata
signals and to minimize TACS usage bending mode filters were used.
The filters for each control axis were composed of a second order
llnur difference equation. The numerical values for the =oafflclent
gains and scale factoru are given in Reference I.
After initial transfer to ATII)C control, TACS was used for
throe functions during the mission.
(1) TACS Only Control. TACS Only attitude control
could be initiated tn tvo rays. These were:
Co_snded
Absolute actitude error greater than 20 degrees
in any axis.
NIB and full-on firings in TACS only ware generated
by a weighted sum of position and rate errors. If this sum ex-
ceeded the control law modulation regton, a full-on of one second
is ccsmsnded. A rate ledge to limit the turning rate of the vehicle
is tmplmtented by 1Lmitin8 the attitude error us_ in the control
equations. In TACS only :ode, _he oostt!on deedband yes 3 degrees,
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f2 degrees, 2 degrees for X, Y, Z, respectively. Shown in figure 16
is an uncoupled phase plane repreoentatlon of the TACS Only L_trol
Law.
(2) System Momentum Desaturation. The TACS was used
to desaturate the CMGs when the system momentum exceeded 0.96 of
CMG system capabii_ty. A slngle thruste" _as fired to reduce the
momentum about the axis of maximum accumulation. Single or multiple
MIBs were fired depending upon the 1eve! of saturation.
(3) CHG Reset Routine. During the CMG reset routine
the TACS was u_ed to redt_ce the rate error generated in inltlalizing
and caging the CHGs. (See Section VI._) The CMG/TACS control
mode was then remttered to reduce any acclmmlated attitude error.
During s CHG reset, TACS Only was selected if the absolute attitude
error was greater than 60 degrees in any axis.
b. History. !n the original Orbital Workshop (OWS) con-
trol system the Workshop Attitude Control System CRACS) was the pri-
mary controller except during that portion of the mlsslonwhen the
ATMwas docked to the OWS radial port. The WAC$ consisted of _Ix
(22 pound) redundant hot gas engines, spatlal amplifiers, horizon
sensors, sun sensors, rate gyros and control logic. This control
system was active also during launch and orbltal insertion as well
as during the OWS mission.
When the OWS was replaced by the Saturn Workshop (S_.
several nmJor changes were made to the attitude control system.
The rack mounted CHGs became the primary controller c_rating _h
the Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS) config;_res in a ne_ted
system. The six redundant hot gas engines were repleced with six
cold-gas thrusters with redundant va)ves operati_,g from a non-ragu-
lated gas supply.
The TACS control requirement_ were cv_,med of the nece_.-
gary logic to select and fire the proper thruster. The firing loglc
could either be triggered from _tn input based on vehlcle state
(desdband operation) or from an excessive momentum state magnitude.
The logic for thruster Melection in either of those two w_des re-
mained basically consttnt throughout the software evolutlonary pro-
_ress. However, the operational aspects of when to use_hich set
of lo8i¢ was totally changed and these changes were the key to
efficient use of T_5 impulse.
The early definition stated that the TAC$ operated in
the foLlowing manner:
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Provided attitude control any time the deadbands
were exceeded: one degree deadbands if _ Control
was enabled, and five degree deadbands if TACS Only.
Continuously monitored CMG momentum buildup and
actuated a thruster when the _omentum had reached
a preset level. The selected thruster reduced
the magnitude of the maximum momentum component.
This was the nested system operation whereby the CMGs
were to provide the fine control and the TACS, if n_eded, would
supply coarse control.
Problems with the nested concept began to manifest th_m-
selves. Steps were taken to try to alleviate some of these problems.
The deadband was set at 20 deg for CMG/TACS control a,,d the TACS
desaturation firings were baseQ on saturation of system momentum as
opposed to CMG momentum. Moving of the TACS deadband, however, did
not solve the real problem of allowing more than one source of error
signal to fire the TACS at one time. This was not completely under-
stood until later. The move to command the desaturation firings
from system momentum, however, was of paramount significance. This
allowed any small attitude disturbance to be removed with no TACS
impulse, insured that GG dump would not fire TACS, and provided a
means of immediately firing the proper amount of TACS at the initia-
tion of any general purpose maneuver.
Later development led to one important change - that
of making the TACS desaturation firing time a function of the system
mome_=um deficiency. By increasing the thruster on time by the time
equivalent of one minimum impulse firing for each one-half H of
system momentum deficiency, it was guaranteed that, while maneuvering,
the vehicle could always keep up with the commanded rate.
Later the nested concept was eliminated. Vehicle attitude
was monitored and if it exceeded 20 deg, TACS Only Control with 3, 2,
2 deg deadba_tds was selected. Under this condition, CMG control was
inhibited. This change removed the possibility the C_IGs and TACS
ever fighting one another. Another change made for the Final Program
was the development of a TACS Only Maneuvering Control Mode. This
allowed the TACS to execute maneuvers in a rate only mode similar to
the CMGs except the TAC$ operated within a rate threshold. The magni-
tude of the threshold was set so that the vehicle would be within the
normal attitude deadband upon time out of the maneuver. This change
wa_ made to eliminate the computation of a commanded attitude para-
meaer used in conjunction with the vehlcle-Solar Inertial quaternion
for attitude error data.
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c. Design Analysis and Verification. Analyses were per-
formed to determine the effects of the flexible body rates on TACS
propellant usage and to determine the digital filters which would
decrease TACS firing. Simulation verifications were conducted at
HSL and are summarized in References 5.
The TACS Control Law underwent extensive analysis and
simulation under varied conditions. The actual ATMI)CFlight Program
version of the Control Law then was verified, also under varied
conditions. For a summary of design analysis and verification, see
Reference A.2.
d. Mission Operations. The TACS Only Attitude Control
worked as designed. Due to the relatively large TACS rate ledge
which was designed to protect against a stuck thruster, the auto-
matic switch to TACS Only proved expensive in terms of fuel usage.
e. Conc]usions. The TACS control system worked as
designed. It demonstrated capability both for stabilization and
maneuvering of the vehicle. No significant coupling problems were
encountered in those cases where TACS was required only to au_nent
CMG control.
3. Maneuvers.
a. Description. The maneuvering requirements for Skylab
dictated two classes of maneuvers, SI offset pointing and general
purpose. The general purpose maneuvering scheme was used for Atti-
tude Hold, Z-LV and moment,m desaturation maneuvers, the distinguish-
ing factor between these two maneuver c]asses was the manner in
which the control error signal was generated. SI offset pointing
was limited to small angles (_ 4 degrees) about the X and Y-vehiel_,
axes and was accomplished by biasing the attitude error signal with
the designed offset angle. The control system command was derived
by comparing the desired bLas to the stzapdown output. This
automatically resulted in a rate ledge type closing response and
allowed sun sensor update of the strapdown while offset pointing
was in progress.
The general purpose maneuver class required maneuvering
the vehicle to arbitrary tLme w_riant or inertial attitudes and was
accomplished via strapdown commands. It can be characterized as a
closed-loop maneuver scheme with a constant maneuver rate, the mag-
nitude of which is dependent upon the desired maneuver angle and
a predicted time to complete the maneuver. An eigenaxls maneuver
was effected by configuring the CMC Control Law in a rate only mode
which forced the vehicle angular rate vector to conincide with the
maneuver eigenaxis.
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As opposed to offset maneuvers large momentum changes in
the CMG system was generally required to provide the desired maneuver
rates.
The maneuvering scheme generated a desired attitude
reference quaternion with respect to SI from the maneuver commands.
This quaternion was continuously compared to the vehicle to Solar
Inertial quaternion to generate an insLantaneous attitude error
between present position and desired position. A maneuver time
was always specified and decremented as the maneuver progressed.
Rate commands were computed by dividing the body axes attitude
errors by the maneuver time-to-go parameter. When time-to-go reached
60 sec it was frozen to keep the rate commands orderly.
This type of maneuver scheme was advantageous for CMG
gimbal management. With the CMGs operating on rate error alone a
constant eigen-axis maneuver rate was generated. This allowed
identification of the location of the fLnal CMG momentum vector
upon initiation of the maneuver. The fLnal CMG momentum vector would
attempt to align along the maneuver eig._n-axis. It was therefore
possible to design special logic for CMq;control for insuring that
gimbal stops were missed in achLeving that final momentum state.
The CMG outer gimbal drive logic for av,_iding the stops during
maneuvers was an open loop function that.could momentarily perturb
vehicle attitude. This closed loop scheme made allowances and a
higher or lower maneuver rate would appropriately be commanded.
Skylab was required to maneuver as a result of a mode
change or in response to an attitude mmteuver command in a given
mode.
The primary maneuver modes w,_re:
Z-Local Vertical (Z-LV) Mode - The Z-LV attitude
is defined as the Z-(geometric) axis pointing along
the Local Vertical (positive away from the earth's
physical geocenter) and t:hepositive X-(geometric)
axis in the orbit plane (in the direction of the
velocity vector). The Attitude Pointing and Control
System (APCS) was required to hold this attitude
within _ 2 degrees during each Z-LV pass. Skylab
was also capable of performing a Z-LV rendezvous i
maneuver with the negative X-axls in the direction
of the velocity vector. In either case, attitude
could be malntaltled for a maximum of two orbits.
_0
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!Solar Inertial Mo@e - The Solar Inertial attitude
was defined as the X (principal) axis in the orbit
plane with the +Z (geometric) axis pointing toward
the center of the sun. The +X-axls was in the
direction of the velocity vector at orbital noon.
Skylab was capable of maneuvering from Z-LV attitude
to the Solar Inertial attitude. This would be
required following each docking rendezvous and
each EREP pass. The capability to bias the Solar
Inertial attitude was also required for the purpose
of Experiment Pointing.
Attitude Hold Mode - The capability to inertially
point Skylab to any desired attitude was available.
This, in turn, required a maneuver capability to
reach the desired attitu,,e. This capability was
necessary because of the probability of experiments
regarding stellar pointing and the possibility of
emergency maneuvering.
b. History - Following the conversion to Dry Workshop
acceptable maneuver concepts underwent major changes. The initial
offset pointing maneuver was to be performed by summing a bias with
the output of the acquisition sun sensor and an attitude error limit
was placed in the summation in order to allow the CMGs to perform
the maneuver within the TACS deadband. No update of the strapdown
was to be performed if offset pointing was active. This was soon
changed to the final scheme described above.
The initial general purpose maneuver scheme, upon
initiation of the maneuver, formed an open loop rate profile, drove
a maneuver quaternion with the computed rates, and derived attitude
errors by comparing the maneuver quaternion with a quaternlon re-
presenting the current vehicle position. This procedure assumed a
level of acceleration capability and ramp up and ramp down times
were allotted in the profiles.
It was soon recognized that a new approach to general
purpose maneuvering must be found. As these maneuvers would re-
quire large CMG momentum swings, _mbal stop encounters were fre-
quent. The result was the vehicle would deviate from the commanded
attitude profile and subsequently broach the TACS attitude deadband.
This was very costly in TACS impulse as the TACS system oftenwould
have to return the vehlcle to the commanded attitude via rate ledge
operation.
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A scheme had to be developed that would allow attitude
perturbations while CMG control straightened out the stop problems.
A totally new and final maneuvering scheme was therefore devised.
This change in conjunction with the changed TACS desaturation
firing scheme provided for significant improvements in TACS impulse
utilization and CMG system performance. In addition, the new
maneuvering scheme required less operational constraints, was easier
to co_nand, offered greater flexlbillty and required less core storage
thsu the previous maneuvering scheme.
c. Mission Operation
(I) Z-LV Mode. The Z-LV mode and, thus, maneuvers to
Z-LV attitude were used extenslvely throughout the Skylab mission.
During SL-I, a modifLed Z-LV attitude was experimented with in an
attempt to cool the SWS and meet power requirements. However, use
of Attitude Hold maneuvers were used extensively instead. Tables
24, 25, and 26 summarize the EREP passes performed during the mission.
The EREP pass maneuvers, as designed and performed,
were based upon many different requirements (TACS fuel, CMG momentum,
thermal, power, etc.), the major of which was the experiment data
requirement. The most common EREP pass during the Skylab mlss=on
was to enter Z-LV attitude Just prior to the data take period and
return to Solar Inertial attitude at the end of the data take. This
was the original maneuver profile design for an EREP pass.
Another EREP ,mneuver profile that was utilized during
SL-4 was called a noon-to-noon pass. The Z-LV mode was entered
near orbital noon and exited near the next orbital noon. To avoid
momentum accumulation in the Y-axis due to gravity gradient torques,
a Z-LV offset attitude was maintained while not in the data take
period. This offset attitude was such that the X (principal) axis
in the orbit plane and perpendicular to the radius vector to the
center of the Earth. This type of pass was used because it minimized
TAtS fuel usage and CMC glmbal stop encounters. ?
A Z-LV rendezvous maneuver was never performed during
the three rendezvous and docking phases of the Skylab mission. Due
to rate gyro, thermal, and power problems, rendezvous and docking,
durln8 SL-I, were performed in the thermal attitude. For the re-
mainder of the mission, rendezvous and docking were performed in
Solar Inertial attitude.
(2) Solar Inertial Mode. The offset pointing capabill-
ties in the Solar Inertial mode permitted accurate experiment point-
: ins. One design change was uplinked to the AI_4DC to meet Kohoutek
pointing requirements. This change _ncreased the Solar Inertial
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toffset command resolution to 0.01 degree and the offset limit from 4
degrees to 5.2 degrees. Previous to this change, the smallest off-
set that could be con=handed was 0.i degree. Kohoutek pointing re-
quirements, which were defined w II into the mission, necessitated
this change. This design change contributed to the success of the
Kohoutek pointing experiments.
The Solar Inertial acquisition maneuver capability
functioned properly throughout tLe mission.
(3) Attitude Hold Mode. Before the mission, the
Attitude Hold maneuver capabilities were required, but little use
was outlined for them. However, during the mission, these capabili-
ties were used extensively. During SL-I, the continuation of the
mission was dependent upon the emergency Attitude Hold mode maneuver-
ing done to cool the SWS. Approximately 55 Attitude Hold maneuvers
were performed during SL-I due to thermal, power, and rate gyro
problems.
The number of Attitude Hold Mode maneuvers required
to support experiments also increased significantly during the
mission. The primary contributor to this was the Kohoutek comet
activities defined for SL-4. Approximately 30 Kohoutek comet maneuvers
were performed during SL-4 using two CHGs. During the entire mission,
approximately 40 other Attitude Hold maneuvers were performed to
support various other scientific activities.
d. Conclusions. The maneuvering capabilities of Skylab
operated as designed. The ability to maneuver the vehicle in a
number of modes allowed great flexibility for both planned experi-
ment operations and observation of targets of opportunity such as \
Comet Kohoutek. The use of Attitude Hold maneuvers to obtain
desirable thermal and power attitudes aided materially in avoiding
serious damage to the vehicle during SL-I.
l
C. Momentum Management
Any noncyclic disturbance torques acting on the vehicle will
result in _ net momentum buildup of the CHG cluster. Because of the
finite storage capacity of the CHG cluster this momentum accumulation
will eventually cause CHG saturation and inability to compensate
for a disturbance torque about the axis of saturation. Although it
is not posslble to eliminate the noncyclic torques, techniques are
available that can be utilized to minimize them.
: Three techniques utilized on Skylab are:
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To minimize the noncyclic gravity gradient torques by
maintaining the axis of minimtnnmoment of inertia
(X-axls) in or near the orbital plane
To minimize the vehicle vent torques by the design
of non-propulsive vent hardware
To nullify the saturation effects of the remaining
noncyclic disturbance torques by periodically during
the night portion of the orbit producing controlled
bias torques which tended to desaturate the CMG
cluster.
i. Disturbances. Disturbance torque profiles resulting
from $kylab vents during the mission were derived from TM data
and compared with the predicted preflight vent torque profiles.
The four types of vent disturbances primarily considered were:
Experiment M092 - Lower Body Negative Pressure (LBNP)
Airlock depressurization prior to Extra-_ehicular Activi-
ties (EVA) including astronaut suit venting during
these EVAs
Habitation Area (H/A) Blowndown following the storage
periods
Command and Service Module (CSM) vent.
The Waste Tank (W/T) vent was also observed but the largest
pressure profile analyzed produced negligible disturbances on the
APCS. 'or addltional details on vent torques during the mission,
see Reference 9.
a. Lower Body Negative Pressure Experiment Vent.
(I) Experiment Description. The M092 Inflight LBNP
experiment is designed to determine the time course of cardiovascular
deconditioning during space flight and to provide data for predicting
the degree of orthostatlc intolerance and impairment of physical capa-
billty expected following return to earth's environment. The experi-
ment is conducted by two astronauts; a subject and observer. The
subject's lower body is encased in the LBNP device and measurements
of the cardiovascular system are recorded _4,ile the ambient atmos-
phere of the LBNP device is vented overboard.
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The primary method of identifying the time at which
the LBNP vent occurred was Co correlate the vent with the Experiment
M092 ambient temperature measurement number C7311M092 and the ex-
periment M092 chamber temperature, temperature number C3730M092.
These measurements are activated when the astronauts are preparing
for the LBNP experiment. The first noticed event is when the data
recorder is turned on which also automatically activates the tempera-
ture sensors. Part of the sequence in performing the experiment
requires calibration of the sensors Just prior to ard _---ediately
after the experiment.
The LBNP experiment vents that were analyzed and the
actual duration of the event is pre,qented in Table 9.
Table 9. Experiment Vents Analyzed
OP.BI_AL
TIME DURATION POSITION *
LBSP NO. MZSS ION (DAY :HR:MIN) (Sen) (DeR)
4 SL-2 18:21:15 1350 123
17 SL-2 33:16:04 975 246
24 SL-3 81:15:48 910 190
•*27 SL-3 86 :17 :08 UD 232
33 SL-3 94:14:37 II00 206
36 SL-3 98:15:39 970 004
48 SL-3 110:21:16 1100 292
49 SL-3 Iii :19:17 1120 000
50 SL-3 113:22:30 1090 347
53 SL-3 116:16:05 1170 063
77 SL-4 191:15:40 1190 132
79 SL-4 196:20:40 960 264
85 SL-4 208:21:27 960 211
UD - Undetermined
• - Orbital position in degrees past orbital m:dnight
• _ - Not completely analyzed due to lack to TH data.
(2) Predicted Torque Profiles. The predicted torque
profiles for this vent were essentially a rectangular pulse with a
duration of 600 seconds. D,_e to the nature of the experiment being
performed, this partlcular vent deviated from the predicted. The
extracted torque profilts are compared with the predicted profiles
in figure 17. The two curves on each axis represent the maxJJR_m and
minimum torques imparted to the vehicle for the experiment vents
analyzed. It is readily apparent that the loss of the micro-
meterold shield changed these profiles considerably from the pre-
dicted. Also, the actual vent period was much longer than predicted.
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(3) Extracted Torque Profiles. The extracted torque
profiles vary considerably from each other as well as from the pre-
dicted. The Indtvidual variations were mainly due to the differences
in the time history in which the experiment was performed. Since
each time the experiment was performed, the amount of negative pres-
sure applied to the LBNP device was controlled _anually by the astro-
nsut, it is unlikely that any two experiments would have the same
ventlr.g time history. The ulgn reversal on the X and Z-axle torques
from the predicted are apparently due to uncertainties in the im-
plnge_ent coefficients and to the change in mass properties when
the mlcro-meteorold shield and one solar wing was lost. A composite
plot of the extracted torque profile is presented in figure 17.
At the I_eginning of the SL-4 mission, the astronauts :
modified the H092 Inflight LBI_P experiment vent to be vented into
the Orbltal Workshop (O_) waste tank instead of directly overboard.
This was done in order to el_nlnate the disturbance torques acting
on the vehicle due to this vent and to preclude the possibility of
having any TACS thruster firings. The effect of this modification
is that the masnitudes of the LBNP vent torques during these ex-
periments were very low compared with vent torques which occurred
before the modification. Hence the modification was successful.
As a result, the modification elimlnated H092 experiment schedullng
constraints imposed by the APCS.
The results of the disturbance torque extraction
task as applied to LBNP experiment vents is su_arlzed in Table 10.
b. Extra-Vehlcular Activity Vent.
(I) Vent Description. The Airlock Module (AM) lock
depressurlzatlon vent is located at station number 3295.5, eisht
degrees from the +Z-axls toward the -Y-axis. This vent is manually
controlled by the LOCK DEPRESS VALVE, located in the AH lock. It
is operated by an astronaut Just prior to opening the EVA hatch.
No_Inally, 1.45 K8 of oxygen and 0.45 Kg of nitrogen is vented
overboard as the Inter_al pressure in the lock is decreased from
the nominal 35,800 _/mZdown to approximately zero. Predlctad EVA
torques are shown in figure 18_ile typlcal torques are shown in
figures 19 and 20. The change in slgns on the torque profiles are
apparently dtte to uncertainties in the impingement ca-a_f_cients
and to a shift in the center of mass because of loss of one solar
array and the mlcro-meteorold shield. Table II shows the de-
pressurization vents investigated.
(2) Extracted Torque Profiles. The extracted dis-
turbance momentum and torque profiles are sumurlzad in Table 12.
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Table 10. Disturbance Torque Results
MOMENTUMIHPARTED, (N.m.s) AVERAGETORQUE (N.m) ,,
,, E, .i,
'LBNT X Y Z X Y Z
4 -188 2800 630 -0.4 2.07 0.48
17 -180 1400 1280 -0.19 1.44 1.32
24 -130 2250 2000 -0.15 2.50 2.22
**27 -37 780 595 -0.10 2.10 1.58
33 -50 1720 2450 -0.05 1.56 2.23
36 * 2800 2700 * 2.89 2.78
48 -450 2500 2150 -0.41 2.27 1.95
49 * 1410 1050 * 1.56 i 1.17
50 -70 2020 1800 -0.64 1.85 1.65
53 * 2650 2050 * 2.67 1.75
77 16 200 -55 * * * ;
79 -310 300 490 * * *
85 -13 185 -100 * * *
NOTES: (I) The disturbance torque was obtained from _n extracted
disturbance momentum whlch had been averaged over the ps_c slx data
points. Thls derived torque was then averaged over the past six data
points.
(2) The extracted disturbance momentum was computer from TH
data samples taken every 14.75 seconds. The torque was obtained from
a filtered momentum profile and then filtered again. The filters used
were 0.7 damped quadratic lags with a break frequency of 0.5 radians/
second.
*Not dlscernable.
**Not completely analyzed due to lack of _data.
Table II. EVA Vents Investigated
START
DEPRESSUR I7ATION
TG_fr DURbTION POSITION*
I.z_rrI, rICAZlOS , (D^Y :.R:HIN) .. (Set) (_9
SL-2 EVA 1 15:15:18 591 216
SL-2 EVA 2 37:10:45 480 150
SL-3 EVA 1 85:17:21 690 115
SL-3 EVA 2 103:16:15 540 183
SL-3 EVA 3 132:11:10 540 90
SL-4 EVA 1 193:17:36 480 170
SL-4 EVA 3 230:17:21 5!0 238
*Orbital position In degrees past orbital midnight,
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%A composite cf the "straight line" version is shown in Figure 19,
while a typical vent profile is shown in Figure 20. These torques
were those used in performing the evaluation of the APCS in response
to the depressurlzation torques for the EVAs.
Table 12. EVA Vent Results
MOMENTUM IMPARTED [ AVERAGE TORQUE (l_)
IDENTIFICATION X Y Z _ X Y Z
SL-2 EVA I -600 -7bO.,,+!00 :,I.0 -1.3 +002
SL-2 EVA 2 . (i)_
SL-3 EVA 1 -700 -735 410 -1.0 -1.1 0.6
SL-3 EVA 2 -850, -800 +600 (3)-1.6 -1.5 111
SL-3 EVA 3 (I_ ....
SL-4 EVA 1 -900 -1050 450 -1.0 -2.2 0.9
SL-4 EVA 3 .... (2)
(I) Not analyzed d,_eto telemetry data gap.
(2) Not analyzed b,cause CMC co_Itrol was inhibited just prior to
the vent.
(3) Insufficient data.
c. Extra-Vehicular Activity Torques.
(i) Description. During normal EVA, 3.59 Kg t_ 4.09
Kg/hour of Extra-Vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) gases are vented
overboard. This flow comes from the suit's Pressure Control Unit
(PCU) which is mounted around the astronaut's waist. The vent is
located near the small of the back.
While the astronaut is outside the vehicle moving
around on the cluster, this vent is functioning and produclng dis-
turbance torque_ on the vehicle. It was the purpose of this portion
of the study to extract these torque profiles from the telemetry data
and attempt to determine magnitude of the suit vent forces. For this
purpose, three of the EVAs were investigated as noted in Table 13.
Table 13. EVAs Investigated for Suit Vents
EVA NO. DAY .....DURATION ._ APCS.MODE*
SL-3 EVA 3 132 2 Hrs 41 Min Sl
SL-4 EVA I 193 6 Hrs 18 Min SI
SL-4 EVA 3 230 3 Hre 23 MLn Sl
*During the fizst two EVAs investigated, the APCS was in SI mode
under 3-CMG/TACS control. On DAY 327, one CMGfailed and was secured.
Therefore, SL-4 EVA 3 utilized only 2 CMGs. Also during portions of
the EVA, the APCS was in the Attitude Hold (A/H) mode under CMG/TACS
control.
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Tables 14, 15 and 16 present the EVA torques for the
three EVAs shown in Table 13. The torques were generated by differen-
tiation of the momentum profile for these time veriods.
It was not possible to extract the suit vent forces
from the telemetry data. Several unknowns effected t_e anal _is.
These were astronaut station and attitude, and reflected force
which occurred when the astronaut was in a seml-constrained space,
such as the area near the EVA hatch.
d. Habitation Area Blowndown Vent.
(I) Approximately two days prior to docking, during
the storage period, the Habitation Area (H/A) of the OWS was de-
pressurized from the storage pressure down to approximately 3440
N/m_ (see Table 17). This is accomplished by opening the OWS
solenoid vent valves by DCS/DAS commands from the ground.
The vent is designed to be non-propulslve and is
located at station 3165.0, 25 degrees from the -Z-axls toward the
-Y-axis and 25 degrees from the +Z-axis toward the +Y-axls. The
vent duration is nominally 6 to 8 hours.
Figure 21 shows the H/A pressure profile. This
figure is'the pressure profile as seen in measurement number D7111-
436 of the AM telemetry system. In figure 22 the solid llne shows
the torque profile, etc. while the dashed llne shows the extrapo-
lated predicted profile.
e. Co.and and Service Module Vent.
(1) Vent Description. The vent is located on the
CSM and was used to vent steam from the primary and/or secondary
glycol evaporator as part of the CSM Environment Control System
(ECS) function.
Due to the oxidizer leak problem with the SL-3
(CSH) durin_ preparation for SL-3 undocking, the CSM ECS checkout
p_ocedures were modified to be in compliance with the procedures
used during deactivation. The revised procedures zesulted in
operation of the Secondary Glycol Evaporator which produced steam
which is vented directly overboard. A momentum build-up was ob-
served which resulted in the CMG reset prior to securing the
evaporator.
Upon observing the momentum build-up, a possible
leak on the +Z-Scientific Airlock (SAL) vacuum source quick disconnect
(qD) was suspect. This QD, which incorporates a shut-off valve,
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Table 14. SL-3 EVA 3 Vent Torques
TIME* TDX TDY TDZ
(Sec) (N.m) (N.m) (N.m) ;
0 -0.84 -0.57 0.20
400 1.34 0.76 -1.55
2000 0.80 ** -0.85
3200 -0.90 i.64 O.85
4800 0.40 2.70 -0.50
5850 -I.i0 i.64 O.65
6400 O.38 i.64 O.O0
7600 -0.38 O.00 O.O0
8350 -0.69 -I.00 0.50
9000 O.O0 O.00 O.O0
*Time is from Tre f. = 132:11:22:43.0
**Undet ermined. Tre f
NOTE: Hatch open at -249 (132:11:18:34), close at 9411
(132:13:59:27).
Table 15. SL-4 EVA 1 Vent Torques
T[ME* TDX TDY TDZ
(_Sec) (N.m) _N.m) (N.m)
0 -0.05 0.15 -0.20
5010 0.O0 O.04 O.26
5790 -0.97 -I.I0 0.88
6270 -0.53 -0.65 0.26
6810 -0.37 -0.33 0.12
8760 -0.22 -O.35 0.44
9192 -0.13 O.66 -0.15
12700 -0.12 0.39 -0.79
12920 -0.46 -0.35 0.33
16740 -0.06 -I.03 -0.65
28480 ** ** **
29850 ** ** **
*TLme is from Tre f. Tre f = 193:16:00
**Undetermined --- TACS firings.
NOTE: Hatch open at 6810 Sec (193:17:53:30),
close at approximately 29490 (194:00:II:30).
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Table 16. SL-4 EVA 3 Vent Torques
TIME* TDX TDY TDZ
(Seg) (N.m) ....._N.m) _N.m)
0 (TACS FIRINGS)
850 -0.01 0.0G 0.01
1030 (TACS FIRINGS)
1470 0,00 0.00 -0.01
1860 (TACS FIRINGS)
2030 0.00 O.00 -0.01
2280 (TACS FIRINGS)
2300 -0.51 2.06 0.33
2600 (TACS FIRINGS)
2610 -0.84 -0.52 0.92
2670 (TACS FIRINGS)
2690 -0,28 -0,08 0,02
2870 (TACS FIRINGS)
2900 -0.46 -0.52 0.38
3030 (TACS FIRINGS)
3040 -0.31 -0.19 0.25
5980 (KOHOUTEK MANEUVER)
13455 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time is from Tref. Tref. = 230:17:14:45:184
NOTE: Hatch open at approximately 1095 (230:17:33)
close at approximately 13275 (230:20:59).
Table 17. Habitation Area Pressure
INITIAL FINAL DURATION APCE
DAy N/m _ N/m2 (Hrs) MODE
74 12600 3940 7.9 SI
185 26000 * * Sl
No data.
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was capped. The SAL valve was set to VENT. The cap was first re-
placed with a 183 cap and finally a hose was attached to the QD,
neither of which seemed to halt the momentum build-up. The build-up
was finally attributed to the CSMwater boiler.
(2) Extracted torque profiles. At Greenwich Mean
Time (GMTj on DAY 135, at approximately 13:06:28, the Secondary
Glycol Evaporator Vent was initiated on the CSM. This vent
occurred during preparation and checkout for the SL-3 undocking
sequence which occurred at approximately 135:19:52:53. The vent
lasted for 3901 seconds until approximately 135:14:11:29. The
resulting momementum build-up on the Cl4Gs forced a CMG reset which
started at approximately 135:14:02:17. The vehicle was at an orbital
position of approximately 243 orbital degrees with a solar elevation
of approximately minus 44.7 degrees. The APCS was in the SI mode
with the CMG-TACS in control, The events are stmmarized in Table 18.
Table 18. Sequence of Events
TIME
(DAY:_ :MIN:szc) (SEC) EVENT
135:12:00:23 23198423. TGMT
135:13:06:28 23202388. START VENT
135:13:55:04 23205304. START CMG RESET
135 :14:02 :I7 23206289. END CMG RESET
135:14 :ii:19 23206289. END VENT
The extracted disturbance torque profile is presented
in figure 23.
2. Momentum Desaturation.
a. Description. Angular momentum desaturation was
accomplished by performing three successive eigen-axis maneuvers
during the night portion of the orbit. The first maneuver utilized
25Z of the dump interval, the second 507. and the third 25Z. The
maneuver interval is symetric about the position in orbit where the
x-principal axis is perpendicular to the gravity vector (defined as
dump mldnight).
A delta Z-axis rotation was included in the third maneuver.
This correction minimized momentum accumulation during the next
orbit.
The maneuvers were implemented utilizing attitude commands
and based on navigation parameters and the desaturation momentum
commands.
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Information about the accumulated momentum was obtained
by sampling the normalized components of the CMG momentum four
time_ an orbit. The information contained in the momentum samples
were used to establish a momentum bias, a momentum drift and a
change in momentum drift. A weighted sumn_tionwas then utilized
to form body axis momentu_ come, ands.
Provision was included for the commands to be based on
a single contingency sample if any of the normal samples were in-
valid.
To preclude CMG saturation during the momentum dump
maneuvers momentum dump state prediction logic was included. If
the logic predicted CHG saturation the original maneuvers were
scaled down.
b. History. The orlginal concept of Skylab was to
desaturate the CHGs by means of TACS, but an energy-conservative
approach was the one finally employed. In this method the vehicle
was maneuvered, during the night portions of the orbit, to an
orientation which caused momentum to accumulate in a direction
which reduced the total momentum stored £n the CHGs. Then, before
the day portion of the orbit, the vehicle returned to Solar Inertial
except for an offset about the sunline used for desaturat£ng and
mlnlmlzln3 momentum accumulation during the ensulng day.
The basic problems to be solved in developing a practi-
cal dump scheme included:
Sampling a momentum to be dumped
Generating a maneuver command profile
The sampling scheme changed from looking for maximum
and mint_,n momentum accumulation along each axis to sampling at
those points in orbits where the cyclic component of gravity
3radiant n_mentum were expected to be either zero or maximum.
Therefore, bias and cyclic momentum can be extracted. The
maneuver scheme underwent a major change in that the angle profile
was changed from a trapezoid to a triangle allowing more desatura-
tton over the desaturation period. Desaturatton comnands were
computed in principal axis coordinates and then transformed into
vehicle coordinates. Due to the similarity of vehicle Y and Z-
inertias and their being much greater than the X-axis inertia,
only Y and Z-axis principal axis maneuvers were computed. There-
fore, by the time the change from the Wet to the Dry Workshop con-
figuration had been made, the basic ground-rules for dump maneuvers
had been developed.
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In the development of the Dry Workshop ATMIE program,
the momentum sampling was changed from five to four samples as _he
extra sample was not providing unique data. In addition, a major
increase in performance was achieved with the addition of momentum
state prediction logic. This was a set of logic used to ascertain
whether the CMGshad the capability to execute the computed dump
maneuvers. If the CMGmomentum state was determined to be incom-
patible with the computed maneuver, the maneuver angles would be
scaled down untll an acceptable level was reached.
The next changes were basically ¢lerlcal. For example,
primarily for convenience, the alternate sample was specified to be
taken at dump commence time. In addition, a llst of specific cri-
teria for determining the validity of the momentum samples was In-
corporated. This was necessitated by the various options that were
emerging in CMGcontrol (primarily the reset routine) and Redundancy
Management. However, there was one performance related change, the
incorporation of S! offset commands into the generation of the
maneuver attitude profile. This provided the capability to dump
from an SI offset attitude and to return automatically to that
offset upon completion of the dump. This was initiated as an
operational concern by the crew. They did not want to have to re-
move and re-enter the offset commnds every orbit Just before and
after dump. A complete investigation was made as to the effects
of dumping from an offset. The results indicated no performance
problems.
The final version contained two significant changes.
One was the removal of the rate coneaands in the execution of the
maneuvers. This was done as a memory saving after extensive simu-
latlonwork had shown that the steady state attitude offset that
resulted from having only a ramp attitude co_nand had insignificant
effect on the dump scheme capability. The other cb_,ge was the
inclusion of the SI off-set cosmands in dump prediction and scale-
down logic to make this logic compatible w_th the change made earlle_
of dump f_om the Sl offset angle.
c. Analysis and Verification. The maemntumAanagement
scheme underwent extensive analysis and simulation under varied
conditions. The actual ATMDCFlight l'rosramversion of the Control
law then was verified, also, under varied conditions. For a s_ry
of deslSu analysis and verification, see Reference 5.
d. Mission Performance. Skylab was the first spece
vehicle to utilise vehicle maneuvers for desaturatlon and it worked
atr_ly_11. The desaturatlon schme allmmd Skylab to So t_o
151
1974021165-163
entire unmanned missions without any TACS usage and allowed con-
siderable TACS saving during the manned phases.
One problem arose from the interface of the dump scheme
and the Star Tracker. The Star Tracker gave a direct independent
indication of the angle between th_ vehicle X-axis and the orbit
plane. During normal performance of the Tracker, this angle pro-
vided useful information to the mc.mentummanagement scheme as to
where momentum samples should be taken. Rowever, the Star Tracker
on several occasions during the SL-2 erroneously locked on to ob-
Jects other than the required star. This caused the outer glmbal
angle input to be inaccurate. On one occasion the erroneous inputs
were received Just prior to calculation of the momentum desaturation
maneuvers. This resulted in a degraded performance by the u_nentum
management scheme, resulting in less than optimum momentum states.
In order to avoid these situations, a procedure was formulated
wherein Star Tracker control and outer gimbal use were inhibited,
the desired Star Tracker gimbal angles were calculated by ground
support software, the Star Tracker was u_nually positioned on the
star by the crew via the C&D Panel, and Star Tracker control and
outer glmbal use were enabled. This allowed a valid outer g£mb_l
reading to be obtained, after which Star Tracker control and outer
glmbal use were inhibited again. Effective utilizatlon of this
procedure alleviated this problem with the Star Tracker readings.
This procedure to protect against Star Tracker false
lock-on could have been avoided by having attitude about the sun-
line determined from momentum samples. _ile this information
was not as accurate as that obtained from the Star Tracker, it
was sufficiently accurate for momentum management and is indepen-
dent of star availabillty or cre_ presence.
During the first unmanned period, the hal£-_ngle of the
dump maneuver was decreased from 53 degrees to 51 degrees to en-
sure that for a 8olar elevatlun whose absolute value was less than
35 degrees, the dump msneuv,_rs would be at night. This was done to
protect an experiment with a failed door. Momentum management
functioned welt even though this smaller interval caused larger
maneuve_ angles. The dump half-angle was changed back to 63 degrees
at the start of SL-3 and retained at tibet value for the remainder
of the uls_ion.
Despite the generally nomlnal behavior of the dump scheme,
on two occasions, certain events occurred during or Just prior to
initiation of the GG dump that resulted in loss of attitude control.
Since the loss of control occurred during the active portion of the
C_ maneuvers, they were referred to as GG dump problems. The first
loss of control occurred after a Z-axls Pate Gyro failure was
152
I
1974021165-164
detected during the dump maneuver. The second event resulted from
action taken because of unexpected vent torques during an EVA.
One hnportant condition of the O4G control system
existed during both instances of loss of control, i.e., C]4C
saturation. Once the OtG con-rol syst,_ became saturated, it
took on the following propertles:
Control Law attempted to alIBn the total
momentun vector along the torque command
vector.
l)u-_ to proportional scallng, any addlt-
ional torque requlrement in the axis of
the largest comnand reduced the com_nds
in the other axes (thus, altering the
direction of the torque command vector).
Nomentum, therefore, changed in all axes
(due to momentum vector svlngln8 to
realign vlth torque counand).
X-axle vas the most sensitive axis to this
phenomena because of:
Lower control gains
Small moment of inertia
Less momentum equlvalency of X-axls
rate ledge caused by destr_ to keep
rate below Pate G_o scale swltchlna.
liLstortcally, the above described phenomena was referred
to as the X-axis momentum siphon effect. The relative difference
in the momentum change among the ;brae axes was small, :._t because
of the small moment of inertia in the X-axle, the vehicle rate
change was an order of maKnltude greater than the ¥ and Z-axes.
TACS desaturatioo flrlnas normally prevented C]4G
saturation, thus, not allovln8 the above described condition to
exist. However, the 66 dump maneuvers were designed so as to pre-
vent needless deseturetlon firings. As the result of Implementing
the suneuvets by commanding a strapdmm offset vLth a zero atti-
tude rato ccsmar_l, syst_ momentum saturation did not occur.
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Special scaled_m logic in the momentum management
routine controlled the exLent of CHG saturation during GG dump
maneuvers to maximize dump capability. The logic proportionally
scaled the maneuvers conslderlng:
}_nent um bias
Momentum ramp
Average cyclic momentt over dump Interval
Commanded b las
Amount of momentum alz o- 4y dumped.
Addltlonally, the sceledob_ logic assumed that without
maneuvers, the system would not saturate.
(I) Z-axis Rate Gyro Scale Factor Error. On _¥ 91,
at 17:03:00, a nominal GG dump maneuver conDenced. At 17:03:32, the
two controlling Rate Gyros in the Z-axis failed the integral test
criteria because of a difference in rate readings. Prior to the
integral test failure, the C_G control system was cot:trolling,
using the average of Gy_'os Z2 and Z3. After the failure detection,
Gyro Z2 was arbltrarily chosen for control. Since the reading on
Z2 was lower than required, an a_ditlonal 0.3 Ii was required to
bring the readin_ of Z2 up to the required rate. The additional
_entum requirement forced the CHGs into saturation and siphoned
momentum from the X-axis at the same time. The X-axis momentum
change produced an uncontrolled rate and resulted in a 20 degree
attitude buildup in the X-axis requiring an autoomtic switch to
TACS only control.
A slmulator yes initialized with data taken prior
to dump commence (17:02:30)with the follovtn, _erifyins results:
Computed same C_ dump profile as AIMDC
Nith normal Gyros, no switch to TACS Only
With 0.01 degree/second difference in Z2 end
Z3, switched to TACS Only within 15 seconds
of flight and all control parameters tracked
closely with flight.
(2) Control Problem8 Vurin= EVA Vent. The sAcond
Incld©nt, in which loss of control occurred during a C_ du_,
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rook place on DAY 103, at 19:00 hours. The _pprox/_ate tlmeltne
of events was as follows:
17:10:00 - EVA started to install Six-Pack
Gyros
17:50:00 - Installation complete
17:53:00 - Solar Inertial mode selected to
remove attitude errors
19:42:00 - By ground command, a single sample
dump was forced
(Desaturation firings had occurred since 18:00
hours due to momentum ramp resulting from crew
suit vents.)
19:53:00 - CMG saturation
19:52:00 - Siphoning of X-axis momentum follow-
ed by divergence of attitude error
19:57:00 - Attitude Hold mode commanded
The CMG saturation occurred as a result of the GG
maneuver plus the crew suit vent. Since a single sample dump
(versus the complete four-sample) cannot detect the presence of
a momentum ramp component, the scaledown logic could not predict
the CMG saturation and, therefore, did not reduce the magnitude
f the maneuvers. A more sophisticated sample scheme could have
detected a momentum ramp component with as little as five minutes
Solar Inertial attitude. However, the lack of additional available
memory in the ATMDC made this not feaslble.
D. TACS Budget
I. Mission Usage. At launch, the Skylab vehicle was loaded
with 376, 996 N.s. of TACS impulse capability. The predicted usage
for the llfe of Skylab was ii0, 102 N.s. The total TACS used
during the entire Skylab mission was an impulse of appro_imately
340,311N.s. The usable TACS impulse remaining at the end of the
m_sslon was approximately 36, _85 N.s., assuming mlnlmumusable
thrust of _.5 Newtons. However, additional impulse could have
been generat" %y allowing TACS pressure to drop to zero. This
usage is sum :Ized in Table 19_ according to five time periods:
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Table 19. TACS Usage Summarized by Missions ;
TIME PERIOD TOTAL TACS USED
(DAY :HR:MIN)....... EVENT .. (N.s)
I :!7:30 SL-I Launch to Acquisition 190,895
to of True SI. '
13:18:00 •
an
13:18:00 Skylab-2 13,656 i
to
40:09:24
76:19:38 Skylab-3 27, 263
to
135:19:53
187:21:00 Skylab-4
to 3-CMG Operation 7,046
271 :i0:32 2-CMG Operation 93_i01
Total i00,147
271 :I0:32 Deactivation b Storage II,081
to
272:18:17
Table 20. Summary of TACS Used Prior to Acquisition of
_rue Solar Inertial Attitude
I :EVENTS TACS USAGE (N.s)
IU Control Period 36,716 :
APCS Acttvatlon Pertod_ 29,807
Thermal Maneuvers 12,072
Resets 44,812
Destination Firings** 1,779
Rendezvous and Docking 48,566
Maneuver to SI 17a143 . (
Total 190,895
,,, ,|
*Includes three thermal maneuvers and TACS only period.
**Only those not associated with specific event.
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Table 21. Sunmmry of TACS Used During Skylab-2 Mission
EVENT TACS USAGE (N. s. )
EREPs 2509
J
TrlmBurn 2580
Rate Gyro Anomaly 142 i_
Rate Gy¢o Calibration 267
Thermal Maneuver 3852
LBNP 142
Refrigeration Haneuver 3074
Resets 1090
Total 13,656
Table 22. Summry of TAtS Used During Skylab-3 Mission
EVENT TACS USAGE (N.s.)
Docking 3634
EREPs 1210
DAY 91 Anomaly 11,450
LBNP 360 •
+
EVAs 4146
Desaturation Firings 289
Resets 2180
Undocking
Resets 1873
Attitude Hold 2032
CalibrationF_aneuver 89 _
Total 27,263
i
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Skylab-i launch to true Solar Inertial
Skylab-2 mission
Skylab-3 mlssion i
Skylab-4 miss ion
Post Skylab°4 deactivation and storage.
Additional breakdowns are in terms of mission events such
as maneuvers and EVAs.
A summary of TACS used during period of SL-I launch to ac-
quisition of true Solar Inertial attitude is shown in Table 20.
It should be noted that the impulse used during the mission
subtracted from the initial stored impulse is not exactly equal to
the final measured stored impulse. This was caused by Skylab being
dea_tlvated before TACS pressure had stabilized and approximations
made in calculating TACS usage. See Section VI.E for addltlonal
details on problems associated with TACS pressure measurements.
a. Skylab-i Launch to Solar Inertial. Essentially, all
the TACS usage during this period can be classified as being used
during the thermal attitude. Due to the loss of the mlcro-meteoroid
shleld and the non-deployment of the Solar Panel (Section IV), ma_y
maneuvers aud attitudes other than SI attitude were required for
extended periods. While in these extended non-SI attitudes, gravity
gradient torques caused momentum buildup. Since momentum desatura-
tion maneuvers were not possible, TACS was used for CMG desatura-
tion purposes, as well as aiding with maneuvers.
b. Skylab-2 Mission. The Skylab-2 mission is considered
to start when the Solar Inertial attitude was acquired on DAY 14,
18:00:00. TAC:_ usage from the acqulsl.'on of Solar Inertial to
the undockin_ of SL-2 are given in Tah3 I.
c. Sky!ab-3 Mission. The Sky_b-3 mission began with
SL-3 docking on DAY 76, 19:38:50, and ended with SL-3 undocklng
on DAY 135, 19:52:53. TACS usage for the mission is summarized
in Table 22.
d. Skylab-4 Mission. The Skylab-4 mission began with
SL-4 docking DAY 187, 22:00:00, and ended with SL-4 undocklng
DAY 27_, 15:00:00. The first part of the mission was under 3-CMC
control. However, on DAY 194, the number 1CMG failed and the rest
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of the SL-4 mission was under 2-CMG operation. Two CMG operation
generally required more TACS usage than 3-CMG operation. Table
23 gives a summary of TACS usage for the SL-4 mission.
e. Post SL-4 Deactivation and Storage. After the CSM
undocked DAY 271, 17:15:00, ending the SL-4 mission, the SWS OA
was maneuvered to an X-LV attitude under TACS only control. TACS
used during the period SL-4 undocking to powering down of vehicle
was 11,081N.s.
2. Event Usage.
a. Thermal Attitude Maneuvers. Shortly after orbital
insertion, the workshop began to overheat, due to loss of the micro-
meteoroid shield. To protect the contents of the Workshop from
excessive heat, it was necessary to maneuver the vehicle to attitudes
where the Z-axis did not point dlrectly at the sun. The most accept-
able compromise between thermal and electrlcal power constraints
proved to be an attitude with the vehlcle Z-axls point 40 degrees
away from the sun llne. Problems associated with maintaining the
thermal attitude resulted in a TACS usage amounting to a large portion
of the total Skylab Impulse expenditure.
The large Rate Gyro drift present in the Rack Rate Gyros
presented serious difficulties in maintaining attitude and attitude
reference. By causing movement of the X-princlpal axis out of the
orbital plane, the gyro drift caused frequent CMG momentum satura-
tions and subsequent resets. !
Since the momentum desaturation scheme was deglgned to
function in Solar Inertial mode and would not operate at the thermal !
attitude, consideration was given to implementatlon of an ATMDC
patch to provide momentum desaturatlon capability. The patch, however,
could not be developed in the time available.
The only means used to desaturate the CMGs was the reset
routine. As the reset routine caged momentum to the nominal value
for Solar Inertial attitude, resets could only be commanded at
orbital po$.uts where the Solar Inertial and thermal attitude n_inal
momentum curves intersected. In addition, adequate station coverage
was required for these points.
b. Attitude Hold Haneuve-_. Before the mission the Atti-
tude Hold maneuver capabilities were required but little use was out-
lined for them. However, during the mission these capabilities were
used extensively.
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Table 23. Summary of TACS Used During
Skylab-4 Mission
EVENT I TACS USAGE (N.s)
3-CMG Docking 4608
Operation Desaturation Firings 67
EVA No. I 2349
CMG No. i Deactivation 22
2-CMG EVA 2, 3 and 4 37,525
Operation Trim Burn 22
TACS Only (High X Rate) 2691
Resets 2126
Desaturation Firings* 3168
EREPs 28,090
EREP (.al 2865
C Motlcn 22
Maneuvers
$232 III
S183 249
JOP13 3582
S063 765
SO19 226
JOP18 3974
: Undocking Period 7784
Total 100,147
*Many desaturation firings could be attributed to experiment-
caused dump inhibits or maneuvers.
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The first week of Skylab involving almost constant maneuver-
ing in the thermal attitude gave the crew and the mission support
team confidence in the vehicle maneuvering capability. After the
installation of the thermal shield and the reacquisition of Solar
Inertial, a wide variety of Attitude Hold maneuvers were performed.
These maneuvers were for the following purposes:
P_te Gyro Calibration (Rack and Six-Pack)
KohoutekManeuvers
X-Ray Stellar Photography (JOP-13)
The first Rate Gyro calibration maneuvers were performed
to check the scale factor of the Rack Gyros with respect to each
other and with respect to the Acquisition Sun Sensor. After the
installation of the Six-Pack Rate Gyros, a second set of maneuvers
was performed to check their alignments to Workshop axis. The !
maneuvers showed this alignment to be sufficiently accurate that
no additional ATMDC compensation was required.
The study of the Comet Kohoutek was an unplanned opportunity
requiring the development of ground software and flight procedures.
In order to verify instrument capability and the accuracy of maneuver-
ing tO a bright target, a maneuver to point the ATM at the planet
Mercury was performed. The success of the maneuver led to the plan-
nlng of a variety of maneuvers to investigate the Comet Kohoutek.
Three types of maneuvers were required for Kohoutek ex-
periments. The first, consisting of a roll about the X-principal
axis, was for the purpose of observing Kohoutek with experiments
viewing through an articulated mirror system located in the Scienti-
fic Airlock (SAL). As these maneuvers were about X-principal, there
were usually no problems with TACS usage or gimbal stop problems.
The only problems occurred with gimbal stops in the 2-CMG case for
some of the largest maneuvers. The second type of maneuver in-
volved pointing ATM experiments at Kohoutek and maintained X-princl-
pal in the orbit plane. As these maneuvers required vehicle rates
about both Y and Z-axis as well as the X-axls, they generally re-
quired extensive optimization in terms of maneuver rates, maneuver
start and maneuver stop times and momentum biases in the 2-CMG case
in order to minimize TACS usage. The third type of Kohoutek maneuver,
used only during EVAs, involved a rotation about the X-prlnclpal
axis in order to have the ATM Solar Panels shade the astronaut held
S20l camera.
30P-13 maneuvers, from the APCS point-of-view, were
similar to Kohoutekmaneuvers in that the ATMwas pointed at a
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celestial reference and X-princlpal was maintained in the orbital
plane. As the X-ray experiment had no independent sensor to help
determine whether the target was within the field-of-view, which
was only six arc minutes, several JOP-13Dmaneuvers obtained no
data. This was the only case of insufficient APCS maneuver accuracy
and would have been avoided had the crew been provided with target
detection capability. The maneuvering capability of the APCS would
then have allowed target acquisition.
Table 24 is a summary of TACS usage in the Attitude Hold
mode during SL-4.
c. Z-Local Vertical (Z-LV) Maneuvers. The Z-LV mode,
utilized for Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP) passes, puts
the vehicle -Z-axis towards the center of the earth, vehicle +Y-per-
pendicular to the orbital plane and vehicle+X in the direction of
the velocity vector. Hence, while the vehicle is in she Z-LVmode,
/ orbital rate of about 0.066 deg/sec is present on vehicle Y-axls.
In addition, maneuver bias capability allowing the maintaining of
an arbitrary vehicle axis perpendicular _o the local vertical existed.
This capability was designed primarily for rendezvous of the CSM
with the Skylab, but as rendezvous in the Solar Inertial move proved
feasible, it was not used in this capacity. It was utilized for
Z-LV offset biasing in the two-CMG Z-LVs and for insertion into the
gravity gradient attitude at the end of SL-4. EREPs were limited to
absolute solar elevation of less than 60 degrees and to the daylight
portion of the orbit.
During the missions, it became apparent that EREP data-
take constraints could be met by a variety of maneuvers, thus allow-
ing system optimization. The areas to be optimized included:
Total TACS usage
No attitude excursions during data-take time.
The parameters that could be varied included:
Orbital position for maneuver-ln initiation
Maneuver-in rate
Orbital position for maneuvering-out initiation
Maneuver-out rate
Momentum bias
Enable or inhibit dump.
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EREP passes were performed for absolute solar elevations
less than 60 degrees and for data-take during the dpylight portion
of the orbit. After the loss of CHC No. 1, the first FA_EPs under
two-CMC control had high TACS usage. This led tc the development
of the technique of noon-to-noon EREPs, possib] a. where data-take
through orbital noon was r.ot required. The advantage of noon-to-
noon EREP passes is that large maneuvers about the vehicle Y-axis
(large inertia axis) are not required during the maneuver to Z-I.V
when Z-LV entry was at orbital noon.
The maneuver about the X-axls to position the Z-axls in
the orbital plane is much less demanding from the momentum satv_ratlon
aspect as the X-axls inertia i,_much less than the Y or Z-axls Inertlas.
It then became apparent that due to the mlsallgnment of the X-prlncl-
pal from the X-vehicle axis, a Y-axis momentum bias was generated.
This led t_ _;he technique of utilizing the biased Z-LV maneuver to
maintain the X-principal axis perpendicular to the vertical for the
non-data take portion of the noon-to-noon EREPs and maneuvering
the Z-axis along the vertical for the data take, This tended to
minimize momentum accumulation.
The pre-launch requirement_ had not allowed noon=to-noon
ERE_J. However, the temperatures of t_ • O_"S proved to be somewhat
higher than anticipated requiring less power from the OW_ duct
heater_. _hus, despite the loss nf the OWS solar panel, power proved
adequate fer noon-to-noon EREPs. In addition, since the failure of
CMGnumber one occurred relatively late in _he mission, the additional
battery depth-of-discharge caused by noon-to-noon EREPs could not
significantly reduce battery capability to susta|n the remainder
o£ the mission.
All EREPs performed duz_ing SL-2 and $L-3 were done using
3-CMC control while all thos_ perforued during $L-4 were under 2-CMC
control. Excludlng the three EREPs where procedural p_blems occurred,
the followlnS comparison can be made. Forty-elght EREPs were Bade
under 3-CMC control using -', total of 1548 Newton-seconds. Tblrty-
six EREPs were made undQr 2-CMC control using 12, 290 Newton-seconds.
Therefore, EREPs performed under 3-C_4C control used at_ avera6e o_
approxlsately 31 Newton-seconds while those performed under 2-CMC
control used an average of 338 _ewton-seconds. Had the noon-.to-_oon
maneuver not been used, the TACS usage under the 2-(_C case would
have been much higher. Due to an unique set of initial conditions
whLeh gust be a_soctated with each EREP maneuver, predicted TACS
usage gust be studied for a given ZEEP. However, the greater the
available CMC_o_ntu_ for a siren maneuver, the less the _ACS usage
should be.
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There were a total of 102 EREP passes scheduled during the
Skylab mission, of which 94 were flown. They are summarized in this
section.
(i) FREPs SL-2. Eleven EREP passes were made during
the SL-2 mission. Table 25 lists the eleven EREPs, giving maneuver-
in time, duration time of the data=pass, maneuver-out time, and the
predicted and used TAnS impulse.
EREP number 7 was the only one of the eleven whlcn
required TACS usage significantly different from the predicted
value. The larger usage was attributed to the maneuver not being
executed as planned.
(2) EREPs SL-3. Forty-one EREPs were scheduled
during the SL-3 mission. Table 26 lists the 41EREP passes giving
maneuver-in time, duration time of the data pass, maneuver-out time,
and the TACS impulse predicted and used.
EREP number 12 was the only one of the 41 which re-
quired a IA_S usage slgnificantly different from the predicted value.
T'_ large, usage was attributed to the maneuver not being executed
a ?lanr.ed.
(3) EREPs SL-4. Fifty EREP passes were scheduled
during the SL-4 mission. Table 27 lists the 50 scheduled passes
giving maneuver-in time, duration time of the off-set attitude and
data pass combined, maneuver-out time, and TACS usage predicte_
and "ised.
All EREP passes during "_-4 were performed under
!-CMG control. Therefore, in ge_ _ral, TACS usage was much higher
than the values required during SL-2 and SL-3 EREPs, which were
performed under 3-CMG control.
Beginning with EREP 12 (SL-4) the noon-to-noon type
EREPmaneuver was used when ne=essary. This type maneuver resulted
in a great saving in TACS usage.
EREP number 13 was the only EREP pass duri_tg SL-4
which resulted in significantly more TACS usage than predicted. This
maneuver was nut executed as planned.
d. Kohoutek And Other Non=EREPRaneuvers. A description
of the maneuvers made for exp,_riment purposes are given in Table 24,
along wi_h the time of occurrence, maneuver times, dure_£on time,
attitude, and TACS usage information. All of these maneuvers were
made with the vehicle under 2=CMC control. TACS usage, for the most
part, nRreed reasonably well with the predicted value.
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e. Docklng-Undocklng. The docking and undoeklng TACS
usage, are given in Table 28.
f. EVAs. TACs usage during ErAs is given in Table 29.
For an analysls of some EVAs, see Section VI.C.
3. Concluslons. The actual TACS impulse used during Skylab
was more than twice the anticipated amount. A large portion of the
TACS fuel used during the mission can be identified as having oeen
used under anomalous operation conditions. However, the TACS usage
during nomlnal operation is consistent with prefllght predictions.
Most of the difference was due to the thermal attitude requirements
which prevented the use of CHG momentum dump maneuvers. Nearly
half of the loaded TACS impulse was expended during the thermal attl-
tude phase. TACS usage during EVAs proved to be higher than ex-
pected as an apparent consequence of the astronaut suit vents.
During SL-4, TACS expenditures rose following the CMG No. 1
failure. Decreased CMG momentum capabillty coupled with increased
maneuver requirements, especially for Kohoutek observation, placed
an added burden on the TACS budget. Mission planners had to mini-
mize TACS usage while allow£ng full experiment operation. The
most slgn_ftcant conservation technique proved to be the noon-to-
noon EREP.
Also, several simulators were used to dete_._nlne TACS require-
ments during mission plannlng. The simulators were used to identi-
fy situations Involving excessive TACS firings and to verify fuel
saving alternatlves. Because they provided accurate and realistlc
predictions, the s lmulatlons were an invaluable planning tool and
were responsible for perrafttlng mission objectives to be met and
exceeded.
E. ATHDC Software Program
1. Description. The onboard computer subsyste_ for the
Skylab vehicle consisted of two ATMDCs and a Workshop Computer
Interface Unit (WCIU). Each ATMDC contained an input/output adapter
10A and a TC-1 (16Kmamory) Central l'roce_,Ing Unit (CPU). The 16K
memory was configured in two 8K modules. The final 16K Fllght
Program fully utillzed both 8K modules of memory. 16,329 ATMDC
memory locations or 99.7 perc nt were used.
To increase the system rellability a skeleton 8K software
system was developed whlchvould provide llmtted capabilitles and
occupy only one 8K memory module.
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Table 28. Skylab Docking and Undocklng
TIME PERIOD TACS (N.Se()
DOCKING (DAY :HR,:MIN) PRED IC'TED USED
FROM TO
SL-2 012:20:24-146:03:58 N A 48,565
SL-3 076:19:09-209:20:07 ' 2624 3634
SL-4 187:21:60-320:22:05 2535 4608
UN-
DOCKING
SL-2 040:06:45-173:08:19 3113 3074
SL-3 135:13:04-268:19:52 0 3905*
SL-4 271:08:30-039:17:15 N A 7784
Table _9. Summary of Total TACS Used Du: EVA's
TIME PEKIOD TACS (N._ec)
EVENT ,, (DAY:i _:MIN) . PREDICTED USED
FROM TO
EVA NO. I SL-2 015:15:24-158:]8:47 1334 0
EVA NO. 2 SL-2 037:10:53-]70:12:30 0 1090
EVA NO. 1 SL-3 085:15:00- TBS 0 0
EVA NO. 2 SL-3 i03:17:13-236:21:20 2980 3718
EVA NO. 3 SL-3 132:13:00-265:14:33 556 427
EVA NO. 1 S1-4 193:21:13-327:03:02 1112 2349
EVA NO. 2 SL-4 226:17:29-360:02:03 3336 17,210
EVA NO. 3 SL-4 239:17:21-363:2_:00 8452 16,022
EVA NO. _ SL-4 26b:t4:50-034:20:47 6552 4292
*Uuscheduled CSM vent
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In the event of an address failure where only one module of
core memory wee affected, _he 8K Flight Program could be loaded into
the operable module. The 8_ Flight Program was resident on the on-
board Memory LOr_dUnit (M_U) an( thus provided a means of prolonging
the useful life of the comp.,tez if a failure occurred which incapaci-
tated one of the ATHDCssuch tk¢,t there remained an operable Central
Processing Unit and one memory module. The program could then be
loaded into _.he operable memory module via the MI.UAnd exercised
normally.
a. 16K Flight Program. The 16K Flight Program's ob-
Jectives were to provide the following capabillties:
Subsystem Mode Cont--ol
CommandProcess Ins
Subsystem Redundancy Management
Mission Nmvigation and Timing
Momentum Management
Attitude Reference Processing
Attitude Control
AT}/ Experiment Support
Information Display and Telemetry.
The Flight Program, which was modular in design, con-
sisted of two basic software subsystems: the Executive or Control
Progran and the appllcation subsystems. The Control Program, a_
the name implies, controlled the sequet,co of program execution and
provided a software priority on executable functions in order to
achieve a multltask keying capabillty. The application subsystems
consisted oE all appllcatlon program modules _Ich, when secured
by the cont_ox subsystem, would perform all required Fllght Program
functions.
Each Program had an initialization that was @_.ecuted
when power was applied to the computer. This portion of the pro-
gram initialized the interrupt processing logic, discrete output
resisters, and data quantities. When initialization _ms completed,
control was given to the executive where tasks were performed
based upon relative importance.
18'1
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Tie dependent functior_ such as slow loop, intermediate
loop, and switchover processor wer, first scheduled by initializa-
tion, then rescheduled themselves by telling the executive when
they would like to have control. The s'_ loop started every
second, the intermediate loop started every 200 milliseconds, and
the switchover processor every 500 _illiseconds.
The externally controlled functions, such as telemetry
outputs and comnand system inputs, were processed upon request by
interruptin 8 the currently cycling program. The Executive Control
Prosram recorded the location and status of the current progrsa
before passing control to the requested function. When the inter-
rupting program was completed, the executive restored the status
and returned conr._ol to the interrupted program.
(1) Executive Control Subsystem. The Executive Con-
trol Syste: consisted of the Executive Program and • co_ou comnunt-
cations areas which allowed for centralization of lnter-aodule
ccmmnicattons, _n data, and mission dependent paraaeters.
The Executive Program, composed of sub-programs and tables, con-
trolled the executive of application modules, serviced interrupts
and routed control to the appropriate application module on a
priority baals, and provided utility operations.
The ATMDC Flisht Pro•ram Executive provided the
roll.in8 capabilities :
Priority multit•sk support
Interrupt Processlns
Interval Timer Support
Time Keeping Support.
Each of these areas will be discussed in detail in
the following paragraphs
(2) Priority 14ultitssk Support. Each appllcst_,,_n
module had an asslsned priority lev•l denoting its relstiv• Is-
portent• with resp•ct to th• other application tasks. Th• execu-
tion of a task was keyod (requested) t_rough any of th_ followln8
II•nI •
The occurrence of a particular interrupt signal
_1,• occurrence of • p_rttcular discrete sisnal
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fm"
I
i.
Elapsed Tim=
Direct request of another appllcat_on _ask.
Every applicatlon task was executed with the InLer-
rupts enabled in order to allow the executive to perform t_ functions
of task keying and task switching. Any task, regardless of ILsf
i/ associated priority level, was interrupted when a nee task was
'_ requested. The executive then entered the requested task lato theprlorlCy level ccntrol tables, It the new task was of e hi_her
/_ priority, it vss completed prior to return of c_ntrol to the inter-
rupted task.
i
From the individual task point of view, the overaZl
result o_ the multltask executive c_pabillty is as described below:
i>reelse cask Inltlatfon occurs with only the
llmltatton tha_ higher priority processing
_rL11 be acc_ipllshed first.
Task may be inte, Lupted Ic,L shoze duratione
to accomodate ta_ keying. _he_ _nter_pts
are tranbparent to the InLerrupted _u_ _
that all £nformltion required for restorattc:
is automatically provided.
Tuq_orary fJuspension of a taok can occur in
order to _ccomplish a hisher priority task.
(3_ Interrupt Processor. The Execat_e F. ogram
provided the capability to process the foLlovinS interrupt_ de-
fined for the ATHIX3Fl£sht Program:
Interval T_er
24 Pl_ Telemetry
Command Enable
Com_n4 Z_ce:ute
2_ PPS Telemetry Backup
I PPS Telemetry
Coat.. d Enable Backup.
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Upon occurrence of any of the interrupts, program
control was passed automatically by the ATMDC hardware to the
program's interrupt processor. The interrupt processor determined
the interrupt source and performed the following functions:
Obtained the tasks to be executed from the
Interrupt Control Table entries.
Provided for simpler maintenance or altera-
tion as requirements were changed.
Provided a framework for progressive levels
of testing.
Permitted addition of new modules as new
requirements were defined,
Allowed control to lowest level during
program dr_elopment.
(4) Application Subsystem. An application module is
defined as a program unit exclusively designed to perform one or
more associated functions. Module execution is governed by the
Exscutive Control Program either directly (the module is called
by the executive) or indirectly (the module is called as a sub-
routine by a module which was called by executive). When entered,
each module will perform its function and return control to the
executive or to the calling module. Through the use of macros,
an application module may request re-execution at some future time
or may request execution of another module.
For a more complete description of these subsystems,
this area has been further sub-divided into the following categories:
Time Dependent Sequence Functions
Asynchronous Punctions
Utility Functions
(5) Time Dependent Sequenced Functions. These appli-
carlotta modules, (i.e., program units specifically designed to per-
form one or more associated functions), fell in the category that
utilized system task queue capability of the Executive or Control
Prosram. Those functions that were time dependent and sequence
oriented were included in four categories:
183
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Slow Loop - Involved the execution of all
functional requirements which must be performed
at a cycllc rate of approximately once per
second.
Intermediate Loop - Involved the execution of
all functional requirements which must be
performed at a cyclic rate of approxlmately
five times per second.
Output Write - during each intermediate loop,
attitude control signals were calculated which
must be issued at a rapid rate. Due to hardware
limitations, these outputs were spaced between
intermediate loops to effectively utilize the
inpu¢/output converters.
Switchover Controller - to insure the _ timer
in the_ClU did not count to zero, and thus
initiate computer switchover, the switchover
control maintained the T_ timer approximately
once per second. If no self-test computer
errors occurred, the timer was loaded to full
value so that automatic switchover did not
occur.
(6) Asynchronous Functions. All areas of the Flight
Program which responded to or were entered on the receipt of an ex-
ternal signal were called asynchronous functions. The following
modules were classified as asynchronous functions: J
Telemetry Processor o the Flight Program output
fifty bits of digital data from the ATHDC to the
telemetry system 24 times per second. To synchro-
nize this operation, two external signals from
the telemetry system generated interrupts to
the ATKDC. Recognition and receipl; of the
interrupts caused the Flight Program to execute
the Telemetry Processor which output the data.
Command System - the Command System provided a
conu_nication link between the ground station
and the Flight Program s.d also provided an
astronaut interface through the Digital Address
System (DAS).
• 184
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(7) Utility Functions. Various common functions to
be executed as subroutines from the various application modules were
known as utility functions. The following is a list of utility
functions utilized in the 16K Flight Program:
Square Root
Sine/Cosine
Arctangent
Matrix Multiply and Matrix Product
Vector Dot and Vector Cross Products !
Scaled Divide
Quaternion Multiply
Alert Display Indicator Opdat_
Gimbal Angle Computation
Double Precision Multiply
Limit Routine
Status Word Set/Reset
(8) Computation Cycle Profile. Figure 24 is a
representation of a typical 16K Flight Program computation cycle.
Level i. Experiment input data, CHG gimbal rates, WCIU
wrap tests and Conmand System processing was done on this level.
Level 2. Telemetry outputs were issued on this level.
Level 3. Switchover timers were reset once per second and
the 64 bit transfer register was loaded approximately every 17
seconds at this level.
Level 4. The intermediate loop which was made up of strap °
down and CHC control was executed 5 times per second on this level.
The once per second TACS module also ran on this level.
Level 5. The slow loop was cycled once per second on this
level. Timing, navigation, mode logic, maneuver ins , :omentmn
185
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management, display control, redundancy management, self test, and
experiment support made up the slow loop modules.
Level 6. When all computations were flniehed, the Program
entered the '_NAZT" _ate from Level 6.
The final Program had an 85Z duty cycle or 15Z 'WAIT" state.
This meant that 157. of the time the Program had no tasks to perform
and the ATHDC was in a "reduced power consumption" mode.
b. 8K Flight Program. The objectives of the 8K Fllght
Program were to provide the following functions for the Skylab
mls s ion:
Critlcal parameter monitoring
Attitude reference processing
Att itude control
Subsystem mode control
ATId experiment support
Mission navigation and t_ning
Information display and telemetry
Command processing.
The 8K Flight Program was modular in design and con-
sisted of two basic solid,are subsystems: the Executive, which
was identical in operation to the 16K Flight Program, and the
application subsystems. The Executive =ontrolled the sequence of
program execution and provided s soft_are priority on executable
functions in order to achieve a multitask keying capability. The
application subsystem consistzd of the applicable 16K Fligbt Program
modules modified to meet the memory size constraints.
The operating characteristics and modes were in essence
analogous to those discussed in the 16K Flight Program section.
The 8K Flight Program had an Intermediate Loop and Slow Loop and
handled Co_nd System and Interrupt processing as required.
Most of the applicable 16K Flight Program routines used
in the 8K Fllght Program were modified in order to reduce their
memory size to a level where the Program could most the 8K memory
requirements.
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Figure 25 is a representation of a typical 8K Flight
Program computation cycle.
2. Design Development. In order to allow an orderly build-
up of the ATHDC software system a three phase Flight Program develop-
ment schedule was established. These phases, namely Phase I, Phase
II, and Final, were configured following the criterion that each
phase would be baselined and developed on the preceding phase, thus
providing the necessary documentation and testing on each secant.
However, due to a significant amount of requirements changes/addi-
tions after the Phase I baseline, an additional phase (Phase IA)
was scheduled to come between Phase I and Phase II, thus alleviating
a portion of the problems encountered with the Phase I program sche-
dule. Additionally, a requirement from the Johnson Spacecraft
Center (JSC) was introduced which requested a 'best available"
Flight Program delivery between Phase I and Phase III for use in
crew training procedures. The following paragraphs briefly describe
each of the four phases with respect to:
General software requirements
Changes/additions to requirements
Sizing/timing est_nates
Schedules
Impacts of requirements modifications.
a. Phase I Flight Program (16K). The baseline PDD
for the Phase I 16K ATNDC Flight Program was released on November
4, 1970. The Phase I software was generated according to the
specifications in this document, addended by subsequent changes
in requirements whichwere approved by the Software ReviewBoard
(SRB)." The Phase I program consisted of the following functional
elements.
Discrete I/O and interrupt processing
Col_and systemnprocessing
initialization
kedundancy management
Attitude reference determination
Attitude control
Hode Control
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Momentum desaturation
L_taneuverfn8
Navigation and timing
ATM experiment control
Display
Telemetry
Algorithms.
This version of the Flight Program occupied 16,224
_emory locations in the ATMDC (or approximately 99%) and had a
duty cycle of 73%. The Program was released for verification on
June 23, 1971, with a projected delivery date (to NASA) of October
4, 1971. These Program milestones were based on a requirements
change cutoff of April 23, 1971, with all subsequent changes to be
incorporated in the Phase II Program. However, changes to the
baseline requirements prior to the April 23 cutoff date had necessi-
tated four revisions to the PDD, and six additions; PDD revision_
had been released by the October 4 delivery date. Due to this
large number of changes, and the prospect of significantly more
changes befor_ delivery of the Phase II Program, the decision was
made to add an intermediate program release, called the Phase IA
Program, to be delivered on February 9, 1972.
(I) Phase IA Flight Program (16K). The Phase IA
ATMDCFlight Program development was begun on September 15, 1971,
ut£11=ing the Phase I Program scheduled for dellvery on October
4, 1971 as a baseline, the forty-five (45) waivers which were
written against the Phase I Program, as well as all requirements
changes introduced through Revision 13 of the PDD. A require-
ments update on August 31, 1971 concluded the changes to be imple-
mented on the Phase IA Program. A total of 105 Software Change
Requests (SWCRs) were incorporated into this program. Major
requirements changes in critical program areas such as strapdown
reference, CMC control, mode logic, maneuvering, navigation and
timing, TACS control, Star Tracker control, and Redundancy Manage-
ment were implemented in this version. To stLmnartze, approximately
40% of the Flight Program logic was modified as a result of require-
ments change and/or problem correction in the Phase "_Arelease.
Six separate internal deliveries were made for program verification
activities during development of this program, and final delivery
to NASA was made on February 9, 1972. This program occupied 16,111
locations in the ATMDCmemory (approximately 98.3%), and had a duty
cycle of 90%.
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(2) Phase II Flight Program (16k). The original
development schedule for the Phase II 16K ATHDC Flight Program
assumed that the Phase I Program would be utilized as a baseline
for the Phase II version. However, introduction of the Phase IA
software necessitated a change in scheduling, and hence the Phase
IA Program was used as a baseline in lieu of the Phase I version.
The extended Implementatlon period for the Phase II Program (be-
ginning July 23, 1971 and ending June 19, 1972) was due to impacts
from both the Phase IA develop_nent and the large number of require-
ment modifications. As a result, the Phase II basellne consisted
of the Phase IA Program plus implementation of forty-nlne (49)
Software Char.ge Requests, and thus included all requirements
changes contained in Revision 14 of the PDD. The program was re-
leased for verification on June 19, 1972. Addltlonal requ_.rements
contained in the dellvered program _ncluded /mplementatlon of 102
addltional SWCRs (through PDD Revls_on 19), all waivers wrltten
against the Phase IA Program, and thirty-eight (38) Program
Trouble Reports (PTRs) _rritten against the Phase IA Program. Major
dlf_erences between the Phase IA and Phase II Programs were in the
areas of command system processing, Inltlallzatlon, redundancy
_snagement, maneuvering, momentum management, CMC control, TACS
contrdl, experiment support, and displays. These changes resulted
in a software system which occupied 16,338 locations of AIMI_
memory (99.7%), had an 857. duty cycle, and required approximately
35% change in program code,
(3) Final Flight Program (16K). The Final 16K AT}4
Flight Program, as in the preceding programs, utilized the previous-
ly delivered version (Phase If, in this case) as a basellne and
developed from there. Four distinct levels of the Final Program
were released. The first, designated FF32, was released to NASA
on December 4, 1972, for use in Software Integration Tests (SIT)
and All-Systems Tests (AST) at KSC. The three subsequent releases,
designated FF40, FFSO, and PF60, were delivered to NASA on January
26, February 16, and March 20, 1973, respectively. The final de-
livery, FF60, was the version which was loaded into the ATHDC for
the launch of the Skylab vehicle on May 14, 1973. This version
was developed by utilization of the Phase II Program as baseline,
implementation of seventeen (17) SWCRs, and implementation of
' twelve (12) PTRs. Major areas of the software which were modified
between the Phase II end the Final Program included mode logic,
experiment support, (2_ control, Redundancy Hanagement, navigation,
self test, comand system processing, and data modules. Require-
ments changes reflected in Revisions 20,21, and 22 of the PDD were
included in the modifications. The Final Fl:ght Program used 16,329
ATHDC memory locations (99.7_) and had a duty cycle of 857_.
191
J
* %
1974021165-203
b. 8K Flight Program. The onboard computer subsystem
for the Skylab vehlcle consisted of two (2) ATNDCs and , Workshop
Computer Interface Unlt (WCIU). Each ATI4DC,contained an Input/
Output Adapter (IOA) and a TC-1 Central Processing Unit '.CPU)
with a 16K memory. The 16K memory was configured in two (2) 8K
modules (module 0 and module I), with both modules addressable
by the CPU. Due to the length of the mission, the computing load,
and other factors, the rellability of the computer subsystem was
0.87. To increase the _.,llability, a software system was conceived
which would provide llmlted capabilltles, occupy only one 8K memory
module, and increase the reliabillty factor to 0.97. To implement
the 8K software system, two modifications to the ATHDCwere
necessary:
The capability to force the ATNIX:to address
module I only
The addition of a Memory Load Unit OfLU) to
enable loadlng of the ATHIX:swithout active
participation by the resld_t computer program.
This software system was developed only as a contingency
program, and was designed to provide stable attitude control, allow
continuation of solar experiment activity and data collection, and
other functions as alloyed by memory constraints.
Al:houth two versions of the 8K ATH_ Fllght Program
were released, they were both developed from the same basellne
model. The requirements were generated, starting November 15,
1971, by modification of the Phase IA 16K Flight Pro_rJm. Speclfl-
catlor;s in the form of a PDD were subsequently basellned on April
3, 1972. The programming effort was actually begun on December I,
1971, wlth log£c changes being terminated on Aprll 25, 1972, and
data changes being terminated on June 6, 1972. Interim versions
of the 8K Program were dellvered to JSC for testlnS on August 15,
_972 and .qeptember 22, 1972. The first official release to NASA
was made on November 14, 1972, after ten (10) weeks of verification
testing by IBI4. This 8K Program release _q)lemented requfrements
in the major functional areas of :
Discrete 1/O and interrupt processln 8
Cmmmnd systm processln8
: Init lalizat ion
Attitude refere_ce determination
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Rate Gyro Redundancy Management
Attitude control
l_ode, control
Maneuvering
Navigation and timing
A_/ experiment support
Displays
Telemetry
Algorithms.
Although the differences between the major functional
areas of the 16g and BK Programs are few, the 8g Program offered
reduced capabilltles in those conmon functions, when compared to
the 16K Program. In addition to the baseline PDD, forty-six (66)
$WCRs (reflecting requirements changes) were implemented in this
version of the 8K Program. This program used 7,884 loeatlon_ of
AI_//_ memory (96.2Z) and had a duty cycle of 73Z.
A subsequent contingency delivery was made February 15,
1973, _dlich provided updated capabillties in Redundancy Kanagement,
maneuvering, display, experiment support, and co(mend system pro-
cessing. This version of the 8K Program occupied 8,001AIMIX: memory
1ocatlons (97.77. of totdl available) and had a duty cycle of 73Z.
Requirements changes documented in nlnc (9) SWC_s were Implemented
in this program.
3. Software Verification.
a. Test Descriptions. Ten weeks prior to each scheduled
delivery date, a formal verification phase was initiated. This
verification effort was directed toward verifying the accuracy and
adequacy of the Flight Program to guarantee that it meets mission
requirements and conforms to program specification, goth Zoglc
tests and performance tests _mremade to accomplish that goal.
b. Logic Tests. Each program for each phase, 16K and
8K, was aubJc "ed to a rigorous set of loglc cases to check every
logic path through the program, every data constant specified, and
_he accuracy of each calculation. The System/360-75 Sbmul_tor
was utilized extenalvely for this effort, with a more 1/Jalted use
of the Symtem.360-44 Simulator end the HSL.
193 _
1974021165-205
c. Performance Tests. The performance testing was
accomplished prhnarlly on the Final Program with subsets run on
earlier programs. The performance tests were divided into two
categories, general performance and mission requirements. The
HSL and, to a lesser extent, the System/360-4A Simulator were
used for these tests. The general performance cases were used
to demonstrate that the Flight Program was capable of proper ._
functionin 8 under the adverse enviromnents, for which it was designed
to compensate, that it might experience during the actual Skylab
mission. The philosophy used in the design of this verification
was to simulate as many variations of program input perturbations
and off-nominal situations as could be conceived and classified
as reallstic posslbilltle_. The ultlmate purpose of this effort
was to create, detect, and isolate at system level (all functions
in operation) the following types of problem areas:
Unusual program execution sequences
Function interference due to unexpected
t i_tns situat iorl8
Parameter scaling overflows associated
with equation input extremes.
The mission requirements performance cases were to
demonstrate that the ATHDC Flight Program was c_pable of meeting
all of its function require_,ents with respect to the planned overall
mission objectives and 8ct_vities for the entire mission duration.
The approach used in the design of the verification cases was to
identify the mission time frames and vehicle configurations (nomi-
nal and perturbed) that would place the maxlmun stress on the ATHDC
software system. One of the major areas of interest associated
with execution of these performance studies _ts attainment of the
knowledge that the Flight Program 8calln s was adequate for the
computational loads that would be experienced during the various
phases of the Skylab mission. This was accomplished through
analysis of data on the yearly variation of Skylab tutorisation
data and experiment reference stales and star availability dais
for the entire mission. Orbits containing worst case combinations
of these parameters were "flown" in • simulated environment using
an actual Flight Prosr_ in a real (as opposed to a simulated)
ATKDC. Anticipated external torques that misht be a_perienced
by the Skylab vehicle during each phase of the mission ware in-
cluded if they ware applicable to the flight 8qpmnts simulated.
The average duration of the cases defined for _his phase of
Flight Program verification was slx orbits. This, in general.
allowed for one or t_o orbits with the vehicle positioned in the
196
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desired test configuration and fo.r or five orbits in the normal
Solar Inertial configuration for evaluation of control system.
transient recovery. The following _ypes of cases were run
and analyzed:
CSH/Skylab rendezvous and docking
Earth Resources Experiment Pointing (EREP)
All daylight orbits
CSl_/Skylab undockin8
Rescue mission
Maneuver effects of performance.
4. Software C_eration. Prior to Skylab launch a number
of '_hat if" situations were identified and 24 software patches
were developed as solutions to these situations. Table 30 llsts
the routines developed during this period.
During the mission, as problem areas were identified, the
procedures developed for prelaunchwere u=ilized to develop solu-
tions. Table 31 lists those SNCRs defined for delivery afte_ the
launch, Including their disposition. There were fourteen canned
routines Implemented during the Skylab mission. Three routines
were implemented for a second time after the commanded ATHDC
swltchover (DAY 27) from the primary computer to the secondary.
Seventeen canned patches were iw,plemenced. In aU cases, the DC$
memory load was impl_nented with no problems.
A brief des_Iptlon of each implemented patch follows:
$3013 - Implemented into Secondary on 16 Dec. 73.
The purpose of this patch to the Flight Program
was to reset and re-enable all runaway interrupt
protection tests and to re-enable the capa-
bility to use all external tnterrvpts if the
runaway interrupt condition could be fixed or
if it was only transitory.
S3029 - Implemented in Primary on 8 June 1973. Imple-
mented in Secondary on 11 J_ne 1973. Purpose
to provide nee _ehicle data to repres_mt SAS
position II deployea at 90 desrees , SAS posi-
tion IV 8one; solar shield deployed and S_
CSH docked (at port V) and SNS undocked.
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1974021165-207
Table 30. Prelaunch Canned Patches-
SWCR # DELIVERED TITLE DISPOSITION
, DAT_ ..... PRIQR TO LAUNCH
$3001 4/26/73 Sumcheck Tests Disable Available
$3002 4/26/73 Sumcheck Test Re-Enabl= "
$30o3 4/26/73 Re-Enable TACS Transfer Testing "
$3004 4/26/73 D1709 Only for TACS Transfer Test "
I
$3005 4/26/73 D1713 Only for TAC Transfer Test "
S3006 4/26/73 Ripple Test Failure Identi- "
fication
$3007 4/26/73 Complete DIR6 Mask ....
$3008 4/26/73 CSM Docking in Port 3, Vehicle Disapproved
Data
$3009 4/26/73 Select Primary DC Input Multi- Available
plexer
S3010 4/26/73 Select Secondary DC Input Multi- "
plexer
$3011 Select Primary AC Input Multi- "
plexer
J
$3012 Select Secondary AC Input Multi- "
plexer I
$3013 4/26/73 Reset Runaway Interrupt Protection Available
$3014 4/26/73 Reset Rate Gyro Scale Switch "
Inhibit
$3015 4/26/73 ATM Failure to Deply-TACS Only "
J
'. #!
j $3016 4/26/73 Reset Canned Routine $3015
$3017 4/26/73 TACS Only Contingency Mode "
S3018 4/26/73 Select Coarse Rate Gyro Gain "
S3019 4/26/73 Select Fine Rate Oyro Gain "
196
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Table 31. Patches Developed During the Mission
SWCR # DATE FINAL
DELIVERED TITLE DISPOSITIONill
$3025 Allow SI Operations Verified but
for Offset Attitudes Cancelled
$3026 Restrict TACS to Verified but
MIB Firing Cancelled
$3027 Reset SWCR 3026 Verified but
Cancelled
S3028 New Docked Vehicle Verified but
Cancelled
S3029 Day-24 New Vehicle Data - Implemented in
SASII Deployed Primary Day 26
$3029 Day-24 New Vehicle Data - Implemented in
SASII Deployed Secondary Day-29
$3030 Day-24 Strapdown Updating Implemented in
Primary Day-26
S3030 Day-24 Strapdo%mUpdating Implemented in
Secondary Day-29
$3031 Rate Gyro Drift Verified and
Compensation Cancelled
$3032 Day-21 Y-3 Rate Gyro Scale Implemented in
Factor Compensation Primary Day-22
$3032 Day-21 Y'3 Rate Gyro Scale Implemented in
Factor Compensation Secondary Day-28
$3033 Day-38 Y-2 Rate Gyro Scale Implemented in
Factor (R.G. Scale Secondary Day-39
Switch Limits)
$3034 Day-86 Reset Rate Gyro Scale Implemented in
Switch Inhibit Secondary Day-103
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Table 31. (continued)
m
DATE FINAL
SWCR # DELIVERED TITLE ,, DISPOSITION
$3035 Select Fine Rate Gyro Verified Day-86
Scale Available
$3036 Day-86 Select Coarse Rate Gyro Implemented in
Scale Secondary Day-92
$3037 Day-lOO Set all Y Rate tyro Implemented in
Scale Factors to One (1) Secondary Day-lO3
$3038 XI' YI' Z2 with 6 Pack Cancelled
(Via J6)
$3039 XI' Y2' Z2 with 6 Pack Cancelled
(Via J6)
$3040 3/15/73 Correction of Timing For Sim Use Only
Accumulation
!
$3041 4/30/73 I PPS Backup for For Sim Use.Only
Memory Dump
$3042 4/9173 D1601/602 Reset Mask
$3043 6 Pack Misalignment Verified Day-86
Quaternion (J3) Available
$3044 5/12/73 Patch for Location OlFEI6
Failure - Sim Use Only
$3045 6 Pack Misalignment Cancelled
Quaternion (a6)
$3046 X and Z Rate Gyro Verified Day-86
Scale Factors Available
$3047 Reset $3037/$3038/$3039 Cancelled '
$3048 Use ZE for GO _mp and Verified Day-86Available
Nominal Cage
ms
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Table 31. (continued)
SWCR # DATE TITLE FINAL
DELIVERED ,, ID_POSITION
$3049 Inhibit J6/Software Interface Cancelled
$3050 Reset $3049 Cancelled
S3051 Day 86 Y System Momentum Test Constant Available
$3052 Day 86 Reset $3051 Avallable
$3053 Y Axis Control without Rate Verified Day 138
Gyros Cancelled Day 189
$3054 Reset $3053 Cancelled
53055 SWS Control wlth No Rate Gyros Cancelled
$3056 Reset of $3055 Cancelled
$3057 Day 96 Y/Z System Momentum Test Avallable
Constants
$3058 Reset $3057 PreI.SWCR Only
53059 XDY,Z Rate Gyro Scale Factors Verified Day 94
Available
$3060 Reset Rate Gyro Scale Switch Verified Day 94
Inhibit Available
$3061 Day 96 Reset Rate Gyro Scale Switch Available
Inhibit
53062 X-Axis Control without Rate Verified Day 152
Gyros Cancelled Day 191
$3063 Reset of S3062 Cancelled
i $3064 Rate Gyro Scale Switching Limits Verified Day
Cancelled Day 191
$3065 Day 106 Data for Star Rigll Kent Implemented In '
Sec Day 107• i
S3066 Day 108 X3Rate Gyro Multiplexer Implemented in
Definition Sec. Day 109
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tTable 31. (continued)
i
SWCR # DATE TITLE FINAL
DELIVERED DISPOSITIO_il m Ji
$3067 Primary ATMDC Updates Verified Day 116
Cancelled Day 193
$3068 X1 Rate Gyro Multiplexer Verified Day 120
Definition Available
$3069 Y1 Rate Gyro Multiplexer Verified Day 120
Definition Available
$3070 Z. Rate Cyro Multiplexer Defini- Verified Day _20
t_on Available
$3071 6 Pack Power-Failure Detection Verified Day 164
X Axls Cancelled Day 189
S3072 6 Pack Power Failure Detection Verified Day 138
Y Axis Cancelled Day _q9
S3073 6 Pack Power Failure Detection Defined Day 145
Z Axis Further Scheduling
Not Performed
53074 Z Axis Control Without Rate
Gyros
53075 Reset $3074 and S3073
S3076 Day 136 Changes for Kohoutek Pointing Implemented in
Sac. Day 189
S3077 GG Dump for X-Axis Derived Rates
S3078 GG Dump for Y-Axis Derived Rates
S3079 Additional Kohoutek Pointing Delivered to MSFC
Changes Elm Use Only
S3080 Rate Gyro Drift Compensation
S3081 Day 178 Roll Reference Update Implemented in
Sec. Day 189
S3082 Select Coarse Rate Gyro Scale Verified Day 177
Cancelled Day 189
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Table 31. (continued)
SWCR # DATE TITLE FINAL
, DEL_VEI_D DISPOSITION
$3083 Reset Rate Gyro Scale Switch Verified Day 177 :
Cancelled Day 178
$3084 Day 193 Update Primary ATMDC Available ,.
S3085 Post SL-4 Navigation & Timing Verification i.
Changes Cancelled Day 249 ,
$3086 Day 197 TACS Only Contingency Mode Available
$3087 Day 197 Single CMC Control Law Defined Only.
Cancelled Day 213
$3088 Acceleration Limit for CMG Cancelled Day 213
Gimbals
$3089 Day 215 Revised TACS Only Selection Logic Implemented in ',
See. Day 218
53090 Day 215 TACS Only Contingency Mode Available
$3091 Day 220 Gimbal Rate Limits During GG Implemente_
Dump Day 222
53092 Day 220 TACS Only Contingency Mode Available
$3093 Day 222 Update Primary ATMDC to FFg0 Available
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S3030 - Implemented in Primary on 8 June 1973. Imple-
mented in Secondary on II June 1972. Patch
updated REV , ft and TACS MIB pulse width for
initialization so as to reflect changes in
these quantities since launch and to prevent
undue errors in the event of computer switch-
back. Additionally, strapdown, primary and
backup, references were to be updated with
the Acq. SS during Rate Gyro failure isolation.
This was to prevent destruction of the primary
strapdown (due to current Acq.SS strapdown
updates) while on the backup strapdown and
to prevent loss of backup reforence due to
use of gyros with large drift rates.
S3032 - Implemented in Primary on 4 June 1973. Imple-
mented in Secondary on I0 June 1973. Patch
modified the No. 3 Y-axis Rate Gyro scale factor
compensation. Flight data indicated approximate-
ly a 6% high scale factor error on the No. 3
Y-axis Rate Gyro. The compensation was to pre-
vent Y-axis Rate Gyro failure during maneuvers.
S3033 - Implemented in Secondary on 21 June 1973.
Patch modified No. 2 Y-axls Rate Gyro scale
factor compensation for an approximately 6.9%
high error and was for the purpose of preventing
Y-axis Rate Gyro Failure during EREP maneuvers.
This routine also changes Rate Gyro scale
switching limits to 0.088 deg/secfor coarse
scale selection and .078 deg/sec for fine
scale selectlon in order to allow scale switch-
ing initiation by Rate Gyros which have been
compensated for large scale factor (5.2%)
and drift (18 deg/Hr.) errors.
S3036 - Implemented in Secondary on 13 August 1973.
1_is patch modified the Flight Program to se-
lect coarse Rate Gyro scale, to inhibit further
scale switching and scale switching verification
and to kimit control parameters accordingly.
The patch was expected Co be used in the event
of a scale switching error.
$3034 - Implemented in Secondary on 24 August 1973.
This patch was to re-enable previously in-
hib£ted scale switching logic and to restore
control parameters co original values in the
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event the scale switching failure condition
could be fixed or if it was transitory. The
patch was used, in this case, to reset $3036
impleme_.ted on 13 August 1973.
$3037 - Implemented in Secondary on 24 August 1973.
This patch set all Y-axis Rate Gyro scale
factor compensation terms (C1y , C2y , C3¥)
to unity. This patch was needed, at the
time of the Rate Cyro Six-Pack installation,
to facilitate c_libratton of the scale factor
errors for the new Gyros.
$3065 o Implemented into Secondary on 28 August 1973.
This change _odified the Flight Program to
replace the Alpha Crux star coordinates with
those of Rigil Kent after the Star Tracker
could no longer acquire Alpha Crux.
$3066 - Implemented into Secondary on 30 August 1973.
This patch required the X3 Rate Gyro input
to be read using the backup input multiplexer.
This change recoufigured the Rate Cyro/Iuput
Multiplexer relationship to the initial one
of Gyros 1 and 3 on the backup multiplexer
and Gyro 2 on the primary multiplexer. With
this change, Six-Pack Rack Cryo redundancy
and multiplexer redundancy could be provided
by selecting Gyros 2 and 3 in each axis. Also,
the Cyro Hultiplexer relationship was properly
configured for 3 Cyro operation if the Six-
Pack single point failure in the power input
was solved on SL-4.
$3076 - Implemented in Secondary on 18 November 1973.
This routine changed the DAS/DCS '_laneuver Bias"
co_mand to provide 0.01 degree Least Significant
Bit (LSB) instead of 0.1 degree LSB. The rou-
tine also changed the Solar Inertial offset
pointing limit from 4.0 degrees to 5.2 degrees.
This was done to provide increased SI mode off-
set pointing resolution and range to provide
pointing accuracy for observing the comet
Kohoutek.
$3081 - Implemented in Secondary on 18 November 1973.
This patch redefined the computation of para-
meters in the roll reference and orbital plane
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error calculations so as to allow changes in
the angle between the vehicle X-axis and the
orbital plane due to GC dump maneuvers to up-
date the value of roll reference and to allow
changes due to orbital precession to be re-
flected in the roll reference.
$3089 - Tmplemented in Secondary on 17 December 1973.
This rou=ine changed the program I.D. to FFS016.
Functionally, the TACS Only control selection
logic was redefined to effect TACS fuel savings
if TACS conditions were met during the maneuvers
by allowing the crew/ground to command a _aneuver
instead of having the system automatically select
TACS Only. This change also relieved the crew
monitoring requirements for APCS maneuvers.
S309l - Implemented in Secondary on 21 December 1973.
This routine modified the Flight Program to
provide smaller CMG sheel bearings by limit-
ing the rate of movement of the CHC spin axis
during CC Dump. When the APCS was in the Solar
Inertial or Experiment Pointing mode and a CHC
reset was not in progress and GC Dump was active
within the last 200 seconds, the _ate of change
of the n_nentumvector was 1_ :ted to 2 deg/sec.
At all other times, the limit was 4 deg/sec.
5. Conclusion. The ability to modify or patch the existins
Flight Program proved to be highly advantageous. This capability
enhanced survival of the Skylab and made it possible to support the
new program objectives related to Kohoutek. Many of the routines
ware imperative for a successful mission.
F. Redundancy Management
Due to the length of the Skylab mission and because it was
a manned mission, considerable emphasis was placed on reliability.
A high level of confidence was obtained in the APCS by the use of
high reliability components as'demonstrated by previous use and/or
qualification tests and by the use of redundancy. The design phi-
losophy was that no single point failure would Jeopardize mission
success end no double failure would endanger the crew. Sneak
circuit analysis of all circuitry was performed to insure that
no circuit paths existed which caused an unwanted gunction or
inhibited • wanted function.
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The Redundancy Management philosophy was that primary APCS
mission crltlcal systems would be monitored and managed auto_at£cally,
utillzlng the Fllght Program and backed by a manual switching capa-
bility. Failures which would cause loss of thruster fuel, loss of
attitude reference, or loss of control were detected and eliminsted
by automatic Redundancy Management. Automatic Redundancy Management
was required because of the rapid response time needed to recognize
and correct a failure. Rapid response was necessary to prevent
endangering the crew or Jeopardizing the mission. Automatic response
was necessary due to the possibility of a failure occurring during
LOS while unmanned. Capability existed to inhibit all or portions
o£ the automatic redundancy program. The less critical systems
were monitored manually by the astronauts using the C@D Panel and
by ground support using the telemetry link. Manual Redundancy
Manasement switching capability existed via the C6DPanel and the
S/DCS.
To insure the integrity of the Flight Program, an ATMDC self-
check capability was included. To increase the reliability of the
computer system the ability to reload the ATMIE from the memory load
unit or via the RF l£nkwas included. A skeleton program capable
of fitting in one 8K Memory Module was provided to maintain limited
uee of the ATMDCduring flight should a failure occur which precluded
the uee of the 16k Program.
1. Automatic Redundancy Management.
a. Description. Automatic Redundancy Management of
mission critical components consisted of the following:
(1) Rate @yro Redundancy Management. The _PCS ceu-
tained nine vehicle Rate Gyros, three per axis, in a pair and a
spare configuration. Two RGs were averaged for control and the
third was powered up with the wheel not spinning. RG outputs _re
monitored by the ATMDC for failure detection, isolation, and RC
reconfiKuration. DAS/DCS commands were provided as a backup for
controlling RC configuration.
All classes of _te Cyro failures such as scale factor,
drift, full-on, zero, etc., were detected by comparison of the rate
integrals from the controlling Gyros in each axis. RGI04 testing was
performed once per second for all axes. The test constant developed
included a constant noise factor of 0.5 degree, a drift factor of
0.005 deg/sec, and scale factor compensation of 2_ of the "prime"
Kyro integral. This test was used in failure detection both for the
three CyTO and two Cyro conflguration_. A momentum reasonableness
test was used for single Cyro failure detection, along with reasonable-
ness testing from Acquisition Sun Sensor and Star Tracker information.
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Failure isolation in the three Oyro case involved spin-
nlng up the spare Gyro and using its output as a standard for com-
parison wit_ the control Gyros. _ .ng two Oyro operation, post
failure detection processing included additlonal logic for determining
the adequacy of the controlllng strapdown. For the Z-axls, this test
involved a comparison of the actual vehlcle X-axis to orbital plane
dlsplacement to a software calculated e_tlmate. For the X and Y-axes,
this involved a check to insure that the sun was being viewed by the
Acq.SS during periods when it _hould have beer as determined by soft-
ware equations. This 1ogle was also used for failure detection in
a slngle Gyro configuration.
Logic was designed into RGRM to prevent a control
catastrophe from occurring during RGRHpost failure detection pro °
cesslr.g. This involved malntalnlng redundant strapdown references,
each of which used one of the presently designated "control" Gyros
for input data. A concurrent test was made to monitor measured sy o
stem uoulentum change versus expected change over the test period.
A test failure would result in switching control to the backup strap-
down if available, or inhibiting ,=ontrol in the affected axis if a
switch to backup strapdown had already occurred.
(2) CHG Redundancy Management. Three CHGs and C_4CIAs
were used for redundancy although only two were required for control.
Determination of when a CMGwas to be removed from control, C_4Gshut-
down and Control Law reconfiguration were managed automatically by
the ATMDC. Capability to power UP/DOWN the _HG and to control the
CHC sheel was provided by C&D Panel switches and by Switch Selector
commands. In addition, circuitry was provided in the C'4GIA to auto-
matlcally turn off wheel power and apply the brake when a bearing
temperature exceeded 93.4 degrees C.
CHG desaturatlon resolver power (Vre f) could be sup-
plied from either CMGIA No. 1 of CHGIA No. 2. Switchable reference
lines off the Vref bus were input to the _CIU for use in demodulatlng
the resolver outputs. Both Lhe source and reference lines were under
the control of ATMIX:atltomat£c Redundancy Hanagement but the capability
of manually switching these functions by Switch Selector command
existed.
To insure that an acceptable excitation voltage was
constantly applied to the CHG resolversj the reference voltage was
compared to a standard value. If the difference was out of tolerance,
then all possible redundancy comblnatlons of ultiplexer channels,
WCIU input llnes, and reference voltage sources were utilized in an
effort to obtain an acceptable Vre f. This logic was also desired
to detect and isolate a shorted CHG resolver and el/mlnate the failed
O/G from control. The Vre f comparison test constant was conditioned
to insure that in an over voltage or under voltage situation, the
test tolerance_ould be exceeded once per second.
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The Rate Command Integral (RCI) test was designed to
monitor C}40 unit performance by comparing the integrals of the
commanded gimbal rates to measured changes in the 8/Jnbal positions
over a test period. The _est was made each I0 seconds and the Inte-
grals were accunnJlated over a 100 second period and then tie test
was relnltialized. Direction cosine data was used to calculate
actual glmbal change and both inner and outer glubals were tested.
If glmbal response was found to be out of tolerance five times, not
necessarily consecutive, before 20 consecutive acceptable tests on
both gimbals were completed, then that CZ4Gwas declared failed and
was removed from control. Dual multiplexers were incorporated for
the direction cosine inputs during RCI test failure processing.
If a CMG glmbal was determined to be on its stop, the
RCI test was bypassed for that unit. Two tests were designed to
monitor CI4G perforuance when a glmbal was on a stop. The first was
the H-vector magnitude test which was used to determine whether a
glmbal was actually on its stop or a glmbal resolver failu_.e had
resulted in an erroneous atop indication. The test involved a
compsrlson of the sum of the squares of the non-normalized momentum
components for the selected _ to the square of the reference voltage.
A difference in excess of 15_ of the V_ef value resulted in c failure
being determined. The second such tes[ was executed if the H-vector
test passed This test monitored the glmbal rate coumsnds to deter-
ulne if they vere of a convention to drive the glmbal off Its stop.
If so, and the glmbal remained on its stop for 15 degrees of rate
integral, then the CHO was declared failed.
(3) Acq. SS Redundancy F_nagement. Redundant Acq. SSs
were provided in the X and Y-axes. Determination of the validity
and use of Acq. SS errors for updating the strapdownwas controlled
by the ^THDC. The capability to select u slngle or _,_al Acq. SS
configuration was provided by I_S/DCS commands.
Analog Signal Redundancy Hanagement (ASIa4), for a
dual Sun Sensor system, conslated of a comparison test of the re-
dundant signals in each axis and was performed each slow loop. If
the difference was out of tolerance five consecutive passes, then a
failure was determined. Redundant multlplexer channels for the aria-
log signal inputs were exercised during failure processing. If the
command system had selected either Sun Sensor as prime, the associated
ASIa4 test consisted of minltorin8 the sun presence indication during
periods of tlnewben the "light" tndt=ationwas expected. If the
8unwe8 not present for 30 consecutive passes, then the sensor beln8
tasted was failed.
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(4) ATFfl)CRedundancy Management. The APCS contained
redundant computers, one which was powered vp and selected for control
and the other powered down but loaded with the flight software ard
available for control if needed. Each AT_DC was supported by a _ec-
tlon in the NCIU which expanded the computer INPUT/OUTPUT capability.
Swltchover from one computer system _o the other could be accomplished
manually or automatlcally. Automatic switchover, when enabled by a
C&D Panel switch or the DAS/DCS, was controlled by a ti:er in the
common section of the WCIU. The timer was reset each _ow loop if
a series of software self-tests were completed successfully. Other-
wise, the timer timed out in 1.5 to 2.75 seconds and switchover oc-
curred automatically. Approximately every 17 seconds, at the com-
pletion of a successful self-test cycle, a 64-bit transfer register
in the WCIU common section was loaded with information necessary for
initializing the off-llne computer. Both the self-test ti:ers and o
the transfer resisters were made trlple redundant.
A series of AT}4DC/WCIU error detection tests acre
desi_ned to support the automatic swftchover capability. The
basic test frequency was once per slow loot ,_d test failures woulJ
have resulted in the computer entering the wait state until the
self-test ti_ers timed out and forced automatic switchover. These
critlcal systems self-tests included the following:
ATMI)C/WCIU Self Tests. These tests served to
check the integrity o£ the computer memory cir-
cuitry and instruction execution. They included
a check on fixed memory data by comparison of
the sum of all fixed memory locations to a preset
constant. This particular test required that
a n_ comparison constant be calculated and
upllnked with each real time software patch
effected during the mission.
Instruction Counter Test. Verified the capability
cf the instruction counter to route program flow
to the proper memory location.
Interval Timer Test. Oesigned to detect failures
of the interval tlmer _Ich was used by the soft-
ware for scheduling all tL_e-depm_dent functions
Real Time Clock Test. Verified correct operation
of the RTC which yes the basic soft'ware t/..ing
source.
WCIU Analog ;hrap Test. Designed to verify correct
operation of the A/D and D/A converters used for
INPUT/OUTPUT functions.
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TACS Wrap Test. Served to check for proper imple-
mentation of the '_CS thruster firing cc_nds.
Slow Loop Completion Test. Designed to check for
acceptable slow loop cycling characteristics.
The capability to troubleshoot an off-line computer
by switchover to that computer and executing TSH routines designed
to telemeter any portion of memory, execute the self-test error
detection programs, and accept any required software modifications
was deslgued into the ATMDC Flight Program.
b. History. The initial design of automatic Redundancy
Management (RM) was developed _ithout a set of groundrules. Fmch
piece of hardware wav studied to identify testa which would verify
proper operation. As a result, memory required for Redundancy M_nage-
ment was excessive. Since the memory used was large and due to in-
consistency in design of different routines, a set of groundrules
was established in September, 1970. These groundrules and failures
experienced in hardware testing resulted in the following changes to
the initial Redundancy Management design.
(I) Rate Gyro Redundancy Management. The direct com-
pare test and the int,:gral divergence tests were deleted in a memory
saving effort. The _ntegral test was retained a_ the sole failure
detection test. The test constant used with this test was simplified
by deletion of cross axis rate terms.
A major change was made to the initial interim control
strapdowu verification test. A more simple test which counted TACS
full-on and MIB firings until monitored rates began to decrease re-
placed the initial definition which was based on a requirement that
rates sensed outside of a 1 degree attitude deadband should be approach-
ing contended rate as time progressed.
Single Rate Gyro failure detection was added. This ,
was implemented in logic by exe,:uting the two good Gyro failure iso-
lation logic and the interim control strapdown verification testing
to indicate a failure of a single controlling Gyro.
A major improvement in the interim control strapdown
verification test occurred with the definition of a "system momentum
reasonableness test" to replace the previous tests based in MIB counts,
decreasing rates, etc. This was the first time that gyro performance
could be quickly and accurately evaluated as a single input to a
controlling strapdown.
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A WCIU Multiplexer failure test was designed that
would establish and m_Intaln an input multiplexer configuration
for the Rate Gyros that would insure detection of a multiplexer
failure. This logic was added to Rate Gyro Redundancy Management
so that the WCIU Multiplexer failure rate could be assigned to speci-
fic Rate Gyros for management purposes and because multiplexer switch-
ing logic was already defined as part of the Rate Gyro Redundancy
Management routine.
(2) CMG Redundancy Management. Problems experleuced
with the CMG tachometer during system testing resulted in exhaustive
testing of CMG errors. Only the tachometer scale factor was deter-
mined to be a concern. Test results were utilized to expand the
RCI test constant to compensate for tachometer scale factor errors.
The capability to remove CMG power from a C_not
available for control was added.
A "gimbal-on-a-stop" test was added. Since RCI test-
ing must be bypassed near a mechanical stop, the possibility existed
that a failure could have driven a gimbal to a stop and held it there.
Since nc RCI test was run, the failure could have gone undetected.
The capability to monitor ground or crew removal o£
CMG power was added. This was necessary so i_nediate action could
be taken to reconfigure the Control Law.
Logic to detect a shorted C_4Gdesaturatton resolver,
remove power from the resolver, and make the appropriate recon-
figuration was added.
Logic which caused an ATMDC switch on certain CMG
Redundancy Management failures was deleted.
Differences in MANNED/UNMANNEDCMG RMwere deleted.
A major change in the application of the RCI test was incorporated.
Previously, long term (100 sac.) and short term (10 sac.) tests
were run on each CMG gimbal. This produced quick reaction to hard
failures, and also provided sensitivity to subtle failures. This
was replaced by an Lmproved RCI test that wag initially evaluated /
at 10 seconds, and incremented for ,n additional 10 second period
if a "pass" occurred. Thus, for a "passing", gimbal test time
increments of 10 seconds occurred until a 100 second test was com-
pleted. At this point reinitialization of the test occurred, The
new test gave all of the advantages of the previous test with less
memory and additional sensitivity to certain failure modes, such as
open tachometer feedback loops.
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(3) Acq. SS Redundancy Management. Automatic iso-
lation of a failed analog signal was deleted. A degraded mode of no
Sun Sensor update of strapdown was added. This resulted in a signifi-
cant memory savings with no severe operational penalty.
Logic was added to permit single Sun Sensor Redundancy
Management.
Sun presence Redundancy Management was deleted. This
was permitted by use of computer timing for navigation in lieu of
sun timing.
c. Mission Operations. In the course of the mission,
the Redundancy Management scheme was very active in insuring the
operational integrity of various hardware components, expecially
the Rate Gyro subsystem. The RGRM integral test was failed many
times during the early phase of the mission. It was during this
phase that RGM proved so versatile in maintaining the best RG con-
figuration. It not only responded to failures and reconfigured the
subsystem automatically, but also recognized and effected commanded
subsystem reconfiguratio_s from the ground/crew.
CMG RM failed the RCl test one time for CMG No. i, twelve
times for CMG No. 2, and four times for CMG No. 3. RCI failures
were widely intermittent and never threatened to eliminate one of the
CMGs. All of these RCI failures occurred, as predicted pre-launch,
during periods of maximum gimbal rates. Under certain conditions,
high rates on the CMG outer gimbal would result in a back-torque on
the inner gimbal which exceeded the controlling capability of the
inner gimbal torquer. This brief period of torquer saturation would
be incorrectly identified as an RCI failure, due to the sensitivity !
of the RCI test.
_iI the critical hardware components serviced by the
ATMDC/WCIU detection program performed acceptably during the mission,
hence ATMDC automatic switchover capability was not used. The
manual switchover capability was exercised twice during the mission,
once on DAY 27 to demonstrate the functional integrity of the secon-
dary computer system and again on the last day of the mission as part
of a test which loaded the ATMDC program via the MLU.
d. Conclusions. Automatic Redundancy Management per-
formed as intended. Use of automatic RM proved essential to the
accomplishment of a successful mission.
There was a design deficiency in the circuitry used for
selection of which ATMDC was powered; a rapid switch from primary
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to secondary and back to primary resulted in a relay race which could
cause both computers to be powered up simultaneously. Crewmen were
aware of the deficiency and no problem resulted from it during the
mission.
2. Manual Redundancy Management.
a. Description. In addition to the manual switching
used as a backup for automatic redundancy switching, the following
manual Redundancy Management capability existed.
(I) 28 Vdc Power. 28 Vdc power was supplied to the
APCS from redundant, diode isolated, overcurrent protected power
buses. Either of these buses could be powered down vla a C&D Panel
switch or DAS/DCS conmmnd.
(2) 455 Hz Power. 130 volt, 455 llz power was supplied
to the ST from either CMCIA No. i or CMGIA No. 2 and to the FSS from
either CMGIA No. 2 of CMGIA No. 3. Selection of the 455 Hz source
was controlled by Switch Selector command.
(3) 800 Hz Power. 28 volt, 800 Hz power could be
supplied to the EPC from either CMGIA No. 1 or CMGIA No. 2. Selec-
tion of the source of 800 Hz was controlled by a C&D Panel switch.
(4) EPEA. The EPFA contained five redundant channels:
Roll, MPC, UP/CN, L/R, and Caging. Both a CIxDPanel switch and
Switch Selector commands were provided to switch all five channels
from primary to secondary or vice versa. In addition, each channel
could be switched to primary from secondary individually by Switch
Selector commands.
(5) FSS. Two FSS opto-mechanical assemblies and
associated electronics were provided in both the UP/DN and L/R axes.
Switching could be accomplished via a C&D Panel switch and Switch
Selector comm_nds.
(6) EPC Rate Gyros. The EPC contained redundant RGPs
in both the UPIDN and L/R axes. Selection of the RG in control could
be accomplished by a C&D sw_tch or by Switch Selector command.
(7) MPC. In order to provide redundancy for the MPC,
a secondary MPC was stored in the MDA. In the event of a failure,
the primary MPC could be removed from the C&D Console and the spare
MPC mounted in its place. The two units were identical except for
: the electrical connectors at the base of the unit. Two connectors,
one functional and one dummy, were present to interface with the
primary and secondary MPC cables in the C&D Console,
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(8) Roll Reslovers. Redundant Roll Resolvers were
provided. Selection of the active Resolver could be accomplished only
by a C&D Panel switch.
b. Mission Operation. Manual Redundancy Management was
used extensively throughout the mission. Reconfiguratlon of vehicle
Rate Gyros was rcqulred numerous times due to Redundancy Management
Integral test failures. CMG No. 1 wheel was powered down due to a
bearing failure. A switch to secondary ATMDC was performed to verify
that two operational computers existed. The primary Acq. SS was
powered down in support of a Kohoutek expeclment. The EPEA was
switched to secondary in an attempt to isolate a caging anomaly (see
Section VIII). The secondary EPC UP/DN RGwas selected due to a
failure of the primary and the secondary EPC L/R RG was selected in
an engineering test. The FSS was switched during EPC troubleshooting.
No problems were encountered in Manual Redundancy switching.
c. Conslusions. There was no capability of switching 800
Hz and Roll Resolver while unmanned. Loss of Resolver outputs due
to failure of either the selected 800 Hz source or the selected Roll
Resolver would have caused the ATHDC to drive the FSS wedges and
thereby Jeopardize experiment operations. Backup DAS/DCS commands
for Redundancy Management of the 800 Hz power and the Roll Resolvers
would have beer desirable. Since there were no 800 Hz or Roll Re-
solver failures, there was no impact on the mission.
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SECTION VII. ATTITUDE AND POINTING CONTROL SYSTI_4 HARDWARE
A. Rate Gyro Processor
I. Hardware Description.
a. General. The ATM Rate Gyro Processor (RGP) consisted
of a single Kearfott series 2519 rate integrating gyroscope and the
electronics necessary to operate it in the rate mode, and was con-
tained in a rectangular enclosure 30.28 X 21.74 X 14.60 centimeters.
The RGP weighed 5.58 kilograms. The RGP was attached to the space-
craft by four gusseted mounting feet with 1/4 X 28 screws on 20.32 X
20.32 centimeter centers. Thermal isolators were used on experiment
package gyros. External connectors, a lapsed-time indicator and the
vent port were located on one end of the enclosure. The external
finish was a flat black high emissivity paint.
The RGP electrical components included:
Power supply
Heater control
4800 Hz generator
Three-phase inverter
AC amplifier
Demodulator
Torque driver.
b. Operation. A block diagram of the RGP is shown in
figure 26. The commands and input voltages of the RGP are shown in
Table 32. The commands and output voltages are shown in Table 33.
The RGP had two modes of operation. The fine mode gave a
scale factor of 450 volts per degree per second for inputs up to _ 0.I
degree per second while the coarse mode gave a scale factor of 45 volts
per degree per second for inputs up to _ 1.0 degree per second. The
mode of operation was selected by gain control commands applied by
the ATMDC to the ac amplifier (figure 26). T6is command then deter-
mined tt_ mode by selecting appropriate gains for the ac amplifier,
demodulator, and torquer driver. Except for different gains, both
modes operated in the same manner. All Rack RGPs were commanded to
change modes simultaneously.
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Table 32. Rate Gyro Tnp,,r
Inputs Function
22 to 32 Vdc Battery voltage to package.
28+_ Vdc gain control No. 1 Selects fine mode of operation.
(fine)
28+_ Vdc gain control No. 2 Selects coarse mode of operation.
(coarse)
28_88Vdc self test command Energizes relay that applies test
signal source to input of torquer
driver.
28_ Vdc wheel inhibit command De-energlzes wheel excitation.
Torque test input Applies test voltage to torquer
driver.
i
Table 33. Rate Gyro Output
Outputs Funqrlon
0 to + 45 Vdc control output Output proportional to rate input
of l;yroand uqed to correct attitude
of ATM.
Gain Monitor (fine) Dis:rete signal indicating RGP is
in fine mode.
Gain monitor (coarse) Discrete signal indicating RGP is
in coarse mode.
Signal conditioner 0 to 5 Vdc indicating temperature
of gyro.
Wheel inhibit monitor 28 Vdc indicating wheel inhibited.
217
\
1974021165-229
The 3-phase, 400 Hz excitation to the gyro spin motor was
provided by the 3-phase inverter assembly, l_e output of the inverter
was phase locked to the output of the 4800 Hz generator assembly and
was provided with an inhibit capability. The outputs of the inverter
provided phases A, B, and C in the proper amplitude and phase separa-
tion to drive the gyro spin motor.
The 4800-Hz generator assembly provided a regulated, stable,
low-distortion excitation to the gyro pickoff primary. In addition,
a reference output to the demodulator, phase shifted to compensate
for the gyro shift, was provided. There was also a 4800 Hz square
wave clock and a regulated +5 Vdc output which were used by the in-
verter assembly.
In addition, a signal conditioning circuit produced an
output proportional to the temperature of the gyro. A temperature
sensor in the gyro provided the input signal to the telemetry signal
conditioner. The output ranged between 0.0 and 5.0 volts and repre-
sented a temperature range from 62.2 degrees to 73.3 degrees C.
The secondary of the gyro pickoff produced an output
which was proportional to the rate input to the gyro. This signal
was applled to the ac amplifier where it was amplified by one of two
precisely controlled gains. The gain used was selected by an ex-
ternal co_nd signal and was a functJon of the operating mode se-
lected.
The output of the ac amplifier was applied to the de-
modulator, which converted the ac output to a proportional dc voltage.
The polarity of the dc voltage indicated the phase of the input sig-
nal relative to the reference signal from the pickoff driver.
The output o_ the demodulator provided an error signal
to the vehicle control system, telemetry, and to the torquer driver
which provided the gyro torquer feedback current. The torquer
driver, like the ac a_plifier, had two gain levels so thac operation
in two different modes was possible. The gain was switched by an
external command signal. Auxiliary inputs to the torquer driver
permitted preflight checkout as well as system bandpass measurements
during manufacturing test.
A heater control circuit was provided to ma'_ain the
temperature of the gyro at 67.8 degrees _ 0.5 degrees C.
The power supply received a 22 to 32 Vdc battery voltage
and produced +12, -12, and -29 Vdc for the RGP.
c. Applications. The RCPs performed the vehicle rate
sensing function for the AI_/ Attitude and Pointing Control System.
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Nine RGPs, mounted three per vehicle axis on the ATN Rack, were used
in a pair and spare Redundancy Management scheme. Additionally, four
identical RGPs, two per axis, were used in the coarse mode for rate
feedback in the experiment pointing control system UP/DN and L/R
control loops. The EPC RGP redundancy was manually managed via either
the onboard Control and Display Panel or ground command. For a more
detailed description of the RGP, see Reference 14.
2. Des_._ignHistory.
a. Design Goals. The RGP was designed to meet the follow-
ing goals:
(I) The package was to have the ability to operate in
both "fine" and "coarse" modes. The "fine" mode (_.1 deg/sec) was
to be used for accurate control of the ON$. The "coarse" mode (± 1 def./
sec) -_:s to be used for rapid maneuvering, and to allow for accidental
vehicle over-rates. In addition, the EPC Rate Gyros (operated in the
coarse mode) were used for EPC rate damping.
(2) The package was to operate over a temperature of
-40 degrees C to +32 degrees C, and at altitudes from sea level to
200 nautical miles.
(3) All heat generatea within the package was dlsei-
pated by surface radiation.
RGP design specifications may be found in Reference
15.
b. Design Growth. In July 1969, a decisionwas made to
fly the AAP (Skylab) mission in a '*DryNorkshop" configuration.
Two design modifications were made to the RGP.
(i) An integral inverter was Installed to eliminate
the need for an external AC power source.
(2) A telemetry signal conditioner was addad for
the gyro temperature output.
3. Design Verification.
a. Hardware Qualification. Qualificatto:. testins of the
RGPs was performed at the Martin Marietta Corporation, Orlando, Florida,
facility and at MSFC during the period from December 1969 through
January 1970. l_le Qualification Test Program was conducted as speci-
fied in Reference 16 and Reference 17.
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The requirements of the Qualification Test Procedure were
maintained during all phases of the test program except for the ther-
mal vacuum test and the vibration test. During the thermal vacuum
test the test temperature varied during the eight hour cold soak and
the vibration test was entirely repeated due to the inadvertent appli-
cation of gyro wheel power during the initial test.
_o component (piece _art) failures occurred during the
qualification program (both associated with the vibration test) and
minor out of specification conditions were noted during the transient
susceptibility and D/I tests. In each failure a defective component
was found to have been the cause. In both instances the defective
component was replaced and the test repeated. A waiver was granted
to permit acceptance of the minor deviations noted during the transient
susceptibility and _4I tests.
At completion of testing, the RGP was certified to have
met all the performance specifications in Reference 14 with the ex-
ception of the one deviation concerning transient susceptibility and
D4I,
It should be noted that Rate Gyro Processor Qualification
Test Procedure, Reference 15 , does not require that RGP scale factor
and drift be measured under thernml-vacuum conditions. As a result,
RGP drift and scale factor changes under thermal-vacuum conditions
were not measured until much later in the program.
For additional information see Reference 17.
In addition to the formal qualification tests, a life
test was performed on the complete RGP assembly. The intent of this
test was to test the RGP failure. At the time of SL-1 launch, the
RGP had accumulated approximately 27,000 hours with no failures.
This test was performed in ambient conditions rather than the ex-
pected flight environment.
b. Hardware Integration. The RCPs were first integrated
into the closed loop Attitude and Pointing Control System during
integration testing in the llardvare SimulatlonLaboratory (HSL) in
Astrionics Laboratory, NSFC. This testing was performed in the
summer and fall of 1971. Rate Gyro Processor performance was examined
in closed loop operation with both the CNG/TAC$ system and the Ex-
periment Pointing Control System. All testing was performed under
ambient conditions with earth's rate biased out by use of the Pate
G_/ro Torquers. The Pate _/ro Processors performed satisfactorily.
No problems were encountered.
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4. Hardware Verification. System-level tests were performed
on the prototype and flight ATHs to verify system design and flight
readiness. These tests included post-manufacturing checkout, vibra-
tion _esting, thermal-vacuum testing, and pre-launch checkout. During
these tests a number of Rate Gyro Processor problem_ occurred. These
are listed in Table 34. Most of the confirmed failures were traced
to solid-state devices and were closed. The problem involving bubbles
in the gyro flotation fluid during systems-level thermal-vacuum tests
were not closed at the time of SL-I launch, but were resarded as an
acceptabl_ risk because the resulting gyro drift could be compenstted
in the ATHDC software.
For additional information, see Reference 19.
5. Mission Operations. The APCS Rate Gyro Processors were
powered up on DAY I, 19:07:00 GHT. Following switchover from launch
vehicle IO control to ONS ATHDC control, it bacame apparent that
some of the RGPs were behaving anomalously. First, ATHDC Redundancy
Management rate integral dlscompares showed that several Rb_Ps had
out-of-spec drift. Second, telemetry showed that the Z1RGP was
hotter than the telemetry temperature window of 62 degrees C to 73
degrees C. Eventually, six RGPs became hot, as shown in Table 35.
a. RGP Drift Anomaly. The excessive RGP drift rates
first became evident shortly after switchover to ATMDC control, on
DAY I, 18:22:20 GMT. Drift rates as high as 18 degrees per hour were
noted. Specification values were two orders of magnitude less. The
high drift rates made it difficult to maintain the correct attitude
for thermal control during the first ten days after SL-i launch.
The high drift rates were compensated for by changes in the ATRDC
software uplinked from MCC, however, the drift rat_s often changed
suddenly. This caused dlffLculty until the new rates could be
measured and compensated. As time passed in the mission, the magni-
tude of the drift rate changes decreased. Eventually, the XI, YI,
and Z3 RGPs became stable, and were used through the remainder of
the mission. Table 36 is a history of Rate Gyro drift compensation
during SL-I and figure 27 is a typical plot of drift trends of the
X3 RGP during the SL-2 mission. Several abrupt drift level changes
are shown, with a gradual decrease in drift beginning on DAY 30.
After considerabte investigation, the cause of the high
drift rates was shown to be gas bubbles in the Rate 6yro flotation
fluid. The formation of bubbles in the fluid was apparently caused
by a design deficiency which exposed the float chamber bellows to the
hard vacuum of space, and by entrained gasses present in the flota-
tion fluid. Figure 28 presents a section of the or£girull K6srfott
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series 2519 Gyroscope. This section shows the float chamber and
fluid, the float chamber bellows, and the vented end cap. The de-
crease in drift rates as the mission progressed were attributed to
either reabsorption of the gas by the flotation fluld, or relocation
of the bubbles in the float chamber due to float fluld agitation.
Table 35. Rate Gyro Temperature
Time of Thermal Rise !
RGP Condition After Power-up (Hours) [
X1 Normal ....
X2 Rot 271.0
X3 Normal ....
Y1 Normal ....
Y2 llot I0.5
Y Hot 21.0
3
gI Not i.5
Z2 Hot 3.0
Up/Down Primary Hot 82.0
Up/Down Secondary Normal ....
L/R Primary Normal ....
L/R Secondary Off ....
Corrective action for the drift rate problem Included
tests to verify the theory of bubble formation, and a design modlfl-
cation which sealed the float cavity from the hard vacuum of space.
The design modification consisted of replacing the vented bellows
end up cap with an unrented end cap so that internal float pressure
would remain near the origlnal float f111 pressure despite external
pressure changes. The change was incorporated on six RGPs which were
installed in the MDA on SL-3. None of the six replacement RGPs
showed excessive drift slmilar to those experienced on SL-1.
It is believed that the RGP drift anomaly is the same as
the RGP gas bubble anomaly encountered during ATMThermal-Vacuum
Testing (see Paragraph VII.A.4).
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b. high Temperature Anomaly. Within the first 21 hours
of APCS operatio_l, failures of either telemetry meaoorlng circuits or
heater control circuits were evident on four Rack RGPs. Later in the
mission, an additional Rack RGP and one EPC RGP showed identical
symptoms. The EPC RGP (Primary UP/DN) eventually failed.
A detailed thermal analysis was performed, relating RGP
base plLte heat sink temperatures to RGP temperatures. It was deter-
mined that base plate temperatures of 14 degrees C corresponded to
RGP temperatures of about II0 degrees C. Also, a hot RGP was powered
down, allowed to cool, and then powered up. The RGP temperature was
seen to increase and become off-scale high. It was concluded that
the six RGPs in question had experienced heater control failures,
and that the RGP temperatures were about I08 degrees C.
There was much concern that as the RGP temperatures in-
creased, the RGPs would become unstable and cause loss of control.
Test and analysis data indicated that the RGP stability margin ex-
pected at 67.8 degrees C would disappear at ii0 degrees C because of
the reduction in float damping fluid viscosity. It was expected that
normal increases in solar elevation angle during the misslon would
cause increased RGP base plate temperatures, and higher RGP tempera-
tures. The EPC pitch primary RGP continued to deteriorate and failed
on DAY 64.
All the hot RGPs showe_ much noisier outputs than the
normal RGPs. This can be seen in figure 29. Z. and Y_ RGPs had
extremely noisy outputs, suggesting that they w_re on _he verge of
instability. Analyses were ._rformed which showed that the hoL
RGPs were more stable in the coarse mode than in the tine mode when
temperatures approached ii0 degrees C (base plate temperature near
14 degrees C). Therefore, it was decided to operate the RGPs in the
coarse mode whenever the base plate temperature of any of the opera-
t!ng RGPs exceeded 14 degrees C. This action reduced the system
maneuver accuracy sllghtly, but had no harmful effects.
To preserve the Y3 and Z1 RGPs for possible use later,
these two RGPs were powered down and vehicle control was transferred
to the remaining RGPs in the Y and Z area. The Y3 and Z1RGPs were
later powered up again to obtain diagnostic data.
Another problem noted with the hot RCPs was a change in
scale factor. A comparison of ATMDC-computed rate integrals during
a nominal momentum dump is shown in figure 30. RGP Z2 was hot, while
RGP Z 3 was normal. This problem caused Redundancy Management rate
integral discompares during maneuvers. It was possible to compensate
in the ATMDC software for scale factor errors in the Y-axis.
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Table 37 sunmmrizes the status of the Rate Gyros midway
through the SL-2 mission. No further significant RGT changes occurred
until the Rate Gyro Six-Pack was installed.
Efforts to determine the cause of the temperature anomaly
focused on component failures, electromagnetic interference (EMI),
and design deficiencies. Ultimately, through extensive analyses and
test, the cause was proved to be a design deficiency. Use of a fiber
washer which shrunk in the space environment, allowed loosening of
the power switching transistor mounting system. Loosening of the
transistor heat sink allowed the transistor to thermally saturate.
Under a condition of thermal saturation, the transistor leaked ex-
cessive current to the gyro heater blanket causing the gyro to over-
heat. The recommended fix was to replace the fiber washer with a
spring steel washer to maintain tension in the mounting bolt. Figure
31 shows the original mounting and the recommended mounting of the
power switching transistor.
Although it was determined that the RGP was susceptible
to _I, tests on the ATMground backup unit were not able to demon-
strate a sufficient level of _I to cause the temperature anomaly as
observed in flight.
The cause of the overheating anomaly was determined after
the six replacement RGPs were installed in the FLDA. Consequently,
the power switching transistor mounting could not be modified. How-
ever, provisions were made prior to SL-4 to provide an easily Imple-
mented corrective action had any of the six RGPs exhibited high tempera-
tures. The corrective action consisted of removing the covers of the
RGT box and applying a thermally conductive silicone grease to the
power switching transistor/heat sink Junction. Tests bad shown this
to be a very effective way of preventing thermal saturation of the
power switching transistor. A backup procedure was also developed
to be used in case the silicone grease fix was unsuccessful. The
procedure would have disabled the RG heater by cutting wiring to
the heater. The RGPs on the backup unit were to be refurbished with
a positive _ension stud mounting system whlch would eliminate the
possibility of breakdown of the heat condition path to the mounting
plate. Because of the susceptibility of the RGP to EHI, the refurbished
processors on the AT}/ backup unit were to have circuitry modified to
reduce the susceptibility level. Because of the _I susceptibility,
future qualification test specifications will be more explicit in
testing for F_I _usccptibility at the black box level.
The _verneating anomaly was not encountered at any time
during ground _esc before SL-1 launch.
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Table 37. Rate Gyro Performance Capability Status
, ,m
Quality
Gyro Temperature. of Output Usefulness
xI Normal Good In use, good for all
conditions.
X2 Hot Fair Use in coarse mode if
base plate above 14eC.
X3 Normal Good In use, good for all
conditions.
YI Normal Good In use, good for all
conditions.
Y2 Hot Fair Use in coarse mode if
base plate _bove 14°C.
Y3 Hot Oscillating Not useful except for
diagnostic data.
ZI }lot Oscillating Not useful except for
diagnostic data.
Z2 Hot Fair In use, good for all
conditions.
Z3 Normal Good In use, good for all
conditions.
PP Hot Not useful Not useful.
PS Normal Good In use, in all conditions.
YP Normal Good In use, in all conditions.
YS Not turned on .... Nevez activated, assumed
good.
Efforts to determine the cause of the temperature anomaly focused
on component failures, electromagnetic interference (EMI), and design
deficiencies. Ultimately, through extensive analyses and test, the cause
was proved to be a design deficiency, use of a fiber washer which shrunk
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Fiber Washer
ORIGINAL MOUNTING
!
I
Stud-Mounted
. Component
i
Mica or Kapton
Washer
s.,.,.. Stee,J/" _ _---.,coo,K.pto°
J \ w°,h.rldlsher "---- Nylon SleeveNickel Plated
Sprtn9 Steel
Stainless Steel
Ntcke] Plated Nut
Copper or Gold
Plated Iron A11oy
RECOMMENDEDMOUNTING
: Figure 31. RGP Power Switching Transistor HountinB
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Tc. RG Six-Pack Development. During SL-2, a crash program
began to prepare a package of ATM Rate Gyro Processocs that could be
interfaced into the APCS system should additional Rack RGP failures
threaten mission termination. The Six-Pack containing Jix RGPs (two
per axis) was designed, tested, integrated and weighed in the MSL,
checked out on the flight backup vehicle and interfaced at the MDAC
facility during SL-2 and was ready to be sent up on SL-3. Additionally,
a Derived Rate Control Assembly was designed and built to replace
the RGPs in the EPC loop (see Paragraph IX.F). These two sub-
systems were carried up on SL-3. The Six-Pack was installed in the
HDA, powered up and checked out by the SL-3 c_ew (see f_gure 32). An
EVA consisting of four electrical connections was required for in-
stalling the Slx-Pack in the APCS systems. The greatest risk in-
volved the disconnect and reconnect of the standard connector J3 at
the WCIU. Failure to reconnect (or pin breakage) would _ost likely
have meant mission termlnatton since all RGP signals feed into the
ATMDC through this connector.
On DAY 103, the Six-Pack was installed in the system.
No problems were encountered. Three S%x-Pack RGPs were paired with
the remaining Rack RGPs (XI, YI' Z3) to avoid a p_tentlal single-
point failure in the Six-Pack power source.
The Six-Pack and the selected Rack RGPs performed sat is-
factorily. Only one RGP (Ys of the Six-Pack) required d_ift com-
pensation. No gross anomall_ occurzed subsequent to =he Six-Pack
installation; however, integral test failures occurred when the
Slx-Pack was inadvertcntly bumped by the crew and when the vehicle
was maneuvering. This resulted from using for control purposes one
Slx-Pack and one Rack RGP on each vehicle axis; the different reso-
nance modes of the locati_ns contributed to integral test failures.
The cause of the excessive drift rates experienced on
Rack RGPs was determined during the time the Six-Pack was being de-
signed. A modification _as n_de to the Six-Pack RGPs te prec!ud¢
the drift problem. The cause of off-scale high temperature was not
found untll after SL-3 however, a quick _!x was formulated and a
procedure defined for implementing the fix with onboard materials
and tools as noted in Paragraph V!_.A. 5.b. No further RGP problem_
were encountered.
6. Conclusions and Recomraendations.
a. Concluslons.
(1) The cause of the Rate Gyro Processor drift anomaly
was determined to be the presence of gas bubbles which fm.'med _n the
235
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gyro flotation fluid when the Rate Gyro Processors were exposed to
the hard vacuum of space. This was caused by a design deficiency
which exposed the float chambel bellows to the space e_v_ironment.
(2) The cause of the RGP overh=at anomaly was deter-
mined to be a design deficiency which allow_d loosening of the power
switching transistor mounting system, which caused the transistor
to overheat.
(3) Neither of the two RGP problems were discovered
during qualification testing, or life testing of the Rate Gyro
Processor.
(4) Replacement of the failed Rack RGPs with the
Six-Pack restored the system to a more normal conflgurdtlon and
permitted normal operations during the SL-3 and SL-4 missions.
b. Recommendat ions.
(I) Precision performance data should be monitored
during hardware qualification and life tests when exposed to the
operec ing e_nironment.
(2) In future long-duration manned misslon_, considera-
tion should be given to replacement or n_Intenance of mlssion-crltical
components such as Rate Gyro Processors during the mission.
B. Star Tracker
1. Hardware Description. The Star Tracker furnished star
position inputs with respect to the spacecraft for calculation of the
v-hlcle roll reference and EPC roll reference.
The Tracker system consisted of two subassemblies; the Optical
Hechanical Assembly (OHA), and the Star Trackez V.lectronics (STE).
The OHA consisted of a refractive telescope, photomultiplier tube
detector, and telescope electronics with a hi8h voltage power supply.
This was contained and mounted on a double g_r,d_al suspension. G/tubal
freedom was + 40 degrees on the inner gimbsl and + 87 degree_ on the
outer g/tubal. See figure 33.
The STE contained servo control circuits, power supplies,
dlgital logic unit, shutter drive ampllf[er, and nuxiliary electronics.
Ali Input/output functions to other systems were interfaced in the STE.
Star light was detected through a baffltd sunshade into the
telescope lens, and into the photomultipller tube aperture. The
sigrusl generated by the photomultlplier b;: light Impingement was
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conditioned by a video amplilier, sweep generator, scan electronics,
and a demodulator, and was used as an error signal to close a servo
loop to the gimbal torquer amplifiers and the torquer motors. Gimbal
position information was provided by an optical encoder mounted on
each pivot which was fed through conditioned logic to the digital
computer in a 15-bit serial binary word, and to telemetry using a
parallel binary word.
The sunshade had a lid type shutt_r which was driven by a
motor and worm gear actuating assembly. It could be activated by
mode selection or by automatic closure from sensors which operated
when the optical axis was within 45 degrees of the sun or within 5
degrees of the earth's albedo This was done to protect the photo-
multiplier from light damage.
The Tracker operated in three modes: the first was "Hold"
which maintained a digital position loop for each gimbal and closed
the shutter; next was '_anual" mode which enabled the astronaut to
drive each gimbal to a desired position with a MPC rate command from
the Control and Display Panel, and also opened the shutter; the third
was "Auto" mode wh_(h allowed the Tracker to search in a progranmmd
pattern, acquire t e target star, and track the star while providing
gimbal position information to the digital computer and telemetry.
Manual mode cotmmqnds from the C&D Panel (manual, shutter Closed/
Hold, and Auto) took precedence over commands issued from the ATMDC
(Auto and Shutter Closed/Hold). The computer commands were effective
only after the astronaut had issued an "Auto" command.
Tn the search submode the outer gimbal search motion was
achieved by driving the outer gimbal rate loop at a constant spee,_.
At the start of the search operation, the outer gimbal position
was stored and thereafter the new outer gimbal position was sub-
tracted from it. The results of the subtraction were examined by
"Error Detectors" which disconnected the rate-loop drive signals when
angles of _ 2 degrees were reached in thr "Fine" mode, or -_ 15
degrees in the "Coarse" mode.
The initial inner gimbal_; were stored and the actual gimbal
position subtracted from it to provide an error to drive the position
servos to m_ll. The "initial position" register was incremented in
3/4 degree steps after each outer glmbal cycle. The search pattern
is shown in figure 3_.
Under ATMDC Star Tracker cnntrol, the coarse search pattern
was not used. If the search submode was entered, and a star was
not acquired within 25 seconds, the ATM_; would set the ACS alert
condition _4 and issue a Star Tracker hold command. The 25 second
limitation would allow the fine search to be completed. The coarse
mode could be r_ached only by inhibiting ATMDC Star Tracker control.
(Reference Table 38 for Performance Specification).
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Table 38. Star Tracker Performance Characteristics
Field-of-View
Acquisition I arc degree (+--8arc minutes)
Track i0 arc minutes (+i0, -i arc minute)
Tracking Accuracy +i0 arc seconds
Capable of tracking to within 5 + 3 degrees of Earth (0.35 albedo)
and 45 ! 3 degrees of Sun, if not occulted by vehicle structure.
Shutter fully opened or c]osed in less than one second.
Search Angles
Coarse - Inner Gimbal -4.5 to +5.25 deg (+i0,-0 arc min.)
Outer Gimba] -15.0 to +15.0 deg (+I0,-0 arc min.)
Fine - Inner Gimbal -1.5 to +1.5 deg (+I0,-0 arc min.)
Outer Gimba] -2.0 to +2.0 deg (+I0,-0 arc m]n.)
Gimbals
Freedom
Outu_ Gimba] +87 degrees
Inner Gimba] +40 degrees
Readout Serial binary (ATMDC), parallel
binary (telemetry)
Gimbal Position 40 arc seconds (serial binary and
Resolution parallel binary)
Gimbal Position +30 arc seconds (1 sigma)
Accurary
Gimbal Rate 1.0 deg/sec. (max)
Capable of operating in automatic search/track, manual (from Manual
Pointing Controller), and shutter closed/hold modes.
i i ,,
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2. Design History. Most changes to the original design of the
Tracker resulted from deficiencies or problems uncovered during various
levels of testing, covered below, two significant design requirements
changes were:
a. Modification of the initialization logic in the glmbal
drive circuitry was done to assure that the Tracker, when
powered up, would drive the gimbals to the zero or zenith angle posi-
tlon. The original design was such that the gimbals would usually
drive to the llmit stops when power was applied.
b. The Star Tracker Electronics Unit was modified to
operate with an input of 130 volts at 455 Hz instead of the original
115 volts, 400 Hz power. This was done when the CMG inverters were
changed from 400 Hz to 455 Hz in order to increase wheel speed. The
Star Tracker, except for heaters, was powered from the CMG Inverters.
3. Design Veriflcat£on. During the hardware qualification
thermal vacuum test a failure occurred when the photomultiplier tube
assembly cracked at approximately -30 degrees C. The design specifi-
cation was -50 degrees C. As a result, a thermostatically controlled
I0 watt heater was mounted close to the photomultipller tube assembly.
The heater would turn on when the temperature of the assembly reached
+ 5 degrees C. Also, tube supports were modified slightly to relieve
stress points encountered at low temperatures.
No problems were encountered during hardware integration tests.
4. Hardware Verification. The following problems were en-
countered during final acceptance tests and systems level testing.
a. The search pattern logic was redesigned after a _l-
nerable one-shot was found to be noise sensitive at certain positions
in the search pattern. This problem was noted during final acceptance
testing in Astrionics Laboratory, MSFC, when the Tracker would in-
advertently stop in the middle of a search routine.
b. During then_al vacuum tests at JSC, the Star Tracker
was noted to display false star presence signals. This problem was
found to be an increase in the star threshold which was a result of
resistor changes in the photomltlplier voltage divider circuit.
This problem triggered the '_amistor" investigation which resulted
in some ATM subsystems being purged of the Vamlstoz film resistors.
c. During prelaunch tests at KSC, the Star Tracker gim-
bals were recording periods of oscillation when commanded in a "Hold"
mode. The Star Tracker Electronics Unit was replaced with the flight
spare. The problem was eventually traced to a faulty connection in
a potted logic module (microstick) which occurred in manufacturing.
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5. Mission Operations. The Star Tracker was activated it
the beginning of SL-2 and operated satisfactorily except for fre- !
q,ent disturbances when star acquisition was lost due to contaminants
entering the field of view. If a particle reflected light which had
an intensity above the photomultiplfer tube threshold and entered :
the field of view, the particle was tracked as a target star. This
type of disturbance was noted thirty-five times during SL-2 and four
times during SL-3. A large majority of these anomalies can be
attributed to contaminant particles. Typical particles were generated
by sloughing of paint, dust, outgasslng, and venting from the vehicle.
Fewer problems were encountered on the SL-3 mission with
tracking stray particles. This was attributed to a different operating
procedure. During SL-2 the Tracker w_s placed in the "Auto" mode
throughout each day part of the orbit and was automatically switched
to "Shutter Close/Hold" during the night or a dump period. The Track-
er was tracking continuously during the day and was susceptible to any
bright particle that passed in the field of view. During SL-3 the
Tracker was placed in "Shutter Close/Hold" as a normal mode and was
switched to "Auto" by the crew only when it was used for an attitude
update. These updates were accomplished in less than three minutes
so that the possibility of a stray particle entering the field was
reduced considerably.
During SL-3 there were five occasions when the shutter stuck
in the open position. On each occasion the shutter would recover,
usually within several hours. The system would be reactivated and
normal operation would resume. Protective procedures were established
after the first failures, to prevent damage to the photomultiplier
tube due to the sun or reflections from the earth's surface and the
vehicle. This procedure called for an _ediate power down. Later,
during the orbital night, the system was powered up and positioned
to parking angles looking at the dark surface on a blocking plate.
The shutter failures were analyzed. All available data were
evaluated, a sneak circuit analysis was performed, and the mechanical
and electrical designs were reviewed. It was concluded that the
most likely failure mode was a mechanical binding of the shutter drive
mechanism.
One consequence of the shutter problem was that b" ght light
from the earth's albedo apparently impinged the photomul_Iplier tube.
This apparently degraded the tube response and lowered the sensitivity
so that the target star, Alpha Crux, could not be acquired. A light
as bright as the earth's albedo would degrade the tracker sensitivity
: arc 50% if it is exposed for twenty minutes. It was estimated that
the tube was degraded 30% to 5_/o during SL-3 before protective pro-
cedures wcrc established. The star Rigel Kent was selected as an
alternate to Alpha Crux and was tracked successfully.
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Satisfactory operation was recorded during SL-4 until DAY 228.
At this time a failure was noted when the outer gimbal position indi-
cation went to zero and the outer gimbal rate signal recorded a con-
stant output. An analysis of telemetry data was made and laboratory
tests were performed to simulate the failure mode. The failure was
exactly duplicated by interrupting the outer gimbal encoder output or
the encoder lamp excitation. It was therefore concluded that the
outer gimbal encoder had failed and in all probability would not re-
cover. This failure mode rendered the Star Tracker useless and its
operation was terminated. Backup techniques were implemented to
calculate the vehicle roll reference. This was used in lieu of the
Star Tracker for the remainder of SL-4 mission.
The Star Tracker was designed to provide both a fine and
coarse search pattern; however, due to operational constraints imple-
mented through the ATMDC, the coarse search was never used. All
other features of the design operated normally (except for the afore-
mentioned malfunctions).
Thermal conditions created no problems during system operation.
The Tracker had internal heaters (30 watts) that maintained the tem-
perature above a critical value of -18 degrees C. At first, it was
felt that the shutter sticking problem was a result of low temperature,
but when the problem occurred at times during the warmest part of the
orbit this possibility was discounted. No electrical problems were
encountered.
The interfaces with the ATMDC, EPEA, C&D Panel, and telemetry
created no problems and it worked satisfactorily.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations. Test results with mission
data and comparison with preflight analyses showed that the Star
Tracker performed as designed except for the shutter failure, and
the encoder failure.
Future St_r Tracker systems should consider incorporating
redundancy in optical encoders, e.g. lamps and power
supplies. Also, alternate technlaues in obtaining digital position
data, e.g., multi-speed resolvers with resolver-to-digital converter
electronics should be considered.
Problems with the shutter mechanism indicated a mechanical
design deficiency and that a redesign should be considered.
Future designs should provide additional telemetry data to
permit a more complete evaluation of problems and workaround techniques.
It misht also be desirable to provide for remote control operations
during unmanned phase_ of the mission.
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it should be recognized in the future that a Star Tracker
flown on a large ma_xncd space station similar to Skylab would be ex-
posed to drifting contaminant particles which, by reflecting sunlight,
are brighter than target stars. The presence of such contaminant
particles appears to be unavoidable because of life support syste'ns
vents and paint deterioration on large surface areas. Thus, every
effort should be made to design a star tracking system which would be
less susceptible to drifting contami_laut particles. Concepts that
should be considered are dual trackers, limiting tracking rate and
limiting brightness and spectral characteristics of targets.
C. Control Moment Gyro
I. Hardware Description. The Control Moment Gyro (CMG) con-
sisted of a motor driven rotor which was gimbaled to provide two-
degrees-of-freedom within the limits of the electrical and mechanical
stops. The instrument by utilizing its rotation momentum was capable
of producing torques on a vehicle propor'ional to the angular rate
of the gimbals. By controlling the CMG gimbal rates, attitude con-
trol of a vehicle was achieved. Figure 35 shows the assembled CMG.
a. Inner Cimbal (IG) and Rotor Assembly. The 21 inch
diameter rotor rotated at a speed just under 9000 RPM and had an
angular momentum of approximately 3000 N.m.s. The rotor was
supported at each end by a single angular contact bearing and was
constrained such that the correct bearing preload was maintained
regardless of orientation during its operation within a wide environ-
ment range. A strut was inserted through the hollow rotor shaft and
was rigidly attached to the gimbal at both bearing e_ds insuring a
constant preload over the thermal operating range of the CMG. Lubri-
cant was supplied to each hearing by means of a lubrication nut that
also locked the bearing inn_,r race to the shaft. The nut was hollow
and was filled with suffici_.nt lubricant to maintain the CMG through
its operating life. The ceutrifugal force from the wheel rotation
generated a pressure upon this w_lume of oil and forced oil through
a metered portion on the llp of the nut. Centrifugal force carried
the oil from the nut lip to the step in the bearing retainer. From
this step in the retainer three holes carried the oil to the line
contact of balls and races. The IG and rotor assembly was instru-
mented so that bearing tempL_rature, rotor speed, and cavity pressura
could be monitored (cavity pressure was monitored only during ground
operations). Figure 36 shows a crosssection of the Inner Gimbal.
b. Motors. Tht, rotor was rotated by two identical double
squirrel cage induction motors. The nmtor rotors were an integral
part of the'rotor shaft. The stators were mounted in the glmbal.
The two mot,ors provided redundancy as well as a symmetrical design
for balanced heat dlss[pation. A single motor was capable of main-
taining s,Lffic[ent RPM if a failure occurred.
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The motors were driven at 8900 RPM by 130 V, 455 Hz three-
phase electrical power supplied from a CMG Inverter Assembly (CMGIA).
Synchronous speed for the six-pole motor was 9100 RI_. The motor
efficiency under operational conditions was approximately 90 percent.
The motors developed a relatively constant accelerating torque of
0.127 N.m. up to the region near synchronous speed. Just below
synchronous speed, the motors provided a steep torque _ersus speed
characteristic which made them behave as synchronous motors for good
speed regulation with varying load. Input power was relatively con-
stant during acceleration and dropped sharply near synchronous speed,
resulting in high operating efficiency.
The double cage induction motor used two squirrel cage
windings placed in slots one above the other. The outer cage wind-
ing had a high resistance and high leakage inductance, while the
inner cage winding had low resistance and high leakage inductance.
At stall, the frequency of the rotor current equaled the line fre-
quency, allowing the outer cage to provide a high starting torque.
As the motor accelerated, the rotor slip frequency decreased and the
inner c_ge impedance approached the outer cage impedance. The com-
bination tended to maintain a constant power transfer to the rotor
and a relatively constant level of developed torque during accelera-
tion. When the motor reached the normal operating speed, the re-
actances of the cage windings were small compared to the resistances.
The currents i.n each cage were determined almost entlrely by the
resistances_ The lower resistance inner cage then provided the major
share of torque producing capability of the motor. The characteris-
tics of a lo_ resistance rotor at low slip are high efficiency and
good speed r, gulation through a range of varying load torques. Figure
37 shows typical spinup and braking curves for CHG SN I0.
c. Hotor Braking. The motor brake could be actuated by
a cresmmn or by ground command to disconnect a CHG in case of a
failure. The command (to the CHGIA) disconnected wheel excitation
power and initiated the motor brake. Electrical means for providing
braking torque to stop the CMGwheel consisted of applying adc
voltage (from the CIdGIA) between two phases of the wye-connected
motor stator; the third phase was left open. The dc current set up
a field that caused the motor to behave as a short circuited ac
generator to dissipate the energy stored in the rotating wheel.
d. Gimbal Seals and Covers. The rotor and inner gimbal
assembly were sealed so that during earth testing, the gimbal cavity
pressure could be maintained at a level of 100 microns of mercury or
less. This was necessary to minimize windage friction losses on the
high speed rotating wheel. During orbital operation, the evacuation
valve was opened and the $imbal cavity vacuum was maintained by
outer space.
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External covers were provided and were attached to the
upper and lower surfaces of the CMG frame. A thermal insulatlng
blanket was attached to the CMG covers to assist in maintalnlng
the proper thermal environment for the Ig and rotor assembly.
e. Actuator Pivot Assembly. Both inner and outer glmbal
rotation was accomplished by Identical actuators. The actuator also
,erved as a glmbal pivot. Each actuator consisted of a housing
assembly, adc torque motor, gear train, output shaft, and rate-
feedback dc tachometer.
The actuator was capable of dellverlng 245 N.m. of torque.
The tachometer operated at motor speed and provided an output of 1.0
volt/radian/second. The ratio of the two stage spur gear train was
56.55 to 1.
f. Sensor Pivots. The sensor assemblies served as gimbal
pivots and provided electrical readouts that were used for gimbal
Vosltlon information. Each sensor consisted of a housing, baU bear-
ing mounted pivot shaft, resolver assembly, cam-operated mlcroswltches,
and a flex lead assembly.
g. CMG Electronics Asserably (CMGEA). The CMG Electronlcs
Assembly contained the rate servo electronics (ampllfiers, modulator,
detectors, etc.) to drive the CMG gimbals. The gimb_ torquing rates
were controlled by rate servo loops with adc tachom _ r output for
i_dback. The rate servo amplifiers for either the inner or outer
glmbal were functionally Identical, differing only in servo character-
is t Its.
h. CNG Inverter Assembly (CMGIA) - Each CMG derived Its
gyro wheel power from an individual solid state inverter. One CNGIA
was also required to supply 455 Hz primary reference power to the
Star Tracker and the Fine Sun Sensor CMG[A (No. I). A second CNGI^
(No. 2) supplied the same excltations as a secondary reference power
source. The CMG!_ _Iso supplied 4.8 kHz, to the C}iG resolver and
800 Hz power to the EPC resolvers and the MPC via the control dis-
tributor. The control distributor perforraed the swltchln8 operations
between the primary and secondary refere_ce power.
2. Design Slstory.
a. Design Concept. The CNG was a spinning gyroscope
mounted in two g/_bals to provide two-degrees-of-freedom for the
syro spin vector. Driving the spin vector at some angular rate caused
the gyro to produce a torque about an axLs perpendicular to both the
spin vector and the axis about which the spin vector was driven. The
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torque was proportional to the angular rate and the angular momentum
of the 8yro. Three CHGs mounted orthogonally, were used on the A_.
For a description of the GIG subsystem, see SeCtlon IIl .A.2.b.
b. Design Goals. The CMGwas origlnally designed in 1966
for an ATM mission period of 56 days. M,Jmentum storage capability was
2700 N.m.s, _nd maximum gimbal rate was 4,5 deg/sec. Operating al-
titude was to be greater than 100 nauti¢_1 miles. Performance and
design data are presente_ in Table 39.
Table 39. CHG Perfo ,_nce and Design Data
|, ..-
Angular Momentum Storage: 3115 H.m.s @ 9115 Rpm
Degrees of Freedom: 2
Output Torque"
Range: 0 to 245 N.m
Threshold: 0.112 H.m
Gimbal RaCes:
Range: 0 to 7.0 degrees per second
Threshold: 0.0057 degrees per second
Gimbal Kate Servo:
BandwldCh: 5 Hz
Phase NJrgin: 70 degrees
Oimbal Pivot:
Actuator Hotor Torque (1_xtmum): 9.52 M.m
Tachometer Gain t VDC/radian/second
Gear ReCto: 56.66 : 1
Resolvers Speed: Single (4.8 kl_ excitation)
Gimbal Freedom:
Inner : +80 desrees (mechanical)
Outer : +220 degrees (mechanical) -_
-130 degrees (mechanical)
i | | _ • i •
2Sl
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Table39. CHG Performance and Design Data(continued)
Wheel:
Operating Speed: 8900 rpm
Electrlcal
Power:
Wheel Ac_eleratior: 120 watts
Wheel at Operating Speed: 50 watts
Bearing Heater:
15.6 degrees to 26.7
degrees C. 48 watts
Physical
Size:
CMG_ Within a 1.06 meters sphere
CMG Electronics Assembly 0.249 by 0.218 by 0.0761
(CMGEA): meters
Weight:
CMG: 190 Kg
Wheel : 65.8 Kg
CMGEA : 3.7 Kg
c. Design Growth. In 1969_ it was decided to fly Skylab
in the "Dry Workshop" configuration. A number of design changes to
the CMGS were required by this deslcion. These included:
(i) Deslgn llfe was increased to i0,000 hours
(approximately 400 days).
(2) Momentum storage capability was increased to
3115 N.m.s at 9115 rpm.
(3) Maximum glmbal rate was increased to 7 deg/sec.
_2
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The CMG was originally designed to operate on a 400 Hz
power source which caused the w[,eel to spin at 7900 rpm (sync speed ?
was 8000 rpm). The angular momentum of the wheel at this speed was
2700 N.m.s. To increase the ang,lar momentum of the wheel to 3000
N.m.s, it was necessary to increase the wheel speed to 8950 rpm.
This was done by changing the CMG motor power supply frequency from
400 Hz to 455 Hz, which provided a synchronous speed of 9100 rpm.
This required a major modification of the CMG inverter design, and
retrofit of the ii CMGs which had been delivered. Engineering studies
were made to update the CMG stress and thermal analyses, and to deter-
mine the CMG safety margin at the higher rpm.
Tile increase in CMG design llfe forced a redesign of the
gimbal actuators. For the 56 day mission, the actuators had used a
simple spur gear design lubricated with a dry lubricant. For a
i0,000 hour design life, it was necessary to redesign the gear train
using hardened steel and a Bray grease lubricnnt. Other actuator
changes included actuator pivot grease seals to avoi_ torque motor
contamination, and redesign of the torque motor commutator and
brushes.
The increase in gimbal rate limits was made by a scaling
resistor change on the rate command input _ard in the CMGEA. All 12
delivered CMGs were retrofitted. ATMDC software was designed to
command the maximum CMG torque output consistent with inner and outer
glmbal torque motor capability for all cimbinations of rate commands
and outer gimbals.
3. Design Verification.
a. Hardware Qualification. Qualification testing of
the CMGs was completed March 15, 1973. The Qualification Test
Program was conducted as specified in Reference 14. No significant
problems were encountered. Minor out-of-speclficatlon conditions
were noted during the _I tests. A waiver was granted to accept
these deviations. For additional information, see Reference 15.
In addition to lhe formal qualification test program,
llfe tests were performed on the major CMG components. These tests
were performed in a vacuum chamber at ambient temperatures. No
significant problems were encountered.
b. Hardwar_ Integration. Fli.ght type CMCs were fIL_=
integrated into the APCS during testing in the Hardware Simulation
Laboratory (HSL) at MSFC. This testing was performed in the Summer
and Fall of 1971. All testing was performed under ambient conditlotLs
with torques due to earth's rate and gravity biased out of the Torque
Measuring Fixture output. The CMGs performed normally. No problems
253
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were encountered. Since the CMGs were spinning continuously for
months at a time, care was taken in the HSL to keep the spin axis of
the No. 3 CMG horizontal when the simulation was not in use, to avoid
excessive wear of the wheel spin bearings. By February 1974, these
CMGs had accumulated over 27,000 hours with no problems.
For additional information see Reference 19.
4. Hardware Verification. System-level tests were performed
on the prototype and flight ATMs to verify system design and flight
readiness. These tests included post-manufacturing checkout, vibra-
tion testing, thermal-vacuum testing, and prelaunch checkout. During
these tests several significant CMG problems were encountered. These
are discussed below:
a. Belleville Washer Problem. The power transistor_ and
diodes in the CMG Inverter Assembly (CMGIA) were mounted to the heat
sink by a nut and a stud with a Belleville washer used to provide
tension on the stud. This tension maintains firm contact between
the transistors and the heat sink to provide for heat conduction from
the transistor to the heat sink. During post-manufacturlng checkout
of the flight ATMCMG output became quite noisy. Investigation
showed that this w=s caused by overheating of some transistors in
the CMGIA. These transistors were found to be loose. The problem
was traced to improper heat treat of the Belleville washers used in
the transistor mounting. The washers deformed under stress, which
allowed the transistor mounting to loosen. This caused a decrease
in the heat flow from the transistors to the heat sink. The faulty
washers were replaced.
b. Resolver Coupling. During post-manufacturing checkout
it was noticed that the output of the CMG outer glmbal linear resolvers
decreased when the outer gimbal approached the negative stop. This
was caused by coupling between the linear and desaturation resolvers
which were mounted slde-by-side, but were excited by independent
power sources which were not in synchronization. The systems net-
works and the CMGIAs were modified so that excitation voltages from
a common source were applied to both resolvers. The resolver ex-
citation in each CMG was fused so that a shorted resolver in one CMG
would not affect the other CMGs.
c. Noisy Tachometer. During Thermal Vacuum (T/V) testing
of the prototype ATM at JSC, it was noted that an excessive number
of caging co,hands from_e ATMDC (preflight program) were required
to maintain the CMGs caged to any desired gimbal configuration. The
problem was traced to a noisy output from the tachometer used to pro-
vide glmbal rate feedback in the CMG glmbal actuator control loop.
The noisy output caused the control loop to drive the gimbals at a
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rate greater than commanded by the ATMDC, _ ich resulted in over-con-
trolling the gimbals. The actuator tachometer brushes were made of
a newly developed material designed for use in the vacuum of space.
During T/V testing, the brush outputs became intermittent. This
was caused by buildup of a non-conducting film layer on the surface
of the brushes. The film layer was caused by a reaction between the
brush material and outgassed products from the potting compound in
an electrical connector in the actuator. The problem was corrected
by changing the brush material to silver graphite and eliminating
the potting compound from the connector.
d. Bearing Failure. During post-T/V testing of the
flight ATM, a wheel bearing of the Z-axis CMG (S/N II) failed. The
spin axis of the Z-axis G_4Gwas normally vertical when the ATMwas
mounted in the test fixture. The lower bearing failed. A detailed
analysis of the failure was performed. It was concluded that the
failure occurred because the oil flow rate in the bearing was in-
sufficient to maintain an adequate lubrication film in one "g" spin
axis vertical operation with the normal range of gimbal rates. The
failure was'believed to have occurred as follows:
(I) The lubrication make-up rate was insufficient to
support unlimited operations in earth gravity. This was caused by
a low flow rate from the lube nut combined with a relatively short
time for the oil to accumulate in the bearing raceways.
(2) Marginal oil film thickness, caused by insufficient
lubrication, led to breakdown of the elastohydrodynamlc film which
caused initial metal damage. In addition, sufficient oil was not
available in the raceways and bearing pockets to dissipate local heat.
(3) Neating from metal damage caused the allowable
temperature differential across the bearing to be exceeded causing
loss of radial clearance and destructive failure of the bearing.
(4) Lo_al heating was believed to have been caused
by two factors, neither of which was suz_-ient to cause the failure:
Higher bearing loads [ __se of the addition
of wheel weight and radl._ loads caused by
gimbal rates.
Flow of oil away from the bearing raceways
for a vertical orientation in one "g".
Changes in wheel speed and bearing temperature had
been not d on this CMG for about 35 bouts before the failure.
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It was noted that the failed bearing had had the lowest
make-up lubrication rate of all CMG bearings, (0.026 mg/hr). Another
bearing with low make-up lubrication rate was on CMG $/N 9, also on
the flight ATM. This bearing also showed temperature abnormalities.
Disassembly and analysls of this bearing showed early metal damage
to the bearing raceways.
As a result of the failure investigation, three actions
were taken:
A visual and test screening program was con-
ducted on all flight CMGs. This consisted of
a visual screening for oil in the spin bearings,
followed by s 270 hour screening test which
operated the inner gimbal and rotor assembly in
vertical and horizontal positions while monitor-
ing cavity pressure, bearing temperature and
vibration, _eel speed, spin motor currents, and
bearing drag. °
The spin bearing lube nut flow rates were in-
creased to a ra_e of 0.05 to 0.12 mE/hr.
The spin axes were maintained horizontal
during ground t_sting.
No further difficulties were noted, and the CMGs were
certified fllght-worthy. For more information, see Reference 16.
5. Mission Operations. Spinup of the CMGs were begun on DAY 1
at 19:05:00. CMG control was enabled at 22:20:00. CMG No. I and
CMG No. 2 reached nominal wheel speed on DAY 2, 06:30:00, a spinup
time of 11 hours and 25 minutes. C_G No. 3 reached nominal wheel
speed at 07:30:00 on DAY 2, a spinup time of about 12 hours and 25
minutes. These spinup times were nominal. CMGwheel speeds, spin
motor currents, bearing temperatures, and general behavior were
all nominal.
On DAY 12 at 09:56:00, the CMG No. 3 wheel speed indication
on telemetry went to zero. All other data from the No. 3 CMG re-
mained nominal, which indicated that the wheel speed transducer had
failed.
The CMGs continued to perform nominally until DAY 194, 08:42:00
when CMGNo. 1 wheel speed went to zero, accompanied by a rapid rise
in spin motor currents and bearing temperatures. This indicated
failure of CMC No. I. The APCS was reconfigured for two-CMG operation
on DAY 194, 08:57:35. CMGs No. 2 and No. 3 continued to run until
conclusion of the SL-4 mission on DAY 271. After several post-mlssion
tests, the CMGs were powered down on DAY 272, 13:25:06.
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a. CMG No. 3. CMG No. 3 performed nominally throughout
the entire mission except for the wheel speed transducer failure on
DAY 12. On DAY 272 a wheel speed run down test was performed on No.
3 CMG. Using the CMG wheel speed/motor current curves, the initial
wheel speed was calculated. Power to the wheel was turned off and
the wheel was allowed to coast for 85 minutes. Wheel power was then
turned on and the new wheel speed calculated from the speed/current
curves. From this informatlon, spin bearing torque was calculated
to be 0.0205 N.m, which is nominal.
b. CMG No. I. CMG No. I appeared to perform nominally
until about DAY 194, 0?:57:00. At that time, over the Honeysuckle
tracking station, the No. I spin bearing temperature rose a_out 5
degrees C, the wheel spin motor current increased about 65 milliamps
and the wheel speed decreased about Ii0 rpm.
On DAy 194, 08:42:00, the Bermuda tracking station acquired
Skylab telemetry. The following anomalies were observed in CMC No. i:
Wheel speed - zero rpm
Bearing No. I temp 83 degrees and decreasing
Bearing No. 2 temp 23 degrees and increasing
Phase A current - 2.06 amvs
Phase B current r 2.01 amps
Phase C current - 2.03 amps
The CMG was shut down by Mission Control Center (MCC).
Since the failure occurred while the OA was not in range of a track-
ing station, no real time data were available. Playback recorder
data for the time of the failure included:
Phase A spin motor current
Gimbal rates
DC bus voltage
ATHDC Rate Gyro rates
These data were reduced and tabulated in Table 40 to-
gether with bearing temperature data available from Honeysuckle and
Bermuda. A plot of Y-axis rates, Phase A current, system momentum
and 8imbal rates are shown in Figure 38,
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Analysis of Data Points 1 through ii on Table 40 follows:
(I) This appeared to be the beginning of the final
failure.
(2) This reflected a worsening condition as evidence
in increasing bearing temperature and approximately a 15 milllamp
increase in motor current. Suppose the distress is in bearing No. I,
causing it to heat up (21.8 degrees C to 24.69 degrees C to 26.22
degrees C) more than bearing No. 2 (18.55 degrees C to 19.14 degrees
C). The heat flows from 1 to 2. Normally the temperature differences
between temperature measurements does not change this much. The
gimbal rate command coincidence with the increase lu current (1.0A to
1.98A) is considered significant here even though it is considered
negligible in a normal system.
(3) Analysis here is based on playback recorder A
phase current, RGP, and glmbal rate commands. The situation is
worsening as Judged by a higher current value which implied a further
decrease in wheel speed. A point of significance is that this worsening
condition coincides -,ith initiation of gimbal rate commands of +1/2
deg/sec IG -3.5 deg/sec OG. The Y rack RGP uutput appears normal.
(4) The rapid increase in current, (0.339A) over a two
minute period, infers an increase in torque; tending to slow the
wheel (646 rpm decrease).
(5) Although the overall condition appear_ to be
worsening, the current decreased by 30 milliamps from item 5, and
the inferred speed increased by 131 rpm. A motor of this torque
capability (0.127 N.m peak) cannot accelerate the inertia of the
CMGassembly thi_ rapidly.
(6) The peak current indicated (2.3A) would infer a
stall condition for a normal motor. However, approximately one min-
ute after, the motor current inferred a rotor speed of approximately
7,000 rpm and it was physically impossible for this to occur. This
current anomaly was not understood. At that time, the Rack Yaw RGP
indicated considerable perturbations leading one to conclude initially
that the CMGsystem was causing the rack to vibrate. However, sub-
sequent data analysis disclosed other periods of similar Rack RGP
indications leadiu 8 to some doubt about the cause and effect relation-
ship.
(7) The inferred wheel speed based on current indica-
tion is 6,100 rpm, at times followed by small intervals of increased
speed.
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I(8) Current value was itLcreasingand inferring a de-
crease in wheel speed to 4,800 rpm. At the same time, a gimbal rate
command was initiated. The Rate Gyro indications showed increased
vibration shortly after the gimbal rate command. This and the evi-
dence of constant current just preceding, indicated a rise in current
value. These conditions inferred that the CMG rotor was spinning.
Momentum management calculations of rotor speed from 25% to 35%
1,000 rpm did not corroborate speed as inferred from current.
(9) Utilizing analysis based on realtime data at AOS
Bermuda and inferred wheel speed (based on current) one would con-
clude that the rotaLion was 3,864 rpm. Hcwever, the real time wheel
speed indication was zero. This loss of wheel speed data from real
time data inferred the loss of the wheel speed pickoff. A composite
of a real and recorded ASAP data for line currents were constant for
4 1/2 minutes and were balanced (A phase 2.01A, B phase 2.07A, C
phase 2.07A). Bearing No. I temperature was 74.82 degrees C and
decreased from a high at AOS of 82.3 degrees C. This value of tem-
perature was considered valid because the caution light set at 74
deErees was initiated during LOS, however, auto shutdown at 90 degrees
C wasn't initlated. Bearing No. 2 showed a value of 24.45 degrees C
and increasing from an AOS value of 22.59 degrees C. The RGP inferred
a quiet rack condition at this time.
(i0) Because of evidence high bearing No. I temperature
and loss of real time wheel indications, the CMG No. i _ystem was
shut down by applying the dynamic brake for seven minutes. The
inverter was left operating. The bearing temperature showed that
bearing No. i was decreasing and No. 2 was increasing as expected
(short time after shutdown). Both bearings attained the same tem-
perature of 28 degrees C in approximately four hours after shutdown.
The exact mode of failure of CMG No. I could not be
determined because o_ insufficient data. Bearing failure, due to
insufficient lubrication, appeared to be the most llkely cause.
Review of data recorded before the failure showed that four CMG No. 1
bearing anomalies had occurred, all of which had been thought to be
insignificant. These anomalies were characterized by a change of
differential temperatures between the bearings, a slight decrease in
wheel speed, and a slight increase in spin motor current. The first
occurred on DAY 174 and the last over Honeysuckle about one hour be-
fore the failure on DAY 194.
After completion of the SL-4 mission, CMG No. 1 was
turned on to determine if it would ru-.,.The bearing heaters were
turned on 24 hours before spinup wp_ attempted. Initial spin motor
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!currents were 2.26 amperes. During the first 90 minutes, the phase
currents decreased _bout 110 milliamps to about 2.15 amperes. At
this point the currents leveled off and remained constant. Power
was applied to the wheel for 8.5 hours. At the end of this time,
the spin motor currents should have been 1.85 amps and the wheel
speed should have been 6700 rpm. Bearing temperatures increased
slowly during the test. The slight drop in spin motor current at
the beginning of the test was attributed to an increase in spin motor
winding impedance and a decrease in rotor gap caused by a rise in
temperature resulting from cvrrent flow. It was concluded that the
splnmotor torque (about 0.127 N.m) did not overcome the bearing
friction and the wheel did not turn.
c. CMG No, 2. CMG No. 2 performed nominally until DAY 190,
when the first of a long llne of CMG No. 2 bearing anomalies occurred.
The anomaly was characterized by a change in differential te_o_erature
between the bearings, a slight decrease in wheel speed, and a slight
increase in spin motor current. This anomaly went unnoticed at the
time, but was discovered d_ring data review after the CI4GNo. I fail-
ure. As a result, MCC and STAC were asked to monitor CHG No. 2 and
C}IGNo. 3, 24 hours a day, until the end of the mission, and a committee
was created to investigate the CMG anomalies and to determlue how
best to conserve CHGs No. 2 and No. 3. CHG No. 2 continued to exhibit
periods of anomalous behavior of increasing frequency and duration
until DAY 255 when en anomaly began which lasted until the end of the
mission, except for brief perl, Is of normal behavior. The anomaly
gradually became more severe as time passed. A typical CldG No. 2
anomaly is shown in figure 39. In general, all the anomalies showed
the characteristics presented here for varying periods of time.
A detailed review of all CHG bearir: data was performed by
the committee to investigate the i.'G No. 2 anomalies. It was con-
cluded that the CHC No. 2 anomalies were probably caused by insufficient
lubrication in the proper locations in the bearings; i.e., in the ball
_tack and the ball retainer. It was recommended that the bearing
heaters be cycled manually to maintain the oearlng temperature be-
tween 21.1 degrees C and 26.7 degrees C, and that the CHG glmbal rates
be llmlted to 2 deg/sec during momentum dumps. These recommendations
were implemented. The suggestion was also made to limit all gimbal
fete commands to 2 deg/sec, and to ramp in rate commands, but it was
decided that the software impact of these changes outweighed their
value. It was felt that the increase in bearing temperature enhanced
bearing lubrlcation by lowering the oll viscosity, increasing the oll
flow from the lube nut, end promoting better oll distribution. Limit-
ing the gimbal rates reduced the radial loads applied to the spin
bearings.
CHG No. 2 was used for attitude control until the end of
the SL-4 mission. On DAY 272 a wheel speed rundown test was perfor d
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on CMG No. 2. Power was removed from the wheel for 85 minutes. In
that period, the wheel speed decreased 496 rpm. The bearing torque
was calculated to be 0.034 N.m, which while greater than nominal is
within the ranse of torque for norma_ bearings. This indicated that
llttle permanent damage had been incurred by the bearings. It was
felt that the results of this test support the theory _f retainer
ring instability due to insufficient lubricant in the bearing race-
wlys and the retainer Ling.
6. Conclusions and Recommendatlon-.
a. Concluslons.
(I) The cause of the CMGNo. 1 failure was not flrmly
establlshed, but can be attributed to insufficient lubrlcatlon.
(2) The cause of the CMGNo. 2 anomalies was not
:Italy established, but can be attributed to insufficient lubricatlon.
(3) Bearing and lubricant behavior in zero "g" is not
well understood.
(4) The Control Moment Gyro (CMG) concept was thorough-
ly tested during Skylab and found to be very satisfactory for control
of long-llved spacecraft in earth orbit.
(5) Data provided by the ATM PCM telemetry system were
Inaleauar_ for real time analysls of CMGanomalles.
b. Reco_mendatlons.
(I) Tests of high speed bearings in zero "g" should
be performed Lo further the state-of-the-art in bearing technology
for future space application.
(2) In future long-duratlo_l manned missions, considera-
tion should be given to replacement o- n_Intenence of mlaslon-crltlcal
components.
D. Acquisition Sun Sensor
1. Hardware Description. The Ac(!ulsltlon Sun Sensor con-
slated of two major subassemblles, the Optlcal Assembly (OA) and the
Electronics Assembly (EA). The Optlcal Assembly used a family of five
photovoltalc cells arranged in a geometric configuration to generate
voltage analogs of the sun's angular position about two orthogomal
axes, linear to _ 5 degrees, and a discrete signal any rise the sun
18 within the fleld-of-vlew of the error detectors (9 +I degrees
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circular). The Electronics Ass_abl_ _sed conventional electronics to
shape and scal_ the signals from the Optical AssenWly and then trans-
mits the angular error signal and the sun presence signal to the APCS
digital computers for subsequent processing and use in the Attitude
and Pointing Control. The Optical Assembly optical axis was aligned
parallel to the Z-ax's of thc vehicle and measured angular errors
about the X and Y-axes.
The Optical Assembly contained two pairs of flne-pointing
detectors (one pair per axis) and a target detector. F_ch pair of
detectors was connected ao that the output currents were differenced
and functioned as an energy balance null sensor. When the sensor
was pointed directly at the sun both photocells received the same
amount of energy and the elecLrical output was at a null. When not
pointed directly at the sun, the optics (lenses and baffles) prodILced
a difference in the solar energy reaching the t_o cells in the pair.
The electr::al output from the cells was proportional to the angle
between tht optical _xis of the sensor and the sun line. The target
cell drone level detecting electronics which triggered a discrete
when the en, rgy entering a ..9 +_1 degree clrcular field-of-view was
equivalent to one-half solar constant.
The subsystem was completely redundant. There were two in-
dependent systems operating at all t_es. (See figure 40).
2. Design History. Although th_ original design requirements
for the Sun Sensor were based on a 56-day mission, no significant
design changes were made to adapt the sensor to the _onser requirements
of the mission as flown,
3. Design Verification. All qualification and integration
testing was successfully completed with each flight type sensor
meeting all speclfi_ations.
Integration testing pnint_d out that the sensor was sensi-
tive to reductions in solar light intensity. The sensor was designed
to operate at one solar constant. However, any degradation or con-
tamination which would result in reduced tight intensity at the de-
tection cells also caused a reduction in the scale factor of the ana-
log angular error signal. It was f,'lt that this _Id not be a pro-
blem during the period of the Skylab mission.
4. Hardware Verification. All test requirements were met
during the hardware verification testing.
5. Hisslon Operation. The Acqulattlon Sun Sensor performed
throughout the mission without malfunction or failure. 'll_e sensor
Was in continuous operation from initial power-up to flnal power-
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Figure 40. Acq. SS Detector Block Assembly
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down. It operated within and fulfilled all design requirements. There
were no problems with system interfaces.
Telemetered temperatures of the mounting plate ranged from
-II to +43.9 d_grees C, well within the design operating range of
-40 to +70 degrees C. There were no active heating elements in the
Optical Assembly, so all heating was due to the sun and cooling due
to conduction and radiation. Temperature rises of 15 degrees C in
i0 minutes were observed during orbital sunrise.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations. The Acquisition Sun
Sensor operated as desired and fulfilled all requirements. Analyses
of flight data have shown that the sensor scale factors and operating
characteristics were consistent with preflight test data. Based on
the temperature data, it has been concluded that there was some de-
terioration of the S-13G paint on the Optical Assembly. The extent
of the deterioration could not be determined.
There were no indications that any changes should be made to
the sensor design. For long duration missions, a sun sensor design
which is not sensitive to solar intensity should be col_sidered.
E. TACS
I. Descr_ptio n.
a. Mechanical Components. A schematic representation of
the Thruster Attitude Control System is presented in figure 41. The
location of the system on the Skylab spacecraft and the mounting of
key components are shown in figures 42, 43, 44, and 45.
The six thruster nozzles had 50:1 expansion ratios and
bell-shaped expansion contours. These features were selected to
maximize specific impulse while confining the exhaust plume to mini-
mize impingement on the vehicle aft skirt. An impingement shield
was provided to eliminate unbalanced forces on the vehicle due to
plume impingement on aft skirt structural elements.
There were 24 propellent control valves (figure 45) in
the system. The sole_oid aztuated, pneumatically operated, valve
contained a small pilot poppet integral and coaxial with the main
poppet. The pilot poppet controlled pressure forces that opened
the main poppet. The pilot Poppet and main poppet were linked
mechanically so that energizing the solenoid coil opened the valve
against the springs at low supply pressures. When the soJenoid was
de-energized, both poppets were pressure-unbalanced closed to assure
leaktlght sealing.
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Figure 42. Skylab Cluster Configuration
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Figure 44. Thruster Module Installation
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Figure 45. TACS Solenold Conerol Valve
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The 22 nitrogen supply storage spheres in the system were
of the same design as those used in the S-I_B ambient helium repressurl-
zation system. They were constructed of welded titanium hemi-spheres,
and were qualified for operating pressures up to 22 N/n_n2. The
storage spheres were loaded through a self-zealing disconnect mounted
at the vehicle skin. The discor:._:t was hard-capped prior to launch
to provide redundant sealing protection against gas leakage°
The propellant supply and distribution syst_ was induction
brazed at all tubing connect points to minimize leakage. Fluxless
induction brazing provided a lightweight leakproof joint. A modifi-
cation to the inlet fitting of each sphere and the addition of a
bi-_etal Joint provided the capability of "in-placc" brazing of the
supply feed line to the distribution manifold and the sphere tem-
perature instrumentation. The propellant distribution system included
24 flexible metal tubing sections to provide for relative motion be-
tween the shock mounted thruster module panels and the hard mounted
distribution manifold.
The two supply line filters utilized a multilayer etched-
disk construction to provide I0 micron nominal filtering capability.
Instrumentation was provided for system loading, checkout
and flight monitoring. Two pressure transducers located on the dis-
tribution manifold were provided to monitor system pressure. Six
temperature transducers located in six storage spheres equally spaced
on the aft vehicle support structure were provided to determine the
average bulk gas temperature. Two temperature transducers were
located at the inlet to each cluster of three modules at position
plane I and III. Six pressure switches, one for each thruster, pro-
vide a positive indication of thruster firings.
b. Electrical Components. The TACS electrical subsystem
was developed to (I) utilize Airlock Module (AM) power; (2) accomo-
date command or control signals from the Apollo Telescope Mount
Digital Computer (ATMDC), the Instrument Unit (IU) Flight Control
Computer, the AM Digital Command System and the OWS Switch Selector
(depending on the mode of operation and the phase of the mission);
and (3) provide instrumentation measurement capabilities for tele-
metry and Skylab panel dlsplaymonitorlng requirements.
The electrical system utilized separate redundant circuits
and components to protect against slngle-polnt failures and employed
high reliability in parts selection and design while insuring com-
patibility of command signals, control signals and power and measure-
ment signals with the interfacing system and equipment.
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Relay logic and control circuits, with solld-state time-.
_lay circuits, were selected as the electrical configuration. Relays
were chosen because of:
High reliability, based on past experience
Excellent isolation features for interface compatibility
Non-loading circuit features
No status change from loss of power
Compatibility with the installation environment and
structural load conditions.
The Power and Control Switching Assembly (PCSA) contained
the circuitry and relays necessary to command and control TACS. The
PCSA translated commands from the OWS Switch Selector and/or the DCS
to enable TACS, apply power to thruster buses, and transfer the con-
trol mode between the IU and the ATM. The PCSA transferred thruster
coemands from either the IU or ATM _o energize the quad-redundant
valve opening solenoids of the thruster selected to be fired. The
relays within the PCSA changed state upon receiving commands of 28
Vdc with a minimum duration of 20 milliseconds.
Power for the PCSA was supplied by AM buses ! and 2,
utilizing each bus to power a differen_ half of the TACS quad-redundant
thruster units. Buses were k_pt separate within the PCSA.
Eighteen time delay modules were utilized in the TACS. Six
modules, £n conjunction with the pressure switches, were used for the
on-board display of thruster firing events. The time delay module
extended the duration of the pressure switch pulse from 40-400 to
500 milliseconds to drive the thruster indicator lights on the ATH
Control and Display Panel in the MDA.
The remaining 12 time delay modules were used for re-
application of thruster bus power after a manual inhibit coemnd had
been removed. Functionally, the time gelay module was of capacitor
discharge design. The appl_cation of the manual inhibit =mmand
charged the module. Removal of the inhibit comuand by placin S the
switch to _I_BLE allowed the module to discharge. The power frOm
the module closed the contacts of the enable relay and held the
relay closed for approximately 500 milliseconds (minimum) and 18 to
33.5 Vdc.
Two voltage sensor modules were utilized with the TACS to
monitor the 12 telemetered thruster bus voltages between 0 and 35 Vdc.
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The output of the sensors was routed to low-level multiplexers of the
instrumentation system. Each voltage sensor module contained six
independent voltage sensor circuits (one for each thruster bus).
c. Design Data.
(I) N2 Supply
Value
Parameter i Sphere 22 Spheres
Volume .127 m3 2.8 m3
Nitrogen Capacity
@ 10°C & 22 N/m 2 32.2Kg 7061(8
@ 24oc & 20 N/m 2 28.5Kg 627Kg
Residual Nitrogen *
@-i0.5°C & 2.4 N/m 2 3.98Kg 87.7K8
@ 4.4°C & 2.2 N/m 2 3.46Kg 76.3Kg
Usable Nitrogen *
With zero leakage (max.) 28.3Kg 623Kg
With max. leakage (min.) 24.1Kg 528Kg
Nitrogen Leakage
TACS (max.) N/A 9.531(8
Leakage Rate N/A 24 sccm
Sphere Operating Temperature * - 26 ° to +78°C
Spere Operating Pressure * - 0 to 2.1 _ .I N/mm2
Sphere Proof Pressure @ 99°C - 33 N/mm2
Sphere Burst Pressure @ 99°C - 55 N/mm2
* Based on TACS operating at thrtlst levels above 44.5N
(2) Control "'alves
Parameter Valu_..._ee
Operatin8 Pressure Ranse 0 to 22 N/In 2
P:_o_ Pressure 33 N/un 2
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(2) Control Valves (Continued)
Parameter Valu_.___ee
Burst Pressure 55 N/Ira 2
Cpereting Life 35,000 cycles
Nitrogen Temperature Range -101oc to 74°C
i _1 onEnvironmental Temperature Range -_. _ to 74°C
Valve Response
Opening Time Haxtmum 42 msec
Closing Time 35 msec max.
Nitrogen flgw rate with inlet _.ondicions
of 2 N/ramz & 21°C (3000 psig & 70°F) .675Kg/sec
Pressure drop @ .67._Ks/sec (1.5 Ib/sec) of
nitrogen, maximum .12 N/ran2
Valve Leakage Rates (using nitrogen)
External maximum @ operating
tesperature and pressure I0 -6 sccm
Internal (inlet to outle¢) _axtmum @ 2 scca
operetin s temperature an_ pressure 100 sccm (with 10-
12_ of inlet pres-
sure across valve)
Electrical
Solenoid Voltage 24 to 30 Vdc
Solenoid Dropout Voltage 2 Vdc min. ; 8 Vdc wax.
Solenoid Pull-in Voltage 5 Vdc rain. ; 22 Vdc Bax.
Solenoid Cvrrent 3 amp max.
(3) Thruster
Parameter Velu._.._e
Throat Diameter 4.16 um
Exit Dieueter 29.5 nm
2
Throat Area, At 13.6
2
lkit Area, Ae 682 am
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(3) Thruster (Continued)
Parameter Value
Lxpansion Ratio, ,:.e/At 50
Length, Throat to Exit 3.68 cm
i. Performance Data.
(I) Tots) Impulse. The total TACS impulse available
for attitude control was 377,000 N.s. This included both primary
control requirements prior to CMG spln-up (first 6 orbits) and (_4G
backup requirements.
(2) Thrust Level Requirements. The pre-mission thrust
level requirements for the thruster Attitude Control System are pre-
sented in Table 41. The defined Minimum thrust, for vehicle control,
of 44.5 N co_responded to a system pressure of 2.52 N/mm2. The pres-
sure included telemetry and instrumentation inaccuracies. This re-
sulted in available impulse beino defined as the initial loaded im-
pulse minus the impulse remaining at a pressure of 2.52 N/m 2.
Since the potential to gain additional impulse existed
by lowering the rescue mission thrust level and therefore the system
pressure, a review o£ rescue and other mission thrust level require-
ments was initiated during the second Skylab manned mission. An
analysls was performed to evaluate thrust level requirements for
various mission events utilizing available fllght and design darn
The result8 of the analysis shown in Table 42 indicated that a res-
cue mission CSM docking in the radlal port would require 44.5 N
which would not allow the pre-mlssion thrust level requirement to
be lowered.
(3) Minimum Impulse Bit (MIB). During the period of
IU control of the SW_, the TACS impulse provided by a MIB was 41.4 N.s.
This was the result of a standard Launch Vehicle Digital Computer
(LVDC) _IB pulse width of 65 milliseconds, end a thrust of 445 N.
During _he mission period, the TACS thrust declined
from about 445 N down to 82 N as a result of nitrogen pressure decay.
The impulse of a MIB was controlled during this decay to ,bout 22
N.s by increasing the duration of the MIB as commanded by the ATMIX_
The impulse of the MIB declined between changes in MIB duration due
to the thrus_ decay noted above. The MIB duration at the start of
the mission was 50 milliseconds. The duration was inczeasad in steps
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Table 41. Thru,ter Attitude Control System
Pre-Mission Minimum Thrust Level Requirements
,j
Miss ion Events Newton_
Booster Separat ion Transients 222
Each Mauned Mission Command Service 89.1
Y_du le Docktng
From I_sstManned Mi_slon Docking 44.5
to End of Mission
Rescue Mission Command Service 44.
Module Docking *
• This requirement appended to original pre-mtssion thrust
requtrement s.
table 42. Thruster Attitude Control System
Minimum Thrus_ l,evel Requlret1,_nts Analysis
Miss lop Events Newtons
Earth Resources E_pet tment Pointing * 8.91
Cozttrol Moment (,yro Re_et Maneuver * 8.91.
Momentum Desaturation Maneuver ,'_ 8.c.I
Trir. Burn - Four Command £er_Jce 89.1
Module Engines
Trim Burn - Two Corr/_.nd Service 44.5
Module Engines
Rescue Mission - Nomln_tl End Port 22.2 44.5
Docking
Rescue Mission - 'Norst Case"
Radial Po-t Docking 44.5
• This thrust level is not optimum but ts usable. Lower thrus:
levels mi£ht be acceptable but were not studled because it
required rescalins of the slmulatlon.
278
1974021165-290
!during the mission to a maximum of 200 m. !liseconds. Foe post-mlsslon
test_t_g, the MIB duration was decreased to 50 millLseconds, which
provided an impulse of about 6 N._ eer MIB. A typica" M._ thrust
profile is 3hewn in figure 46.
e. System Operation. Thruster control of TACS was provided
by the PCSA. The PCSA received discrete connnand_ for thrustcc ope-a-
tion, and routed these commands to the respective contrel relay or
thruster control valve solenoid. Figure 47 is a siauplifteq sch_Jatic
showing the controls to a single thruster module.
Power for the PCSA was supplied by AM buses i dnd 2 through
20 circuit breakers on panel 202 in the AM Structural Transition
Section. Power was supplied to the BUS ON/OFF logic and the thruster
buses through 12 circuit breakers, TIfi_IISTERI through 6 for both AM
buses 1 and 2. Logic control power w_s provided to the command con
trol buses _ _t,d2 through four circuit breakers, TACS COMMAND CONTROL "
I PRIMARY and SECONDARY for AM bus i power and TACS COMMAND CONTPOL 2
PRIMARY and SECONDARY re. AM bus 2. Power to the manual inhibit con-
trols was provided through the TACS MANUAL CONTROL circuit breokers
(4) I-INHBT-2, and I and 2.
All OWS Switch Selector DCS and GSE .....maands to the PLSt_.
required an enable command before they could be imple._eozed. Th_
enable co_maands accomplished the connection of AM buses _._:2 to
command control buses 1 and 2. To enable the TAC$ for operatiot,,
a'. _. circuit breakers, with the exception of the manasi control c:L_.=__.t
breakers, were closed before launch. TRANSFER ENABLE IA-ON, 2A-ON,
2B-ON was sent either by the OW_.JSwitch Selector or by I_2Sco,sand to
power up command control buses 1 and 2, respectively, prior to Launch.
Command control bunts 1 and 2 supplied power to the thruster bus 01/
OFF logic and the transfer command logic.
trier thc command control buses were enabl_d, and prier to
lift-off, the GSE ser.t BUS t-ON and BUS 2-ON ten.ands. These cora_snds
could _lso be sent by DCE prior to launch. BUS 1-ON relays connected
the co_and control bus 1 to s|_ thruster bus-on relays. The s!y
thruster bus-on relay contacts closed, allowing power to be supplled
to thruster buses I-3A, I-IA, I-2A, 2-2A, 2-1A, and 2-3A from AM buq
I.
Similarly, the BUS 2-ON command connect_.d the <-offhand
control bus 2 power to be supplied to thruster buses I-3B, I-IB, I-2B,
2-2B, 2-1B, and 2-3B (Schematic not provided). ,:,ith_.,ower_n the 12
thruster buses, the TACS was configured to recei_,_, thru_te,." commands
from the Flight Control Computer (FCC) in the IU. TACS could be
disabled by sending BUS OFF and BUS 2-OFF by DCS comma_d, which
removes power fr_m_ the _ thruster buses.
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TYPICALTHRUSTPROFILE
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FL&ure 46. TypLcaL ThrulC l_'oEtLe
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With IACS configured in the IU mode, attitude control
commands from the IU were initiated by grounding the return within
the FCC. Power to the thruster command relay coils was provided by
the IU (figure 48). A fire command was generated within the Flight
Control Computer (FCC) by grounding the circuit. This simultaneously
applied power to the thruster command relay coils. The command from
the IU closed eight sets of relay contacts. Four sets of contacts
provided a redundant path for supplying power from the thruster bus
A, and four sets similarly provided power from the thruster bus B.
Thruster bus A and B power energized the four control valve solenoids, i
which opened the control valves, allowing N2 to flow through the
thruster.
The IU thruster commands were in the form of electrlcal
pulses of 65-millisecond duration or to Full-on. When the pulse was
applied to the thruster fire relays, the thruster control valves
opened. The valves closed upon termination of the pulse to the
solenoids.
Transfer to the ATM mode was sent approximately 4 1/2
hours after launch of SL-I by ground command. The TACS TRANSFER I-IU
to ATMand TACS TRANSFER 2-1U to ATM coummnds removed command control
bus power from the IU mode buses and applied power to the ATM mode
buses. Application of power to the ATM mode buses switched the trans-
fer command relays to the ATMmode. Transfer back to the IU could be
accomplished by sending both TACS TRANSFER I-ATM and 2-ATM to the IU.
In the ATM mode, the TACS augmented the CMGs of the ATM. Attitude
control commands from the ATM passed through the same contacts of
the thruster command relays and the thruster fire relays to energize
the control valve solenoids as did the ZU commands. Commands from
the ATMDC were issued when the Workshop Computer Interface Unit TACS
driver switches closed. Thls applied 28 Vdc to the thruster command
relay coils (figure 49). The Thruster fire commands from the ATM
APCS were in the form of 40 to 400 millisecond electrical pulses in
contrast to the 65 millisecond ZU command pulses. These pulses varied
the on time to allow for the drop in thruster operating pressure with
mission duration. As the N2 storage pressure dropped, the thrust
available at the thruster dropped. Lower thrust required that the
thruster control valve stay open longer to obtain the same amount
of impulse.
Upon entry into the SWS, the crew reconflgured TACS to
provide manual inhibit control capability and disable the ground
command capability. The crew opened the TACS COMMAND CONTROL I PRI-
MARY and SECONDARYand the TACS CONTROL2 PRIMARY and SECONDARY
circuit breakers, and closed the TACS MANUALCONTROL1 and 2 _vd
I-INHIBIT-2 circuit breakers.
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Power for any of the six thruster units could be manually
inhibited by placing its TACS ENABLE-INHIBIT (panel 130) switch to
INHIBIT. Power was then applied to the thruster bus i and thruster
bus 2-OFF relays to open the supply from AM bus I and 2 to the thruster
buses A and B of the selected thruster. Inhibit power was also pro-
vided to the 500 millisecond timer for charging. When the inhibit
conm_and was removed, the 500 millisecond timer caused a 500 milli-
second reset signal to be generated. AM bua I and bus 2 power was
then supplied through the enable relays to the thruster bus i and 2-
ON relays tc close the relays, which reapplied AMbus i and 2 power
to the thruster buses A and B.
Positive indications of thruster firings were provided for
each thruster on panel 130, ATM Control and Display, in the HDA. These
indications were actuated by pressure switches monitoring chamber
pressure. A 500 millisecond time delay module was used to lengthen
the thruster-on indication from 40 milliseconds (minimum) to 500 milli-
seconds to accommodate the display by incandescent indicators. N2
supply pressure could be monitored on the ATMControl and Display
Panel by placing the ACS monitor select switch to TACS P. The
re_dout was in percent of full scale (i.e., I00 percent equals 24N/
_m4) .
i
The TACS ONLY indication flagged the crewman that the
APCS was operating on the TACS only. This indicated a possible
large usage of TACS propellant. Additional failure checks were
provided through the use of the Digltal Address System (DAS).
2. Design Concept. For most of the elght-month long Skylab
mission, the primary source of attitude control was the three Control
Moment Gyros (CMGs) which provided the pointing accuracy and stability
necessary for many Skylab astronomical and Earth Resources Experiments,
and whichmaintained the Solar Inertial attitude necessary for the
Skylab solar arrays. A propulsive Attitude Control System (ACS) wag
needed to provide control during CHC spinup (the first ten-hours of
the mission), to handle docking transients and large maneuvers be-
yond the capability of the CHGs, to desaturate the CHGs when necessary,
and to provide a contingency capability in case of a CHG failure.
This system designated TACS (Thruster Attitude Control System), was
required to provide a minimum of 272,000 N.s of impulse. A high
thrust level of 222 N. was required aL the start of the mission for
separation transients, a 89 N. thrust minimum was required for each
of the three dockings with Apollo command modules, and a 44.5 N.
mlntmumwas specified for the rest of the mission.
Because of the ample payload capability of the Saturn V Booster,
the design was not subject to weight constraints normally imposed on
such a system. This permitted selection of an ambient gas syst_ to
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minimize development costs and maximize reliability. Nitrogen was
selected as the propellant to minimize contamination of Skylab ex-
ternal equipment and to avoid the complexity of preventing condensa-
tion in cold propellant lines that would have resulted from use of
a heavier gas. The thrust requirement permitted deletion of system
pressure regulators. Thrust level was allowed to decay with bottle
pressure in a simple blowdownmode.
3. Design Verification.
a. Hardware Development and Quallficatlo_l. The Thruster
Attitude Control System was certified for flight after successful
completion of development, qualification, and checkout test programs.
This effort included development and qualifications tests of the
solenoid control valve, the in-line gas filter, the fill-drain dis-
connect, the storage sphere, the bi-metal Joint, the manlfolding, the
temperature transducer, the pressure transducer, and the pressure
switch. The primary test objectives, major problem areas, and solu-
tions are summarized in this section.
(1) Thruster Hodule Assembly.
(a) Development Test Program. The purpose of the
development test program for the Thruster Module Assembly was to
evaluate and establish a production configuration for the Thruster
Attitude Control System solenoid valve. The development valves were
tested at the valve, dual valve, and module levels to evaluate the
valve's functional, performance and dynamic characteristics at various
environmental and system operating conditions.
Several different main poppet seal materials and
configurations were _,aluated in the initial phase of testing. The
configuration that demonstrated minimum leakage over the operating
pressure range was a conical poppet with a conical sealin K surface
using '_espel" as the seal material. In addition the preload on
the main poppet springs was increased and all machined parts were
cheqnically deburred to further enhance the leakage characteristics.
Testing of this configuration revealed that the
upstream valves did not seal effectively with a high inlet pressure
and low delta-pressure across the valve. All valves exhibited
sufficient sealing characteristics at moderate or high delta-pressure
with gas trapped downstream of the valves. The valves were leak
tight at all inlet pressures with ambient downstream pressures. The
solution to the problem consisted of maintaining the proper delta-
: pressure across each upstream valve during operation. This was ac- :
complished by removal of the zener diode in the valve's voltage sup-
pression circuit. This increased the closing time at the downstream
valve, lowering the trapped pressure between the valves.
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During high temperature testing, electrical shorts
developed in the magnum solenoid coll wire. This was corrected by
changing the coil wire to constantan and changing the insulation fro_
teflon to polymide. In addition, this wire was wrapped on an alumlnu_
spool and the entire assembly potted to provide greater heat dissipa-
tion.
A problem with bent plunger flanges was identified
in the downstream valves. Analysis revealed that pressure surges
from the upstream valves caused the plunger flange to impact the
orlfice plate thus yielding the plunger flange. This resulted in slow
pneumatic response within the valve. Amain poppet stop was incor-
porated in all production valves which precluded impact o£ the plunger
flange with the or_flce plate.
Testing also revealed the existence of a leak path
behind the llp seal retainer, which tended to slow the valve's open-
ing response. The cause of the problem was associated with gas leak-
age into the solenoid chamber. A '_espel" static seal was added be-
hind the lip seal retainer. In addition the plunger vent holes were
increased from two to four and mlcrolube lubricant was applied to
the llp _eal to further enhance the response characteristics of the
valve.
Loss of voltage suppression was encountered during
testing. The problem was as3oclated with failure of the diodes in
the voltage suppression circuit. This problem was solved by changing
to high reliability diodes from a new supplier.
During vibration tests of a module assembly it
was determined that the valve main poppets were experiencing high
dynamic loads and were actually unseallng (chattering) at a frequency
which might cause damage to the poppet seals and/or seats. To re-
duce the loads on the valve poppets during vibration, "shock"mounts
were installed between the thruster panels and the vehicle aft skirt.
Because the "shock" mounting introduced more degrees of freedom of
movement between the valve panels and the distribution manifold,
additional flexlble metal tubes were required.
(b) Qualification Test Program. The. purpose of
the qualiflcatlon test program for the Thruster Module Assembly was
to establlsh the fllght worthiness of the solenoid valve, module, and
cluster (three modules). The pressure switches, temperature trans-
ducer, filter, flexible metal tubes, and manifold were included in
the test specimen.
During pre-qualificatiou production acceptance
tests at the module level, an upstream valve developed a blowing leak.
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Subsequent disassembly revealed that the main poppet seal was frag-
mented with ]_rge segments of it missing. Extensive tests at simu-
lated production acceptance test conditions revealed that the valve
failure was due to an incorrect test setup. The inlet manifold was
improperly sized causing a high reverse delta-pressure condition to
exist across the upstream valve thus failing the seal under very
severe back-flow conditions. This sensitivity to back-flvwwas
recognized and all subsequent test and operating procedures were
reviewed and rewritten if required to insure that no valve was
subjected to possible reverse flow conditions.
During vibration testin_ of the inlet manifold
installation consisting of the filter and one fl£xlble tube assembly
mounted on a section of the aft skirt, the clamp mount!ng the filter
to the skirt yielded. The cla_ J were redesigned and the test re-
peated. The specimen successfully me_ the qualification require-
ments with an additional tube clamp between the fill llne and thruster
manifold and the addition of doublers to the filter support bracket.
In addition, post vibration tests revealed that the filter would not
meet imposed cleanliness requirements. The cleanliness requirements
_erewaived and no further action was taken primarily because the
flight filters had been installed and each valve contained an inte-
gral filter capable of providing protection from the amound of con-
taminants that would be generated by the filter.
Qualification testing of the thruster module
assembly (three modules) consisted of proof, leakage, functional,
vibration, ordnance shock, duty cycllng, continuous duty, thermal
vacuum environment, electrical, and nozzle cover blow-off tests.
The module inlet temperature transducer was found to be inoperative
due to mishandling. This necessitated the qualification of the com-
ponent under _ separate tes= program. All pressure swi:ches used in
the test specimen failed at various times in the program. The cause
of failure was determined to be diaphragm fatigue in all cases.
Further qualification testing occurred in a separate test program.
During high temperature functional testing and prior to vibration
tests, a downstream valve developed a blowing leak. The cause of
the severe leakage was determined to be a fragmented seal with similar
characteristics to the earlier failure in the module producti_n
acceptance tests. Extensive testing and analytical investigation did
not reveal the exact cause of failure. The most probable cause of
the fath,re can be attributed to a reduction in impact and fatigue
resistance of the seal material resulting from the assembly stress
condition which varies randomly with material strength properties,
manufacturing tolerances, and flow forces. The valve was replaced
and all testing was successfully completed.
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Concurrent with the thruster module assembly quali-
fication tests additional test programs were performed to investigate
inherent valve characteristics, to evaluate and identify environmental
and operational conditions which might contribute to or cause the
seal to fail, to establish confidence in the production seal con-
figuration, and to develop and evaluate backup seal configurations
for use if 'the production seal configuration had been assessed un-
satisfactory for flight.
The extensive seal failure testing did not identi-
fy any specific factors which caused the seals to fail. Increased
confiderce was gained in the production seal configuration for flight
from this test program. A back-up seal was developed and tested
but was not implemented into the production valve program because it
did not offer any known advm.tage over the production configuration
seal used for flight.
Because of the difficulties experienced with quall-
fying the pressure switch and temperature transducer in the thruster
module assembly qualification test program, these items were quali-
fied at the component level in a separate test program. Both com-
ponents were subjected to proof, leakage, functional, vibration,
shock, burst, and cycle testing.
Prior to the qualification of the temperature
transducer at the component level during checkout of the flight
Thruster Attitude Control System, one of the module inlet temperature
transducers was found to have an out of specification leak from a
weld Joint. The magnitude of the leak did not warrant removal of
the transducer. A stainless steel "clam-shell" doubler was epoxy
bonded over the body of the transducer. "Clam-shell" doublers were
epoxy bonded to every temperature transducer in the system t) pre-
clude further leakage of this type. The temperature tr!msducer
with the "clam-shell" doubler attached to it completed all qualifi-
cation testing with no anomnlies or deviations from the requirements.
In the qualification test program the pressure
switch failed to actuate during the post vibration life cycle test.
The cause of failure was determined to be a fatigue rupture of the
diaphragm. An evaluation test program was performed using a pres-
sure switch with Kapton diaphragms and production flight pressure
switches with stainless steel diaphragms. The results of this pro-
gram indicate that the Kapton material Is better suited to meet the
cycle life requirements for this application than the stainless steel
material. _wever, due to the cost and schedule impacts from chang-
ing the diaphragm material and more realistic cycle life requirements,
the pressure switch was considered qualified at a reduced number of
cycles. In addition, the pressure switch talkback parameters were
not critical to mission success and the nominal mission cycle
prediction for the pressure switch was less than the demonstrated
cycle life of the production units.
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(2) Pressure Sphere Assembly.
(a) Development Test Prograa. The hi-metal Joint
was the only component in the Pressure Sphere Assembly re_tJ_ring de-
velopment testing. The purpose of t_.e development test l_._., _ for
the bi-metel Joint was to evaluate the desip configu_'_on st _.e
Joint with respect to the Skylab mission environmental and oper-' _tng
requirements. Specific areas investigated were the redundancy of
the Joint, pressure and load capabilities, weld Joint and _phere
neck configuration, and tooling and welding procedures. Six r.est
specimens were successfully tested to demonstrate the acceptability
of the bi-metal Joint configuration for production and flight usage.
(b) Qualification Test Program. The purpose of
the pressure sphere assembly qualification program was to qualify the
pressure sphere installation for Skylab usage. The test speciueu in-
cluded a pressure sphere assembly with temperature transducer, _t-
metal Joint and a segment of the thrust structure. The test specimen
was qualified without any problems.
(3) No information was available on qualification of:
Power and Control Switching Assembly
Time Delay _4odule
Voltage Sensor Module
b. Hardware Integration. The Power and Control Switching
Assembly (PCSA) was first integrated into the closed loop APCS during
testing in the HSL in Astrtonics Laboratory, KSFC, in the winter of
1971-1972. All testing was perfo_d under ambient conditions. No
problems were encountered. For additional information sea Reference
D.3
The complete TAtS subsystem was integrated during OWS proto-
type In-Process Tests and Post-Hanu£acturin8 checkout in 1972. T_ _se
tests verified the TACS frcu the PCSA dotmstream to the thruster.
The TACS was integrated with the ATJ4DC/WCIUduring assembly
and checlout at ESt. All interfaces were verified and the system
performed satisfactorily. Two proble_ were noted:
(1) One of the sphere mounted temperature transducers
leaksSa rate did not meet specification requirements when leak checked
with a mess spectrometer operating tr, the vacuum sods. The swgnitude
o_ the leak did not warrant removal of the transducer from the system.
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Extensive tests were )erformed to quantify the maximum leakage possi-
ble through the existing leak path to insure flight worthiness. The
results of the tests and the magnitudc of the leak indicated that the
leak would not be detrimental to the mission and no further action
was required.
(2) During component inspection, the hack-up vehicle
pressure switche_ were found to be contaminated with mercury. It
was postulated that the flight vehicle pressure 3witches were a.so ,'
contaminated. Since mercury forms an amalgam with gold and gold is
used in the braze alloy material, it was feared that the structural
integrity of the system mlght be compromised. To prec]ude loss of _
structural strength, clam shell doubler assemblies were epoxy bonded
over most of the brazed fittings in the areas adjacent to the pres-
sure switches. One fitting at each thruster location was inacce_sable
for retrofi:. In add_tlon, extensive tests were performed to evaluate
the effect mercury contamination has on the properties of the braze
alloy used. The tests did not reveal any detrimental short term
effect on the strength of the brazed fittings.
4. Mission Operations.
a. First Ura_anned Orbltal Storage Period, SL-1. The
Thruster Attitude Control System was pressurized for flight to 20.8
newtons per square millimeter on April 30, 1972. Approximately 64?
kilograms of ambient temperature nitrogen gas was loaded.
The Thruster Attitude Control System was activated at
17:39:52 at which time firing commands were received from the Launch
Vehicle Digital Computer. It _unctioncd as the primary attitude
control system until control was switched to the AIMDC at 22:20:05,
enabling CHG control. The Q4Gs had spun up to about 25Z of full
wheel speed at that time. The 1or momentum capubility coupled with
excessive Rate Gyro drifts caused TACS Only control to be automatical-
ly selected at 23:29:06. CHG control was not enabled again until
DAy 2 at 05:33:00, when the CHGs were approaching I0_ wheel speed.
At 06:24:29, Attitude Hold (TACS) mode was selected in i
order to perform a series of maneuvers. The maneuvers represented
the first attempts to position the vehicle in a thermally acceptable
attitude, CHG control was enabled again at 11:48:31.
The total impulse remainin s for this initial unmanned
period is presented in fiaure $0. Large gas consumpt )n on DAY-1
and DAy-2 resulted from removal of orbit insertion transie,ts and
operstlon in TACS Only control until finn1 transfer of control to
the (_4Gs we5 affected. "A_e total /mpulse usage rate remained high
because the system was required to perform frequent G_ resets.
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The system pressure decay and gaseous nltrogenmass are
shown in figures 51 ano 52. Both parameters display blowdown char-
acteristics similar to the total impulse remaining curve. The thrust
level variation for this phase of the missi6_ is shown in figure 53
and is compared to the thrust level stored in the ATMDC. The variation
in Minimum Impulse Vit, figure 54, also shows the times at which the
ATMDC command pulse width were updated. With the exception of a brief
period during DAY-3 and early in the mission when the system pressure _
was high, the minimum impulse bit was maintained at about 27 N.s for
vehicle control.
Figures 55 and 56 present thruster firing histories during
ATMDC Control. The firing history while on Instrument Unit control
was not recorded. The Minimum Impulse Bit (MIB) firings and the
Full-On firings are shown separately. A Full-On firing is defined
as a firing of ne second command pulse width duration. Firings of
longer duration are counted as individual one second Full-On firings
equal to the number of seconds of the firing conmmnd.
The average bulk gas temperature is presented in figure 57.
The average bulk gas temperature is the arichmetlc average of the six
temperature transducers located in equally spaced storage spheres on
the aft structure. The solar elevation angle variation is shown in
figure 58. Solar elevation angle describes the orientation of the
orbital plane with respect to the sun vector. It should be noted
that during most of this phase of the mission, the average bulk gas
temperature does not increase as is expected with a increase in ab-
solute solar elevation angle. The bulk gas temperature should in-
crease with an increase in absolute solar elevation angle. The fact
that it does not is attributable to cooling of the bulk gas after
orbit insertion. Orbital thermal equilibrium was established at
approximately DAY 9, thereafter the bulk gas temperature responded to
the changes in solar elevation angle.
The module inlet gas temperatures and the average module
inlet temperature are prese,ted in figures 59 and 60. In Solar
Inertial attitude, Module O_e is located on the hot side of the
vehicle at Position Plane I and Module Two is located on the cold
side of the vehicle at Position Plane III. Cooling of the hardware
and gas occurred st these positions after orbital insertion until
thermal equilibrium was established. The process was similar to
that occurring in the storage spheres.
L
b. First Manned Mission, SL-2 (28 Days). The TACS was
utilized extensively during the first five days of this initial _
manned phase. The total impulse remaining is presented in figure 61.
It can be seen that the system usage was low after DAY 17.
!
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The system pressure decay and GN2 mass are s_,wn in figures
62 and 63. The thrust level variation for this phase of the mission
is shown in figure 64 and is compared to the thrust level stored in
the ATMDC. The variation in Minimum Impulse Bit, figure 65, a_so
shows the ti_es at which the ATMDCcommand pulse width was updated.
The Minimum Impulse Bit was maintained at about 22 N.s.
Figures 66 and 67 present thruster firing histories for
this mission phase. The MIB firings and Full-On firings are shown
separately. The large usages early in the mission are associated
with the stand-up Extra Vehlcular Activity (EVA) to free the partlally
deployed Solar Array and several docking attempts before flnal hard
dock was achieved.
The average bulk gas temperature is pres_nted in figure 68.
The Sular Elevation Angle variation is shown in figure 69 for this
mission phase. Note that the temperatures responded to the changes
in solar elevation angle during this period of time because orbital
thermal equilfb:ium conditions had been _stablished.
The module inlet gas temperatures and the average module
inlet temperature are presented in figures 70 and 71.
c. Second Unmanned Orbital Storage Period. The Thruster
Attitude Control System was inactive throughout the orbital storage
period from approximately DAY 40 to DAY 76. Consequently the total
impulse remaining, the GN2, the HIB firings, and the Full-On firings
were constant. The variation in thrust and MIB reflected the changes
in system pressure due to changes in bulk gas temperature.
d. SecondManned Mission, SL-3 (59 Days). The total
impulse remaining for this second manned mission is presented in
figure 72.
The system pressure decay and gaseous nitrogen mass are
shown in figures 73 and 74. The thruster level variation for this
phase of the mission is sho_m in figure 75 and is compared to the
thrust level stored in the ATHDC. The variation in Minimum Impulse
Bit, figure 76 also shows the times at which the ATHDC command _Jlse
width was updated. The Miniemm Impulse Bit was maintained st approxi-
mately 22 N.s.
The thruster firing histories are shown in figures 77 and
78.
The average bulk gas temperature and solar elevation
angles are presented in figures 79 and 80.
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The module Inlet gas eemperatutes and the average module
Inlet tempera_;ure are presente_ in figures 81 and 82.
e. Third Unmanned Orbltal Storage Perlo_. The Thruster
Attitude Control System was inactive throughou_ the orbital storage
period from approximately DAY 135 to DAY 187. The total Impulse re-
malnlng, the gaseous nitrogen mass, the Ml_ flriI_gs and the Full-On
flrln_ ,_-_re constant. The var: tion in _._stem pressure, tbruat, end
Hln_,num Impulse Bit reflected c_ ,nses in _ystem pressure due to changes
in bulk gas temperature.
f. Third Manned Hisslon, SL-4 (85 Days). The total Im-
pulse remaining for this third manned mission 18 presented in figure
83.
The system pressure decay and gaseous nitrogen mass are
shown in figures 84 and 85. The thrust level variation for this
phase of the mission is shown in figure 86 and is compared to the
thrust level stored In the ATI4DC. The variation in the HIB, figure
87, also shows the tines _t which the AT)iDCccmumd pulse vidth yes
updated. The Hinlnann Impulse Bit was maintained at approx/matvly
22 lq.s
The HIB and Full-On flrins histories are shmm in flf;ures
88 and 89. The average Glq temperatures and solar elevation angles
are shown in figures 90 8n_ 91. The uo_Jlo inlet gas tempera._ures
and the average nodule Inlet temperature are presented in figures
92 and 93.
.5. Anomalies.
s. Thruster Attitude Control System Thermal Anomaly. TiCS
hardware yes desigued and qualified for • m_xlmut tesperature of _7
degrees K. Since the operation of the solenoid control valves _s
critical to system operation, valve performance or 8nythlr_ that might
effect performance was closely monitored. Analysis of flight data ob-
tained during the SL-2 indicated that th_ valves at Position Plane I
had reached their maxtnmmqualification test levels during a high
solar elevation angle period. The pre-mlssion thermal analysis had
not predicted such an occurrence and, therefore, an investigatioq was
initiated te determine the cause of the difference beL_een the analy-
tical and the actual temperature values. Correlation betveen the
_118ht data and the analytical pr_ict/on was obtained by assuaing
that the aft skirt white paint solar absorptivity, alpha, ms de-
jsraded by retro-rocket plume contlmination. By vary_ alpha from
8 desian value of 0.31 u_xtmm to 0.34 and using an actual waste tank
temperature value of 3?2 degrees K rather than the original prediction
of 300 degrees K the thermal nodal predictions agreed closely with
320
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the actual valve module temperatures. Photographs of the aft skirt
area obtained by the first crew further verified the optical de-
gradation o£ these surfaces. The increased alpha had resulted in
higher temperatures than originally predicted.
Based on the above flight data correlations, predictions
for the third and final manned mission indicated that the quallfica-
tion maximum temperatures would be exceeded during the orbits where
the vehlcle was contlnuously exposed to the sun during the periods
of minimum solar elevation angle. This would be caused by the in-
creased solar Intensity(s) in the November-January period as the
earth approached and receded from perihelion, and F.Iso assumption
of further degradation of the solar absorptivity, alpha, as the sun
exposure time increased. A vorst case temperature of 369 dearees K
was predicted for the high solar elevation angle periods. Maximum,
minimum and numinal thermal predictions for the third manned mission
time period are shown in figure 94. Actual fliaht temperature data
are also plotted for the Position Plane I module inlet. The maximum
tempernture actually observed was approximately 353 degrees K, indl-
cating that the paint did not degrade as much as assumed in the worst
ease prediccion.
b. TACS Pressure Transducer Nnise. The telemetry system
pressure _asurements were observed to be fluctuating by as much as
.4137 H/_ Just after the SL-3 CSH docking on DAY 76. The fluctus-
tlons were not noted during the previous orbital stowage phase of
the mission. Althouah the measurements remained within system toler-
ances, an investigation was made to determine the probable cause of
the noise.
Review of data from DAY 75 through DAY 83 indicated that
the data on tvo different multlplexers and their raspectlve reference
channels were stable until the manned phase, b_en the Skylab was
manned there was a noticeable increase in noise lot" the subject pres-
sure measurements and their respective multlplexer reference channels.
Three other reference channels were evaluated and they also showed
increased noise content. Since the con:isuration of the Radio Fre-
quency field may have changed follc_inS docking due to the pressure
of the CSM, the most probabl_ cause for the fluctuations was that
the signal lines _are experiencing radio frequency interference.
The fluctuations of both pressure measurements continued
throughout the manned phases of the mission. However, accurate mass
calculations could still be made by averagin8 many data points to
remove the random fluctuations caused by the noise. No £urther
investigation or troubleshooting of the instrumentation system vas
necessary.
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c. Sphere Temperature Anomalies. During the mission
support effort it was noted that mass calculations did not stabilize
until some period of time after large gas usages. After equilibrium
conditions were restored the mass calculatlons yielded consistent
results. In order to evaluate the effect and to determine possible
means of eliminating this phenomena from future missions an analysis
of flight data was performed.
Calculations indicated conduction to be the dominant heat
transfer mode in the storage sphere since body forces acting on the
gas were small except for brief periods when gas was being with-
dra_m. In most instances the rate of w_thdrawal of gas from the
spheres and the rate of change of the radiation environment were
small enough that heat transfer by conduction could maintain a state
of near equilibrium between the gas and the metal sphere. However,
during periods of large usage, the gas tended to cool faster than
the sphere due to gas expansion with the result that a non-equilibrium
condition existed for some t_mo after the usage. During this transient
period, large temperature gradients could have existed within the gas.
The sphere temperature transducer installation was de-
signed to minimize the effect of temperature gradients within the
sphere by placing the sensing element at a point where it would read
close to the mean gas temperature in the sphere during the transient
period. Since this mean temperature point could shift during the
transient and methods for analyzing its location are not very accurate,
it was to be expected that there would be some error Lnherent in the
temperature data during the transient periods. Figure 95 shows the
approximate magnitude of this error for a representative gas usage
period. The temperatuxe during the transient period read higher than
it should have based on calculations of mass from subsequent equilib-
rium data. This trend was observed during most periods of high gas
usage. Mass calculations using pressure and temperature telemetry
data performed during this transient period yielding erroneous re-
suits. These tended to indicate a greater mass usage than that cal-
culated from equilibrium data.
The analysis indicated that the transducer sensing ele-
emnts should have been l,cated slightly _arther from the wall in
order to glve a better _ tim ate of the mean temperature during the
translent period.
F. ATIqDC,WCIU AND MLU
t. Vescrtption. The $kylab Attitude and Pointing Control
System (aPeS) Computer Subsystem consists of two Apollo Telescope
Mount Digital Computers (kTtil)Cs), one Workshop Computer Interface
Unit (WCIU), and one Memory Load Unit 04LU) and its assocbated tape
recorder. Some of the _ore significant box characteristics and a
sl_llfted block diasr_ are shown in figure 96.
331
1974021165-345
--; _91 - M092 ---
278 "-
- 40
Gasand S,_ere
tn (qut11brtum
277 i(lth Envtronmnt--T'--
276 Usage !
• ' - 36
_275 £qtlJbrium
274 /
I _ ------Telemetr7 Data
I/ '----Calculated Ustng - 32
Pressureand MassData273
-3O
27
16 20 24 4 8 12 lb 20
Ttme, nr
Averagegaseousnttrogen temperature
- 14091 14092 ---
9.6
-1380
_ 9.2 - 1340 _-.,.
_.c
_o.e L _" _'_ _ _- "13°°
- 1260
8._
12 16 20 7.4 4 8 12 16 20
T|m, hr
Averagesystempressure
FiSure _$. Typical NLl:rosen Temperatut'e Error
334
1974021165-346
r_-:l_ Sw,_,_c,or_I-_--_--'-I
I'"_t/ K.._ --i Ii :'_I,opuuII o,,,_,,,,I " I I I v I Ou_p,,,I
I""_"'_Iill II _ ,
Pfimary O._Jmi>uter
I/0 Ext(:ns=on • TMR Computer
• Autort,atlc Sw;tchover I/0 Extensio=_
I/0 I_.,!dtlun C_fcu;t._
Figure 96. Skylab Computer System
335
8
1974021165-347
1The A_I_DCs and WCIU constitute the heart of the first fully
digital control system to b_ utilized on a nmnned space vehicle.
Under control of the ATMDC Flight Program this hardware received
inputs from the nine APCS Rate Gyros, three Control Moment Gyros
(CMGs), two Acquisition Sqn Sensors, and System Discrete Status
Indicators. The Flight Program processed this input data and pro-
vided output co_mlands necessary to maneuver the vehicle to any de-
sired attitude. Similarly, analog and discrete signals were received
and generated in support of the operation of the Apollo Telescope
experiments. Software and hardware operations also controlled the
redundancy of tile onboard critical control system components. This
Redundancy Management was accomplished automatically without crew or
ground intervention.
The ATMDCs were basically IBM 4 Pi, TC-I computers with addi-
tional I/0 capability for interfacing with the Skylab experiment
pointing system and the WCIU. Each computer contained two 8K word
16 bit memory modules.
The WCIU was an I/0 extension for the ATMDC. The WCIU was
divided in o three sections; a section dedicated to each ATMDC and
a comon section. The dedicated WCIU sections contained the critical
Skylab attitude control system inputs and outputs, as well as the
isolation circuits to disconnect the "off" I/0 (WCIU and ATMDC) out-
put circuits from the external system and connect the active I/0
to the external system.
The two ATMDCs operated in a one-on (primary), one-off (backup),
configuration. The WCIU common section Triple Modular Redundant (TMR)
64-bit transfer register and TMR timer were updated under control of
the ATMDC self-test program. Failure to update the timer would result
in the WCIU generating a pulse to switch to the backup computer. The
information contained within the transfer register was used to initial-
ize the backup computer when it came on line.
The Ml_i provided the capability to re-load either ATMDC from
the Onboard Tapu Recorder or from the ground in a maximum of ii
seconds. The MU] also provided the capability to reload either 8K
memory module with a modified program in the event a single memory
module failure occurred, which greatly improved the overall ATMDC
reliability. This was an important design consideration since the
computer subsystem had to operate coutinuously for the entire 8-month
Skylab miss ion.
2. Design History. The design evolution of Skylab's Attitude
Co_,_rol System started in 1966 with a mission called the Orbital Work-
shop (or Wet Workshop) and ended with the in-fllght modifications made
in 1973.
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IThe computer hardware used in the final design performed flaw-
lessly during Skylab's successful 271 day mission.
A brief discussion of the design development of the ATHDC,
WCIU, and HLU follows:
a. Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer (ATHDC). The
ATHDC provided high-speed general purpose computing capability and
incorporated a versatile operation code set, a large capacity random
access storage, and a multipurpose, flexible input/output capability.
The ATMDC controlled data flow to and from its system interfaces and
performed arithmetic and logical manipulation, routing, conversion,
storage, timing, and formatting of data as required.
In addition, the ATMDC provided a Mission-Elapsed-Time clock
that could be set to some initial time under program control. The _
timer was monitored by the ATM system for experiment film reference.
The ATMDC's schedule and constraints to using proven hard-
ware limited the mechanical development of new technologies. Other
significant design items were:
Developing and proving component mounting techniques
for the planar I/O and analog circuits
Developing and proving the wiring harness and inter-
connection system in such a way to allow adequate
maintainability al;9 future change activity
Extensive design and process work in the multilayer
interconnection boards to insure a high quality,
reliable electronic circuits, without single point
failures
Power supply development.
The ATMDC was functionally divided into four major sections
as follows:
TC-I Computer plus expansion storage assembly
Interface Control
Input/Output Assembly (IOA)
Power Supply Assembly (PSA).
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JInputs accepted and processed by the ATMDC were the follow- !
ing types:
AC analog signals
DC analog signals
Continuous discrete signals
Momentary discrete signals !
Interrupt discrete signals
Serial digital data
Parallel g bit digital data
Parallel 12 bit digital data
Parallel 16 bit digital data
Digital data from test equipment.
The following outputs were provided by the ATMDC:
DC analog signals
Continuous discrete signals
Momentary discrete signals
Control discretes and timing
Parallel 6 bit addresses
Parallel 13 bit digital data
Parallel 16 bit digital data
Parallel 29 bit d[gital clock data
Parallel 42 bit digital data
Parallel 50 bit digital data.
338
1974021165-350
(I) ATMDC Design Problems. During the course of the
Skylab Program various design problems were encountered. These prob-
lems were caused by worst case situations in piece parts over opera-
ting conditions, incompatibility of software processing with hardware
design, and interface incompatibility within the APCS.
These problems were addressed from various disciplines
such as Electrical and Mechanical Design, Flight Programming, and
System Engineering.
Solutions to the individual problems were the results
of this coordinated approach.
The following specific problems are indicative of tile
conditions that were encountered:
(a) Interrupts. Interrupt Processing problems in
the ATMDC persisted during manufacturing and delivery of the units.
The problems ranged from electrical design deficiencies, system soft-
ware application, and system environment. The solutions to the pro-
blems required synchronization of interrupts to internal timing to
prevent loss of interrupt and occurrence of double interrupts, ex-
panding registers to insure entrapment of interrupts during register
read instructions, providing design modifications to insure proper
processing of interrupts _uring various instruction and data combina-
tions that were encountered during system software processing.
(b) Memory Problems. The ATMDCs experienced mem-
ory problems during thermal and vibration environments. These prob-
lems were addressed both in Huntsville and Oswego. The solution was
to re-design sense amplifier input circuitry, timing control, and
vibration damping to insure that the core output would be detected
over the environment to which the ATMDC was subjected.
These modifications were implemented An all flight
units during a recycle phase.
(c) Analog Conversion. Analog conversion problems
within the ATMDC manifested themselves during delivery and system
testing. The main cause of these problems was in the detection of
the signal after crossover, i.e., zero volts. This situation pre-
sented the problem of determining the polarity of the signal due to
instability and noise. Various design modifications were implemented
to eliminate the combinations of faults that were exposed during the
different phases of the program. These changes improved the ¢ontro]
logic ability to detect the fault conditions and provide correct
processing of the signals.
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(d) Temperature Problems. The NRL experiment in-
put isolation circuits failed to function at cold temperature during
the later phase of the manufacturing cycle. It was determined that
a worst case situation existed in the circuit that prevented the pro-
cessing of this signal. The circuit was modified to prevent this
situation from occurring.
(e) Logic. Reset problems within various circuits
of the ATMDC were detected during testing of the units. These prob-
lems generally fell into the category of race or silver conditions
caused by combinations of the delays internal to the ATMDC. The
approach to correcting the problems was to modify the logic to in-
sure positive resetting or stroblng of these circuits.
(f) Temperature Seasor Circuit. A problem was
encountered when the temperature sensor element failed causing the
operational amplifier to saturate. This condition forward biased
the analog multiplexer providing an offset bias on the external
analog signals. This condition was corrected by replacing the ampli-
fier with another device that had short circuit protection.
(g) Interconnection Failures in Harness. The
wiring harness was complex in that it allowed the three sections of
the unit to be folded for maintenance. Space for terminating and
strain relief was w_ry limited. The unit design employed foam rubber
bonded to the cover, but it clamped the upper harness runs when the
cover was bolted in place. A great deal of development effort went
into devising ways to terminate and support the wires at the page
connectors and to eliminate chaffing when folded for maintenance.
After qualification, a problem of shorts to ground developed.
Tolerance analysis of each stack was conducted.
No mechanical interferences or problems were found. Analysis and
testing indicated broad variation of loads created by the compressed
foam due to tolerances affecting percent of deflection, variation
in contact area, variation in foam density and vendor data. In
addition, vertical grops of harnesses were quite rigid and if loaded,
would carry load to page connector. Real time presentations and dis-
cussions were held with MSFC engineers.
The design was modified to i" _it foam pad to
specific areas and to clear vertical drops of hL.ness. The upper
tray was reinforced to limit deflection toward the upper multiple
interface board. This design modification was requalified as part
of a planned requaliflcatlon test. The schedule was not impacted.
Few harness problems developed after this modification.
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(h) Feed-Through Pin - Solder Joint Failure. A
rework technique was developed to "save" existing inventory. An im-
proved technique was developed for future build. Sample pages were
built and tested to evaluate several soldering techniques. An analy-
tical analysis of failures and projected merits of proposed redesign
was conducted. Communications were opened with MSFC engineers.
The schedule was maintained. Analytical data and
test data gave understanding of the failure and confidence that the
modified design would not fail.
(i) Feed-Through Pin - Solder Joint Failure -
Type 1300 Page Only Non-Flight Hardware. Investigation found that
the arrangement of feed-through pins was unusual on Type 1300 pages
and presented a failure mechanism not incurred in initial worst-case
testing. Conservative decisions had previously modified Type 1300-
page flight hardware to a best-possible design, but allowed non-flight
hardware to be a lesser modification. Flight hardware was reproven
by testing of sampi=s. A new rework technique was developed.
Non-flight Type 1300 pages were reworked. Schedule
and inventory was maintained.
(j) Capacitor Assembly Short. A situation developed
whereupon under a combination of worst-case temperature, tolerance
conditions and assembly clamping force, exposed pins of a large capaci-
tor assembly could short against the ATMDC backpanel support plate.
Analytical work addressed the decrease in clearance due to the cold
and clamping conditions. An experimental analysis provided deflection
contour maps of the critical areas under the same clamping and tem-
perature conditions. This investigation showed that while this short-
ing condition was unlikely, it could occur again. As a result, in
order for the ATMDC to be a completely reliable nroduct, design changes
were implemented into all capacitor assemblies such that no deflection,
and thereby no shorting possibility, would occur under any conditions.
This problem, therefore, did not recur.
(k) Memory Vibration Problems. Under long term
vibration, the three memory connectors would experience excessive
pin wear. A computer failure had been traced to this situation.
An experimental analysis was initiated by creating a test plan to
vibrate a memory under instrumented, controlled conditions. This
test showed that there was relative movement between connector halves,
thereby explaining the cause of wear. The addition of memory stif-
feners and connector clamps alleviated this problem as demonstrated
by additional vibration tests at the memory, and then at the ATMDC
level. This analysis thoroughness created a solution which prevented
recurrence of this problem.
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Another ATMDC memory problem was breakage of sense
wires of certain memory planes after long term vibration. A long,
detailed study, including performance of several vibration tests on
individual and certain combinations of pages, showed that the problem
could only exist on an earlier design pl_ne, and that it was caused
by excessive crosstalk in a page fixture used in page vibration
screen tests. Further tests showed that the new plane design was
immune to this excessive vibration level. Those memories which had
experienced this particular screen vibration test (some had not)
had the suspect planes replaced for flight usage.
(i) Design Contract Changes. Load Enable • System
testing of the ATM Control System at MSFC, produced a condition in
which the ATMDC would enter a wait state or have altered memory Ioca-
tions. Investigation of this problem revealed that system noise was
present at the ATMDC GSE test interface. The noise was above the
threshold level of the input ci_ "uits, causing the ATMDC to produce
the conditions described.
The source of the noise and subsequent elimination
became a significant system problem. A change was proposed to MSFC
to modify the GSE interface of the ATMDC, by providing a network con-
trolled gate through a spare discrete input. This n_dlfication allowed
system control of the interface preventing the spurious noise from
effecting the ATMDC during normal operation.
(m) High Core Restart. The enhancement of the
overall reliability of the computer subsystem was deemed desirable.
A study was made to determine if a flight program could be developed
that would require only half of the core capacity of an ATHDC.
It was determined that this was feasible. A
change was proposed to modify the ATMDC in which network control of
the memory modules through a spare discrete input would provide the
option of operating the computer in a full memory mode or in a half
or degraded memory mode. Thus flexibility was added to the computer
subsystem providing fault isolation of a memory module through net-
work control.
(n) Tape Timing Pulse. The GSE input to the ATMDC
contained a tape recorder interface to load memory from the ground
test equipment through 300 feet of cable. Problems were encountered
during testing. Investigation revealed that the tape timing pulse
was distorted due to the cable characteristics. To insure that this
condition would not occur at KSC, a change was developed for the
computer. This modification provided internal regeneration of this
distorted signal to the computer circuitry, insuring positive clock-
ing of the internal counter. Implementation of this change elimi-
nated the problem
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I(o) Momentary Discrete Change. The momentary
discrete inputs to the computer system did not function as specified.
A condition existed on which the Input was not detected. The ATMDC
circuits were modified to prevent the loss of the signal. This change
was made within the ATMDC by removing a latch circuit function.
b. Workshop Computer Interface Unit (WCIU). The WCIU pro-
vided the capability to interface the one-ON/one-OFF (I+I OFF) ATMDCs
with the APCS. The WCIU provided the necessary buffering of ATMDC
input/output (I/O) lines to accomplish this function. The WCIU, in
conjunction with an active ATMI)C, provided a means of sensing a fail-
ure of an ATMDC and the committed WCIU I/O pages.
WCIU mechanical design followed the same approach as ATMDC,
but design requirements allowed use of the standard 4 Pi pages for
logic and I/0. Plugable power supplies were developed. The harness
complications were greatly simplified by the page on backpanel design
with flat flexible printed circuit cable interconnection.
The cable and interconnection system was developed and
proven for WCIU. The wiring ha'hess from external I/O connectors to
backpanel was simplified. Signals were sorted to make straight wire
drops to the backpanel. This technique developed into mounting the
external connectors directly to the multilayer backpanel and is used
in ATS and currently proposed for future space applications.
The WCIU was made up of four main functional sections, as
follows:
IOA extension section A
IOA extension section B
WCIU common section
Power _upply scction.
On]y one of the two IOA Extension Se_'tionswas powered on
at any time. The conluonsection has power applied at all times when
the system is functional. The power supply section furnished power
to the active IOA Extension Section and to the common section.
Six separate power systems were required; Section A, Section
B, Common Section, and three TMR Power systems.
; The WCIU was composed of four backpanel assemblies inter-
connected with forty tape cables. The unit contained 37 4 Pi pages
composed of 18 unique types.
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(I) WCIU Design Changes
(a) Temperature Sensor Circuit. Since a problem
was encountered in the ATMDC temperature circuit (previously addressed),
the same change was implemented in the WCIU.
(b) MET B Reset. During vehicle swltchover testing
the software indicated a failure in the low order bit. It was deter-
mined that the tolerance of power-on reseL signals between the ATMI)C
and WCIU would cause transients on the address aid data lines which
were decoded as write commands. The condition was corrected by pro-
viding a positive control at the MET B Interface Control Circuits
during switchover.
(c) A/D Conversion Time. A logic change was made
to eliminate a 208 microsecond delay in generating an analog interrupt
upon completion of an analog conversion.
(d) Momentary Discrete Change. Previously men-
tioned in the ATMDC section. The same action was taken in the WCIU.
c. Memory Load Unit (MLU). The Memory Load Unit 0_LU)
provided the in-flight capability of loading Flight Programs into the
ATMI)CMemory from either an on-board magnetic tape unit or one of
two Command Receiver upllnk channels while maintaining the preflight
interface capabilities. The MLU provided multiplexing of 39 data,
address, and control lines to each ATMIX_.
The MLU generated a load enable command to each ATMDC
when either of the operating modes were co.handed. A reproduce
command would be sent to the on-board Magnetic Tape Unit when a
memory load from magnetic tape would be commanded.
The MLU was functionally divided into four major scctions
es follows:
Control and Timing
Multiplexer
Command Receiver [nterface
Power Supply
; Inputs accepted and processed by the HLU were the follow-
ing types:
One Manchester Type 2 blphase data input from the
Magnetic Tape Unit
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One digital serial clock from the Magnetic Tape Unit
One Manchester Type 2 biphase data input from each
RF Command Receiver input (two total)
Four momentary discrete inputs from the ATM Switch
Selector (SS)
Four hlgh-level discrite from the test point panel
or umbilical for each #;fM])C
Thlrty-nlne data, address and control signals from
the test point panel (including those from the umbili-
cal plate) for each ATMDC.
i
The _ generated the following types of output signals
to be sent to external sources:
Parallel 8-bit digital data to each ATMDC
Parallel 15-blt digital address to each ATHDC
One high-level discrete to each ATHDC to enable the
test connectors
Fifteen control signals to each ATNBC
One high-level discrete to the Tape Unit to command it
to pull tape (reproduce command).
A dual RF Couland Uplink capability was added to the HI_.
This change provided in-flight loading of either ATHDC via grouvd
upllnk, thus expanding the flexibility of the Computer subsystem to
receive changes of the Flight Program beyond the level of the stored
programs in the Tape Recorder.
d. ATH/HIJJ Tape Recorder. The 50H17010 Telemetry Tape
Recorder manufactured by Borg-Warner Controls, Santa Ana, California
was selected as the HLU mass storage device.
The recorder was modified for the new application and
manufacturing controls changed in the following areas:
Increased the screening requirements for plece-parts
Imposed plece-part screening where it did not exist
before
Corrected • power supply design deficiency to allow
more stable operation
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Incorporated a desi_ change to preclude errors bei_
recorded on the tape as the recorder was being powered
down
Imposed total box reliability screening.
The above resulted in a unit that would meet criticality
2 requirements and would satisfy the HLU operational requirements.
Serial number 1 Tape Recorder was Installed on Skylab I and launched
on l4ay 14, 1973. After 270 days in orbit, the MLU was commanded to
load the memory. The Tape Recorder started and performed Its re-
quired function.
3. Design Verification. A very thorough test program was im-
plemented to insure that reliability objectives were met. Any failures
whi,=h occurred during these tests were analyzed to determine correc-
tive action. The more significant tests are listed below:
Rigorous environmental acceptance testing on each unit
Qualification testing on each unit type
Delta qualification testing Hen required
System compatibility testing at the subsystem level
(i.e., two ATMIX:s and WCIU)
Error detection and switchover testing at the subsystem
level (i.e., two ATMDCs and WCIU)
Tape recorder, MLU, and ATMDC compatibility testing.
MSFC then conducted detailed prototype and KSC testing of the
syst,m. Each of the above tests wtll be discussed briefly.
a. Acceptance Test. The A'D41_ Acceptance Test was di-
vided into two steps. The preacceptance Test and the Formal Accept-
ance Test descriptions follow:
(1) Preaceeptance Testing. The ATMDCPreacceptance
Test was performed on various levels of page and system testing. The
TCI assembly was pretested in thermal operation for 200 hours. It
was then subjected to a total of 9 minutes of error-free operationel
vibration.
The po_mr supply assembly was bench-tested under both
loaded and unloaded conditions. The I/O pages, power supply and com-
puter were then integrated in a test fixture for functional verifi-
cation of the system. Upon completion of _his testing, the system
was installed in the A_DC electrical/mechanical assembly. The unit
underwent various assurance tests to ascetein its integrity. These
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included 75 hours of thermal cycling.
The unit was then loaded into its housing. An addi-
tional 24 hours of thermal cycling and 3 minutes of vibration testing
in the flight axis was conducted.
(2) Formal Acceptance Test.
(a) The unit was rmaoved from the temperature
chamber and worst-case detailed measurements conducted on all inputs
and outputs.
(b) The unit was then subjected to one complete
temperature cycle vhile the functional test program was being run.
(c) Vibration profiles were run on all three axes
with a speclal vibration test program being run Jn the ATHDC.
(d) Post-vlbration detailed measurements were
performed.
(e) A twelve-hour life test was run with the
semi-automatic checkout equipment and the functional test program.
(f) The Acceptance Test Team met and reviewed all
relevant documentation (i.e., HRB, UCR, failure analysis report and
test history). If no open problems existed, the unit w _ accepted.
The requirement for entering formal acceptance
test was that the last t_ preacceptance test temperature cycles be
error free. If an error or part failure occurred during the last
two preacceptance cycles, the problem had to be resolved and two
additional error-free preacceptance temperature cycles run. This
sequence would continue until two error-free temperaturc cycles had
been completed.
If an error or part failure occurred during formal
acceptance test, the problem was corrected and t_ Acceptance Team
met to review the nature of the problem and its resolution. This
meeting also determined the amount of retest required as a result of
the failure. The amoullt of retest depended on _he nature of the
specific problem, and might result in going back into preacceptance
testing. All formal testing was witnessed by DCAS.
ATH_ Acceptance Test Sequence - The test sequence
is shown in figure 97.
WCIU Acceptance Test Sequence - The test sequence
is shown in figure 98. i
347 :
1974021165-359
o kild Cycle o Build Cycle o 9ulld Cycle
o DynamLc Testtn8 o Install in test fixture
o J4easurmnents o Operstionxl Verlflcstion
o Thsrnal-21 cycles _ 6.5 hr/cycle
-hnse -2_'C to +710C
-Cold nnak-I for 1.$ hr _-440C
-Last 2 error ft'ee
o D_mic Vibrstlon
-3 planes for 3 min each
o Operstiomtl Vertflcation
"t '
-,,- Jo Operational Verificationo kn_lo8 & Tamp _llqnmmt
t
ATtiC ELec/Hech Asey
o I_r_ese Tests
-Croundtns. Isolation &
Cent tnuity
o Povor Supply InsinUation
-Pover Distribution
o Computer I/0 PaRs "_stellation
o Operational Verification
-Annie 8 & Temp Alijnment
-Test Point Heaauresmnte
u Thenwl-15 cycle_ e 5 hr/cycle
-hnge -26"C t_ +550C
-Cold Snak-3 for 2 krs
o Operational Verification
o Quality Inspection
.
J Final Assembly
o Operational Verification
o Dynamic Vibre*lon
-1 plane for 3 ut_
t hr/¢ yc In
FtSACCK_AJLB o Yhernal-5 cycles @ 5
TRSYIIG -Jtsn|e-260C to +55"C
-La t 2 error free
Jwceptance Test
o Goverment Concurrence
o l}etell Heseuremente
o Thersml-I cycle 0 6 hr/cyele
-Co!d Soak 1 for _ hre
o Operational VerificationDynamic V£br_tion
-3 planes for ) sin each
o Post Vibration Hesnuromentn
o Life Test-12 hours over input rases
o leviw Teat Dots
o IN Ce_eurre_e
o Government Concurrence
o SIRs Fore 71
!
FLsure 97. ATI4DCAcceptance Test Sequence
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Power Supply MLU Elec/Mech Assy _U Pages
o Build Cycle o Harness Tests o Build Cycle
o Dynamic Testing -Grounding
o Measurements -I. olation
-Continuity
T
y-
MLU Assy
o Power Supply Installation
-Power Distribution
o Page Installation
o Operational Verification
o Thermal-20 cycles @ 5 hr/cycle
-Range-26°C to +55°C
-Cold Starts-3 for 2 hrs
-Last two erro" free
o Operational Verification
o Quality Inspection
PREACCEPTANCE TESTING 1
Acceptance Test
o Government Concurrence
o Detail Measurements
o Thermal-i cycle @ 5 hr/cycle
-Range-25°C to +55°C
-Cold Soak 1 _or 2 hrs
o Dynamic Vibration
-3 planes for 3 min each
o Post Vibration Measurements
o Life Test-lO hours over
input voltage range
Test Complete
o Review Test Data
o IBM Concurrence
o Government Concurrence
o Sign Form 71
Figure 98. WCIU Testing Sequence
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\MLU Test Sequence - The test sequence is shown in
figure 99.
b. Qualification Testing. The ATMIX_ Qualification Test
results were documented in report IBM No. 70-K39-0001, ATM 275-036TM-
0001, dated 12/10/70.
Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer S/N 003 successfully
passed all the specified qualification test requirements with exception
of the discrepancies noted during Detail Measurements, Thermal Vacuum
Test, RFI, and TransieiLt Test. Corrective action was initiated for
discrepancies experienced during Detail Measurements and Transient
Test.
The discrepancy experienced during Thermal Vacuum was con-
sidered a one time failure and not attributed to Qualification Test.
The ATMI)C passed all the RFI susceptibility tests, indicating that
it was capable of tolerating RFI generated by ot_._r devices. The
ATMDC failed the conducted and radiated interference tests. A
Deviation Action Request (DAR) was submitted for those portions of
MIL-I-61810 that were not passed.
The WCIU Qualification Test results were documented in
report IBM No. 72W-00007, IBM-DRL-585-1 line item 036, dated 2/14/72.
No desigr changes were required as a result of Qualification
Test.
The Workshop Computer Interface Unit S/N 003 successfully
passed all the specified qualification test requirements with excep-
tion of the discrepancies noted during thermal shock testing, post
vibration detail measurements, thermal vacuum, and RFI. Discrepancies
noted during thermal shock, detail measurements, and thermal vacuum
were attributed to defective piece parts and were not considered
design qualification failures.
The MI_ Qualification Test results are documented in re-
port IBM No. 72W-00264, IBM-DRL-585-1 line item 036, dated 7/31/72.
No design changes were required as a result of Qualification
Testing. The Memory Load Unit S/N 001 successfully passed all the
specified qualification test requirements with the exception of the
discrepancies noted during RFI and transient testify. Althnugh the
MLU failed portions of the conducted and radiated interference and
transient generation tests, it did not fall any of the susceptibility
tests. Thus, the MLU demonstrated that it was capable of tolersting
both RFI and transients generated by othez devices.
c. ATMDC Re-Qualification Test. Structural changes and
additional structural supports on the memory assemblies dictated par-
tial re-qualification. The test results obtained during the performance
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supply,lwci leciM c lAssywc,u a,esJo Build Cycle I o Backpanel Tests o Build Cycleo Dynamic Testing I -Grounding o Dynamic Testingo Measurements [ -Tsolation o Measurements
I -_ont___Zinutty I
WCIU Assy
o Power Supply Installation
-Power Distribution
o Page Installation
-Analog/Temp Alignment
o Operational Verification
o Therma-20 cycles @ 5 hr/cycle
(Each side)
-Range-26°C to 55°C
-Cold Starts-3 for 2 hrs
-Last two error free
o Operational Verification
o Dynamic Vibration
-Flight Plane for 3 min/side
o Operational Verification
o Quality Inspection
PRFACCEPTANCE TESTING
Acceptance Test
o Governmant Concurrence
o Detail Measurements
o Thermal-I cycle @ 6 hr/cycle
(Each side)
-Range-26°C to 55°C
-Cold Soak ! for 4 hrs
o Dynamic Vibration
-3 planes for 3 rain each/side
o Post Vibration Measurements
Life Test-12 hrs over input
voltage range
1
Test Complete
o Review Test Data
o IBM Concurrence
o Government Concurrence
o Sign Form 71
Flgure 99. MLU Test Sequence
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of a re-qualification test program determi..ed the acceptability of the
Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer, P/M 7196600, S/N 003.
Re-qualification testing consisted of vibration, teardown
inspection, four-hour functional test and post-vibration detail mea-
surements test. All testing was conducted at the IBM Corporation
(Huntsville Facility), Huntsville, Alabama 35805 and the results
are documented in report IBM No. 71W-00254, ATM No. 871-13, dated
7/30/71.
The ATMDC showed no sign of physical or functional de-
gradation as a result of the vibration test. The ATMDC was functionally
tested after each vibration run in each vibration axis and functionally
tested during low level random vibration test. There were no functional
discrepancies.
d. System Compatibility Tests. The primary objective of
the Skylab System Compatibility Tests was to demonstrate that the
ATMDC and WCIU would perform as designed in a simulated flight con-
figtration, i.e., one ATMDC plus one section of the WCIU "ON" and
one ATMDC plus the second section of the WCIU "OFF". Specifically,
these engineering development tests were designed to show:
That the ATMDC could read and write through the ATMDC
Control Connectors J-10 and J-18 all valid addresses
associated with the WCIU, and also that this communi-
cation could be accomplished at operational speeds.
That the paralleling of inputs and outputs concept of •
two ATMDCs and one WCIU was valid, and that the speci-
fic buffering concepts used also had design margins.
That the power UP/DOWN sequencing specified in the
CEI could be achieved. Spurious outputs during switch-
over, if any, would ulso be detected in these tests.
That a switchover and d, " transfer through the 64-bit
WCIU Transfer Register 'd be accomplished.
That the common section functions such as Mission Timer
B (MTB) perform correctly, i.e., be independent of Bus
i or Bus 2, and that the MTB time data is available
to both computers on demand.
The tests were performed using ATMDC S/N 2 and S/N 3 and
WCIU FIN 2. ATMDC S/N 3 was designated the Prime computer and S/_I 2
was designated the Backup Computer.
The ATMDC/WCIU computer system compatibility tests estab-
lished the compatibility of the two unit designs (ATMDC and WCIU) while
operating in a simulated system configuration. Switct,overs were ac-
complished, thus establishing the basic one "ON", one "OFF concept of
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the system. In addition, the buffering concepts were proved to be
valid and all results predictable during switchover except as noted
below:
During switchover, four to six ms pulses appeared on
all TACS control lines. IBM released Engineering
Order (EO) number 271 to correct this condition, since
spurious TACS Thruster firings might occur during
switchover.
Whenever +28 Vdc power was initially applied to the
WCIU Common Section, a 3 to 4 millisecond pulse
appeared which could conceivably initiate switchover.
IBM released EO numbers 294 and 295 to prevent this
spurious output.
Two ATMDC circuit anomalies were highlighted during
compatibility tests, although they had no bearing on
ATMDC/WCIU compatibility tests themselves. These
collectively were labeled the ATMDC Serial Data prob-
lem and were both concerned with transmitting succes-
sive ones across a logic isolation circuit. The symp-
toms were: When a write command was issued to either
ATMDC Mission Timer A (MTA) or one of the Experiment
Output Registers with bit 15 of the data word a logic
one and the preceding IOC instruction had left s logic
one in the bit 15 position of the computer I/O serial
register, all data up to the first write zero was lost,
i.e., all signifirant bits before the zero were written
as zeros. EO number 277 was released to correct this
problem.
e. ATMDC/WCIU DemonstraLion Test. The purpose of this
test is to demonstrate that an Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Com-
puter (ATMDC) system would perform properly when failures are in-
Jected into the system. In general, failure modes which were identi-
fied in Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis for Skylab I
Digital Computer Subsystem, IBM Document Number 70-383-0024, were
utilized to demonstrate:
That a variety of critical failures to the on-llne
computer subsystem (i.e., the prime ATMDC and Section
A and Common Section of the WCIU) could be detected
and a system recovery from these failures could be
implemented.
That non-crltlcal failures did not affect critical
system performance.
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IA system recovery from the critical failures was demon-
strated as follows:
Power-down of failed on-line ATMDC subsystem.
Power-up of the backup ATMDC subsystem.
Initialization of the backup subsystem by the transfer
of data from the WCIU 64-bit Transfer Storage Register.
Proper system operation after the initialization is
completed.
The following guidelines were used in establishing the
Demonstration Test planning and operation:
All hardware used in this test was required to pass
a functional test as a unit level prior to integration
into the system test configuration.
Prior to the start of this test, a system compatibility
test was performed to assure proper system operation.
Failure cases were selected such that wide variety of
critical functional failure was exercised during this
test. Examples of functional failures were WCIU
Analog-to-Digital Converter, TAtS Output, and
Memory Addressing.
Some failures were simulated by software techniques.
In general, these were limited to critical failures
in the computer memory which could not be properly
injected into the hardware or which would cause ex-
cessive damage to the hardware.
Several non-critical failures were injected into the
system to verify critical system performance would
not be affected and forcing a non-requlred switchover.
Each failure was injected by the activation of a switch
and removed by the deactivation of the same switch.
Each failure was injected into the hardware one at a
time. Multiple failures were not inserted.
The basic failure mode was grounding a signal line.
This reduced the probability of damaging the prime
hardware.
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The July I, 1970 version of the Self Test routine was
used in the demonstration program. In addition, other
error detection routines were implemented to detect
critical errors in WCIU inputs and outputs. An inter-
val timer test was also provided to detect failures
in the ATMDC since the present Self Test Routine checks
interval timer operation.
The component test equipment used for ATHDC and WCIU
acceptance testing was used to simulate the external
system interfaces.
The Demonstration Test injected a total of slxty-seven
failures to successfully demonstrate that critical failures could be
detected by the software test routines similar to those implemented
in the ATMDC Flight Program Self Test Routine. The critical failures
which were not detected by the test routines induced erratic program
operation and caused uncontrolled switchovers. The majority of
ATHDC memory and CPU failure cases forced uncontrolled switchovers
for which no test error codes were issued.
f. MLU Compatibility Test. This test was conducted to
demonstrate MLU operation in the system configuration. Proper MLU
operation was demonstrated at nominal and the low and high speci-
fied supply voltage levels, and nominal and low specified tape re-
corder and RF uplink HLU input signal levels.
At each sapply voltage level, MLU tape recorder and RF
upllnk loads were performed and verified. During these loads the
MLU to ATMDC, HLU to tape recorder, and MLU command receiver inter-
face lines were monitored and photographed. The resulting signal
characteristics were than verified to be within specified limits
for the system configuration.
The tape recorder output and RF uplink signals were tested
at their nominal and low spcclfied values. Proper memory loads were
performed and verified for all signal levels; nominal and off-nomlaal.
The transmitter deviation effects on the RF uplink were evaluated
and the results used to establish the ground transmitter deviations
to be used for an RF upllnk.
Overall, this test verified I_LU system operation as de-
signed and specified; no hardware changes were required as a conse-
quence of this test. The test also provided useful data on system
operation that influenced the load procedures and system setup con-
figuration used during the post-Skylab mission MLU memory load test.
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4. Hardware Integration. The ATMDC/WCIU was first integrated
into the closed loop Attitude and Pointing Control System during
testing in the Hardward Simulation Laboratory at MSFC in the summer
and fall of 1971. ATMDC/WCIU performance was examined in closed loop
operation with the CHG/TACS System and the Experiment Pointing Cot,trol
System. Additional testing was performed during the winter of 1973
to investigate the effects of hardware input signal variations on
ATMI)CWCIU performance. Tests were also performed using the MLU to
verify the capability of loading the 8K program and performing con-
puter switchover.
Several problems were encountered during the above tests.
These included:
The ATMI)Cwas found to be sensitive to noise on the memory
load lines. The ATMDC was modified to provide gating on
the load line.
The ATMDC exhibited random incorrect processing of the
i PPS and 24 PPS interr'_ts. This was corrected by an
ATMDC modification.
A low temperature problem was found in the ATMDC i PPS
interrupt circuit. The circuit was modified.
The WCIU I_ B control logic was not reset during com-
puter switchover. The WCIU was modified to correct
the problem.
5. Hardware Verification. System-level tests were performed
on the prototype and flight ATMs to verify system design and flight
readiness. These tests included post-manufacturing checkout, vibra-
tion testing, thermal-vacuum testing and pre-launch checkout.
No significant ATHDC/WCIU problems were encountered during
this testing.
6. Major Part Problems. There were several major part prob-
lems encountered during the Skylab program. Two of these are expanded
in the following paragraphs:
Integrated Circuit Eutectic Particle Problem.
+ Vamistor Resistance Drift Problem.
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a. Integrated Circuit Eutectic Particle Problem Assess-
ment. Oe January 17, 1971, Workshop Computer Interface Unit (WCIU)
S/N 3 failed after 13.5 minutes of random vibration acceptance test-
ing. After the full 40 minutes of scheduled acceptance test random
vibration, and during detai)ed electrical measurements, another fail-
ure was observed in WCIU S/N 3. This failure could have occurred
during vibration and would not have been identified until post-vlbra-
tion detailed measurements.
On January 18, 1971, WCIU S/N 4 failed after 2.0 minutes
of random vibration pre-acceptance testing. On January 19, 1971,
the Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer (ATMDC) S/N 5 failed
after 3.5 minutes of random vibration acceptance testing.
All of the above were permanent failures and were isolated
to TTL hermetically sealed Integrated Circuits (IC). After replace-
ment of failed parts, the systems were subsequently vibrated for an
additional 140 minutes with no further failures. The four failures
yielded a total incident rate of 0.i percent. The individual inci-
dent rate for the WCIU was 0.16 percent, and 0.05 percent for the
ATMDC.
External visual inspection and radiographic examination
of the failed ICs revealed no anomalies. All four failures were
electrically verified as having open internal circuits.
Internal visual inspection of the devices showed the
failure mechanism to be opened metallization and opened flying leads
between Vcc and ground. It was determined that all failures were
caused by metallic material shorting the Vcc-to-ground metallizations
on the chip surface. This caused excessive current flow, resulting
in an open lead or metallization. Particles ranged from 0.008 inch
to 0.0013 inch, and were generally spherical in shape. Minimum spacing
between critical metallizatlon is 0.003 inch.
A scanning electro-microscope microprobe analysis was
utilized in determining composition of the particle. In all cases
the composition was identified as gold/tin alloy. This combination
of metals is found only in the pre-form used in sealing the device
during manufacture. No other foreign material was noted inside the
device. It was, therefore, concluded that the particles were Intro-
duced during final sealing of the device, and shorted during vibra-
tion.
As part of the support to ATM equipment, static and dynamic
analysis efforts were applied to a variety of problem types as they
were identified. A first example of this support occurred during
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fabrication and testing of the first several ATMDCs and WCIUs, when
failures were traced to particles in certain types of flatpacks.
Support of this program consisted of furnishing vibration
levels that pages and questionable flatpacks would experience, so
that the ensulng vibration test program could evaluate the effective-
ness of a vibration screen in detecting flatpacks with such particles.
Analytical activity also examined forces associated with static elec-
tricity and other attractive forces which the vibration level would
have to overcome to free the particles.
As assessment of the overall vibration capability of the
ATHDCs and WCIUs was undertaken for potential application of higher
vibration levels as a better screen device. The final conclusion,
however, was that no effective screen existed for detecting flat-
packs with particles, such that all suspect type flatpacks in the
flight hardware were replaced with those of a type without a particle
problem. This problem did not reoccur.
The conclusions of the analysis were:
Failures were caused by 0.0008" to 0.0013" gold/tin
(Au Sn) eutectic particles shorting the Vdc-to-ground
and metallizations on the surface of the IC chip.
Source of particles was the Au Sn Pre-form used in
the final package sealing process.
Problem was process oriented; no correlation with
the date of manufacture was found.
No known screens were effective in identifying sus-
pected devices in completed hardware.
Established conclusively that the trlboelectric
charge immobilizes the particles, rendering vibration
ineffective as a screen.
The measured incident rate of Au Sn particles in Its
was 8.8 percent.
At the time these ICs were procured in 1969 - 1970, th_
process for applying a glass passivation on the chip was not quali-
fied. In February, 1971, the process for passivating ICs was quail-
fled by MSFC. Therefore, to avoid the failure risk associated with
the fold particles in existing unpassivated Sylvania ICs, they were
replaced with passivated ICs in flight and prototype Skylab Digital
Computer Subsyc'_ hardware.
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b. VamlstoT Resistor Drift Problem. The Vamistor Resistor
Drift Assessment was initiated by an Alert, (FS-A-72-01 and GSF_-72-
I0), from RCA Central Engineering in September 1972. RCA had ex-
perienced a failure in an ERTS Recorder after only 200 hours of opera-
tion. This fault was isolated to an RNR55C Resistor. The resistor
had increased 5_/. in value during the 200 hours of Recorder operation.
RCA had taken corrective action with the vendor and had
identified all products manufactured prior to 7226 as suspect and a
low voltage screen was recommended. Subsequent testing by MSFC found
the problem in date codes later than 7226. Also, the majority of the
Skylab hardware was already built and resistors from this vendor's
product had been used extensively.
The assessment objectives were to:
Validate, understand true failure mechanism causing
problem.
Identify manufacturing proeess(es) which caused drift
noted resistor value.
Identify environmental, application parameters which
induce, aggravate problem.
Establish true failure rate of resistors built in
this configuration.
Determine impact of problem on Skylab mission.
Four Main Thrust areas were identified _t concentrated
effort to meet the assessment obJectiv.. These were as follows:
Survey vendor's facility and review processes to pin-
point cause of drift discrepancies.
Perform metallurgical laboratory analysis to identify
factors during resistor manufacture and post manu-
facture utilization and ha_Idling that might have
aggravated the mechanism of failure.
Determine where Vamistors were installed in flight
designated Digital Computer Subsystem components
and possible effect on mission. Perform Engineerin8
analysis of circuitry to determine location of
Vamlstors used and power dissipation and expected
mission operating temperature for each. Identify
allowable percent drift for each application for
circuit failure. Determine effect of failure on
subsystem.
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Remove Vam£stors from non-flight hardware which ac-
cumulated considerable operating _Ime to determine
effects cf system operation on Vamistors, Further
rest removed Vamlstors to observe performance. Use
those that drift in the laboratory analysis to con-
firm failure mechanism.
Initiace test program to expose repres_ntatlve
sample of resistors to varyln8 degrees of temperature
and voltage to define conditions which activate fail-
ure mechanism. Establlsh true failure rate of Varistors
undel varying environmental and rated voltage conditions.
The conclusions reached as the result of the study were
that plating solution residues and moisture existed inside the resistor,
which supported electrolytic action that depleted the resistive film.
In turn, this phenomenon accounted for opens and inrrease in resist-
ance from their nominal values.
The lack of adequate manufacturin8 process control re-
suited in contaminant residues and molsture being left inside the
resistors. These contaminants supported an electrolytic degradation
under certain temperature/voltage conditions. It was also noted
during hermetlclty tests that the hermetically sealed resistors did
not meet the requirements of MIL-R-55182 (C&E designations).
Operating temperature and applied voltage were the only
conditions which aggravated the failure mechanism. This was deter-
mined by a test program utilizing 4300 parts.
The varied applications of the Vamistor resistors in Sky-
lab hardware necessitated test simulation over a wide ran8e of tem-
perature and applied volta8e. Tests were set up in a temperature/
voltage matrix elth temperature rangln8 from -20 degrees C to +125
degrees C and an applied voltage ranging from 0.07. to 1107. of the
rated voltage of the resistor. The matrix included the quantity of
resistors tested in each of the temperature/voltage cells. Special
test cases vere included under matrix test cell no. 71 which was
operated st 25 degrees C and rated voltages of 125Z, 150Z, 175Z, and
200Z. Also in matrix test cell t,o. 77 a test was conducted at 40
degrees C and applied voltage of 20-30Z of rated voltage.
Reliability analysis of data from test programs established
failure rates for the drift and for open circuit faults. The cause
of driftlnS to a higher value and eventually to an open circuit was
found to be the same (i.e., electrolytic degradation).
350
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7allure rates were well within rredlcted values utilized
in the Inlttal Skylab reliability predictions, and the Digital Com-
puter Subsystem was judged to be flight worthy as configured (WCIU-7,
ATMDC-9, ATMDC-10 and MLU-2). One thousaud (!000) hours of prelaunch :_
operation was an effective screen for resistors which will exhibit
gross drift.
7. System Operatlon. This section describes those mission
events which affected or were affected by the operation of the com-
puter subsystem hardware. This hardware includes the two A_MDCs,
WCIU, MLU and tape recorder.
a. Thermal Characteristics. The te=nperatures experience#
by the ATMDCand WCI3 during the mission were, on the average, relatlve-
ly mild. Figure 100 shows the average temperatures for the on-llne
ATMDC and WCIU for the entire mission. The temperature of the powered-
off ATMDCw_s not telemetered.
The first temperatures read for the ATMDC and WCIU were
25.9 degrees C and 18.3 degrees C, respectively. Dorlns the flr_t
twelve days of the mission, the vehicle was maneuvered to various
thermal attitudes most of which placed the sunline on the opposiCe
side of the AT)/ from the ATHI_ and WCIU. These c_ponents were
therefore shaded and faced deep space, resulting in the lowest tem-
peratures expericned by the tvc components during the entire mission.
On DAY 5, the ATHDC reached a minimum of 21.7 degrees C and the _CIU
reached -16.7 degrees C.
Following return to Solas Inertial attitude, the two com-
ponent temperatures increased to more nominal levels. On DAY 27, a
switchover to the secondary system was performed. The secondary sy-
stem temperatures tended to be about one to two degrees higher than
the primary system. After this time, the average day _o day tempera-
ture was Influenced, primarily, by the percent of sunlight experle_ced
during each orbit. Each time the percentage of sunlight approached
and/or exceeded the 65% value, the component temperature _uld in-
cre_sa. Figure I00 shows this temperature cycling during the entire
mission.
The orblt-by-orblt fluccuatlon averaged about 1.5 degrees
C iJr the ATMIX:and about 2 degrees C for the WCIU during the low
sun angle periods (low percent sunlight orbits). 1_e orblt-by-orblt
fluct_ation tended to cease during periods when the percentage of
sunlight was above 75 percent.
Prior to the loss of CHG No. I, the Z-Local Vertical (Z-J_)
maneuvers', at tines, caused the temperature fluctuations _o increase
in msnltude. This increase depended on the position in the orbit
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where the maneuver occurred. For example, Z-LV maneuvers at times
caused ATMDC fluctuations of up to b degrees C and WCIU fluctuations
of up t_ 5.5 degrees C. This higher ATMDC temperature fluctuation
resulted from the location of the computer on the side panel nearer
_he sun line. The WCIU was located in a position such that the Z-LV
maneuvers did not result in direct sunlight impingement.
Following the CMG No. I failure on DAY J94, many of the
Z-LV maneuvers terminated in an attitude which could be held until
a point in orbit wa_ reached that would allow a minimum maneuver to
the Solar inertial attitude. This placed the computer in the sun
for long periods of time. During the time from DAY 242 through DAY
248, the percent of sunlight increased from 75 to i00 percent. The
two maneuvers during this tilae that cat sed significan_ temperature
changes for the A_IDC are as shown in Table 43.
T_ble _,3. ATMDC TempLrature
1 12 ] 4 39.6°C 53.0°C 13.4°C
I ]_ i 5 41.7°C 58.9°C J 17. C°C
I
I
These two maneuvers resulted in the computer temperatures
exceeding 50 degrees C for the first t_ne during the mission. The
WCIU was essentially unaffected by these maneuvers because of its
physical location on the ATM. No Z-LV maneuvers were performed
during the DAY 247 to DAY 250 time frame to reduce the heating effect
of such maneuvers whici_ placed the unshielded portion of the work_=hop
in direct sunlight for two or three P,-,_rs. A E-LV on DAY 251 caused
the computer to peak at 53 deg_ ,es P which was the last temperature
experience above 49 d,:gree,,_C. As ,he sun angle decreased, the Z-LV
maneuw-,r lemperature effects decreased in a similar fashion.
During the time from DAY 221 to DAY 244, special maneuvers
(utl!iz,-d to point cameras at, the Comet Kohoutek) began to cause
spikes i_ the A'I_IDCtemperature. During the time from DAY 224 to
DAY 227, these spikes avera_;ed about 7 d_grees C. The comet was then
occulted by the sun unti,_ DAY 235 when the observations were begun
again and continued on a mor': frequent basis. Th_s caused temperature
spikes of from 4 degrees to 10 degrees in the ATMDC temperature. The
WCIU temperatures were aff cted by three of these maneuvers causing
t ._perlture spikes of _ legrees C and 7 degrees C and one of 14.5
degree', C. This was the maximum rate of temperqture change experieneeo
by th_ 'TCTU during the mission.
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Following the end of the last h_gh sun angle period, the
temperatures had decreased to the nominal values of about 33 degrees
C for the ATMDC and 5.5 degrees C for thu WCIU.
On DAY 222, an MLU test was conducted using the primary
computer. Prior to switchover, the secondary ATMDC was at 33.1 degrees
C and the WCIU was at 5.5 degrees C. The primary computer temperature
was -15.4 degrees C at turn-on.
The MLU tape recorder load occurred at an ATMDC tempera-
ture of -12.7 degrees C, and the MLU RF uplink load occurred at an
ATMDC temperature of +12.06 degrees C. When the APCS system was
powered off, the primary ATMDC was 14.8 degrees C and the WCIU was
6.! degrees C.
b. Commanded Switchovers/Computer Operational Times. As
a result of the early mission problems and the thermal extremes ex-
perienced by the vehicle, it was decided to perform a manual switch-
over to the secondary computer system on DAY 27. This was a test to
verify that the redundant capability of the computer subsystem was
functional. At 16:38 on DAY 27, the crew selected the secondary com-
puter and enabled auto switchover using the C&D Panel computer select
switch. The secondary computer system powered on, initialized, and
began operating properly. During the next two days, the program was
updated to the FF70 level (same as the primary) by uplinking three
program patches necessary to compensate for the continuing Rate Gyro
anomalies and vehicle inertia changes due to loss of SAS wing 2 and
meteoroid shield.
The primary computer had operated since AFCS power-up on
DAY I, 19:07 (inflight elapsed time of approximately 622.5 hours).
The secondary computer then operated until DAY 272 14:29
when a switchover to the primary computer was commanded from the
ground in support of the MLU load tests. The secondary gomputer
system thus operated continuously for 5902 hours.
The switchover on DAY 272 was commanded from the ground
by DCS. The switchover was nominal with proper telemetry and no
self test errors. The primary computer then remained operational
until the APCS power buses were powered down on DAY 272, 16:18:22.
The total time on the flight computer and WCIU common
TMR section is shown in Table 44.
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Table 44. Computer Subsystem Hours
Hours at Inflight Total Accum.
Launch Hours Hours
Primary ATMDC 1620 626 2246
Secondary ATMDC 1147 5902 7049
WCIU Common 2335 6527 8862
=. Memory Load Unit Engineering Test. No computer fail-
ures occurred during the mission; therefore, the memory load unit
(MLU) was never used during the primary mission. It was decided to
perform a test at the end of the mission to determine how well the
MLU, tape recorder, and tape had withstood remaining idle in space
for nine months and to demonstrate the RF uplink capability.
(1) MLU Tape Recorder Load. The flight programs FF 50
#.6K) and F820 (SK) were recorded on the MLU Tape recorder at IBM
Huntsville on February 14, 1973. The tape recorder was recorded and
verified using the IBM System/360-44 computer system to generate the
program data and sequence numbers.
The procedures for the MLU test called for a switch-
over to the primary computer and a load of the 16K program ID4, se-
quence 000C from the onboard recorder over Goldstone on DAY 272 at
approximntely 14:30:00. The actual sequence of events is summarized
in Table 45. The primary computer powered up and ":_itialized pro-
perly with no self test errors. The MLU and tape recorder were then
powered up. Sinc_ nc telemetry was available to indicate whether
the MLU was "ON" or "OFF", the next command issued to the MLU was
the"Stop". Issuance of this command caused the computer telemetry
to stop being updated, thus verifying the MLU was on and operating
properly.
The next co_,_alld issued to the MLU was the command to
load ID no. 4. It was predicted that the tape search time would be
approximately 24 seconds after which time the mission timer A would
stop updating. The timer stopped 25 seconds after the ID no. 4 exe-
cute command was issued, indicating a memory load was taking place.
A 16K load nominally required 10.983 seconds to complete. Upon com-
pletion of the load, the timer restarted and the computer telemetry
output resumed upon completion of the initialization. The time re-
quired for the actual load was II seconds. Within 3 seconds of _he
timer restart, the telemetry table appeared nominal and indicated no
self test errors had occurred. Furthermore, memory location 0330
read 000C indicating the desired program had been loaded from the
tape.
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Table 45. MLL Tape Recorder Load Sequence Of Events
'rlHE STA. c O_IMAND/OPERATION
14 :29 :29 GT)S Primary ATM])C Power on
14:29:32 GDS Primary Te]emetry Valid - No Self Test Errors
14:30:03 GDS MLU and TR Power On
14:31:51 GI)S Execute '_LU Stop
14:31:52 GDS Computer Telemetry qtops Updating
L
14:32:34 GDS Execute Load Tape II) No. 4
- GDS Tape Being Searched For ID No. 4 (Nora. = 24 Sec.)
14:32:59 GDS Mission Timer A Stops Updating
- GDS Computer Memory Bein_ Loaded (Nora. = ii Sec.)
14:33:10 GDS Mission Timer A Starts Updating
i
14:33:11 GDS Computer Telemetry Starts - No Self Test Errors -
Location 0330 - 0OOC
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1(2) MLU 72 kbps RF Load. T1_e RF uplink load via Lhe
MLU originated from a ground _ ation tape recorder. The tape used
was generated and verified _ iBM Huntsville using the IBM 1800 com-
puter system and a Bell and Howell VR3700t instrumeutation recorder.
There were two tapes generated for each ground station in the STDN
network, plus several spares. Thirty tapes were delivered to GSFC
for network distribution on February 17, 1973.
The post-mission test of this capability utilized two
passes over Hawaii on DAY 272 to complete the process. The same
ground transmitter was used to send DCS con_nands to uhe vehicle and
transmit the 72 kbps uplink. Normally, two different transmitter
deviations are used for these two operations. The Houston Networks
group did not feel the ground station _ould be able to switch from
DCS to 72 kbps upli_king during one pass. It was decided to send
the DCS commands to select the command receiver No. 2 mode (ID 5)
over Hawaii during the 16:08 pass and perform the actual RF uplink
over Hawaii during the next pass (17:40:00).
Table 46 shows the sequence of events associated with
this test. The command execute ID 5 was issued over Hawaii at 16:08:47.
The computer continued cycling until Hawaii LOS. No stop command
occurred prior to LOS since the RF uplink carrier remained enabled
until LOS, thus quieting the command receiver output. It was pre -
dieted that once the uplink carrier was removed (LOS period for ex-
ample) that the command receiver white noise output would be suf-
ficient to run the MLU internal clock and result in a computer stop
being issued. This was verified at the Vanguard pass at 15:00:00 when
AOS showed the computer had stopped cycling. The mission timer, how-
ever, was still ru_,.ing and had not lost any time indicating that no
extraneous sync messages had been detected.
Following Hawaii AOS and at approximately 17:00:54,
tha ground tape was started. It had been positioned about 40 seconds
before the start of the first program on track 4. At 17:41:55, mission
timer A stopped, indicating a load was taking place. Elever seconds
later (indicating a 16K load) at 17:41:06, the timer re-started and
within two seconds telemetry _ables were being updated. Telemetry
location 0330 indicated tape sequence number FF01 had been loaded.
The telemetry was valid and no self test errors were experienced.
This marked the first time an inflight computer had
been loaded using an RF uplink.
The MLU remained powered until the APCS buses were
powered off at 11:16:22.
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d. S082B/ATMDC Interface Discrepancy. During the analysis
of the SCB2B experiment data taken during the SL-2 mission, some diffi-
culty was experienced in reducing the pitch an@ yaw data.
The S082B contains a Light Emitting Diode (LED) array that
was exposed to the film each time an exposure was made. The LED array
was driven from the mission timer and the experiment output register.
The experiment output register (EOR) was a 42-bit output register
containing 15 roll refererce bits, 12 FSS pitch angle bits, 12 FSS
yaw angle bits, and 3 special purpose bits. The problem experienced
concerned the pitch, yaw, and special purpose bit outputs; the mission
timer and roll reference outputs were correct. The validity (special
purpose bit) bit is assumed correct but is not used by the S082B ex-
per iment.
The problem was appar_Lltly iutroduced into system between
revisions D and E (dated 12/15/70) of the ATMDC/WCIU Contract End
Item (CEI) Specification. A change was directed to be made to re-
vision D that reversed the specified function of each output pin for
the 41 bits (excluding the validity bit, which was a hardware function).
This was an attempt to make the hardware compatible with the manner
in which the software loads the experiment registers from the accumu-
lator.
In the ATMI_ hardware, the roll, pitch, yaw, and two
_pecial purpose bits were loaded into three separate registers under
command of three separate IOCs. The reversal of the functions of
the roll and pitch was properly accomplished, however, the yaw was
complicated by the presence of the bias and data good bits (two re-
maining special purpose bits loaded with the yaw bits). The entire
contents of the third register were directed to be reversed, whereas
only the yaw data bits should have been reversed. _
In addition to the above, a discrepancy existed between
the identification of the pitch and yaw outputs in the CEI and the
PDD. Regis'er number 3 was called yaw and number 2 was cal_ed pitch
in the CEI Specification. Th, PDD and, hence, the program referred
to register number 3 as pitch and number 2 as yaw.
Table 47 shows the ,ecified (CEI) output and the actual
output as tb_ experimenter wa_ £ecelving.
Since all the data in these registers was displayed via
the experiment LEDs (except the unused validity bit), the information
presented in Table 47 enabled the experimenter to update his data
_eductlon programs to unscramble the bits and obtain the proper in-
formation.
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8. Conclusion. The ATMDC/WCIU and the MLU performed their
designed function during the Skylab mission.
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Table 47. Specified (CEI) Output And Actual Output To Experiment
CEI Specification Actual Data to Experiment
WCTU S082B
J18 Pin:! Title Title J4 Pin:
S FSS Pitch AnRle Bit 1 (LSB) FSS Yaw Angle Bit i (LSB) AA
T 2 2 z
U 3 3 v
V 4 4 g
W 5 5 i
X 6 6 j
y 7 7 L
Z 8 8
a 9 9 J
b i0 i0 H
c Ii (MSB) II (MSB) G
d 12 (Sign) 12 (Sign) KK
e FSS Yaw Angle Bit I (LSB) Data Good DD
f 2 NRL Bias CC
g 3 FSS Pitch Angle Bit i (LSB) BB
h 4 2 k
i 5 3 n
j 6 4 p
k 7 5 S
m 8 6 R
n 9 7 p
p lO 8 N
q ii (MSB) 9 M
r 12 (Sign) i0 LL
s NRL Bias ii (MSB) PP
t Data Good FSS 12 (Sign) MM
u Validity Validity (not used) NN
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SECTION VIII. EXPERIMENT POINTING CONTROL SYSTEM
A. Pointing Control Subsystem
I. Design. The general requirements for Experiment Pointing
accuracy and stability (see Table 48) could not be met by the CMG/TACS
system in an environment of crew motion and vehicle disturbances.
Consequently, the EFCS was designed to isolate the ATM experiments
from the vehicle in two axes, as well as perform other experiment
support functions.
Dynamic control was provided for the experiment canister
UP/DN and L/R axes. The control loops were identical for both axes.
The subsystem was active only during the Experiment Pointing Mode-Day.
A block diagram of a slngle axis is shown in Figure 101. The FSS
provided experiment package position information and the Spar-
mounted Rate Gyros provided rate information. The position and rate
signals were summed after passing through Bending Mode Filters (I_{F)
and then amplified by current amplifiers to drive two DC torquers.
Each current amplifier output was limited to 3.75 amps to provide a
maximum of 9.5 N.m torque. The two amplifiers and torquers operated
in parallel for redundancy and power reduction purposes. They
provided a total torque output of 19 N.m. In the event of a single
amplifier or torquer failure, the loop could operate with the other
amplifier or single torquer, without significant performance degrada-
tion. •
Table 48. Experiment Pointing Control Design Requirements
Pointing Accuracy _ 2.5 arc-sec
Stability + 2.5 arc-sec - 15 minutes
Jitter I arc-sec/sec
The EPC Bending Mode Filters were designed to maintaln the
rigid body phase and gain margins and control system bandwldth while
attenuating the dominant flexible body modes. The flexible body
modes associated with the EPCS were generally higher than those
associated with the CHG system. The BMFs were designed for the
range from 3 - 15 Hz. The BMFs consisted of a 5 Hz first order
position filter and an 8 Hz second order rate filter with a 0.5
dallping ratio.
2. p_sisn Verification. Numerous studies, ar_lyses and
simulations of the EPC system were conducted in order to verify the
design and functioning of the system.
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These studies indicated the system had sufficient phase and
gain margins to meet all requirements. Some significant inter-
action was found between the EPCS and TACS Juring thruster firings,
but this was not considered serious since TACS would not be
utilized during nonce1EP S operation.
Design verification o! the hardware system was conducted
:3 the Hardware Simulation Laboratory. Interfaces, phastngs and
gains were found to be -orrecc and the functional opera¢ion of the
EPC system was verified. Hc_ever, the pointing accuracy requirements
were not demonstrated.
The HSL was equlpped to measure motion of the EPC (?namic
simul_tor to an accuracy of + 1 arc-see, the certified accuracy of
a laser autocolltmator used for position measurements, The auto-
collimator was believed to be accurat_ to + 0.1 arc-set, but this
was virtually impossible to verify. Measured accuracy of Lhe EPC
system in the HSL was + 20 arc-sec, and pointing stability was
found to be + 7 arc-see for 15 minutes.
The two prime causes of the degraded accuracy _ere noise
and collimation errors introduced by the fine sun soerce. The
noise was observzd as c 20 Hz signal on the FSS output. The
signal was the beat frequency between the 80 Hz chopper in the FSS
and a 60 8: flicker from the sun source Xenon arc. The level of the
signal was + 2.8 volts RgS or + 17.5 arc-set g_S. Introduced into
the EPC cloged loop, it was se_n as Jitter of  7are-sec.
Offset pointing errors arose from poor collinmtion of the
sun source light beam. Performance data for operation of the sun
simulator gave the collimation half angle _s 30 arcomtn. _pr_ could
be no means to differentiate between errors inherent in the EPCS
and errors introduced by poor collimation.
Several studies were made of this sltuatlon. The studies
increased confidence that the system would operate as designed, but
no means of demonstrating the desired operation of a flight-type
EPCS with the available facilities could be found.
The design requirements co=ld have been verified by
instailat_,r of a double mirror hellos_ar system. Use of a
heltostat system w_,ld have perc_itted more accurate measurement of
the s_stem perforntan_e, but operation of the simulation would have
bean severely limited by weather. Installation of a hf_iostat was
determined noc to be feasible for the Skylab effort, but reccmuen_-
_tlons were made to consider such a device for future projects.
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!3. Subsystems Verification. The EPCS flight hardware was
checked out during Po_t Manufacturing Checkout, Therman-Vacuum and
Pre-launch Tests. No significant problems were encountered with the
control system, although several hardware component changes and
minor modifications were made.
&. Mission Operations. The EPCS performed as requlred
during fllght. Final evaluation of the level o_ pointing accuracy
and stability achieved will be drawn from analysis of experiment
photography. The crews reported that stability and control was
excellent and, apparently, well within specifications.
Dynamic coupling between the vehicle ACS and the _PCS was
a major source of transient disturbances to the AC3. An EPCS spar
roll caused X and Z-axes Rate Gyro peak amplitudes uf approxlmately
0.02 degrees per second at the start of the rust and 0.06 degrees p_r
second when the roll command is term.Snared. Two predominant bendlng
modes were excited with frequencies of approximately 0.81Hz an the
X and Z-axes and l.&8 Hz on the Y-axis.
On Day 64, during the second unmanned phase, the primary
UP/DN Rate Gyro Processor became very noisy and eventually failed
to zero output. The cause of the RGP failure was loosening of a
fiber washer on a power swltchtng translstor mounting. Thls allowed
the transistor to saturate and eventually cause the RGP to overheat
and fail. bee Section VII. A., for details of the RGP failure mode.
In the abset_ce of sensor information for rate damping, the
EPCS became unstable. Lacge amplitude oscillations were set up on
the UP/DN ax_s which kept the actuator currents very high. The
actuators eventually overheated and seized.
Because the vehicle was in a period of minimal coverage by
tracking stations at the time of the RGP Failure, an entire ..rbltal
day phase passed before the problem was fully evident. Solar
Inertial mode was selected by ground command at 03:20, caging the
canister and a11owing the actuators to cool down. The secondary
UY/DN Rate Gyro Processor was powered up and an Experiment Pointing
mode was selected again at 17:26. No problems were encountered.
As a result of the E_: RPG failure and the RGP failures
which had occurred in the ACS, the Derived Rate Conditioner Assembly
(DRC) was designed, buiTt and carried to orbit aboard St-3. The
DRC was designed to modify the FSS output to provide the Etr_A with rate
information. If two RGP fail.res had occurred on a 81nsle EPC axis
the DRC would have been installed by EVA, allowing ATM experiments
to ccntlnue. However, no further EFt Rate Gyro Failures occurred,
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and the DRC was never used. See Settler IX.F., for a complete
description of the DRC.
Also, as a resul_- of the EPC RGP failure, the criteria for
operation of the actuators was reviewed. A rule was ests_?ished
to limit continuous, unattended (either by crew or ground controllers)
EPCS tperatlon to fifty minutes. Studies indicated that the
actuators could draw saturat_.d current commands for fifty minutes
wlthout damage. Mission rules were changed to provide that ExIeriment
Pointing mode be exited whenever the steady state actuate; currents
exceeded + I amp.
o
Anomalies and failures experienced in the H)C system produced
only temporary degradation to the control loops. EPCS components Rre
discussed further in their respective sections.
5. Conc'..uslonsand Recommendations. The stability and
pointing control loops nf the Experiment Pointing Control System
operated as designed. Increased telemetry capability for measu_e-
merits of system operation would have been helpful _n assessment of
inflight stability.
B. Offset Pointing Cor.tro[.
1. _e_/l_n. Tile capability _as requir-d to pnin _- the A'_
Exp_rlment Package at _argets offset from the heliocenter. This
was accomplished by means of the FS.q optical wedge mechanle_ (see
Section VI[I.C.I.) R,,tatzon of the w(dgee produced a devlatlor
of the incident light as seen at the FSS detection cell. 'this
deviation produced a P:;S error signal which the con_r_t loop would
null by repositioning (offset pointing) the Experimenr Canis:er.
The capability was required to offset + arc-rain, on both the UP/DR
and L/R axes. Radlu_ of the solar disk is approximately 16 arc-min.
Another requirement was to position the Star Trarke'-
Te1,-.scopeto any point within its field of view.
_oth of these tasks were processed by the EPEA positioning
control ;oOp. Co--rid signals _:ere processed and routed to either
the FSS Control Electronics Assembly (CE_ or to the Star Tracker
Electronics Assembly eSTEr, depending on the ope_atio,ml mode.
Polntln_ comLand| vere issued either hy the Mat,ual Polntirq_
Controll-.r (MPC), located on the Control and l)isptay Panel, or from
the ATHI_. The EPEA ga_ priority to inputs fro_ the MPC. which
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was selected by the MPC Enable Switch on the C&D Panel. If the Star
Tracker Manual Mode was selected, the EPEA routed the MPC UP/DN output =
! to the inner gimbal circuitry of the Star Tracker, and L/R MPC output :
to the outer gimbal circuitry. Positioning of the Tracker gimbals i
by _he ATMDC was not a mission requirement.
If the MPC was not enabled, the FSS wedges could be driven _
via DAS/DCS through the ATHDC. Using this mode, the desired wedge
positions were stored in the ATHDC and analog commands were computed
and issued until the actual wedge positions, as indicated to the
ATMDC by serial binary data from the FSS Signal Conditioner, were
i driven to within + 20 arc-sec of the desired values. The ATHDC also
utilized the MPC substltute function to provide roll about line-of-
sight, described in Section Vlil.D.
The _SS received wedge position hold/release commands from
the _t_DC. These connnandswere issued each time the EPEA was enabled
or inhibited.i
2. Design Verification. Design analyses of the EPC offset
pointing functions were conducted in conjunction with the control
i l_op studies. No significant problems were found.
Design verification, conducted in the Hardware Simulation
i Laboratory determined that the system design was operational and
functlonally correct. Measurement of the offset pointing accuracy
was limited by the system noise due to the facility sun source.
3. Subsystem Verification. The offset pointing subsystem
performed satlsfactorily during all systems level tests. No
significant system problems were found.
i
i 4. Mission Operation. Manual pointing of the Star Tracker
worked as designed, prior to the Tracker failure on DAY 228 (see
Section VII.B.). The operatlonal procedure developed for the Star
Tracker during SL-3 required manual pointing of the Tracker each
time a roll attitude update was desired. Thus, the Star Tracker
manual pointing feature was utilized far more than originally
anticipated.
The canister offset pointing function was utilized through-
out the mission and its overall performance was as designed. Certain
problems and difficulties were encountered, however.
Frequently, the FSS wedge count changed due to releasing
the wedges before the _SS door was fully open. The FSS Wedge
_ncoder would interpret the change from dark to light as a change
in the encoder wheel position. The counter would then change,
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usually by a single count. If the wedges were not zeroed during the ,_
orbital day, the discrepancy between the actual wedge position and
the position count would remain, and could be increased at the next
orbltal sunrise. Under most circumstances, the error could go
unnoticed. During ATHDC controlled pointing, however, driving the
wedges through the zero position could result in erratic behavior
by the spar,
As an example, if the wedge position on an axis was at some
positive location while the wedge readout indicated some smaller
r_ positive value, incorrect wedge drive commands would be issued if
the ATMDC were to drive the wedge through zero. As the wedge read-
ing decreased, It would overflow at the zero count. In the absence
of an encoder zero pulse, the counter would reset to the maximum
positive value. The AT}_C would then issue a full sca1,_ (5 Vdc, or
200 arc-sec per sec) wedge tare command. When the zero'pulse was :
i_ encountered the readout reset to zero. At this point, an overshoot
:_ may have occurred, and the ATMDC would issue a large command of
the opposite polarlty.
The effect of the error was partlcularly evident if the
situation described above occurred during llne-of-slght (LOS) roU
(see Section IX.D.). This problem was the cause of several LOS
roll anomalies.
Two different sets of circumstances led to releasing the
wedges prior to the FSS door being fully open. In the first, when
the Ex_erlment Polntlngmode was selected during the orbital day =
the FSS wedges were released and the door commanded open simulataneously
(the doer required 11-15 seconds to open). In the other case, during
normal experiment pointing mode operation, the FSS wedges would be
: released at the beginning of orbital day, as computed by the ATNDC.
The aperture door could be released as much as 40 seconds earlier
(see Section VIII. E.) if the Acq. SS had detected sun presence.
However, navigation and timing errors often resulted in sun presence
being acquired within 2-3 seconds of computed day phase.
A related problem was that the wedges could be driven a
full 360 degrees, but no positive indication of wedge position was
provided on the back side of the wedges. On several occasions, the
astronaut inadvertantly drove to the back sides of the wedges. The
wedge counter does not track the wedges over the entire range and
meaningless readouts could be encountered. In addition, operation
on the back side of the wedges resulted in spar motions opposite
in direction from the commands. On DAY 19, this problem arose and
the astronauts did not recognize the cause. After consultation with
ground support, the situation was corrected by re-zeroing the •
wedges.
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5. Conclusions and Recorm_endatlons. Overall performance of
the system was adequate and satisfactory. Based on problems encount-
! ered, certain recon_aendations for improvements can be made.
_- A means was needed to provide accurate and continuous correla-
tion betweer the wedge poslrlon and the wedge pcsltlon readout. The
: problem des_rlbed above could have been avoided by any of several
approaches. A crew procedure to re-zero the wedges each time
Experiment Pointing Mode-Day was entered would have been a minimum
: safeguard. Due to the time required for this procedure, an auto-
i* marie re-zero feature would have been desirable. Another approach
would have been interlock logic which would not release the wedges
until the FSS Aperture Door was completely open.
Modification of the FSS design could allow an Internal light
i source to be used for operation of the Nedge Position Encoder. Also,
a direct position encoder device for the full 360 degrees of wedge
rotation would have eliminated the problem associated wlth operation
on the backside cf the wedges.
The astronauts have stated that an HPC Gain Switch would
! have been helpful to allow changes in canister position by small
increments on the order of I arc-sac. The minimum rate command
from the MPC was 4 arc-sec per second (from the ATHDC, the minimum
: command was 16 arc-sec per second).
_r C. Roll Positioning
1. Des__. In addition to the dynamic control and offset
: pointing capability provlded for the experiment package UP/DN and .
L/R axes, the Roll Position Hechanlsm (RPH), described in Section
IX.D., was designed to rotate the spar about the EPC Z-axls over a
range of + 120 degrees. The mechanism was commanded by the astro-
naut via Rate Switches of the Hanual Pointing Control Panel located
on the Control and Display Console. Spar roll rates of + 7, + 3.5,,
0.7 and + 0.35 degrees per second could be commanded. "Once'the
spar was posltloned the RFF;would hold the location until a
repositioning command was received. The astronaut repositlonad the
spar in accordance with experiment demand requirements. The astro-
naut could also utillze the ATH EVA Rotation Control Panel (during
extravehicular activity) to command rate of + 7/3.5 or + 0.7/0.35
degrees per second to reposltion the spar. _he rates wire dependent
on the setting of the Manual Pointing Roll Gain Switch on the A_
* C&D Console. The spar roll position is dlsplayed on the Control !
and Display Consolp, 'rhp rn11 positioning control loop is shown
in Figure 102.
1
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I: 2. Design Verification. The roll loop design was verified
in the Hardware Simulation L_boratory. The HSL test fixture limited
roll movement to + 22.5 degrees. During Verification Testing, it
was found that the r_gh rate roll generated enough back emf from the
roll motor to damage the EPEA electronics. The EPEA Torque A_pli- --_
fiefs were modified with zener diodes to protect the circuits.
3. Subsystem Verification. The roll positioning functions
were checked during systems level tests and performed satisfactorily,
No significant problems were found.
4. Mission Operations. The roll positioning function was
used extensively during the mission. Host canister roll maneuvers
were perfo,-med as line-of-slght (LOS) roll maneuvers (see Section
VIII.D.), and most problems encountered were associated with the
LOS roll system. The roll control loop fuvctloned as designed
throughout the mission. Hmtever, during SL-2 it was fomd that the
7 degrees per second roll rate could induce large Rate Cyro
oscillations, and the crews were requested not to use that rate.
5. Conclusions and Reconuuendatlons. The roll positioning
function operated as designed. It was found that the highest roll
rate, 7 degrees per second, produced undesirable transients.
The discrete rate command switches made accurate roU
positioning an Involved process, often requiring many _ate and
direction changes. A contlnously variable rate command source
would have been desirable. _is could have been accomplished by _
an option to select one channel of the HPC for roll rate commands.
D. Line-of-Sight (LOS) Roll.
I. _. Since the roll ring is the outermost of the EPC
gimbals, roll operations would cause the EPC llne-of-sight to
transcribe a cone about the sun center. Due to the time required
to reposlti_n the spar to the original llne-of-slght for experiment
set up, a relatively late input was an astronaut request for LOS
roll capability. This was implemented by programming the ATHI)C to
drive the FSS wedges during roll operatlous to maintain the orll-
Inal line-of-sight.
At any time when experiment pointin_ was active and the Star
Trackar was not in the Hanual Hode, all canister roll operations
were automatically performsd about the Experlment Package line-of-
sight. If the EPEA was not enabled or if the _tar Tracker was in
Hanusl Hode, LOS pointing would not be processed.
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The desired wedge positions were computed as the orlglnal
positions resolved through the change in the canister roll position,
whenever the change in roll position exceeded 0.174 degrees over the
period of one computer slc_ loop. Wedge rate commands were generated
from the desired wedge positions. The rate commands were limited
to sllghtly less than 200 arc-set per second. The computer would
generate wedge rate commands untll the difference between the desired
and actual wedge position was less then or equal to 0.5 arc-set or
untll three slow loops (approximately three seconds) after the last
: new set of desired wedge positions were computed.
2. Design Verification. The LOS roll function was studied
for implementation and recommendations for a one Hz computation
cycle, digital filter design and a three second LOS mode cutoff
delay were made.
During design verification testing conducted in the HSL
and during tests at MSC it was observed that the EPC did not
exhibit stable fixed pointing. The problem was found to be that
noise in th_ roli resolver feedback to the ATMDCwas activating the
LOS roll. The Pre-Fllght and Phase II ATMI)CProgrmas would activate
LOS roll whenever the difference between the current and past roll
positions was non-zero. The F_nal Flight Program incorporated the
requirement for a roll position change of + 0.175 degrees.m
3. Subsystem Verification. LOS Roll operations were tested
in systems level tests and performed satlsfactorily. No significant
: problems were found.
4. Nisslon Operations. The LOS roll function was exercised
extensively during the Skylab manned operations. Overall, the
function performed as designed. Pointing stability was degraded
during roll, but this was to be expected.
Anomalous spar behavior occurred several times during LOS
roll. Three separate causes were identified.
On DAY 28, the canister polnclng Jumped about one-half solar
radlu8 during LOS roll. Attempts were mode to duplicate the problem
in the HSL, but without success. Later analyses showed that the
situation was not anomalous, but was transient and canlmter pointing
would recover.
On DAY 90, similar spar behavior was observed. In thl8 case,
however, the cause was determined to be a disparity between the I_$
wedge position and the wedge position readout. In thls situation,
the counter reset prior to encountering the wedge zero pulse. The
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ATMDC interpreted the readout as the maximum possible wedge position,
and issued saturated wedge rate commands to compensate. (The problem
is discussed at length in Section IX.B.). A procedure of re-zeroing
the wedges prior to ATM operations was initiated to prevent recurrence. ._.
A third pointing transient occurred as the result of erroneous
canister roll position readouts. The roll resolver outputs were
demodulated and converted to digltal readings in the NCIU. If the
actual canister ro11 position was zero, potentlally one in every
100,000 readings would be converted to the binary maximum negative
value. Whenever this event occurred, the erroneous position read-
ins was interpreted by the Fllght Program to be a large error, and
a maxlmumvedge drive command was issued. After approxlmately four
seconds, a correct position reading was received, and a true command
was issued. Subsequent correct readings of the roll position would
return the wedge positions approxlmately to their orlgtnal position.
The anomaly was corrected by establlshlng the constraints
of positioning the canister at the zero roli angle position only
when required by the needs of the mission. The canister would
otherwise be posttloned at abo_It one degree from zero.
5. Conclusions and _econ_nendatlons. The llne-of-slght roll
function performed as designed except for the impact of the FSS
wedge encoder problem and the zero roll reading problem.
E. Fine Sun Sensor Aperture Door Control.
I. Design. The Fine Sun Sensor Assembly was equipped with an
aperture door for protection of the sensor from optical contamination
and from undesirable temperature gradients which could arise from
thermal radiation during orbital night. The aperture door could be
opened or closed by DAS/DCS, C&D Panel switches or through automatic
control by the AT_C. The door required II to 15 seconds to open
or close.
If ATI_C control vas enabled, the FSS door open co_nd
would be issued if the APCS vas in Experiment Pointing mode and the
vehlcle was in the ATNI)C computed day portion of the orbit.
2. Subsystem Verification. The door control functions were
checked during systems level tests and no significant problems ware
found.
3. Niselon Operations. The FSS Aperture Door operation per-
formed as designed, throughout the mission. However, problu with
other related systems did impact usage of the FSS door control.
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i On DAY 21, CbD Panel S_atus Flags indicated that the SO54
experiment door had failed to open. The door was finally opened and
I a procedure adopted to prevent the door from being closed: the EVA
Auto Door Control switch was placed in the inhibit position to prevent
the AT_DC OPEN/CLOSE commands fr_ reaching the FSS and experiment
doors. Although the FSS door could still be con_aanded manually, it
was left open to minimize crew and ground door procedures, and to
preclude the inadvertent activation of the EPC system while the
door was closed. An EVA was Ferformed on DAY 21 and the S054 ex-
periment aperture door was pinned open. Normal ATMDC control of
the FSS door was resumed.
At a later date, it was found that the FSS wedges were being
released by the ATNDC prior to the FSS door being fully open.
(Section VIII.B.). A suggested solution was to lock the FSS door in
the open position. The plan was not accepted, hwaever, because the
protection provided by the door was felt to be more significant than
the wedge count problem.
4. Concludions and Recom_endatlons. The FSS Aperture Door
Control operated as designed. A improvement in FSS door operation
could have been realized if the FSS door logic were completely
isolated from the experiment door logic.
F. EPC Caging Control
I. Design. The E?C Experiment Canister was provided vlth
locking mechanisms to protect the canister and gimbal components
from damage during launch, docking and vehicle maneuvers. _wo
hardware systems were utilized: a launch lock mechanlemvas present
to protect the structure from stress at launch only, and orbltal
locks vere used in orbit to case the spar at any time the experiment
package was not in use. An early concept called for both lock
systems to be engaged at launch, but testing shoved that the orbltal
lock rails would be deformed when thl8 occurred, so the vehicle was
launched vlth the orbital locks uncaged.
The taunch locks were designed to be pyrotechnlcally relused
after orbit yes achieved.
Caging logic for control of the orbital locks was contained
in the EPEA. The ATHDC, in turn, determined when the EPZA was to be
enabled or inhibited, thereby indirectly controlling the CAGE/UNCAGE
operation. When the APCS was in Experiment Pointing ._Je (EIM), the
ATMDCmade the following checks to determine what the EPEA status
should be.
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If the APCS was in EPH, an SI acquisition maneuver was not in
progress, the vehicle was in orbital day phase and the sum of the
squares of the Acquisition Sun Sensor errors was less than or equal
to (1.3 deg) 2, the EPEA would be enabled. If the EPEA was enabled,
the sum of the squares o_ the Acquisition Sun Sensor errors would _"
have to exceed (1.4 deg) , or any of the other conditions change in
order to inhibit the EPEA.
When the EPEA received an enable command, it would energize
the orbital lock motors to uncage the spar. Current would be
supplied to each motor until an uncage verify discrete was received
from the lock motor. The uncage verify discrete activated logic to
remove power from the motor.
Conversely, when the EPEA was inhibited, power would be
applied to the orbital lock motorr :o cage the spar. When locks
achieved the cage position, a cage verify discrete was sent to the :
• EPEA and power was removed from the motors.
Orbital lock motor redundancy status was slaved to the status
of the UP/DN control loop. Failure in the primary orbital lock con-
trol for instance, would require switching to the secondary UP/DN
channel.
The lock system concept remained basically the seme through-
out development. One notable change came when hardware tests
demonstrated that the orbital lock rails would be damaged by launch
and docking stresses. The rails were reinforced, but instead of
launching with the orbital locks engaged, the spar was to remain
uncaged untll after orbit was achieved.
2, Subsystem Verification. The EPC caging control was ?
checked durLng systems level tests and no significant problems were
found.
3. Mission Operations. The EPC Caging Control functioned
nominally until DAY 185 when the UP/DN orbital lock failed to
uncage. The EPEAwas switched to secondary, and the spar successfully
uncaged when tested a few hours later. Using the secondary lock
motors, the CACE/UNCAGE function was tested again on DAY 189 and 190.
I Unrestricted operations resumed on DAY 191. However, on DAY 201,
Che UP/DN lock again failed to release.
Without any contiguration changes, the lock successfully
uncaged when tested about an hour after the second anomaly. This
anoumly gave credence to the theory that intermittent mechanical
binding was occurring possibly due to contamination from virln8 L.
insulation in the vicinity of the locR. The conclusion of invest-
igations of the second anomaly was that there was no need to limit
: or inhibit E_ operation.
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IThe uncage failure was not observed again, and the secondary
orblcal lock motor was used for the remainder of the SkTlab mission.
" 4. Concluslons and Recommendations. The launch lock system
performed as designed. No chanses were recommended. The orbital _.
lock system functioned as designed throughout most of the mission.
The two orblcal lock anomalies caused loss of some experiment operat-
ins time. FurCher design and hardware studies are indicated to
_.esolve the cause of the lock anomalies.
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SECTION IX. EXPERIMENT POINTING CONTROLHARDWARE
A. Fine Sun Sensor (FSS)
1. Description. The Fine Sun Sensor (FSS) provided the highly ""
accurate atCltudc information for the UP/DN and L/R axes of the F_,:,r' •
ment Pointing Control System. The FSS comprised four separate p_c_tgee:
an Optical-._4echantcal Assembly (OH), Preamplifier Electronics A:sembly
(PE), Contr_l Electron_cs Assembly (CE), and the FSS Signal Conditioner
(SC), intfr_onnected ac shown in figure 103. The sensor was redundant
in both axes and all four channels were identical. A functional descrip-
tion of a signal channel follows:
Sunlight passed through an aligraent wedge wnlch provided a spectral
filter and a Beans for the edJusment of a null axis relative to the
external r_ference mirror. The rays then passed through a deviation
wedge which refracted the r, mlight at a fixed angle in a controllable
direction. Sunlight from the deviation wedge was then passed through
the Critical Angle Prime (CAP). When light entered perpendicular to the
base of the CAP, it was partially reflected internaity. Of the reuain-
in8 light, an equal amount passed through each face of the CAP and was
focused on a silicon detector. A chopper, at an 80 Hz rate, caused the
detector to look alternately at the light from each face. If the angle
of light incidence changed, e._., during offset pointing, more light
passed through one face than the other. The output of the detector b@-
came s square wave with a paak-to-puk value proportional to the angular
deviation of the incident light. This signal was amplified, demodulated,
and sent to the ExpBriment Pointing Electronics Assembly (EPEA). A sun
presence signal was also 8ener,ated for display and telemetry. See figures
104 end 105.
Direction control for offset pointln8 originated frog either the
Hanual Pointing Controller 04PC) or the ATMDC_PC Subatlt_te function
which could be activated via DAS/DCS. The command slat, el was amplified
by the EPEA to drive a DC wedge torque notor. A techooeter feedback
loop tee included _or rate control. The deviation wqdse was r_tated
by the motor thrr,,ah 8 gear train, siring an apparent rotation of the
line-of-stsh_ of the sun.
Ginbgl readout of the wndse rotation was accomplished by means
of an optical encoder system, a three channel optical encoder pattern
uas attached to each deviation vedae so that e_ the wedse rotated, the
encoder pattern turned with it. Sunliqht passed throegh the code wheel
and gas detected by three silicon photod/ode detectors whose output _ms
proportional to the amount of light tup_ln 8 on them. The detectors
produced low-level incremental sine-cosine signals which were emplified
and sent to the SC. Total angular motion tins tracked in the SC by
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counting the transitions from light to dark with direction determined
by observing that the channel A signal led channel B, or channel B led
\_ channel A. The encoder output is shown in figure 106. The third (C)
_' channel of the pncoder pattern contained _ single reference mark to in-
dicate the zero wedge position. When the SC detected the zero pulse,
it automatically reset the count to zero. The wedge positions weze
converted to se'_ial-binary words in the SC and were sent to the ATMI,C
for processing and display. Table 49 lists the FSS performance
specifications.
Table 49. FSS Specifications (Excluding the
Signal Conditioner)
I
Sensitivity 172 + 32 millivolts/arc-sec! -! Output Voltage Range _ 12.5 _ 2.5 Vdc
iI Pointing Accuracy 2.25 arc-sec t3 sigma)
Pointing Resolution _ 0.625 arc-sec (nominal)
Pointing Stability, Short Term + 0.1 arc-sec (nominal)i L
Pointing Stability, Long Term _ 0.5 arc-sec (goal)
Temperature Stability _ 0.i arc-sec/deg C (nominal)
Field of View:
: Sensor _ 5.5 _ 0.5 deg
', Sun Presence Signal ± Ii0 arc-min of null
I
j Spectral Response 0.8 microns to 1.0 microns
Frequency Response _ I0 Hz
Offset Pointing Capabillty _ 24.21 arc-mln (each axis)
Offset Polnting Drive Rate: 2 arc-sec/sec (min)i,
! 80 arc-sec/sec (avg)
Weight 21.2 K8
(without Signal' Conditioner)
Power (peak) 20.5 watts
Power (average) 9.0 watts
i
2. Dsstgn.,History. The design concept for the 'Fine Sun Sensor
was derived from the high accuracy Sun Sensor which was being developed
for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory (AOSO) prior to that program
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• being cancelled. With various modifications to the AOSO design, the
- system was selected for use on the ATMmlsslon. The modification in-
cluded such things as the alignment reference, physical confignratlon,
_ wedge encoder patterns, and wedge drive motors. The stepplngmotors
used in the AO50 design were replaced with a 400 Hz drive motor for
the early ArM concept. However, due to what proved to be an undesirable
gear train arrangement, the 400 Hz wedge drive system was replaced with
a DC motor and direct pinion gear wedge drive and associated electronics.
This modification to the design took place in early 1969 and only two
other modifications were made to the system. The alignment wedges were
skewed slightly to avoid internal light reflections that created erroneous
wedge angle information.
Late in the program, a de,alga change was implemented which separated
the primary and seconda_ DC power input leads. Originally, the DC in-
put leads were coannoned or,a latching relay used for redundancy switching.
i Separation eliminated a potential single point failure.
3. Design Verification. EPC subsystem InteEratlon and verifica-
tion in the Hardware Simulation Laboratory included observation of the
functlonal characteristics of the FSS. The interfaces, phaslngs and
gains were found to be correct. Accuracy requirements were not observable
in the HSL due to the system noise problem discussed in the pointing
• control section, VIII.A.
: 4. Hardware Verification. The FSS was initially qualified at
the manufactureris facility, Honeywell Radiation Center (HRC).
: One of the most difficult tasks associatedwith testing and
* qualifying the FSS design was duplicating the solar i_age for intensity,
solar spectrum, collimation, and stability while maintaining a stable
thermal environment.
While testing in the lab, HRC used a small solar simulator of
: about 3Z of one solar constant when determining and performing the system's
aliment. Further testing was performed using the actual sun; however,
due to limited, or poor, "seeing" conditions HRC could do little more
than verify scale factor and functional operation parameters. With HRC*s
support, MSFC carried the Qual-FSS to Sac-Peak at Sun Spot, New Mexico
to perform actual solar tests of the system. Sac-Peak is normally one
of the nation's better locations for good "seeing" conditions. The
results obtained at Sac-Peak compared very favorably with HRCts lab test.
All of the FSS systems built were later tested at MSFC utilizing
the Astrtonics Laboratory precision heliostat located in the Celestial
Facility (BIds. 4467).
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The mechanical concept was proved first by testing a single
channel and wedge drive mechanism and lubrication at variable speeds for
I00 days in a hard vacuum and later the QuaI-FSS was life tested in
hard vacuum for 291 days for approximately 7000 hours.
For the 291 days, the system was tested in a sequence for a number _,
of days operating with the wedges being driven at top speed, followed
by a number of days in a storage mode. This _s repeated several times
at various temperature levels until the system had accumulated 4000 hours
in operation and 3000 hours in storage.
This system also successfully underwent all ATM reliability analysis,
thermal, vibration and outgassing tests necessary to qualify the system
for flight.
5. Mission Operations. Operation of the FSS was first verified
on DAY 15 when Experiment Pointing Mode was entered by ground coumand,
and the ATMDC was used to conlnand FSS wedge positions. The following
day, the crew operated the experiments for the first time. A procedural
problem resulted in selection of the secondary FSS. The primary FSS was
reselected on DAI 22.
The system operated in the primary mode for approximately the
first 4600 hours in orbit. Due to a suspected drift in alignment of
the yaw primary channel, the system was switched to the secondary mode
on DAY 213, where it remained for the last 1600 hours of the mission.
One anomaly occurred in the Electrical Power System which impacted
the FSS. On DAY 177 a short developed on TV Bus 2. This caused a tran-
sient on the APCS power busses which caused the FSS wedge counter to be ," .
zeroed. On DAY 258 the FSS wedges were erroneously zeroed without being _
commanded by either astronaut or ground command. Only a signal or a noise
pulse on the encoder "C" channel leads, connecting FSS to the FSS signal
conditioner could have caused the erroneous zeroing on both pitch and
yaw wedge angle readln_s. Since the wedge angle had not changed, as was
confirmed by various solar experiments, that meant the erroneous zero
information was the result of a noise transient on the encoder "C" track
leads, going to the Fine Sun Sensor Signal Conditioner.
The thermal environment and power source supplying the system were
maintained at an ideal level for the most accurate results; however, due
to noise in the CAP's telemetry channel the error signals could never
be fully appreciated or demonstrated by telemetry. The final analysis •
will depend on the evaluation of the experiment pictures end data.
During the course of the mission, the bla8 between the FSS null
end the S082B Extreme Ultraviolet (XUV) spectrograph was observed to
drift. On DAY 213 a four-limb coalignment was run to attempt to determlne
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if a changing null output could be causing the bias drift. The four-
limb coalignment measures the limits of the east-west and north-south
solar limb using the S082B, S055 (Ultraviolet Scanning Polychromator
Spectroheltometers) and the FSS. The effort demonstrated very close
(_ 2 arc-sec) agreement between the primary and secondary FSS, but did
not isolate the source of the experiment/FSS bias change. A warming _"
trend had been noted in the ATH and thermally induced structural warpage
was identified as another possible cause of the drift.
Under certain conditions, disparities between the actual FSS
wedge position and the wedge position readout were generated. This
occurred when the wedges were released (enabled) before the FSS aperture
door was fully open. Transit of the door shadow terminator across the
face of the FSS was observed at slightly different times by the A and
B channel encoder detectors. The FSS Signal Conditioner interpreted
this condition as rotation of the wedges. Consequently, the encoder
wedge count increased, or decreased, creating an error between the actual
wedge poqltion and the wedge readout.
The flight FSS was operated over 600 hours during testing and
ground checkout and another 6200 hours during the Skylab mission for 2
a total of 6800 hours.
6. Conclusions and Recounnendations. Performance of the Fine
Sun Sensor was excellent. Based on laboratory _nd operational usage
of the FSS, certain modifications can be recom_nended which would improve
the operation and accuracy of the sensors.
The wedge encoder system should be modified to operate with an !
internal light source, as well as with the sun, and to give direct in-
dication of the wedge position.
The Base Reference Mirror should be modified to allow more ease
in initial alignment and the base should be constructed of a more stable
_I material such as Cervlt to provide for greater thermal stability.
iII '
The need for a mechanical chopper might be eliminated by chang-
ing the single photc_detector to a twin photodetector. This would reduce
• the threshol,/ _oise allowing for a more sensJtive and accurate system.
State-of-the-art advances in detector design would allow greatly improved
long-term stabillty and drift characteristics for twin photodetectors
over what was available when the FSS design was finalized.
Add a second wedge to each channel to allow for greater precision
in pointing. The wedges and encoder pattern would be modified to provide
even arc-set increments on the coarse wedge with a greater offset point-
ing capability and the fine wedge and encoder pattern would provide
pointing information in 0.01 arc-sec increments.
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1 B. Rate Gyro Processor (RGP)
Th_ EPC Rate Gyro Processors w_re of the same type as used for
: APCS control. A complete discussion of the RGP hardware and the problems
_ and failures experienced _uring the mission, including the EPC RGP
1 failure, is presented in Section VII, A.
_ Four RGPs were mounted on the ATM experiment package, two per axis.
! The RGPs provided feedback to the EPC control loop for rate damping.
The gains of the control loop were designed for the RGPs to be used only
in the coarse mode. Automatic redundancy management was not provided
for the EPC Rate Gyro Processors, although switching could be accomplished
through both the _ontrol and Display panel s_itches and via switch
selector commands. Since automatic redundancy management was not provided,
the secondary Rate Gyros were normally completely powered down, with
the result that the units could not be used without a warmpup period.
This was demonstrated on DAY ]6 when cold Gyro Processors were selected
for EPC control and the canister went unstable. The backup ACS Rate
Gyros were always powered up with the gyro wheel inhibited, so that
_ operating temperature would always be maintained.
The UP/DN primary gyro processor exhibited overheat conditions
after 82 hours of operation. It later developed rate output oscillations
and, ultimately, failed on DAY 64. The problems and failure were traced i
to faulty mounting of a power switching transistor.
Due _o the early loss of redundancy, the EPC Derived Rate Control
(DRC) Assembly was developed as a backup means for providing rate infor- •
matlon to the control loop. The unit is described in Section IX.E.
C. Experiment Pointing Electronics Assembly (EPEA) •
I. Description. The EPEAwas a multipurpose analog assembly !
_ used for signal processing in the EPC subsystem. The electronics in the i_
; EPEA were divided into 12 channels. The six primary channels according _\
to their functions are (see figure 107): _
_
Canister UP/DN control ;'I_
Canister L/R control
UP/DN Fine Sun Sensor (FSS) wedge or Star
Tracker (ST) outer glmbal positioning J
L/R FSS wedge or ST inner glmbal positioning i
Canister Roll Drive {
Orbital Locke operation, l
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All six channels could be switched to six identical secondary channels
and returned to primary channels by Switch Selector conmands or by
actuating a Control and Display (C&D) Console switch. All of the
channels could also be Indlvldually commanded back to prlmaryvlth the
exception of the Orbital Locks operation which was slaved to the canis-
ter UP/DN control channel mode.
The UP/DN and L/R control channels accepted position error
: signals from the FSS and accepte_ rate slgnals from the EPC Rate Gyros.
These signals were amplified and shaped to supply output currents to
drive two actuators in each of the UP/DN or L/R axes. Inputs from the
sensors were switched internally as the primary or secondary sensors were
: selected.
Canister offset pointing, while in the experiment pointing mode,
_ was accomplished by 3ettlng the positions of the FSS wedges. The UP/DN
and L/R angles of the canister depended on the positions of the respec-
tive UP/DN and L/R FSS wedges. The EPEA accepted signals from tk,e
: Manual Pointing Control (MPC) Panel on the Control and Display (C&D)
Console or from the ATMDigital Computer (ATMDC)to drive the FSS wedges.
By selection on the C&DConsole, the MPC derived outputs could be switched
to position the ST by driving its outer and inner gimbals.
The Canister Roll channel of the EPEA accepted any one of four
fixed rate commands from either the NPC panel or the external EVARota-
tion Control Panel to drive the Roll Position Mechanism (RIM).
: The UP/DN and L/R Case/Uncage channels wer_ provided for lock-
ins or unlocking of the canister. Locking signals were provided to cage
the canister approximately in the zero positions in both axes during all
APCS modes except the Experiment Pointing Mode-Day (EPM-Day). In EIM-Day,
the canister was unlocked during the day portions of the orbits to allow
solar experiments to be performed. The A_IX3 determined these exp.e_tnent
periods and provided signals to the EPFA. Cage/Uncage verify signals,
fed back to the EPEA from orbital locks, provided positive indication
of the caging state and were incorporated Into the caging loop lo81c.
2. Design Rlstory. During development of the '_et" Workshop
concept, control of the Experiment Pointing System was maintained by the
ATN Control Computer (ATNCC). The ATNCCincorporated other functions
such as (i) CHGcontrol for vehicle 8ttltu_e control, and (2) control
logic to accept, decipher and implement s ten-blt dlsit81 word. The
digital words vere to implement the ATHCC operating modes, command
; control loop relay svitchin8, and to communicate wlth other parts of
the system, including the A_Digltal Computer.
Nhen the "Net" Workshop concept changed to the '_)ry" Workshop,
the ATH control system requirements 818o changed. The A_HCC function
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was reduced to control the Experiment Pointing System only, and the
name was changed to Exverlment Pointing Electronics Assembly. Except
for a few component changes, the basic design concept of the EPEAwas
not changed again.
3. Design Verification. As the central point of the EPC system,
the EPEA was studied to assure that it could provide the desired control
of the experiment canister. Analysis of spar bending modes and tlmeEPEA
Bending Mode Filters (KHF) was an ongoing project to insure that the
flight EPEA would have optimum control capabillty.
Integration of the EPEA into the EPC system was done in the Hard-
ware Slmulatlon Laboratory (HSL). The HSL was also used for verification
: and checkout of the fllght, fllght-spare and prototype EPFAs.
During the HSL testing, it was found that sufficient ba=k emf
could be generated by the spar roll drive motor at the 7 degrees per
second rate to damage the EPEA roll motor current ampliflers. The ampll-
fler circuitry was modified wlth zener diodes to provide protection
from the back emf.
4. Hardware Verification. The EPEA performed satisfactorily
during systems level testing and no significant problems were found.
5. Mission Operations. The EPEAwas first powered up five hours
after launch to activate the spar caging loglc. The EPEA was kept
powered down to conserve power, except for brief periods on DAY 13 and
DAY 14, untll DAY 16, when the first manned ATM operations took place.
Power remained on for the duration of the mission.
.At the time of the SL-I launch, the EPEA had 1,893 hours of opera=
tlon dlvldedbetween the primary and secondary electronlcs. During the
Skylab mission, an addltional 4,388 hours of operation were added to
the primary EPEA and 2,086 hours to the secondary EPEA electronics for
a total of 6,474 hours. The total llfetlme operation of S/N 004 EPEA
was 8,367.
No problems were encountered with the EPEA. Some EPEA redundancy
switching was required to accommodate interfacing hardware problau.
Secondary inputs were selected for the UP/DN Rate Gyro on DAY 64 and
for the FSS on DAY 213. The secondary EPEAwas selected on DAY 185
following the orbital lock problem. On DAY 254, the primary t/PC loop
was rmselected.
During the ten-_ay period while the vehlcle was in thermal attitude,
the EPFA dropped to -32"C, _11 above the minimum storage temperature
of -55"C. The maximum temperature recorded was +17"C during a period
of continuous daylight over a number of orbits. The operational range
was -40 to +74"C.
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5. Conclusions and Recon,nendatlons. The Experiment Pointing
_ Electronics Assembly (EPEA) operated as designed throughout the Skylab
} 'mission. In view of the performance of the EPF_ during the mission,
: _ no changes were recommended.
i "D. Experiment Pointing Control and Roll
i ! Position Nechanls_ (EPC/RIM)
1. Des,cription. The solar experiment canister was mounted tothe ATNRack through a three-degree-of-freedom glmbal mechanism -- actuator
assembly. The electromechanlcal system was composed of several integrally
i assembled components which performed a nuaber of functions within the
, EPC system.
_ The supporting structure for the EPC/RFN system consisted of two
i large concentric rings. The outer, or Roll Ring, was attached to the
AIM Rack by four symetrlcally placed roller bearings. The Roll Position
Nechanlsm consisted princlpally of a drive and brake assembly, a Roll
i Position Indicator Assembly, the Roll Ring/Gear Assembly roll bearings
and a roll stop. The inner, or UP/DN-L/R glmbal ring contained four
I actuator assembly packages, UP/DN and L/R Orbital Locks and mechanical
! stops. In addition, Launch Locks were provided to constrain both rings
! under launch conditions.
! Figure 7 shows the arrangement of the various components of theL
EPC/RPN system _nd Table $0 lists performance specifications for the
components. The components are discussed below.
a. Actuators. Each of the four actuator assemblies comprised
a brushless DC torque motor, a multispeed resolver, and a mechanical
flexure bearing assembly. The packages provided a frictionless bearing
i along the UP/DN or L/R axis and also provide0 accurate concentric mount-
inss for the torque motors and resolvers. A self-aligning feature pre-
cluded straining the glnbal ring alisrment when rotating the gtnbal
system in UP/DN and/or L/l. A self-alignlng device was incorporated
into the actuator package so that the required torque specificaticn8
could be met.
The drive source for the IX: torque motors yam from the
EPEA (see Section IX.C). The nultispeed (16:1) resolver8 provided the
UP/DN and L/R positions of the canister relative to the ATHRack. Because
oE the 1Is/ted motion involved (+_2 degrees), only the fine wlnd/J_ (16-
speed) output of the appropriate resolver was utlltzed in the AI]_C.
• Only one UP/DIg resolver output and one L/R resolver output were routed
to the ATI_)C. Each fine winding was rotor excited with 10 V104S, 800 Hs
and had an allowable error of one arc-uLnute (smximm).
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: Table 50. EPC/RPH Performance Characteristics
EPC Actuator
Mechanical
Angular rotation: 0° to 2° +5X (either direction)
Torsional spring rate: 6.01 N.m/rad
Breakaway torque: 0.136 N.m
Electrical
Moto__._r
NaxOs.am torque output: 9.5  IOZN.m (at 3.75 amp)
Nomlnal input voltage: 36.7-Vdc
Current: 3.75 amp
Breakavay torque: 0.1 n-m (maximum)
|
Resolver:
Nominal _nput voltage: I0 Vac
Nominal frequency: 800 Hz
Output: sin@, cos@ (not used) _
t sin 164}, cos 16@
Error: 1-Speed: 30.0 arc-mln
16-Speed: I.O arc-uln
Orbital Lock
• Mechanical
Range: Functional at any point from 0 to
_'1 +2 degree gtmbal deflection
Power: Required only during locking and
unlocking. Operating time is 5 _
seconds (maximum). _
Capacity: Capable of operating vlthmsxlnnm
- torque output from one pitch or yaw
actuator with a reserve factor of
two.
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Table 50. (continued)
i
F.lect rice1
Haximum torque output (per 1.5 + IOZ N.m (at 4.6_ amp)
motor) :
Nominal input voltage: 24.2 Vdc
Current 4. _4 amp
P,oll Brake and Drive Assembly
Mechanical
Maximum torque at output 8.4 + 10Z N.m
shaft:
Maximum shaft speed: 65 + IOZ RIM (either direction)
P.atlns: Contlnuou8 operation (either
direction:
Brake Capacity: De-enersized torque: 20.4 N.m
10.9 N.m
Electrical
Hotor nomtrml input voltase:36.7 Vdc
Hotor current: 3.75 map
Tachometer sensitivity: 2.7 volts/red/sac
Brake solenoid nominal
input voltase: 28 Vdc
Brake solenoid input
current: 1.50 map
Roll Position Indicator Assembly
*cc.racy
FiN resolution: + 8rc-m/n
Coarse resolutions _ 30 arc-m/nm
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Table 50. (continued)
Nechmlcal
Input shaft speed: 56RIM (maximum)
Limit of rotation: + 5.6 revolutions
Elec_rlcal
Rssolvezs: Coarse Fin...__e
Nomlnal escltatlon frequency
frequency: 800 Hz 800 Hz
Nominal excitation
voltase: 10 Vac 10 Vat
Maximum input current: 0.03 amp 0.06amp
Output impedance: 75 ohm 75 ohm
Transformation ratio: 1.0 +3Z 1.0 +3Z
Nominal ou=put voltage: 10-Vat 10 "Vac
Output phase angle: 5 des. (max) $ deg. (max)
Accuracy: + 6 src-min + 6 arc-min
Harmonic dlstortlon 0.2_ 0.2Z
6O5
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, Mechanical limits of the flexure bearing constrained gimbal
ring motion to _ 2 degrees in UP/DN and L/R. The UP/DN actuator packages
were located between the roll rir.gaad the UP/DN-L/R gimbal ring; and
L/R actuator packages were located between the latter ring and the can- ._
ister girth ring.
Thermally, the actuator motors could withstand temperatures
u_ to 125°C without damage. Temperatures above 168°C would result in
permanent damage to the motor from fouling due to outgasslng the epoxy
encapsulant material. Motor seizure would occur at about 570C. These
temperature_ apply to the actuator rotor. The temperature transducer,
_ located on the motor housing, would reflect lower temperatures. EPC
system constraints were developed to minimize the possibility of actuator
overheating due to excessive currents. (See Pointing Control Subsystem,
Section VIII.A. ) "_
b. Orbltal Locks. The purpose of the two Orbital Locks (see
: figure 108) was to cage the experiment package girth (spar) ring with
i respect to the UP/DN-L/R glmbal ring and cage the latter gimbal with
i respect to the roll ring. Each Orbital Lock consisted basically of a
roller mechanism and fou_ llmlt switches which were driven by one of
i, two redundant brush-type DC torque motors. Two sets of rollers, one
i for each axis, were mounted on the UP/DN-L/R glmbal. These rollers en-
gaged a set of rails that were located radlally opposite the Orbital
i Lock motors. The rails for the UF/DN Orbital Lock were fixed to the
! roll ring and were located 20 degrees from the UP/DN axis. The rails :
i for the yaw Orbital Lock were fixed to the girth ring and were located
23 degrees from the L/R axis. These locatlons resulted in an equal
moment arm between each Orbital Lock and its corresponding axis of ro-
tation. See figure 109.
In a caging cycle, the rails were contacted by the rollers
and the Orbital Lock motors generated sufficient torques to cage the
UP/DN-L/R glmbal to zero degrees from up to _2 degrees. In the caged
position, the rollers were slightly over "top dead center" with respect
to the rails and w_re firmly compressed (preloaded) between the two i
rails. The preload in the rails not only assisted in containing the
rollers but it also eliminated backlash between the ATH canister and
gimbal, or the gimbsl and roll ring.
In the two end positions, Caged or Uncaged, two limit switches
were activated. In the Caged position, the rollers were clamped between
rails and accurately positioned by rat1 stops. In the Uncaged position_
a pin which was attached to the motor rotor hub impacted another pin
attached to the stationary hub to act as a stop and position the rollers, i
A spring also snapped against che=otor rotor pins and held the Orbital _,
' Lock ia the Uncaged position.
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: Each DC torque motor was capable of generating a peak torque
of 1.5 + IOZ N.m at 4,64 amperes. The torque capability of the motor
and its corresponding moment al_1developed sufficient torque (± I0 N.m)
to allow the Orbital Lock to override the EPC actuators and cage the
experiment package in tileevent of a malfunction.
c. RoLl Positioning Hechanlsm (RFM), The RPH roll drive
and brake assembly consisted of two brush-type DC torque motors and two
DC tachometers mounted on a common shaft which was geared to the roll
ring, and a maguetlcally actuated disc t)pe brake assembly. One motor
and one tachometer were redundant; the brake coil had dual windings.
The drive pinion and both tachometers were driven by either torque motor,
allowing rotation of the roll ring gear. The tachometer rate output
information was used in the roll control loop. With thq_ brake coils
deenergized, the armature was positioned up against the brake shoes,
effectively locking the shaft and braking the roll ring.
The RPM was capable of rotating the canister with rates of
7, _ 3.5, _ 0.7, and _ 0.35 degrees per second depending on the commnded
rates from the astronaut via the ATM C&D console.
The roll position indicator assembly consisted of a shaft that
was driven at 16 times roll ring gear speed and another shaft that was
driven at ring gear speed; four single-speed resolvers; end an amsociated
precision gear train, bearings, :tnd housing. The four identical receiver,
provided a fine and _ coarse resolution _ndication of the roll axis angle.
The two fine resolution resolvers were driven at 16 times roll axis speed
while the two coarse resolution resolvers were driven at roll axis speed.
Two of the resolvers (coarse and fine) were redundant. The coarse and
fine resolvers outputs were combined with additional data in the A_{DC/
NCIU to obtain the roll reference angle and the roll angle of the canieter
with respect to the ATM Rack.
d. Launch Lock Assembly. The Launch Lock Assembly consisted
of four lateral lock systems and one torsional lock system, g,ch lateral
lock system consisted of t_._ spring-loaded struts which were pyre-technically
released once orbit was achieved. These struts were pivoted at the canister
girth ring and symmetrically connected to the ATH Rack in four place,.
The struts restrained the canister assembly with respect to the l_ck,
and resisted the lateral and radial forces generated during the launch
phe,e. The torsional Launch Lock consisted of a single spring-loaded
strut which was sis, pyrotechnically released once orbit was achieved.
This strut was attached to the Rack and the roll gimbal, re,tralnlng
the gimbal and canister with respect to the Rack and resioting torsional
forces generated during launch.
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2. Design Hist, ry. During design, development and construc-
tion of the EPC/RPM system, some fifty Engineering Change Proposals and
Contract Modifications were processed. The more significant are listed
below.
a. Redesign of the RPM. This change was introduced to enable
both drive motors to be used together to overcome the operating friction i
of the brake assembly In the event of a brake failure in the "on" position
and the resultant loss of canister roll capability.
b. Dry-Workshop Launch Configuration. When the Skylab concept
changed from a Wet to Dry Workshop, the ATH launch vehicle was changed
from a Saturn IV B to a Saturn V and inverted the ATN launch vector from
that for which it was originally designed. The major impact of thls
change was to the Launch Lock System which had been designed to react
to major launch loads In tension. In the new configuration the launch
lock structure was required to withstand compressive loads and components
were therefore required to be redesigned and manufactured.
c. Motor Retrofit. Due to cracking of the motor encapsulent
and dcbonding of brush pads, a new procurement of brush and brushless
type DC torque motors was implemented. These new motors were manufactured
with improved potting compounds, to prevent cracking, and a modified
brush bonding technique. All ATN assemblies containing the old motors
were retrofitted with new units.
d. Orbital Lock Redesign. This change was required to improve
the performance, reliability and service llfe of the assembly as a result
of information obtained during development testing of the prototype unit.
The modification consisted of minor changes to a number of detail parts
within the assembly.
e. Deletlou of the EVA Lock. The requirement for an EVA
Lock, to prevent inadvertent roll, UP/DN or L/R motion of the Ro_. and
Olmbal rings during astronaut EVA, was included in the orlglnal AIN
specification. This was subsequently deleted and all EVA Lock assembly
related hardware removed from the ATH.
f. Modification to Roll Axis Bearing Assemblies. A 0.2g
docking shock load case was introduced to the structural design specl-
flcatlon after Roll Bearing hardware had been fabrlcatad. Stress analy-
sis indicated that an overload condition could occur with possible demmge
to the Rot1 Axis Bearing assemblies. These units were modified to
account for the revised loading condition.
g. Introduction of Improved Sensor Switches. Status Sensor
Switches with an improved hermetic glass header seal and installation
procedures were introduced on al] ATH assemblies to prevent a possible
failure and subsequent erroneous equipment function signal.
410
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h. Modification to Launch Lock Pin-Pullers. Cracks occurred
in the mounting flanges of Hi-Shear Pyrotechnique Pin-Pullers subjected
to qualification test. Results indicated an overload condition. The
redesign included strenghtening the mounting flanges and an improved
heat treatment procedure for aluminum alloy components. ,-d
; i. Reinforced Orbital Lock Rails. Tests showed that the
orbital lock rails would deform under launch and docking stresses. The _
flight ATM was retrofitted with reinforced rails which were capable of
withstanding the docking transients. The original system concept called
for the Orbital Locks to be engaged at lift-off, in addition to the launch
locks. Due to the stress problem, this was changed to launch with the
orbital locks disengaged. Caging was to be commanded after orbit was
achieved.
3. Design Verification. The EPC gimbal and roll position mechanisms
were tested in the Hardware Simulation Laboratory using the mercury
bearing (zero-g) test fixture to simulate experiment canister inertias.
Roll movement of the test fixture was limited to + 22.5 degrees, and i
non-flight cable stresses _ere present. However, the gimbal, roll and
caging mechanisms were found to perform as designed.
4. Hardware Verification. During ATM prototype PMC testing at
the Quality and Reliability Assurance Laboratory, MSFC, L/R actuators
would not drive the canister which was supported by the zero-g test
fixtures. Investigation indicated that the actuators were binding
against the ring. Modifications were accomplished on the flight unit
to eliminate this binding by making some cuts on the ring and by chang-
ing the procedure for installing the actuators to insure they are not
preloaded.
t
5. Mission Operations. After SL-I achieved orbit, the launch
locks released as planned. During the launch phase, the orbital locks
were in the Uncaged configuration. Five hours after launch the EPEA
was powered up to activate the spar caging logic, ano engage the locks.
On DAY 64, the primary UP/DN Rate Gyro failed, followed by UP/DN L
actuator motor seizure. The Cyro became noisy, then failed to zero out-
put while the vehicle was outside of station coverage. At the next
station, the problem was not isolated prior to orbital sunset. The
vehicle was again outside of station coverage at the time of the next
orbital sunrise DAY 64 02:04. When the vehicle telemetry was acquired
at 02z50, the actuator housing temperature had risen from 5.6"C to 44.1"C,
and the FSS error signal was oscillating at 0.5 Hz. The FSS wedges were
commanded at 02:53. No spar response was seen on the FSS error signal.
At orbital sunset, 03:01, the EPEA was automatically inhibited, and
Solar Inertial Mode was selected at 03:20.
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In the absence of Rate Cyro information for rate damping, the
pointing control loops were unstable, causing large spar oscillations
and high actuator currents. This was verified by analysis and by test-
ing in the Hardware Simulation Laboratory. Based on analysls of the ,_
houcing temperature, the actuator motor was estimated to have been
heated to the seizure temperature (57°C) at about 02:25. At that time,
a rapid transfer of heat to the actuator housing would occur. Maximum
rotor temperature was established to have been 83-113°C, well below
the upper limit uf 168°C. The oscillations observed at 02:50 can be
attributed to structural ringtu 8 of the spar following the motor seizure.
Similar spar behavior had been obse.'ved in the HSL after eusagtng the
orbital locks.
At 17:20, on Day 67, Experiment Pointing mode was selected again
to test the EPC system using the secondary UI'/DN Cyro. No problems
• were experienced with the actuators.
As a consequence of the actuator seizure, a mission rule was in-
stituted to exit Experiment Pointing Mode if continuous, unattended EPC
operation would exceed fifty minutes without station coverage. Also,
the mission rules were changed to require switching to Solar Inertial
when the current levels exceeded + 1.0 amp, except during transients.
Original criteria for management _f EPC actuator currents required that
Solar Inertial mode be selected if the currents exceeded +0.5 amp.
However, operating levels of _ 0.7 amps were observed. _e changing
bias levels were a consequence of cable torques developed between the
ATM Rack and Experiment Canister during roll and offset pointing opera-
tions. It was felt that the continuous current levels could not be
reduced without restricting operations and that the operating levels
were not having a detrimental effect on the actuators. Furthermore,
studies showed that as long as the effective (l_qS) current did not ex-
ceed 1 amp for the period of ot,e orbit, the actuators would not be
damaged.
On Day 185, during the unmanned phase between SL-3 and SL-4,
the UP/DN Orbital Lock failed to uncage at orbital sunrise. Sunrise
occurred outside of tracking station coverage and next station acquisi-
tion was six minutes later. At that ti_, the UP/DN actuators were
observed to be drawing maximum current (-3.75 amp, the torquer amplifier
limit). Solar Inertial mode was selected two minutes later, caging
the spar. The gimbal actuators and Orbital Lock motors drew full cur-
rent for eight minutes. Temperatures of the actuator housing, and the
lock housing both increased by 3.7°C. About three hours latltr, secon-
dary EPEAwas selected and Experiment Pointing mode was co_nded. The
orbital locks functioned normally.
Analyses and tests of possible failure modes were conducted.
Analysis of flight data indicated that a failure of the primat_ orbital _|
lock motor, or _lectrical relay failures had not occurred. _hts was 1
based on study o_ the transfer bus currents.
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Tests run on a motor in thermal vacutun at stall ctrrrent pro-
duced a temperature rise similar to that seen during the anomaly. The
motor was subjected to stall currents for three hours in one test and
two hours in another. In both cases, after the current was removed
and the motor allowed to cool down, its performance was normal.
it was concluded that a mechaulcal problem, such as binding,
had occurred but was relieved by returning to SI. It was suggested
that the primary Orbital Lock be tested again to verify that the prob-
lem was no longer present. However, this was never done. With the EPEA
in secondary, the Orbltal Locks were tested once on Daly 185, twice per
day on Day 189 and 190 (SL-A crew docked on Day 187). Unrestricted op-
eratlons restmled on Day 191. However, ten days later, the UP/DN lock
sgaln failed to disengage.
Without any configuration changes, the lock successfully un,,
caged when tested about an hour after the second anomaly. This anomaly
gave credance to the theory that intermittent mechanical binding was
occurring possibly due to contamination from wiring insulation in the
vicinity of the lock. The conclusion of investigations of the second
anomaly was that there was no need to limit or inhibit EPC operation.
The uncage failure wa.,: not observed again, and the secondary
Orbital Lock motor was used for the remainder of the Skylab mission.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations. The Experiment Package
Caging and Gimbal Assembly operated without failure or problem, except
for the two orbital lock anomalies. Further design studies might reveal
the actual cause of the anomalies and indicate corrective chat_es which
could be made to the EPC/RPM hardware. Otherwise, no design changes
were recommended.
E. Manual Pointing Controller (MPC)
1. Design. The Manual Pointing Controller (MPC_ allowed the
astronaut to inject command signals in pure pitch (UP/DN), or pure yaw
(LEFT/RIC_T), or combinations thereof, Into the EPC$ or the ST. Tha
MPC was used to either offset point the ATM Solar Instrument Package
or to manually search for a desired star. In either case, the HPC si s -
hal outputs were conditioned in the Experiment Pointing Electronics
Assembly (EPF_) and then routed to the Control Electronics Assembly (CE)
of the Fine Sun Sensor (FSS) or to the Star Tracker Electronics Assembly
(STE) depending ou the operational mode. The CE provided the drive
circuitry to posltlou optical wedges _SS Optlcal-Mechanleal Assembly)
for offset polntlnS operations. The MPC UP/DOWN output was routed to
the inner gimbal circuitry of the Star Tracker, and the _ LEFT/RIOIIT
output was routed to the outer $imbal circuitry whenaver the Star Tracker
was in the Manual mode.
The MPC (see figure II0) had an upright control handle Ihtch
: could be tilted from a canter null position to a LEFT/RIGHT position
413
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Yfor yaw, to an UP/DOWN position for pitch, or a combination of both
positions. These positions were with respect to the NPC mounting con-
figuration on the ATN Control and Display Console. The NPC consisted
of a spring loaded twe-axis gibbs1 control handle and mechanism, two
linear transducers, and a houain8 with connectors for the I_PUT/OUTMFf
wiring. The pitch and yaw output signals were proportional to the handle
deflection. Performance specifications for the HPC are listed in Table
51.
2. Design Verification. Checkout and integration of the NPC
into the EPC system was performed in the HSL. The Unit was found to
operate as designed.
Table 51. Hanual Pointing Controller Performance Characteristics
I ii i ,_
ELECTRICAL INPUT
Excitation: 28.0 + 1.4 VRHS
800 _ 8 Hz slnusoldal
Impedance: > 750 ohms
80 _ l0 degrees impedance ankle
ELECTRICAL OUTPUT
Amplitude: 4.2 to 5.5 VBNS at handle
cardinal positions (limits)
Phase Shift: _ 7 degrees from full output, nominal
Ltnearlty: + 5 percent
Null: < 5 100 millivolts
Output Impedance: 16.7 K ohms, resistive
I i m ! |l
,m LZ
Tilt: _ 30 degrees at cardinal position
Force: _ 3.25 lbs, cardinal positions
Breakout Force| 0.40 lb., minimum either axle
m
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3. Hardware Verification. The MPC performed eatlsfectorily
during all systen level testing.
4. Mission Operations. The ;{PC was first utilized during the
initialmanned ATMoperations on DAY 16. No problems were eneoundered I_
with the MPCat any time during manned operation. Occasional pro-
cedural problems arose when the crew would leave the MPCEnable Switch
i activated, thereby preventing ground operation of the wedges.
5. Conclusions and Recomendations. The Manual Pointing Controller
I ()/PC) functioned flawlessly Skylab manned Nothroughout operations.
! changes to the desiKn of the unit is recommended, although the crews,
during debriefing, expressed interest in system capability to drive the
wedges at very low rates (threshold rate coumand yes 16 are-eat per sac).
F. Derived Rate Conditioner Assembly (DRC)
1. Design. Follovln$ the loss of the EPC Primary UP/DN Rate
Gyro on DAY 64, and in view of the overall problems experienced vlth
the Skylab Rate Gyro Processors, it was felt that there was a sisnifi-
cant possibility that the secondary UP/DN Cyro would fail. The EPC was
equipped with two Cyros per axis, so a second UP/DN Gyro failure would
have terminated use of the EPC. Replacelent or supplementtn 8 of the
EPC Gyro System, such as had been done in the CMG/TACSsystem, was not
considered feasible. Subsequently, a device, the EFC Derived Rate
Conditioner Assembly, was de,isned to be inserted in series with the 7SS
output for the purpose of producing a pseudo rate signal to stabili=a the
EPC system in lleu of Spar Rate Gyros.
The EPC Derived Rate Conditioner Assembly contained a de-de con-
verter, two linear signal conditioners, and two nonlinear siseal conditioners
in a single package. The system was to be installed by Tethering to the
ATM, near the EPEA, and connecting the cable harness. An interconnect-
in8 dissrau is sheen in flgure III. UP/DN (and L/R) conditioner slgnals
fron the FSS were received by the EPC Derived Rate Conditioner electronics
end conditioned by linear and nonlinear signal conditioners connected in
parallel. The Linear Signal Condltiener produced a signal for stabilisa-
tion when the Gyro signal was not available. The nonlinear SiKnal
Conditioner produced an output to limit the error siKnal. These outputs
were sumed to produce the desired output. A block diagrem of the EPC
DEC system is shown in figure 112.
The system nominally required less than 1.8 watts (60 Ma B 28
Vde). The 2S-volt input was converted to 15 Vdc by the dc-dc converter.
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The input signal ranged between -12.8 Co +12.8 Vdc with the
angular offset to the EPC Canister (see figure 113).
The output of the Linear Signal CondlCloner was proporcloual
: to position plus rate over a band of frequencies from 0. I to 25 _g. .d
The output of the nonlinear Signal Conditioner Is shown in figure 114.
The saturated level output was set to limit the drive rate so that the
system would not overshoot the Linear range about null. The output of
the EPC DRC system is the sum of the llnear and nonlinear 818mtl Con-
ditioners.
2. Design Vertlficstion. Inlti81 testing of the prototype DE
in the Hardware Simulatlon Laboratory revealed ground loop problems
between the DRC and FSS. Both the FSS and DRC were connon ground
: devices. Within SheATH networks there yes a reversal of the FS8 UP/IM
lines, so that direct connection of th • DRC shorted the L/R YeS output
to ground. The problem was resolved by rewiring the cable harness to
• reverse the polarity of the L/It FSS 81gnal going into the DRC mud again
before it was sent to the EPEA (see figure 115).
After this correction, the prototype and flight units yore tested
and found to function as designed, but vltn degradati¢_ to the EPC con-
tool loop bandwi4th and pointing stability. Accurate determination of
the pointing stability In fllght could not be made in the IISL.
3. Hardware Verification. The DRCwas subjected to verifica-
tion testing under ambient 8r_I thermat-vucutun conditions as Astrionlcs
Laboratory, t4SFC, and to Wl_ Program integration tests at Quality and
Rellabilicy Assurance Laboretyr, MSFC, prior to shipment to Y_C. Crew
procedures for Installation dur;ng EVAwere verified in the aarduare
Simulation Laboratory and the Neutral Ruoyancy Simulator.
i 4. Nit,ion Opetatlons. One DRC unit with associated cablleqj
ms carried into orbit on _L-3. Additiorml cabllng which would allow
the unit to be used on either the. UP/D_ or L/R axis was carried to orbit
_n SL-4. The device was never Installed, however, because no further
EPC Rate Gyro failure occurred.
5. Conclusions and Reconmndations. The EPC Derived Ra_e Con-
dttloner Assembly was not requires for use during Skylab. The unit pro-
vidsd asnrence that ATMexperiment o._erations could be continued in the
ewmt of the loss of the Secondary UpDI_Rate Gyro.
The fact that it was necessary for theDRC to be daetgmd, built
mud flown as an emergency system to provide EI'C rate information in the
meat of complete loss of gPC Gyro Imrdtmre, indicates 8 need to locate
mission critical hardtmre COUlmmnts, such as the Rate Gyro Processors,
In areas where replacement and/or maintenance would be possible.
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